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1 Purpose and scope  
 1.1 This dissertation is centred on presenting an annotated English 
translation of chapter five of the seventh century A.D. Buddhist philo-
sopher Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavtti (hence PSV V). In this 
important chapter Dignāga expounds his philosophy of language 
known as the apoha theory or thesis of anyāpoha “exclusion of other 
referents,”1 which affected post-Dignāga philosophical debate in India 
for centuries. The original Sanskrit version of Pramāṇasamuccayavtti 
(hence PSV) is no longer extant. Except for a few Sanskrit fragments 
traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature, the only comprehen-
sive sources available for the study of Dignāga’s apoha doctrine are 
two mediocre Tibetan translations of PSV included in the Tibetan 
bsTan ’gyur and a small number of Sanskrit fragments traced to post-
Dignāga philosophical literature. Thus, the English translation of PSV 
V is based upon its two Tibetan versions and Sanskrit fragments pub-
lished in Hattori 1982, including Sanskrit fragments I have traced to 
other sources. The translation is accompanied and supported by a 
critical edition2 of the bulk of the corresponding fifth chapter of the 
single Sanskrit manuscript of Viśālāmalavatī ṭīkā (hence PSṬ V). This 
unique tīkā attributed to Jinendrabuddhi, a central eighth century A.D. 
Indian grammarian and philosopher, is the only extant commentary on 
PSV and thus an important source of information on the philosophical 
context in which Dignāga propagated his work, and the Sanskrit text 
of PSV as known to Jinendrabuddhi. 
 
                                                 
1 Essential means for studying Dignāga’s apoha theory were published in 1976 by 
Muni Jambuvijayaji in the second volume of his monumental edition of Siṃhasūri’s 
commentary on Mallavādi’s Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram. This volume includes San-
skrit restorations of crucial passages of PSV V based upon the evidence presented in 
Siṃhasūri’s work and the Tibetan translations of PSV V, as well as the Tibetan 
translation of Jinendrabuddhi’s PSṬ V included in the bStan gyur. These brilliant 
reconstructions have served many scholars as the only trustworthy introduction to 
essential aspects of the apoha theory as presented in PSV V. An annotated English 
translation of selected passages of the fifth chapter based upon its Tibetan trans-
lations and Sanskrit fragments is published in Hayes 1988. 
2 The critical edition leaves out a few insignificant passages and Jinendrabuddhi’s 
erudite comment on upacāra; independent paragraphs are edited separately; see 4. 
below. 
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1.2 The purpose of the translation is to present a faithful English 
version of the Tibetan and Sanskrit sources. All crucial paragraphs of 
PSṬ V and other chapters of Jinendrabuddhi’s ṭīkā are translated in the 
annotations, as well as citations of Sanskrit or Tibetan sources if they 
are important for understanding Dignāga’s apoha doctrine. Sanskrit or 
Tibetan quotations are rendered into English with the background of 
current knowledge of the vocabulary and technical terms of classical 
Indian grammatical and philosophical literature.3 Sanskrit terms in-
serted in round brackets reflect the vocabulary of the Sanskrit sources. 
Those marked with an asterisk are hypothetical restorations suggested 
by the Tibetan translations and the context as presented in the Sanskrit 
vocabulary reflected in PSṬ. In order to avoid ambiguity a limited 
number of exegetical additions are added in square brackets if sug-
gested by the context and Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis. The annotations 
are intended to explain in exacting detail the philological evidence 
contained in Hattori 1982, PSṬ V, and other relevant Sanskrit or 
Tibetan sources. 
 
1.3 The difficulties of construing the Tibetan translations of PSV 
are well known and in some cases almost insuperable. I have therefore 
taken advantage of the Sanskrit evidence embodied in PSṬ V and 
restored into Sanskrit many paragraphs of the presumably original 
version of PSV V if the Sanskrit evidence of PSṬ V is matched by the 
Tibetan translations of PSV V. Crucial passages from other chapters 
of PSV are also restored if they shed light on the philosophical issues 
addressed in PSV V. The restorations are primarily established on the 
basis of pratīkas quoted in PSṬ and Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrases of 
Dignāga’s presentation of his philosophy in PSV. Independent San-
skrit sources that corroborate the restorations are quoted too. The 
method applied to restore the Sanskrit text of PSV V and other 
relevant sections of PSV is outlined below (see 5.1-9). The Sanskrit 
restorations are presented in separate annotations that lay out their 
sources in a straightforward and comprehensive way. 
 
1.4 Dignāga’s “apoha theory” is an essential complement to his 
theory of knowledge and logic. Since it generated an incessant debate 
among contemporary and subsequent generations of Buddhist and 
non-Buddhist Indian philosophers, and continues to elicit questions 
among Dignāga’s modern Western interpreters about the meaning and 
                                                 
3 Cf. Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastic in Indien, Band I-III, 
Wien 1991-2008; Abhyankar, Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar. 1961. Renou, 
Terminologie. 1957. 
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purpose of anyāpoha, this work includes a fresh study of its basic 
presuppositions as presented in PSV V.4 The objective is to clarify 
fundamental theoretical issues in the light of the Sanskrit evidence of 
Jinendrabuddhi’s PSṬ V, as it is no longer necessary to address the 
inherent ambiguities of the opaque Tibetan sources.5  
                                                 
4 The apoha theory was interpreted by Th. Stcherbatsky as presupposing “The Law 
of Double Negation,” which has left its indelible mark on Western interpretations of 
the apoha thesis, cf. Buddhist Logic, Volume one p. 417 under the heading “The 
Law of Double Negation.” 
5 I addressed essential features of Dignāga’s apoha theory in my published papers on 
the subject. See Pind 1991, and Pind 1999. 
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2 Pramāṇasamuccayavtti V 
  
 The Purpose of PSV V 
 
2.1 The fifth chapter on exclusion follows the crucial chapter on 
the role of the example (dṣṭānta) in inference, succeeded by the final 
chapter six on the jātis “sophistical reasons.” Its place in Dignāga’s 
treatise is undoubtedly motivated by the frequent reference to 
“exclusion” (vyavaccheda, apoha) or “preclusion” (nivtti) in the pre-
ceding chapters. Thus the aim of PSV V, which presents the essentials 
of the apoha thesis, is to supplement previous statements about ex-
clusion or preclusion with an exposition of the apoha doctrine itself.  
 
2.2 As the title Pramāṇasamuccaya indicates, Dignāga composed 
PSV as a compendium (samuccaya) of his works on epistemology and 
logic, the intention being to provide scholars and students with a 
summary of his philosophy on the assumption that if needed they 
would refer to the detailed expositions of his other works. Thus, PSV 
is marked by extreme economy of presentation and tantalizing ellipsis. 
Given the limited number of extant works by Dignāga it is not pos-
sible to place PSV in the context of Dignāga’s philosophical oeuvre, 
as all of his works on logic and epistemology except PSV and the 
Chinese versions of Nyāyamukha (hence NM) are no longer extant.6 
Dignāga must have regarded NM as a current exposition of his 
philosophy of inference when he composed PSV because he always 
mentions this work first when referring to his works on epistemology 
and logic.7 Indeed, there is not a single quotable instance in all of PSV 
where it is not mentioned first. In the final chapter six of PSV Dignāga 
mentions Nyāyaparīkṣā, Vaiṣeśikaparīkṣā, and Sāṃkhyāparīkṣā;8 and 
Nyāyamukha refers once to Sāṃkhyāparīkṣā.9 This makes it possible 
to conclude that most if not all of the Parīkṣās including Sāmānya-
parīkṣāvyāsa (hence SPVy)—apparently the main source of PSV V 
(see 2.3)—were written before Dignāga composed PSV to summarize 
his works on epistemology and logic.  
 
                                                 
6 A Sanskrit manuscript of Nyāyamukha is found among the Sanskrit manuscripts 
stored in Potala; see Steinkellner-Much 1995 p. xix. 
7 The references are usually presented as Nyāyamukha and so on. 
8 He refers to Nyāyaparīkṣā in PSV VI; cf. Hattori 1968: Introduction no. 51; Pind 
2001 p. 157 no. 30; v. next. 
9 Cf. Hattori 1968 no. 53. 
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2.3 It is commonly assumed that PSV records the final stage of 
development of Dignāga’s thought. However, we cannot a priori 
exclude the possibility that Dignāga composed other works after PSV, 
which presupposes and presumably to a large extent is based upon 
earlier works. He exploited the SPVy for the crucial fifth chapter. 
Jinendrabuddhi quotes two passages from this work, and he refers to it 
once (see 5.13). It is thus certain that PSV V is based upon the earlier 
work. It is doubtless SPVy to which Yijin refers in Nan hai ji gui hei 
fa zhuan (T 2125: 230a6) under the title Guan zong xiang lun 
*Sāmānya(lakṣaṇa)parīkṣā10 of which only a fragment of eleven 
verses are included in the Chinese Buddhist canon (T 1623) under the 
same title.11 As the qualification vyāsa added to the original Sanskrit 
title indicates, it must have been a comprehensive treatise. Uddyota-
kara is no doubt addressing statements from this work in his criticism 
of the apoha theory. For instance, he closes his presentation of 
Dignāga’s arguments by quoting an important prose fragment which 
cannot be traced to PSV V. It seems, however, to belong in the same 
context as PSV V: 11d that ends the first section of PSV V12.  
 
2.4 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the scope of the philoso-
phical issues which Dignāga addresses in PSV V to a large extent 
reflects the philosophical discourse of SPVy, although the treatment of 
the subjects in SPVy undoubtedly would mirror the qualification 
vyāsa appended to the title of the treatise: it must have been a full and 
comprehensive treatment of its subject matter. Although the evidence 
shows that Uddyotakara addresses issues identical with those present-
ed in PSV V: 1-11, there are nonetheless conspicuous differences. As 
mentioned above, he quotes a prose fragment that would seem to 
belong in the context of the final statement of PS V: 11d,13 but there is 
nothing comparable in PSV V: 11d, which one would expect. More-
over, there is a particular quotation that Uddyotakara attributes to 
Dignāga and rejects as untenable in his apoha critique, which has no 
parallel in PSV V, cf. Nyāyavārttika (hence NV) 325,14-15: yac 
cedam ucyate tvayā: parikalpitāḥ sattāśabdā iti tad api na. He also 
                                                 
10 Cf. Pind 1999 no.3. The Chinese translation would indicate that the term lakṣaṇa 
was part of the original title, which is unlikely. Siṃhasūri refers to Dignāga as 
Sāmānyaparīkṣākāra at NCV 628, 8 and indicates that Mallavādi was using this 
work in his presentation of Dignāga’s arguments, which are also presented in PSV V 
although in an abbreviated form. 
11 The title also occurs in verse two of the Chinese fragment. 
12 See Translation no. 182. 
13 See Translation no. 182. 
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quotes a slightly edited version of Bharthari’s Vākyapadīya (hence 
VP) III 14:8,14 which belongs in the context of an argument similar to 
the one presented at PSV V: 3, where Dignāga cites the original 
version to substantiate his criticism.  
 
2.5 Dignāga apparently wrote similar extensive studies like, for 
instance, Nyāyaparīkṣā, which is referred to in later philosophical 
literature as mahatī,15 “comprehensive.” It is uncertain if the Dvādaśa-
śatikā which presupposes the apoha theory belongs among Dignāga’s 
pre-PSV works like the SPVy. It must have been considered an im-
portant Dignāga oeuvre because Dharmakīrti quotes a short prose 
passage from it in PVSV.16 The significance of the title “The twelve 
Hundred” is uncertain. It may refer to the number of verses (kārikās) 
of the work. As only a prose passage is quoted, it may have been a 
work of considerable size, consisting of kārikās embedded in a prose 
commentary like other Indian philosophical literature. It is regrettable 
that Dignāga’s works on epistemology and logic are no longer extant, 
as the somewhat truncated discourse of PSV contains very little infor-
mation on contemporary scholars, whose works and philosophical 
doctrines Dignāga addresses in PSV.  
 
2.6 Fortunately PSV has survived the ravages of time albeit in two 
mediocre Tibetan versions and a few Sanskrit fragments. Indeed, there 
is reason to believe that the main reason why PSV is still extant 
although in Tibetan translation is because its relative brevity made it 
an ideal work to comment on for generations of post-Dignāga 
buddhist philosophers, who could use it as a pretext for introducing 
views of later philosophers as if they were Dignāga’s own, while not 
addressing views that had become controversial or out of date in the 
context of post-Dignāga philosophy. For instance, Jinendrabuddhi 
refrains deliberately from addressing the implications of Dignāga’s 
use of the term arthāntaranivttiviśiṣṭa,17 “qualified by the preclusion 
of other referents,” which according to Dignāgan epistemology 
distinguishes the referents (bhāva) of any word from the referents of 
other words. However, the evidence indicates that Dignāga introduced 
this term, since he conceived anyāpoha as a substitute for real 
universals, as opposed to his non-Buddhist contemporaries, who 
                                                 
14 Cf. 2.28 below. 
15 Cf. Vādanyāyaṭīkā 142,13-15: mahatyāṃ Nyāyaparīkṣāyāṃācārya-Dignāgapa-
daiḥ. 
16 Cf. Pind 1991 p. 269 no. 1. 
17 See Translation no. 466. 
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regarded real universals as qualifiers of things and thus as pravtti-
nimitta of denotation.  
 
2.7 Whatever may have been the cause, a substantial part of 
Dignāga’s work is irretrievably lost, and PSV V is the only extant 
exposition of his philosophy of language. Since Jinendrabuddhi does 
not identify the scholars whose views Dignāga rejects in this chapter, 
it is difficult to place PSV V in a well-defined historical context. 
Dignāga’s apoha theory was known among contemporary thinkers 
before he wrote the fifth chapter of PSV V because he addresses the 
sāṅkhyanāśaka18 philosopher Mādhava’s criticism of the apoha 
doctrine in a fairly long and difficult section of PSV V: 39ff.19 
Dignāga’s answer includes slightly edited quotations of Mādhava’s 
critical remarks.20 Fortunately Jinendrabuddhi provides the Sanskrit 
original of Dignāga’s source, although he does not mention its title. 
Mādhava evidently criticized the apoha theory as presented in another 
work by Dignāga, presumably the no longer extant SPVy, and 
Dignāga answers his criticism in PSV V. In the same context Dignāga 
also answers a Jaina philosopher’s critical remarks about his apoha 
thesis at PSV V: 41. Jinendrabuddhi quotes the relevant passage from 
his work, but he does not mention its title or the name of its author, 
who is styled vaibhāgika “distinctionist.” This section is especialy 
crucial for understanding Dignāga’s apoha thesis as it shows 
unambiguously that his theory of exclusion pivots on non-existence 
(abhāva) of other things in the locus of any referent, namely their 
mutual non-existence, which Dignāga appears to regard as a general 
qualifier like real general properties. 
 
 
 Dignāga’s presentation of the apoha doctrine in PSV V 
 
2.8 Dignāga’s presentation in PSV V of the fundamental tenets of 
his philosophy of language is marked by tantalizing ellipsis and 
appears to be remarkably lax, which affects understanding the philoso-
phy of anyāpoha. Important theoretical statements are restricted to a 
few highly condensed paragraphs of the entire chapter, which is pri-
marily concerned with refuting contemporary theories of meaning 
                                                 
18 See Steinkellner 2005 p. 17: sāṅkhyanāśako mādhavas tv āha. 
19 Dignāga mentions Mādhava’s views on pratyakṣa in the Sāṃkhya section of PSV 
I; cf. PSV I 28, Steinkellner 2005 p. 17; Hattori 1968, Translation p. 57f.  
20 Mādhava’s knowledge of the apoha theory necessitates re-thinking his and 
Dignāga’s dates. 
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based on the assumption that the semantic condition of the application 
of words are real universals inherent in things. In contrast to other 
chapters of PSV, Dignāga does not attempt to present or justify in any 
detail his own view on the subject of apoha in the first part of the 
chapter, which is primarily devoted to criticizing doctrines that Dignā-
ga rejects as untenable. In fact, crucial statements about anyāpoha are 
only presented at PSV V: 34-50, the final third of PSV V. The fifth 
chapter starts by presenting the thesis that verbal knowledge does not 
differ from inference, as any word like “existing” (sat) denotes its 
referent by excluding other referents in the same way as the logical 
indicator “being produced” (ktakatva), which presupposes that there 
be invariable connection (avinābhāvasambandha) between the word 
and its referent similar to that of the inferential indicator (liṅga, hetu) 
and the indicated. Dignāga continues immediately thereafter by criti-
cizing in some detail views he rejects as untenable. The identities of 
most of the philosophers whose theses Dignāga analyses and con-
founds remain unknown, as Jinendrabuddhi rarely identifies any of 
Dignāga’s protagonists.  
 
2.9 Thus the exact philosophical context of the relentless criticism 
which Dignāga levels at the philosophy of language of contemporary 
philosophers remains obscure, except when he answers the criticism 
of the apoha doctrine formulated by the Sāṅkhya philosopher 
Mādhava (see 2.7). In general the order of presentation of the philoso-
phical issues discussed in the chapter does not appear to be well 
organised as many of the subjects under discussion appear to be 
addressed haphazardly. This no doubt reflects Dignāga’s attempt to 
summarize, in the fifth chapter, the content of the more comprehen-
sive work, SPVy, and possibly to address reactions to his major work. 
Important concepts are sometimes introduced abruptly without ex-
plaining their connection to the context in which they are introduced. 
This has left a noticeable mark of lack of coherence on the discourse 
of this crucial chapter. For instance, it is not clear why Dignāga 
addresses the semantics of compounds in the light of the general 
apoha thesis immediately after the first central section PSV V: 1-13, 
although the analysis of the relation between the terms of a compound 
like nīlotpala is no doubt motivated by the attempt to analyse the 
semantic relation between general and particular terms in the context 
of the apoha theory, which in a way mirrors the relation between the 
terms of a sentence (vākya). 
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2.10 The first part of PSV V:1-11 (+12-13), however, is a well-
defined and independent section of the chapter. In this section 
Dignāga analyses and rejects four theories of denotation: that a 
general term denotes (1) individuals (bheda), (2) general properties 
(jāti), (3) the connection between general properties and the thing in 
which they inhere (tadyoga), and (4) the general property possessor 
(tadvat). It ends with the claim that the thesis that a word excludes 
other referents is settled (*sthitam), although no formal proof has been 
presented to substantiate the claim. It would thus seem that the un-
tenability of the rejected views serves as a means of bolstering the 
apoha doctrine through via negationis. Although Dignāga presents a 
fairly detailed analysis of the last mentioned theory, he never addres-
ses this thesis again, except in the important paragraphs at PSV V: 34-
36 which present a brief account of why the problems of the four 
theses analysed at PSV V 2-4a do not obtain according to the apoha 
thesis. For instance, the main problem of the tadvad thesis, namely the 
impossibility of direct (sākṣāt) reference, is briefly mentioned at PSV 
V: 36c, where Dignāga claims that the apoha thesis does not entail 
this problem, since exclusion of other referents applies directly (sāk-
ṣād arthāntarapratiṣedhāt). 
 
2.11 However, the immediately following kārikās at PSV V: 12-13 
introduce subjects that have not been addressed previously in the 
chapter and in one case only once in the entire treatise. For instance, 
the implication of the concept of svasambandhānurūpya introduced at 
PS V: 12 is explained in a theoretically charged passage at PSV II: 13, 
which is the only passage of the entire PSV where it occurs. It is 
obvious that the two verses must have been copied from another of 
Dignāga’s works—perhaps the SPVy—in which the implication of the 
term was treated in detail and its denotation explained. There are also 
noticeable inconsistencies in the chapter that are difficult to 
understand. For instance, the fairly long exposition at PSV: 25-30 
explains that exclusion of other referents is caused by conflict or 
opposition (virodha) between properties occurring in a tree of cate-
gories and the terms that denote them. The tree presupposes a logical-
ly ordered hierarchy of properties, which ultimately is derived from 
Vaiśeṣika taxonomy.  
 
2.12 But Dignāga apparently invalidates virodha as cause of 
exclusion at PSV V: 31a by introducing non-observation (adṣṭa) as a 
justifiable substitute, and explains at PSV V: 34 that mere non-
observation (adarśanamātra) of any given word’s application to 
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things other than its own referent establishes exclusion and verbal 
knowledge as inference. This discussion together with the following 
paragraphs at PSV V: 35-36 are the only passages specifically devoted 
to presenting the philosophy of apoha. Dignāga apparently did not 
attempt to integrate the two mutually incompatible causes of exclusion 
into a logically coherent theory, and the crucial paragraphs PSV V: 
34-36 only presents the bare essentials of his apoha theory leaving a 
number of important philosophical issues unanswered. 
 
2.13 Other information that is essential to our understanding of the 
rationale of the apoha doctrine is mentioned incidentally, for instance, 
the crucial information that the general property of any given referent 
or word that is defined as exclusion of other referents or words is 
located in the referent (arthe) or in the word (śabde). Since the 
evidence shows that anyāpoha pivots on exclusion interpreted as non-
existence or negation (abhāva) of other referents (artha) or other 
words (śabda) in any given referent or word, it raises a number of 
intriguing questions about what justifies exclusion: apoha is evidently 
not related to negation in its well-established Western sense because 
ultimately the apoha theory is not centred on the notion of negation as 
the act of denying a word or statement, but rather on the notion of 
non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent of any word 
(see 6.1 ff). Dignāga conceived anyāpoha as a qualifier of the referent 
of the word, evidently imitating contemporary usage among Sanskrit 
grammarians and non-buddhist philosophers. The introduction of the 
locative to denote the referents of the word as loci of anyāpoha would 
otherwise be incomprehensible: anyāpoha is presented as qualifying 
the referent as if it were a real general property, which is corroborated 
by Dignāga’s use of the locative to designate the referent as locus of 
anyāpoha, which is understandable with the background of Dignāga’s 
statement at PSV V: 36d that exclusion of other referents has all the 
acknowledged properties of a general property (jāti). 
 
The title of PSV V 
 
2.14 The Tibetan translation of PSV V attributed to Vasudharakṣita 
and Seṅ rgyal (hence V),21 reproduces the title of the fifth chapter as 
tshad ma kun las btus pa las gźan sel ba brtag pa’i le’u ste lṅa pa ’o. 
This would indicate that the original Sanskrit title of the chapter was 
                                                 
21 K appears to have been completed in the 11th or by the beginning of the 12th 
century A.D. and V towards the end of the 11th century A.D. See Mejor 1991: 179. 
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*anyāpohaparīkṣā. The question is whether it is rightly so named. In 
fact, the Tibetan version attributed to Kanakavarman and Dad pa’i śes 
rab (hence K) does not record any title, but merely refers to the 
chapter as “the fifth chapter” (le ’u lṅa pa ’o). Unfortunately the 
Sanskrit colophon of the fifth chapter of PSṬ is missing. Its Tibetan 
translation, however, corroborates K by reading le’u lṅa pa ’o (= 
*pañcamaḥ paricchedaḥ). As Ms B of PSṬ V omits the colophon we 
are forced to restore its title by extrapolating from the colophon of 
chapters like that of the first one, which reads prathamaḥ paricchedaḥ 
(samāptaḥ).22  
 
2.15 PSV V is, of course, a parīkṣā in the sense that it analyses and 
refutes views which Dignāga considers untenable, but it is certainly 
not a critical examination of anyāpoha. This would contradict the 
purpose of the chapter, which is to justify why exclusion of other 
words and speech units or other referents does not entail the problems 
that follow from the assumption that real general properties inherent in 
words and speech units or things constitute the semantic condition of 
denotation. Originally individual chapters of PSV did not bear any 
title, as indicated by the translation of PSV attributed to Kanaka-
varman and his collaborator. Their translation of PSV merely 
enumerates the number of the individual chapters, in contrast to the 
version attributed to Vasudharakṣita and his assistant, which adds 
information about the number and subject matter of the first three 
chapters, namely PSV I *pratyakṣa (mṅon sum gyi le ’u ste daṅ po 
’o),23 PSV II *svārthānumāna (raṅ gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste le ’u 
gñis pa ’o),24 and PSV III *parārthānumāna (gźan gyi don rjes su 
dpag pa’i le ’u), adding the term *parīkṣā (brtag pa) after the title of 
the remaining three chapters like those of PSV IV: *dṣṭāntadṣṭāntā-
bhāsaparīkṣā (dpe daṅ dpe ltar snaṅ ba brtag pa’i le ’u ste bźi pa 
’o),25 PSV V: *anyāpohaparīkṣā (gźan sel ba brtag pa’i le ’u ste lṅa 
pa ’o), and PSV VI: *jātiparīkṣā (lhag gcod brtag pa’i le ’u ste drug 
pa ’o).26 Since the title *anyāpohaparīkṣā is only recorded in V, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the Sanskrit title *anyāpohaparīkṣā is 
spurious, and in all likelihood so are the titles of PSV IV and VI. It is 
                                                 
22 The Tibetan version of PSṬ V does not corroborate the reading samāptaḥ which 
may be an interpolation. It is occasionally found in contemporary colophons, but it 
is evidently redundant.  
23 Cf. P 27b6. 
24 Cf. P 42b7. 
25 Cf. P 70a8. 
26 Cf. P 93a8. 
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impossible to decide why the term parīkṣā was added to the colophons 
of the last three chapters. 
 
  
The format of PSV V 
 
2.16 The format of the two Tibetan translations of PSV V reflects 
well established classical Indian literary standards. It consists formally 
of 49½ kārikās embedded in a prose commentary. Oddly, in both K 
and V verse 43 only consists of two pādas as opposed to the well-
established pattern of four pādas to a śloka, which Tibetan translators 
reproduce as four times seven syllables. The reason for this anomaly is 
unknown as the Tibetan versions of PSV V and the separate version of 
the verses included in the bsTan ’gyur27 do not imply that originally 
verse 43 consisted of just two pādas as one would expect, nor that the 
identification or numbering of the verses of PSV V is wrong if 
compared to the order and number of the verses of PSV in general.  
 
2.17 As Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation indicates the two pādas of 
verse 43 are introduced by slightly edited quotations from the source 
Dignāga criticizes; and there is nothing that indicates that K and V in 
this particular instance misinterpreted two pādas as prose, which 
otherwise might explain the apparent irregularity. In view of this 
peculiar problem it is noticeable that the translators of V interpreted 
the sentence that closes PSV V:3 as two śloka pādas: /’di yi rigs kyi 
sgra yis ni // brjod par bya ba ñid mi ’thad /, which reads in the 
Sanskrit phrase that closes the paragraph: naivāsya jātiśabdena< /> 
vācyatvam upapadyate. If this interpretation is correct, and it is 
certainly metrically possible, it would solve the riddle of the two 
missing pādas of PSV V: 43.28 The distribution of the two hundred 
pādas among the fifty kārikās merely has to be adjusted accordingly,29 
that is, pādas 4ab are to be converted to 4bc, and so on, and pādas 
43ab to 43bc. 
                                                 
27 The separate version of the verses is extracted from K and is therefore without 
independent value. 
28 See Translation no. [15] (4). 
29 See Translation no. [15] no. (4). 
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 The Tibetan translations of PSV V 
 
2.18 The two Tibetan translations of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamucca-
yavtti are maddeningly difficult as they are peppered with textual 
problems of every kind conceivable. Many sentences are extremely 
difficult to construe, and so far scholars have been forced to study 
PSV V supported by the generally excellent Tibetan version of 
Jinendrabuddhi’s PSṬ V included in the bsTan ’gyur and published in 
Hattori 1982. Thus the problem of construing the two Tibetan 
renderings of PSV V is a major obstacle to understanding Dignāga’s 
thought. 
 
2.19 Although K as a rule appears to be more reliable than V, there 
are nonetheless passages that make better sense in the version 
recorded in V, whose translation occasionally is corroborated by the 
Sanskrit sources as opposed to that of K. Indeed, at the present 
juncture of Dignāga studies there appears to be no justification for 
preferring one version to the other. Only when the two Tibetan 
versions of PSV have been studied carefully in the light of the 
information of the presumably original Sanskrit version of PSV that 
can be restored on the basis of PSṬ will it be possible to decide which 
of the two versions is more trustworthy than the other, and, last but not 
least, to determine to what extent the occasional differences between 
the two Tibetan translations of Dignāga’s work are attributable to 
different versions of it or just illegible Sanskrit manuscripts (see 2.21-
32), rather than to translation mistakes or mere differences of 
interpretation of the syntax and vocabulary of the Sanskrit original.  
 
2.20 The erratic and occasionally nonsensical character of K or V 
would indicate that the two translator teams may not have had 
sufficient expertise in Indian or Dignāgan philosophy of logic and 
language. It is hard to believe, however, that insufficient knowledge of 
Dignāga’s philosophy would explain the tantalizing difficulties of 
reading the translators’ efforts as not all passages of K and V present 
similar obstacles. This makes one wonder if there may have been 
other reasons for the inferior quality of their translations than mere 
incompetence.  
 
2.21 Vasudharakṣita is only credited with the translation of PSV, so 
it is impossible to ascertain whether he was a poorly educated scholar 
in the field of Indian philosophy. Kanakavarman, on the other hand, is 
credited with the excellent revision of the Tibetan translation of 
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Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra,30 which is a demanding treatise to 
translate into Tibetan; in addition he also produced a superb Tibetan 
translation of Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā.31 He can hardly be 
considered incompetent. Even if the two translators were not 
specialists of classical Indian epistemology and logic, we must assume 
that they would be able to construe Dignāga’s Sanskrit kārikās and 
prose, which in general is comparatively simple and devoid of 
syntactical complexities of the kind we encounter in, for instance, the 
contemporary grammarian Bharthari’s prose, which Dignāga knew 
and in a few cases exploited.32  
 
2.22 It is impossible to explain the poor quality of the Tibetan trans-
lations unless one assumes that somehow it reflects the two translator 
team’s inability correctly to interpret the readings of their Sanskrit 
manuscripts. It is therefore noteworthy that Kanakavarman or 
Vasudharakṣita misinterpreted words and phrases, which should not 
present any difficulty of interpretation to scholars with traditional 
Indian background, provided that the Sanskrit manuscripts were 
readable. Indeed, the evidence supports the conclusion that the 
difficulties of construing the Tibetan translations are at least to some 
extent due to the translators’ attempt to render Sanskrit corruptions 
into Tibetan, even if the readings were meaningless and the Tibetan 
translations in consequence incomprehensible.  
 
2.23 For instance, the reading at PSV II 4d: śugs kyis K : don yod 
pa'i V33 is utterly incomprehensible. śugs kyis sometimes reproduces 
Sanskrit arthāpattyā, which regularly is translated as don gyi śugs 
kyis. However, the translator team responsible for V could not identify 
the last word of the compound, which they may have interpreted as a 
form of Sanskrit sattā as the Tibetan term yod would indicate. 
However, the Tibetan term don which is commonly used to translate 
Sanskrit artha shows that the first word of the compound was easy for 
them to identify, which thus corroborates the suggested Sanskrit 
restoration *arthāpattyā. 
 
2.24 Kanakavarman and his assistant must have read the noun 
phrase tadvān artho at PS V 9c as if the reading were *tadvad artho 
                                                 
30 Cf. Louis de la Vallée Poussin’s Preface to his edition of Madhyamakāvatāra, 
Bibliotheca Indica IX (Reprint 1970). 
31 Cf. Mejor 1991: 178.  
32 Cf. e.g. PSV V: 46; Pind 2003.  
33 Cf. Translation no. 2. 
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because they reproduce it as de ltar don. The Tibetan translation de 
ltar presupposes a regular sandhi form of the Sanskrit adverb *tadvat 
before vowel. The Tibetan translation is, of course, incomprehensible 
in the context, and one can only conclude from examples like this, of 
which unfortunately there are several instances, that indigenous 
Tibetan scholars and students of Indian logic and epistemology were 
ill served by the Tibetan translations of PSV that eventually were 
included in the Tibetan bsTan ’gyur. 
 
2.25 Fortunately, the Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi’s ṭīkā 
makes it possible to identify the causes of some of the translation 
mistakes. The Sanskrit evidence indicates that one of them was the not 
uncommon problem of disjoining morphemes in the process of 
copying, another that of scriptura continua, of which there are several 
examples in the Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi’s ṭīkā, which 
occasionally made the competent Tibetan translator suggest 
implausible translations because he did not notice that he was 
translating an instance of scriptura continua. However, without the 
original Sanskrit sources the causes of such errors are difficult to 
detect. 
 
2.26 A characteristic example of a translation based upon Sanskrit 
text with disjoined morphemes is Vasudharakṣita and his collabo-
rator’s reproduction of the term ūrdhvatāvat at PSV V 31d. The 
Tibetan translation re źig greṅ ba la presupposes apparently a reading 
like *ūrdhve tāvat, which is totally meaningless in the context. 
Although Tibetan translators are not known to make conjectures, one 
cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that the translation greṅ ba 
la which would seem to presuppose Sanskrit *ūrdhve, is, in fact, an 
emendation intended to correct the false reading ūrdhva tāvat, which 
any translator with knowledge of Sanskrit would consider dubious and 
perhaps attempt to “correct.”  
 
2.27 In any case, one should not overlook the fact that Tibetan 
translators tend to translate what they read in their Sanskrit 
manuscripts and do not attempt to make conjectures or emendations. 
Thus some of the apparent absurdities of the Tibetan translations of V 
and K stem in the final analysis from PSV manuscripts that were 
carelessly or badly copied and therefore difficult to interpret. The 
vagaries of the transmission of the original Sanskrit version of PSV 
are in places evident. For instance, K and V concur in not translating 
into Tibetan the crucial apodosis required by the context at PSV V 
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32d: tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya prayogaḥ sambhavati. This clause, 
however, was evidently part of Dignāga’s original text, as Jinendra-
buddhi incorporated it into his paraphrase of the paragraph he was 
commenting on.34 This indicates that the otherwise divergent manu-
scripts used by the two translator teams descend from an archetype in 
which this particular sentence was missing. There is no doubt, 
however, that the phrase was an integral part of the original version of 
PSV V: 32d as Dignāga’s exposition would be incomprehensible 
without it. In addition, there are no quotable examples in PSV V of 
phrases beginning with yadā that are not syntactically followed by the 
corresponding apodosis of tadā. 
 
2.28 Some passages appear to reproduce corruptions like PSV V: 
33d, which is impossible to construe in the versions presented in K 
and V. The readings yod pa la sogs par K : sogs par V translate in all 
likelihood *śatrantādau as Jinendrabuddhi’s ṭīkā indicates. The 
translator team responsible for K, however, could not identify the first 
term of the compound correctly, but apparently read it as sattā + ādau, 
the translation not leaving any trace whatsoever of the term anta. The 
scholars credited with V apparently could not even identify the word 
śatranta, although they correctly identified the last word of the 
compound as the locative of ādi. With this background the student of 
the Tibetan version of PSṬ V: 33d, which correctly reproduces and 
comments upon the passage, will find it impossible to identify the 
context of the discussion, much less understand the argument 
presented at PSV V: 33d. The few examples cited above–they are not 
isolated instances–show the type of philological problems that 
students of the Tibetan translations of PSV have to resolve in order to 
make sense of Dignāga’s text. 
 
2.29 There are sometimes considerable differences between the 
Tibetan translations and the Sanskrit evidence of PSṬ, which shows 
that the manuscript transmission of PSV is not uniform. In contrast to 
minor differences between K and V with regard to translation of 
individual verses of PSV V, their versions of PSV V: 2c-d differ in 
several respects. For instance, only V reproduces Dignāga’s quotation 
of Bharthari’s VP III 14:8. This citation, however, is essential to 
Dignāga’s argument and crucial for understanding it; and it is not clear 
why it is not found in K. Jinendrabuddhi does not explain its 
implications, which is remarkable as he usually addresses grammatical 
                                                 
34 Cf. Ms B 225a2 quoted ad loc. 
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issues. This would indicate that he did not find it in his copy of PSV 
V, assuming that he would check the original source when writing his 
ṭīkā. Dignāga, however, quotes the Bharthari verse in support of his 
argument, and we have no reason to assume that it was interpolated 
because parallels in works by Dignāga’s opponents show that the 
verse belongs in the context of this particular argument. Uddyotakara 
cites an edited version of the same verse addressing a similar 
argument in his criticism of Dignāga’s apoha theory. It stems in all 
likelihood from Dignāga’s no longer extant SPVy. 
 
2.30 In a few instances the difference between K and V is 
inexplicable, unless we assume that the Tibetan versions presuppose 
different readings and not just corrupt text or misinterpretations. For 
instance, the Tibetan conversions of the paragraph that follows 
immediately after PSV V: 3 are mutually divergent and incompatible 
with the Sanskrit evidence of PSṬ Ms B 195a1ff. Thus the term 
āśaṃkitam at Ms B 195a6 and the phrase idaṃ tad iti recorded at Ms 
B 195b1 have no identifiable translations in K or V, although 
Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis indicates that he quotes the source he is 
explaining. I have therefore adopted the Sanskrit readings of PSṬ as I 
think that they are preferable to the confused translations of K and V, 
although neither K nor V corroborate the readings presented in PSṬ. 
 
2.31 In other cases the translators appear to have rendered glosses 
interpolated into the verses, as it is sometimes impossible to fit the 
terms reproduced in the Tibetan translation of a particular verse into 
the metrical constraints of a Sanskrit śloka of thirty two syllables. For 
instance, the Tibetan translation of PSV V: 48a-d contains the 
compound ṅag gi don V : ṅag don K, evidently rendering Sanskrit 
*vākyārtha. However, it is impossible to fit *vākyārtha into the 
Sanskrit restoration with the background of the readings of the verse 
recorded in PSṬ V. *vākyārtha is probably a marginal gloss 
introduced as a synonym of pratibhā (f.) in order to explain the 
reference of the demonstrative pronoun sā (f.) at 48a. As the Tibetan 
equivalent of Sanskrit vākyārtha is found in both K and V, which 
represent different manuscript transmissions of PSV, it is possible to 
conclude that the term was interpolated into the verse of the Sanskrit 
original or perhaps earlier Tibetan attempts to translate Dignāga’s 
work before the translations recorded in K and V were executed. 
 
2.32 There are noteworthy divergences between K and V with 
regard to which ślokas are saṃgrahaślokas. In PSV saṃgrahaślokas 
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occur sparingly and they invariably summarize issues treated in the 
preceding paragraphs. However, in Vasudharakṣita’s translation of 
PSV V 12-13 the two verses are designated as *saṃgrahaślokas, 
despite the fact that they do not summarize the preceding exposition, 
but quite unexpectedly introduce entirely new topics.35 In K, on the 
other hand, they are rendered as ordinary ślokas. Similarly, the two 
verses at PSV V 26-27 are saṃgrahaślokas according to V, although 
they do not summarize the content of the preceding paragraphs, but 
rather add some general remarks about the logico-semantic relation 
between general terms. K does not identify the verses as 
saṃgrahaślokas, nor does Jinendrabuddhi in any way suggest that 
they are inserted in order to summarize the content of the preceding 
discussion. The conclusion is inevitable: these stylistic qualifications 
were added at a later time. They were inserted for no obvious reason 
as the nature of Dignāga’s exposition does not per se qualify them as 
saṃgrahaślokas. 
 
2.33 Thus the evidence indicates that corruptions of the Sanskrit 
manuscripts of PSV no doubt are one of the main causes of the 
difficulties of understanding Dignāga’s thought through the Tibetan 
translations of PSV. When all the linguistic information contained in 
PSṬ has been studied with the background of the Tibetan translations 
of K and V we shall be in a much better position to ascertain whether 
or not the many philological problems of the two versions, which 
force any scholar into hairsplitting arguments pro et contra regarding 
possible solutions to almost insoluble philological problems, are 
caused by textual corruptions of the original Sanskrit manuscripts, 
which the translators attempted to render into Tibetan, or just random 
instances of incompetence on their part. Even the highly competent 
Tibetan translator of PSṬ, dPaṅ lotsāva Blo gros brtan pa, occasion-
ally produced passages that are entirely incomprehensibe in the 
context of the subject matter because he faithfully translated a string 
of corruptions exactly as he read and interpreted them. In one case he 
even appears to have made a conjecture, although it is meaningless in 
the context.36 Finally, it is necessary to investigate whether the 
                                                 
35 Cf. e.g. Translation no. 188. 
36 For instance, the Tibetan translation of PSṬ Ms B 211a1 which quotes PS V: 46, 
is incomprehensible because Blo gros brtan pa reproduced text that is full of 
curruptions and in principle untranslatable. For instance PSṬ loc. cit. reads apodvāre 
for apoddhāre, which Blo gros brtan pa translated as sel ba'i sgo la as if the reading 
of the Sanskrit Ms was apohadvāre. He apparently conjectured that apo was a 
mistake for apoha. See Translation no. 221. 
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occasional textual divergences between the Tibetan translations of 
PSV and the readings quoted in the Sanskrit manuscript of PSṬ reflect 
actual differences of transmission of Dignāga’s work and not chance 
corruptions or interpolations.  
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3.1 The Viśālamālavatī ṭīkā attributed to Jinendrabuddhi is the 
only extant commentary on Dignāga’s PSV. As I shall show below, 
PSṬ is not the only commentary devoted to commenting upon PSV. 
The evidence indicates that it is dependent upon other sources, some 
of which were known to Dignāga’s critics Mallavādi and Siṃhasūri 
(see 4.13), who quote them in their criticism of Dignāga’s logic and 
apoha thesis. This makes Jinendrabuddhi’s work an important source 
of information not only on the Sanskrit text of Dignāga’s work, as it 
makes it possible to restore substantial sections of PSV V, but also to 
some extent on the nature of the earlier commentaries devoted to 
explaining PSV and the philosophical issues Dignāga discusses 
throughout his work. 
 
3.2 Jinendrabuddhi is in all likelihood identical with Nyāsakāra, 
the author of Nyāsa, an important commentary on the Kāśikā known 
as the Kāśikāvivaraṇapañjikā. The date of the Nyāsakāra has been the 
subject of continuous debate. Consensus is that the reference to Nyāsa 
in Māgha’s Śiśupālavadha is indeed to Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary 
on the Kāśikā; and therefore it is likely that Jinendrabuddhi was active 
as a scholar around 700 A.D.37 Since he quotes Tattvasaṅgraha verses 
1241, 1263, and 2811 in PSṬ I pp. 43 and 54, Jinendrabuddhi and 
Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725-788 A.D) must have been contemporaries. Since 
Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśīla refer to Jinendra-
buddhi’s view of pratyakṣa as shown by Funayama,38 he may 
therefore have been an older contemporary of this eminent Buddhist 
scholar. Thus it is reasonable to assume that he was active as a writer 
in the first half of 8th century A.D. Apparently Jinendrabuddhi does 
not quote Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā (hence TSP). This would indicate 
that copies of Kamalaśīla’s TSP may not yet have been in circulation 
among Buddhist philosophers before Jinendrabuddhi composed PSṬ.  
 
3.3 Jinendrabuddhi was evidently conversant with the sources 
addressed by Śantarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, as appears from the 
discussion in TSP and PSṬ V of Kumārila’s criticism of the Dignāga’s 
view that verbal communication is subject to the constraints of the 
                                                 
37 Cf. the discussion in George Cardona, Pāṇini. A Survey of Research. Delhi 1997 
(Reprint), p. 280-81. 
38 Cf. Funayama 1999. 
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logical canon of trairūpya.39 However, the treatment recorded in PSṬ 
V differs from that of TSP, which therefore may not have been known 
to Jinendrabuddhi. The source that Kamalaśīla and Jinendrabuddhi 
address criticizes the theory that the inferential nature of verbal 
communication consists in its indicating the intention of the speaker. 
This view was presented by Dharmakīrti, and the unknown source 
specifically subjects Dharmakīrti’s view to criticism. Śāntarakśita and 
Kamalaśīla address the criticism of Dharmakīrti’s view in the context 
of Kumārila’s critique of the assumption that verbal communication is 
subject to the constraints of the trairūpya. It is therefore reasonable to 
assume that the source which Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, and 
Kamalaśīla address may be Kumārila’s Bhaṭṭīkā,40 which unfortu-
nately has never been recovered. 
 
3.4 The colophons of PSṬ and Nyāsa refer to Jinendrabuddhi as 
Bodhisattvadeśīya. As the copyist of PSṬ supports this attribution by 
honouring Jinendrabuddhi as an erudite grammarian, there is no 
cogent reason for doubting that the colophons refer to the same 
author.41 On the other hand, it is difficult to corroborate the attribution 
of PSṬ and Nyāsa to the same person on the basis of internal 
evidence. It is evident, though, that the author of PSṬ was an expert in 
Sanskrit grammatical literature, as appears from his concise 
explanation of Dignāga’s quotation at PSV V 9ab of a well-known 
grammatical definition–allegedly from Bharthari’s Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā–
of the semantic conditions for introducing the abstract affixes tā and 
tva, which are claimed to denote either the relation (sambandha) or 
general property (jāti).42 One would therefore assume that Jinendra-
buddhi’s exegesis of A V 1:119 defining the semantics of the abstract 
affixes would quote and comment upon the same crucial definition of 
their usage, as does Kaiyaṭa, who quotes and explains it in his Pradīpa 
on A V 1:119.  
 
3.5 The Nyāsakāra evidently knew the above-mentioned definition 
as he quotes it elsewhere in the Nyāsa.43 However, he limits himself to 
                                                 
39 Cf. Appendix III. 
40 For the sources of this discussion, cf. Appendix II 
41 Cf. PSṬ I Introduction p. xxxii foll.; Nyāsa or Pañcikā of Ācārya 
Jinendrabuddhipāda. Critically edited by Swāmi Dwārikadas Shastri Vol. VI. 
Varanasi 1967, p. 670.  
42 See, for instance, Prabhat Chandra Chrakavarti, The Philosophy of Sanskrit 
Grammar. University of Calcutta, 1930, p. 207ff (with note 3.). 
43 Cf. Nyāsa Vol. I: 610, 28-29; Translation no. [40]. 
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the barest essentials when commenting on A V 1:119, although he 
mentions the view of some who claim that the cause of application of 
speech units denoting an action is the relation (sambandha) between 
the action and the agent of that action (kecit tu kriyākārakasam-
bandhaṃ kriyāśabdānāṃ pravttinimittaṃ icchanti). The thesis that 
speech units denote sambandha is mentioned by Dignāga at PSV I: 
3d. The example of such kriyāśabdas is pācakatva, which illustrates 
the rule that the introduction of the abstract affix after pācaka serves 
the purpose of denoting the relation. Jinendrabuddhi presents a 
concise exegesis of Dignāga’s quotation of the grammatical definition 
that in essence is similar to the one found in Kaiyaṭa’s Pradīpa on 
Mahābhāṣya explaining A V.1:119, although Jinendrabuddhi mentions 
additional instances of compounds (samāsa), and kt and taddhita 
derivatives. The only instance that would corroborate the alleged 
identity of the Nyāsakāra and Jinendrabuddhi is the remarkable 
similarity between Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis of A II.1:57 and his 
exegesis of PSV V: 14 and 27.44 
 
3.6 The writer Bhāmaha, author of Kāvyālaṅkāra, a well-known 
treatise on poetics, refers to some Nyāsakāra at Kāvyālaṅkāra VI 36 
where Bhāmaha rejects the Nyāsakāra’s description of a particular 
type of compound formation as contradicting Pāṇini’s grammar. The 
question is whether the Nyāsakāra, whose view Bhāmaha rejects, is 
identical with Jinendrabuddhi, the author of Nyāsa. Bhāmaha 
mentions the word vtrahant as an example of a term accepted by the 
Nyāsakāra, although it is excluded by the relevant Pāṇinian rules. In 
this connection Bhāmaha refers to A III 1.133, which introduces the 
affix tc to denote the agent of an action, and A II 2.15, which 
disallows the introduction of this affix to form a genitive tatpuruṣa 
(ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa) compound like vtrahant. This compound, 
however, is recorded in the Mahābhārata;45 and post-Pāṇinian 
grammarians tried to accomodate the Pāṇinian rules to recorded usage. 
But nowhere does Nyāsa mention vtrahant together with other non-
Pāṇinian compounds as examples of legitimate derivations under the 
Sanskrit grammarians’ attempt at accomodating the linguistic 
evidence to the relevant Pāṇinian rules.46 We are evidently faced with 
another Nyāsakāra, several of whom are mentioned in Sanskrit 
                                                 
44 Cf. Translation, notes 203 and 357. 
45 Cf. PW s.v. 
46 For a recent discussion of the evidence, cf. Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha. Edited 
with Introduction etc. by Batuk Nāth Śarmā and Baldeva Upādhyāya. The Kashi 
Sanskrit Series 61 (Third Edition). Varanasi 2002. 
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grammatical literature, among others by Bharthari in his Mahā-
bhāṣyaṭīkā.47 
 
3.7 The date of Bhāmaha has been the subject of a never-ending 
debate. G. Tucci, for instance, concluded on the basis of references to 
Dignāga’s philosophy in Kāvyālaṅkāra, that Bhāmaha must have been 
a pre-Dharmakīrti scholar because he does not mention Dharmakīrti’s 
philosophy anywhere.48 This is certainly true. The question is whether 
the absence of references to Dharmakīrti’s works corroborates the 
conclusion as it is based upon an argument e silentio. The evidence, 
however, supports Tucci’s conclusion. Indeed, Bhāmaha must have 
been either a pre-Dharmakīrti writer or one of Dharmakīrti’s contem-
poraries as Dharmakīrti addresses his criticism of Dignāga’s apoha 
theory at PVSV 63,12ff. This conclusion is corroborated by Jinendra-
buddhi’s presentation of Dharmakīrti’s views on anyāpoha in an 
excursus inserted immediately after his comment on PSV V: 13.49 In 
this excursus Jinendrabuddhi quotes a slightly edited version of 
Bhāmaha’s objection to Dignāga’s apoha theory at Kāvyālaṅkāra VI 
17, which states that according to the apoha theory a word must have 
two separate functions, namely that of affirmation and that of 
exclusion.  
 
3.8 In Jinendrabuddhi’s exposition this objection is followed by a 
quotation of Dharmakīrti’s PVSV 63,12ff, which he interprets as 
Dharmakīrti’s answer to Bhāmaha’s objection. Otherwise it would be 
difficult to understand why Jinendrabuddhi would quote a slightly 
edited version of Kāvyālaṅkāra VI 17 in this particular context. The 
above-mentioned passage of PVSV addresses among other issues 
Dharmakīrti’s statement at PV I 127ab: na cāpi śabdo dvayakd 
anyonyābhāva ity asau that a word does not effect two things viz. 
affirmation and exclusion–which reproduces Bhamaha’s objection to 
Dignāga’s apoha thesis, since the connection between the referent 
posited by the word and the thing excluded is one of mutual non-
existence; and affirmation implies per se negation which merely 
reflects non-existence of one of the elements of the relation of mutual 
non-existence.  
 
                                                 
47 Cf. Cardona 1997 no. 453.  
48 Cf. Guiseppe Tucci, ”Bhāmaha and Diṅnāga” in The Indian Antiquary LIX (1930) 
pp. 142-47. 
49 Cf. Appendix 2. 
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3.9 Jinendrabuddhi’s identification of the target of Dharmakīrti’s 
argument with Bhāmaha is not an isolated instance in post-
Dharmakīrti philosophical literature. Other contemporary scholars like 
Śāntarakṣita, who quotes Bhāmaha’s objection at TS 911, shows a 
marked dependence on Dharmakīrti’s rejection of Bhāmaha’s criti-
cism when presenting at TS 1019 his own refutation of Bhāmaha’s 
arguments. This corroborates Jinendrabuddhi’s identification of the 
target of Dharmakīrti’s criticism with Bhāmaha. Moreover, Karṇaka-
gomin quotes in PVSṬ 250,19-22 the relevant verses from Kāvyā-
laṅkāra followed by the observation that Bhāmaha’s claim is rejected 
by Dharmakīrti’s argument at PVSV 63,12ff, which both Śāntarakṣita 
and Kamalaśīla at TSP 395,18 take to address Bhāmaha’s objection to 
the apoha theory.50 With this observation I think we can safely put the 
debate about Bhāmaha’s date to rest. 
  
 
The sources of Viśālamālavatī V 
 
3.10 The impression one gets from reading Jinendrabuddhi’s ṭīkā is 
that he rewrote older material with the intention of making his own 
ṭīkā au courant with the latest development in epistemology, logic and 
philosophy of language. Jinendrabuddhi’s dependence on Dharma-
kīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikasvavtti, which contains an important section 
devoted to the philosophy of anyāpoha, is evident throughout his 
commentary on PSV V. Thus, PSṬ V reflects Dharmakīrti’s position 
in the process of explaining Dignāga’s apoha thesis. Consequently 
Jinendrabuddhi is not a reliable exegete of Dignāga’s thought in every 
respect. His main objective is evidently to show that Dignāga’s views 
are compatible with Dharmakīrti’s philosophy. This attempt makes 
him gloss over controversial aspects of Dignāga’s philosophy.  
 
3.11  For instance, Dharmakīrti attempt to re-interpret the rationale 
of Dignāga’s claim that words denote things (bhāva) or entities (vastu) 
qualified by exclusion or absence of other things from the referent in 
the light of his own philosophy;51 and he re-interprets Dignāga’s claim 
that verbal cognition does not differ from inference; according to 
Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, the inferential nature of verbal cognition 
means that the thing inferred is not the referent of the verbal 
expression, as Dignāga claims, but the vivakṣā of the speaker, whose 
                                                 
50 Cf. the evidence traced in Appendix 2. 
51 Cf. Pind 1999. 
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intention is inferable through the speaker’s words. Jinendrabuddhi 
follows this re-interpretation as appears from his gloss on the term 
nivttiviśiṣṭa “qualified by exclusion,” which he maintains qualifies 
the person speaking. This understanding departs completely from the 
rationale of the original apoha theory, which aims at substituting 
exclusion of other referents for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika universal as a 
real entity inherent in things and the justification for the application of 
words to things. As already mentioned, according to Dignāga 
exclusion of other referents comes with all the attributes of the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika universal as resident in things and words. Thus Jinendra-
buddhi’s explanation is not true to the rationale of Dignāga’s apoha 
thesis.  
 
3.12  Although Dharmakīrti’s philosophy is the main source of 
Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation of Dignāga’s apoha theory, it is, on 
the other hand, evident that Jinendrabuddhi had access to and made 
use of already existing commentaries on PSV. For instance, he must 
have used the same source as the Jain philosopher Siṃhasūri, who 
wrote a detailed commentary of Mallavādi’s criticism of Dignāga’s 
apoha thesis, because there are several cases where Jinendrabuddhi’s 
glosses and explanations are almost identical with those found in 
Siṃhasūri’s commentary on Mallavādi’s work. Indeed, there is every 
reason to believe that Siṃhasūri’s explanations of theoretically crucial 
passages of PSV V are more reliable reproductions of Dignāga’s 
original view than those found in PSṬ. This remarkable similarity is 
difficult to explain unless we assume that Jinendrabuddhi had access 
to and copied or slightly rephrased explanations found in an older 
commentary on PSV.  
3.13  It is not possible to identify the source with absolute certainty, 
because Siṃhasūri merely identify certain explanations occurring in 
Mallavādi’s work as presented by the ṭīkākārāḥ.52 Given the authority 
of the source, as indicated by the fact that Mallavādi in several cases 
conflates Dignāga’s text with that of the ṭīkā, and further indicated by 
Jinendrabuddhi’s use of the same source as a valid explanation of 
Dignāga’s view on a particular issue, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that the work may be identical with the ṭīkā, which Devendrabuddhi 
composed according to the Tibetan Buddhist scholar Bu sTon. Thus it 
is not unlikely that it is this work to which Siṃhasūri refers and quotes 
as one of Mallavādi’s sources. Mallavādi probably made extensive use 
                                                 
52 Cf. NCV 621, 25. The plural ṭīkākāraiḥ is in all likelihood to be interpreted as 
respect language. Cf. Renou, Grammaire § 207. 
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of the ṭīkā even without indicating that he was quoting or slightly 
rephrasing it. Otherwise it is difficult to explain why the phrase : tato 
naiva prakāśakaṃ syāt that occurs in Mallavādi’s work as quoted at 
NCV 708,13-14, surfaces in Jinendrabuddhi’s ṭīkā Ms B 71a7 as tataś 
ca naiva prakāśayeta. The sentence belongs in the context of explain-
ing PSV II: 15. The similarity of phrasing and syntax is striking and 
undeniable. In any case, Jinendrabuddhi must have considered the 
unknown commentary a valid source of information on Dignāga’s 
philosophy, as appears from the fact that he, Mallavādi and Siṃhasūri 
used it and apparently made no attempt to distinguish between 
Dignāga’s own statements and the explanations attributed to the ṭīkā.  
 
3.14  I quote below selected passages from Siṃhasūri’s Nayacakra-
vtti juxtaposed with those of PSṬ V; they illustrate Jinendrabuddhi’s 
dependence on the source used by Mallavādi and Siṃhasūri: he 
apparently either quotes or edits it slightly to fit it into his own 
exposition. The quotations—often verbatim—are such that there can be 
no doubt that both authors rely on the same source, in all likelihood an 
old and authoritative ṭīkā, although it remains an open question whose 
work it is. As already mentioned it may be identical with the ṭīkā 
attributed to Devendrabuddhi. The following examples show beyond 
doubt that we are not presented with chance similarities: in spite of 
minor differences of expression, Jinendrabuddhi evidently utilized the 
same source as Mallavādi and Siṃhasūri. The collection of examples 
is not exhaustive: 
 
1. PSṬ Ms B 193b1: ānantyād ity upapattiḥ. 
kasyānantyāt? praktatvād bhedānām eva; cf. NCV 627, 14-
15: ānantyād iti hetuḥ. kasyānantyāt? bhedānām, yasmāt te 
pūrvaṃ praktā na cānyaḥ śrūyate.  
2. PSṬ Ms B 193, 2: ākhyātuṃ; karoter anekārthatvāt; cf. 
NCV 627, 17: kartum ākhyātum; karoter anekārthatvāt. 
3. Ms B 193b2: tad etad dhetudvayam uktaṃ: ānantyaṃ 
sambandhāśakyatve hetuḥ, anākhyātasambandhatvam punar 
anabhidhāne; cf. NCV 627, 22: atra cānāntyam pāramparye-
ṇānabhidānahetuḥ. tato hi sambandhāśakyatā, sambandhā-
vyutpatter anabhidhānam. 
4. Ms B 193b6: mlecchaśabde hi śabdasvarūpamātram 
eva pratīyate, nārthaḥ; cf. NCV 627, 23-68,7: yatra śabdas-
yārthena sambandho 'vyutpanno yathā mlecchaśabdānāṃ 
tatra śabdamātraṃ pratīyate nārtha ityādi. 
5. Ms B 226b1: syād etad atulyānām ānantyād vyatirekā-
khyānasyāpi sarvatrāsambhava, cf. NCV 652, 16: syād 
etadvyatirekasyāpy asambhavaḥ iti. 
6. Ms B 208a7: tathā hi te vināpi vkṣārthena rasādiṣu 
dṣṭāḥ, na vkṣaśabdatvādikaṃ sāmānyaṃ, cf. NCV 
Introduction 32 
653,18ff: tathā hi te vināpi vkṣārthena rasādiṣu dṣṭāḥ, na 
tu vkṣaśabdo ’nyatra dṣṭaḥ, tasmād vkṣaśabdenaiva pra-
tyāyanam upapannam. 
7. Ms B 226b1: syād etad atulyānām ānantyād vyatire-
kākhyānasyāpi sarvatrāsambhava iti, cf. NCV 652,16: syād 
etad vyatirekasyāpy asambhavaḥ. 
Ms B 226b4: yasmād darśanasya tattulye sarvatrāsam-
bhavo 'tattulye tu sambhavo 'darśanasya, cf. NCV 652,17-
18: yasmād darśanasya sarvatrāsambhavaḥ. saty api darśane 
sarvathānumānāsambhavaḥ. 
8. Ms B 228a7-B 228b1: tad eva tu vastv asadvyāvttaṃ 
sākṣād abhidhīyate. tatas tasya ye viśeṣās te tadavyatirekān 
na pratikṣipyante, cf. NCV 733,14: atra punar asatpratiṣe-
dhena sākṣād vartata iti tasya ye viśeṣās tān na pratikṣepati. 
9. Ms B 228b1-2: ata eva bhāktadoṣo 'pi nāsti. na hy 
anyatra mukhyavttiḥ śabdo dravyādiṣūpacaryate, cf. NCV 
733,16-17: bhāktadoṣo 'py ata eva nāsti, na hy anyatra 
mukhyā vttir dravyādiṣūpacaryate. 
 
Apart from PSV and other works by Dignāga, Mallavādi and 
Siṃhasūri had access to Dignāga’s SPVy from which they presumably 
quote the lakṣaṇavākya on apoha, cf. NCV 611,5ff,53 as well as works 
by ṭīkākārās, cf. NCV 621,25ff. It is obvious that Jinendrabuddhi too 
had access to other works by Dignāga or his commentators when he 
wrote PSṬ. For instance, he either quotes or refers to Dignāga’s SPVy 
three times.54 Judging from the parallel passages found in PSV V the 
passages from SPVy represent a more discursive treatment of the 
same subject, although the vocabulary is basically the same. The 
fragmentary Chinese translation of a few of the introductory verses of 
this treatise makes it impossible to infer its scope.  
 
 
4 The Critical Edition of PSṬ V 
 
4.1 The Sanskrit manuscript of PSṬ V comprises Ms B 191a7-
242b7. The objective of the critical edition of PSṬ V presented in the 
apparatus as an integral part of the annotation is to establish a readable 
version of the unique manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi’s PSṬ V. The 
edition occasionally leaves out brief sentences that are not important 
for understanding Dignāga’s thought or restoring PSV V into Sanskrit. 
Jinendrabuddhi’s erudite remarks on upacāra (transference) recorded 
at Ms B 198a-198b have been left out too, as they add nothing 
                                                 
53 Cf. Translation no.182. 
54 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 229b1-2, Translation no. 465; PSṬ Ms B 239a1-2, Translation no. 
[301]; PSṬ Ms B 238b7-239a2, Translation no. 608. 
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theoretically important to the grammatical and philosophical issues of 
upacāra. His excursus on central philosophical issues of the apoha 
theory are edited separately and included in the four Appendixes. In 
all, well over 90 percent of PSṬ V is edited and included in the 
annotation and Appendixes. The main purpose of the edition is to e-
mend obvious scribal mistakes and occasionally to suggest 
conjectures. This has in general proved to be unproblematic as scribal 
errors in most cases are easy to identify and correct. The generally 
excellent Tibetan translation of PSṬ edited in Hattori 1982 has been 
helpful as it is useful for corroborating the suggested emendations. 
Jinendrabudhi occasionally quotes original Sanskrit sources in PSṬ V 
in support of his commentary. Where possible I have identified the 
sources of the quotations and if necessary corrected the readings of 
PSṬ on the basis of the published editions of these works. A few 
passages of Ms B are unreadable as are the corresponding Tibetan 
conversions (see 4.3f). Fortunately, it is possible to solve most of 
these problems. There are a few lacunae and missing phrases in the 
manuscript—mirrored in the Tibetan translation—which in a few 
instances make it impossible to understand the intended argument. 
Other passages are unreadable as words or lines were distorted beyond 
recognition in the process of copying the manuscript, with the result 
that it is impossible to construe a few paragraphs, and the Tibetan 
version which evidently reflects a manuscript containing the same 
omissions does not help solving the problem. In a few cases 
difficulties of construing Jinendrabuddhi’s text is caused by scriptura 
continua, which also made the highly competent Tibetan translator 
suggest an implausible Tibetan rendering of the Sanskrit text he at-
tempted to reproduce.  
 
4.2 I have punctuated the critical edition without regard for the 
occasionally meaningful punctuation of Ms B as I consider the use of 
comma, semicolon, and full stop to be more helpful for the reader of 
an occasionally complicated text than traditional indigenous punc-
tuation. The punctuation marks reflect my interpretation of the syntax 
of the Sanskrit original and are primarily intended to present a version 
of Jinendrabuddhi’s work that is syntactically understandable to a 
modern reader. Sandhi has been adjusted accordingly. The manuscript 
has proved to be an invaluable source of information on the Sanskrit 
version of PSV which Jinendrabuddhi commented upon. Apart from 
the substantial number of pratīkas quoted from the original source or 
the sources Jinendrabuddhi consulted for his ṭīkā, his paraphrases of 
the Sanskrit text of PSV V have proved to be an excellent means for 
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restoring a substantial number of paragraphs of PSV V into Sanskrit, 
as they contain important information on the syntax of phrases of PSV 
V. In one instance Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase includes a crucial 
phrase that for unknown reasons was missing in the manuscripts used 
by the two Tibetan translator teams (see 2.8 and 2.6).  
  
 
The Tibetan translation of PSṬ 
 
4.3 The Tibetan translation of PSṬ (hence T) attributed to lotsāva 
Blo gros brtan pa is generally of a high standard and an important 
source of information on the readings of the Sanskrit manuscript of 
PSṬ used by the translator. It is therefore of considerable value for 
text critical purposes. It contains nonetheless a number of passages 
that are impossible to construe and understand. In most cases they are 
either due to misinterpretations of the original Sanskrit ms caused by 
scriptura continua or due to wrong readings found in the manuscript 
upon which the translator relied. Although the Tibetan sources 
indicate that the translation is based upon another Sanskrit manuscript 
than Ms B, it is evident that it must have been based upon a 
manuscript with similar readings, because T reflects wrong readings 
which also occur in Ms B.  
 
4.4 For instance, Jinendrabuddhi quotes PS V 46ab at PSṬ Ms B 
211a1-2 in this form: apodvāre yad anyāṣ?aṃ vākṣād arthe vikalpita 
iti. This clause is reproduced in T 177, 36-37 as: 'di ni sel ba'i sgo la 
gaṅ 'di'i 'di dag las don du brtags pa 'o źes 'chad par 'gyur ro. The 
translation is meaningless. It is evidently based upon a corrupt text 
like the one found in Ms B. One wonders if the translator himself 
could make sense of it. There is no reason to assume, however, that 
the reading of the translator’s manuscript differed essentially from that 
of Ms B on this particular point. The most likely explanation is that 
originally the corruption was introduced because of a misreading or 
misreproduction of the ligature /ddh/ that at some point in the 
transmission of the manuscript was read as /dv/, which would yield 
apodvāre as we find in Ms B. It is therefore likely that the translator 
attempted to emend the reading of his manuscript because apodvāre is 
reproduced as sel ba’i sgo la corresponding to Sanskrit *apohadvāre, 
which has no support in Ms B. The translator may have conjectured 
that the meaningless apodvāre was to be emended to read apohadvāre 
and inserted an extra syllable /ha/ in a desparate attempt to make sense 
of the compound.  
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4.5 In one case the translator misinterpreted the phrase cādyupādā-
naḥ < cādi < ca + ādi + upā° as derived from vādin + upā°. This 
appears from the translation rgol pas ñe bar len pa T 155,15, which is 
utterly meaningless.55 The reading sāmānyaviśeṣāvastvavaccheda-
hetutvāt recorded at Ms B 215a2 is translated in T as spyi daṅ khyad 
par gyi dṅos po ma yin pa gcod pa'i rgyu ñid kyi phyir. The otherwise 
meticulous translator evidently read sāmānyaviśeṣāvastvavacchedahe-
tutvāt as a compound and translated it accordingly in spite of the fact 
that it is incomprehensible. He assumed that /ā/ of viśeṣāvastu˚ was 
due to sandhi: the result of sāmānyaviśeṣa- + avastu (= dṅos po ma yin 
pa). Apparently he did not reflect upon whether his understanding of 
the compound made sense in the context of the argument: he merely 
translated the text as he read it. Fortunately it is easy to emend the 
reading by inserting the space that was deleted by the copyist: the cor-
rect reading is, of course, sāmānyaviśeṣā vastvavacchedahetutvāt 
which is easy to construe with the rest of the clause. The reading of 
Ms B illustrates once again the common error introduced by scriptura 
continua, forgetting to mark syntactical word boundaries in the 
process of copying a manuscript; and without the Sanskrit text it is 
virtually impossible to identify the cause of a meaningless Tibetan 
translation because of the structural difference of the two languages. 
The example illustrates once again that Tibetan translators tend to 
render what they read in their Sanskrit manuscripts, in spite of the fact 
that it makes no sense in the context; and without the original Sanskrit 
source it is difficult to infer what the cause of similar philological pro-
blems might be. 
 
4.6 Although the number of translation mistakes appears to be 
limited—most of them are due to scribal errors introduced into the 
Sanskrit manuscript on which T is based—the translation is sometimes 
difficult to understand and invariably leads to wrong conclusions 
about the context of a particular argument. For instance, at Ms B 
242b5 we find the reading nirdiṣṭapravartakaṃ. The same reading 
was evidently found in the manuscript used by Blo gros brtan pa, 
because he reproduces the term as ṅes par bstan pa 'jug par byed pa. 
The translation, however, makes no sense in the context, and any 
reader, who is unaware of the fact that Jinendrabuddhi quotes a 
passage from Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya (hence NBh), is left with the 
impression that he has missed the point. Jinendrabuddhi is merely 
                                                 
55 Cf. Translation no. 44. 
Introduction 36 
quoting Vātsyāyana's use of the term nirdiṣṭapravaktka in NBh on 
NS II.2:1: anirdiṣṭapravaktkam pravādapāramparyamaitihyam. The 
error is presumably an old one, but without tracing the correct Sanskrit 
reading to the original source, it would have been difficult to identify 
the error and emend the text. 
 
4.7 It is difficult to explain why Blo gros brtan pa would translate 
the term samākhyāsambandhapratīti (Ms B 241a6)56 as mtshuṅs pa 
ñid ces bya ba’i ’brel pa rtogs pa unless we assume that his 
manuscript erroneously left a space between samākhyā and the rest of 
the compound, which is likely to be true. Consequently he must have 
interpreted samākhyā as a qualifier of sambandhapratīti (f.). 
Moreover, he appears to have read samākhyā as a derivative of 
samāna, or he may have conjectured that the correct reading should be 
samānya. It is not clear why Blo gros brtan pa, employs the speech 
units ñid and ces bya ba. No matter what motivated the translation, it 
is utterly incomprehensible in the context. The term samākhyā-
sambandhapratīti, however, is found in Vātsyāyana’s commentary on 
the same sūtra, namely NS II.2:1. These examples illustrate the nature 
of the philological problems involved in studying the Sanskrit and 
Tibetan versions of PSṬ. In spite of the fact that the Tibetan 
translation of PSṬ is excellent it is clear that without having recourse 
to the original Sanskrit version it is difficult to understand why certain 
Tibetan passages are meaningless, unless one is in a position to 
identify the cause of the philological problem as being based upon a 
faulty Sanskrit manuscript or misinterpretation of its readings. 
 
4.8 In spite of its occasional faults the Sanskrit manuscript shows 
that the Tibetan version of PSṬ V reflects a Sanskrit version that in 
general appears to have been similar to the one recorded by the scribe 
who copied Ms B. In a few places there are minor gaps in PSV V. 
Since they also occur in T, which for this reason is impossible to 
construe, it is obvious that the Sanskrit source on which T is based 
descends from a similar Ms. Apart from minor gaps in Ms B as 
reflected in T, it is possible to infer from the Tibetan translation that 
there is one of approximately seven lines between Ms B 237a7 and 
238a1. The missing passage is part of Jinendrabuddhi’s comment 
upon PSV V 46. The commentary of the entire paragraph is repro-
duced in T, which contains several pratīkas; and there is no reason to 
assume that in the process of the manuscript transmission seven lines 
                                                 
56 Cf. Appendix 3 where the Sanskrit phrase is edited. 
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of text were suddenly deleted. As the folios contain seven lines recto 
and verso the conclusion seems inevitable: the otherwise conscienti-
ous scribe who copied his manuscript as far as Ms B 237a7 forgot to 
turn the folio and copy 237b1f; instead he continued copying 238a1f.  
 
4.9 This paragraph is particularly important as it presents Dignā-
ga’s view on pratibhā, which is influenced by Bharthari’s philosophy 
of language. The Sanskrit restoration of this crucial paragraph is there-
fore not fully supported by Sanskrit pratīkas, which is a minor 
problem as it is written with the background of Bharthari’s vocabu-
lary and philosophy of language. It has not been possible to trace the 
Sanskrit equivalent to the Tibetan term lcags kyu med pa to any of 
Bharthari’s extant works or his commentators’ explanations. The 
Tibetan translations lcags kyu med pa yin pa’i phyir ro V : lcags kyu 
med pa’i phyir ro K reproduce in all likelihod the expression 
*niraṅkuśatvāt. Surprisingly, I have succeded in tracing the term to 
Śaṅkara’s Brahmasūtrabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra II.1.3:11. Addressing 
the nature of utprekṣā Śaṅkara describes it as unfettered, like Dignāga. 
There is no reason to assume that Śaṅkara’s use of the expression 
niraṅkuśa stems from Dignāga’s work. On the contrary, it mirrors 
undoubtedly Bharthari’s vocabulary and an aspect of his philosophy 
of language about which we are not well informed.57 
 
 
5 The Sanskrit Restoration of PSV V 
 
5.1 Jinendrabuddhi’s ṭīkā is a valuable source of information on 
the original Sanskrit version of PSV. With the background of the 
Sanskrit evidence it is possible to solve many of the nearly 
inextricable philological difficulties that beset the study of the Tibetan 
translations of PSV, assuming that Jinendrabuddhi quotes and 
comments upon the original Sanskrit version of the treatise. This, 
however, is not absolutely certain as he relied upon information 
contained in at least one earlier ṭīkā on PSV as I have shown (see 
3.14), and he may therefore not always quote from the original 
Sanskrit version of PSV, but rather from whatever material he found 
included in the sources that he was using when writing his ṭīkā. 
 
5.2 PSṬ contains a considerable number of pratīkas, which are of 
inestimable importance for interpreting the vocabulary and syntax of 
                                                 
57 Cf. Translation no.s 574-75. 
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the Tibetan translations of PSV V: the Sanskrit evidence indicates that 
Jinendrabuddhi in many cases chose to paraphrase Dignāga’s original 
Sanskrit exposition in order to present his views in his own words, 
adding glosses in the well-established manner of Indian commenta-
tors, as a means of explaining his terse statements. Thus they are 
helpful in restoring the Sanskrit text underlying its Tibetan conver-
sions. Jinendrabuddhi also quotes passages from works written by 
Dignāga’s contemporary opponents like the Sāṅkhya philosopher 
Mādhava and an unknown Jaina vaibhāgika “distinctionist”, who 
criticised the apoha theory. These examples would indicate that Dig-
nāga in general incorporated into his own presentation, although in 
slightly edited form, quotations from works written by authors, whose 
views he addressed. For instance, when writing the important 
paragraph on pratibhā at PSV V: 46, which reflects Dignāga’s 
intimate knowledge of Bharthari’s philosophy of language, he quotes 
a slightly edited version of one of Bharthari’s own satements on the 
topic of pratibhā recorded in Vākyapadīyasvavtti I; Dignāga even 
incorporates into the pratibhā section of PSV V pādas lifted from 
Vākyapadīya. Thus, PSV V: 47 quotes pāda d and c of VP II 134-35, 
respectively.58 And in the passage at PSV V: 50a where Dignāga 
quotes two verses from VP II: 155-56 he incorporates edited extracts 
from Bharthari’s svavtti on these verses.59  
 
5.3 Under these circumstances, I have attempted exempli gratia to 
restore as much as possible of PSV V into Sanskrit.60 I think it is 
necessary to emphasize, though, that the proposed restorations reflect 
the nature of their primary sources viz. PSṬ and the limited number of 
quotations of PSV V recorded in independent Sanskrit sources. From a 
strictly philological point of view all of these are secondary sources. 
As the occasional differences between the text upon which 
Jinendrabuddhi comments and the versions recorded in K and V 
would indicate, the transmission of PSV may not have been uniform, 
and the fifth chapter is no exception, as the evidence from other 
chapters of PSV would indicate. This divergence is difficult to 
understand, unless we assume that the Sanskrit manuscripts of PSV 
that were in circulation at the time when the two translator teams 
completed their efforts had been subject to textual changes and 
interpolations. The difference of readings is reflected, for instance, in 
the Tibetan versions of the vtti on PSV V: 3 upon which 
                                                 
58 See Translation no.s 580-81. 
59 See Pind 2003. 
60 The first chapter of PSV is restored by Ernst Steinkellner and published online.  
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Jinendrabuddhi comments (see 2.14). This paragraph differs markedly 
from the Tibetan translations of K and V, which, moreover, exhibit 
individual differences that cannot merely be attributed to incorrect 
renderings of the Sanskrit manuscripts that Kanakavarman and 
Vasudharakṣita were translating into Tibetan. In cases like this I have 
adopted the readings suggested by PSṬ, except when K and V support 
each other against the readings of PSṬ. 
 
5.4 The Sanskrit restoration is one strictu sensu: the restored 
paragraphs only comprise those parts of PSV V which PSṬ V and 
independent sources make it possible to reconstruct with reasonable 
certainty. I have only attempted to fill in the lacunae in a limited 
number of cases, where the context and parallels make it possible to 
suggest a hypothetical restoration that is beyond doubt. These 
passages are enclosed in < >. As part of the annotations I have also 
restored passages from other chapters of Dignāga’s PSV based upon 
critically edited versions of the corresponding paragraphs of Jinendra-
buddhi’s PSṬ, when they shed light on issues which Dignāga 
addresses in PSV V. The text of the restored Sanskrit passages is 
presented in separate annotations, indicated by square brackets in 
bold, numbered 1 through 320. For each note, the relevant pratīkās 
and paraphrases found in PSṬ as well as quotations traced to 
independent Sanskrit philosophical literature are quoted. In the 
apparatus I have underlined all words and passages of Jinendra-
buddhi’s paraphrases that match the Tibetan versions of K or V. It is 
thus possible to follow how I interpret the Sanskrit evidence of PSṬ in 
the light of the Tibetan evidence of K and V, and linguistically justify 
the proposed Sanskrit restorations. All of the restored kārikās and 
prose passages of PSV V are combined in a separate Appendix to 
make it possible to read the restoration without the philological 
apparatus and text critical remarks. In all, it has been possible to 
restore approximately eighty percent of the fifty kārikās of PS V and 
approximately seventy five percent of PSV V. 
 
5.5 The Sanskrit restoration is based upon the following sources: 
 
1. The Tibetan translations recorded in K and V as mentioned above. 
2. Sanskrit verse and prose fragments of PS and PSV V quoted as pratīkas in 
Ms B of PSṬ V.  
 
3. Sanskrit paraphrases of PSV V traced to Ms B of PSṬ V.  
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4. Sanskrit verse and prose fragments of PSV V quoted in Sanskrit philo-
sophical literature.  
 
Sanskrit quotations or pratīkas embedded in PSṬ V do not 
constitute a philological problem per se unless they are contradicted 
by other sources. If more than one source contradicts a particular 
reading there is reason to assume that it is dubious. For instance, the 
reading vivecitaḥ that occur in the quotation of PS V 46b at TSP 
363,15-16 is contradicted by three sources viz. PSṬ V which reads 
vikalpitaḥ for vivecitaḥ, and KV which read rnam par brtags, thus 
corroborating PSṬ V. Whatever the source of this reading might have 
been, it is clearly secondary and should be rejected as spurious.61 In a 
similar case Ms B reads iṣṭā at PS V 27d as opposed to tulyā, the 
reading recorded at NCV 649,11, which both K and V corroborate. 
The reading tulyā is therefore preferable, especially as the reading iṣṭā 
necessitates a forced and dubious interpretation of the verse in which 
it occurs. 
 
5.6 In the case of pratīkas or Sanskrit quotations from other 
sources the principle has been to identify the Tibetan words or phrases 
of K and V that match the Sanskrit quotations. It is sometimes difficult 
to identify Sanskrit matches, as the syntax of Dignāga’s original 
Sanskrit writing and relevant terms are not always correctly 
reproduced in K and V, since the translators were having difficulties 
interpreting the Sanskrit manuscripts they were translating (see 2.1-
15). For instance, the term ktam, which is syntactically important for 
understanding the argument at PSV V: 28c-d, is only translated in K.62 
It occurs, however, in the paraphrase recorded in Jinendrabuddhi’s 
ṭīkā.63 In a few instances PSṬ V makes it possible to identify a clause 
that is missing in both K and V, although it is crucial for under-
standing Dignāga’s thought (see 2.8).  
 
5.7 If the Sanskrit restoration is based exclusively upon 
Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrases of Dignāga’s Sanskrit original, the 
problem of identifying suitable Sanskrit matches is sometimes 
considerable, especially when the Tibetan readings of K and V are 
problematic. In such cases the proposed Sanskrit restoration reflects 
                                                 
61 Abhayadevasūri, who relied on TSP, quotes the verse with the reading vivecitaḥ in 
his commentary on Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇam Vol. I: 188, 9. Thus, it is not a recent 
corruption. 
62 Cf. Translation no.s [189] and 368. 
63 Cf PSṬ Ms B 221a3-7 quoted ad loc. 
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the principle followed by Indian commentators when quoting and 
commenting on a passage that needs to be elucidated: the terms of the 
quotation are followed by their glosses. For example, the paraphrase of 
PSV V: 36ab at PSṬ Ms B 227b5ff reads sāmānyaśabdasya yat 
ktyaṃ pratyāyyam. tat punaḥ kīdśam? arthāntaravyudāsaḥ sa sva-
bhedāpratikṣepeṇa. The Tibetan translations show that this paraphrase 
is basically a verbatim reproduction of the first sentence of Dignāga’s 
prose commentary on PS V: 36ab including an explanatory gloss 
pratyāyyam followed by the rhetorical question tat punaḥ kīdśam? In 
the present case K and V do not contain identifiable matches for 
ktyam, which Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase would seem to presup-
pose. Instead of the expected Tibetan reading bya ba both K and V 
read byas pa (= ktam), and one cannot exclude the possibility that this 
translation reflects the Sanskrit reading of their manuscripts, although 
it is incomprehensible in the context, unless ktam is interpreted as a 
neuter ta-participle which is well established as an action noun64 
similar to ktyam in terms of its semantics. 
 
5.8 Fortunately the reading ktyaṃ is quoted by Siṃhasūri at NCV 
730,1ff followed by the gloss vyāpāraḥ: sāmānyaśabdasya hi sadāder 
yo 'rthāntaravyudāso “asan na bhavati” iti ktyaṃ vyāpāraḥ sa 
tvayettham avadhāritaḥ svabhedāpratikṣepeṇeti. In this case the gloss 
vyāpāraḥ “function” covers as a matter of fact the denotation of 
ktyam much better than Jinendrabuddhi’s gloss pratyāyyam. 
Siṃhasūri’s quotation contains the crucial particle hi, which is to be 
construed with iti. But Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase omits hi. As 
ktyam65 occurs in an identical context in PSṬ and NCV the reading is 
beyond doubt and we can safely adopt it for the purpose of restoring 
the original Sanskrit phrase. If Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrases do not 
contain any identifiable glosses and his exposition matches the 
Tibetan translations of V or K, it is reasonable to assume that he 
reproduces the Sanskrit version of PSV V in the form that was known 
to him with minor syntactical adjustments to his own presentation, like 
the omission of the particle hi. 
 
5.9  Sometimes Jinendrabuddhi resorts to the use of analytical 
strings (vigraha) as commentators often do in order to explain the 
scope of technical terms. For instance, the term naimittika that occurs 
in the restored phrase naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu at PSV V: 50a is explained 
                                                 
64 Cf. A III 3:114: bhāve napuṃsake ktaḥ. 
65 The semantics of ktyam encountered in Buddhist Sanskrit literature imitates MI 
kiccam. 
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at MS B 238b2-3 as follows: naimittikā jātiguṇakriyādravyaśabdāḥ. 
teṣu … anyāpohena sāmānyarūpeṇābhidhānaṃ sambhavati. The first 
sentence presents a gloss explaining what constitutes nimittikāḥ śab-
dāḥ. The Tibetan versions of K and V would seem to presuppose a 
phrase like *naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu, which Jinendrabuddhi’s explana-
tion corroborates. The original loc. pl. of the Sanskrit phrase is repro-
duced in the following explanation which introduces the loc. pl. teṣu. 
This pronominal locative merely has the function of imitating the 
original locative pl. of the definition of naimittikā °śabdāḥ, from 
which we only have to extract the term śabdāḥ in order to restore the 
original Sanskrit phrase. Thus the grammatical structure of Dignāga’s 
text is carefully reflected in Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation, which 
makes it possible to restore the original sentence complement in the 
locative: naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu. This restoration matches the syntax of 
the Tibetan translations of K and V and is mirrored in the subsequent 





6 Dignāga’s philosophy of anyāpoha 
  
 
6.1 The objective of this study is to present an analysis of the 
essential features of Dignāga’s apoha thesis as expounded in PSV V,66 
which is a crucial complement to Dignāga’s philosophy of inference 
as it presents the only definite exposition of his theory of induction. 
Dignāga develops in this central chapter the idea that joint absence 
(vyatiraka) of word and referent in contrast to their joint presence 
(anvaya) defines exclusion of other referents and simultaneously 
justifies the invariable concomitance of word or speech element and 
the thing denoted. Thus, by extension, joint absence establishes the 
invariable connection between the logical indicator (liṅga) and the 
thing indicated (liṅgin) because Dignāga claims that verbal cognition 
is subject to the same constraints as those that characterize knowledge 
obtained through inference.67  
 
6.2 All sources indicate that anyāpoha was conceived as a 
substitute for real general properties. Kumārila claims, for instance, in 
the first śloka of his apoha critique, that exclusion of non-cows as 
sāmānya in principle does not differ from the general property 
cowhood (gotva) as real entity (vastu), and Dignāga rejects the 
assumption that real general properties are real entities. Kamalaśīla 
explains that Kumārila’s use of the term sāmānya in his presentation 
of the apoha doctrine presupposes Dignāga’s thesis that the general 
property (sāmānya) as denotable object is characterized by exclusion 
(apohalakṣaṇaṃ).68 The question is, however, in what way apoha 
could be presented as a general property like sāmānya, which 
contemporary Sanskrit grammarians and non-Buddhist philosophers 
assumed is the semantic condition for the application of words 
(pravttinimitta). As the Buddhists reject as untenable the idea that 
extramental real general properties inherent in the object of denotation 
are grounds of application of words, they were somehow forced to 
present a theoretically consistent explanation of the cause of denota-
tion, which dispenses with real general properties like existence 
                                                 
66 The analysis draws on the explanations of crucial paragraphs of PSV V presented 
in the annotations to the translation. 
67 Cf. the frequently quoted statement, which Buddhist writers attribute to Dignāga: 
apohaḥ śabdaliṇgābhyām eva pratipādyate. See PVSV 25,27f; TSP 367, 17 
commenting on Kumārila’s statement at ŚV Apohavāda 73ab: na cānyavyāvtti-
muktā pravttiḥ śabdaliṇgayoḥ.  
68 Cf. TSP p. 360, 15: apohalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyam vācyatvenābhidhīyamānam. 
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(sattā) and substanceness (dravyatva) or the like. The apoha theory is 
thus very much part of the contemporary Indian philosophical scene at 
the time when Dignāga propounded his apoha doctrine. He addresses 
the inherent ontological difficulties that attach to the thesis of real 
general properties in the second chapter of PSV II:1669 and substitutes 
anyāpoha for real general properties, claiming at PSV V: 36d that 
anyāpoha has the same properties as real general properties without 
being subject to the same absurd consequences as the thesis that real 
general properties constitute the semantic condition for denotation.  
 
6.3 In PSV V Dignāga also claims that words denote things 
(bhāva) as qualified by preclusion (nivtti) of other referents (arthān-
taranivttiviśiṣṭa).70 In a theoretically related fragment—presumably 
from the SPVy—we find a similar phrase which substitutes vastu for 
bhāva, claiming that the referent is a real object qualified by 
preclusion: nivttiviśiṣṭaṃ vastu śabdārthaḥ.71 It is thus clear that the 
śabdārtha qualified by nivtti is conceived as a real object (vastu) or 
entity (bhāva). These definitions of denotation and the concomitant 
function of nivtti raise the obvious question of what a term like nivtti 
denotes in this particular context. Neither nivtti nor its synonyms 
have verbal implications per se. In grammatical contexts nivtti is 
recorded in the sense of cessation or removal and is thus semantically 
related to apoha in the sense of exclusion. It is difficult, however, to 
relate these terms and their well attested denotations to verbal 
knowledge and inference as described by Dignāga in PSV V.  
 
6.4 Dignāga’s apoha doctrine and its basic presuppositions as 
presented in PSV V were never adopted by post-Dignāga Buddhist 
scholars without modifications. Their views on anyāpoha were 
inevitably influenced by the works of the central Buddhist philosopher 
Dharmakīrti, and post-Dharmakīrti thinkers. In fact, the theory of 
knowledge underlying the original version of the apoha doctrine as 
expounded in PSV V is incompatible with its subsequent elaboration 
by Dharmakīrti. In spite of an undeniable family likeness between 
Dignāga’s original theory and Dharmakīrti’s version of it, there are 
substantial differences between them, and we must differentiate 
between Dignāga’s views and those of Dharmakīrti and later 
generations of Buddhist thinkers. Thus it is obvious that the 
                                                 
69 Cf. PSV II: 16 restored and translated no. 504.  
70 Cf. the crucial paragraph PSV V: 36d. 
71 Cf. Translation no. 182. 
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expression “apoha theory” does not designate a uniform theory with 
an invariable set of theoretical presuppositions. This study therefore 
aims at shedding light on the theoretical obsqurities of the apoha 
theory by focussing on some of Dignāga’s statements in PSV V, 
which are crucial to our understanding of its basic presuppostions, and 
hopefully thereby paving the way for an in-depth study of what 
suggested to Dharmakīrti to reformulate, in his remarkable œuvre, 
some of the basic presuppositions of the apoha doctrine in the light of 
the criticism it met with. 
  
Verbal knowledge as inference 
 
6.5 There is one assumption whose importance far outweighs all 
other elements of the apoha theory: Dignāga’s claim that verbal 
knowledge (śābda) and inference (anumāna) share the same 
properties. He rejects the commonly acknowledged doctrine that 
verbal knowledge presupposes the existence of real general properties 
inherent in things. In PSV II:1672 he addresses its absurd 
consequences and substitutes anyāpoha for real general properties, 
claiming that exclusion has the same properties as real general 
properties without being subject to the same consequences. Thus 
Dignāga presents the apoha theory as a theoretical achievement 
superior to the doctrine of real general properties.73 The question is in 
what way it is possible for Dignāga to maintain that there is a 
functional homology of exclusion or preclusion of other referents and 
real general properties without generating an ontological aporia 
similar to the one he has shown pertains to the thesis of real general 
properties. In the first paragraph of PSV V:1 Dignāga propounds the 
fundamental hypothesis of the apoha theory, that verbal knowledge 
(śābda) does not differ from inference (anumāna)74 since a word 
denotes its referent (artha) by means of exclusion of other referents 
(anyāpoha) in the same way as indicators like “being produced” 
(ktakatva). And Dignāga continues explaining that when a word is 
                                                 
72 Cf. Translation no. 504 where PSV II: 16 is restored and translated.  
73 Cf. PSV V: 36d where its superior merits (guṇotkarṣa) are mentioned; cf. 
Translation. 
74 This assumption, however, was re-interpreted by Dignāga’s influential commen-
tator, Dharmakīrti, whose work was to dominate Buddhist epistemology and logic 
for centuries. Dharmakīrti’s work shows that the inferential nature of verbal cogni-
tion was no longer of any theoretical concern because he re-interprets Dignāga’s 
original statement about the inferential nature of verbal cognition in such a way that 
the inference is presented as one of the speaker’s intention (vivakṣā) and not the 
referent (artha) as Dignāga originally assumed. Cf. Translation no. 9. 
Introduction 46 
applied to an object (viṣaya) it denotes any given part or attribute 
(aṃśa) of it by exclusion of other referents (artha), like the general 
property “being produced”,75 which excludes things that are not 
produced (aktaka).76  
 
6.5 The reason why Dignāga introduces the abstract term 
ktakatva in the context of explaining that verbal cognition is 
inferential, is to show that exclusion of other referents (anyāpoha) is 
in fact equivalent to a general property (sāmānya). This is shown by 
an important passage at PSV V:33ab in which Dignāga explains that:  
 
In the exact same way as the general property (sāmānyam) ‘being 
produced’ (ktakatvam) is [explained] to indicate 'impermanence' 
(anityatvagamakam) through its exclusion of what is not a product 
(aktakavyudāsena), the general property in a word (śabde) is explained 
[to be] due to its exclusion of other words (śabdāntaravyavacchedena); 
and only through this (tenaiva ca) does it indicate its referent 
(arthapratyāyakaḥ).  
 
Although this explanation is intended to describe what constitutes the 
general property in a word (śabde) the explanation is evidently 
presented on the analogy of the general property in a referent (arthe), 
which by definition is characterized as sāmānyalakṣaṇa. Thus, 
Dignāga’s explanation makes it possible to conclude that the general 
property “being produced” (ktakatva) qualifies produced things 
(ktaka) by excluding them from things that are not produced 
(aktaka). Dignāga rejects the view that general properties are 
ontologically singular entities inherent in things, but he does not reject 
the idea that there are general properties, although of a different order. 
In fact, he defines general properties as exclusion of other, which 
leads to the question of how he justifies establishing an invariable 
connection between indicator and indicated and word and referent 
with the background of preclusion or exclusion of other.  
 
6.7 Dignāga’s theory of knowledge is characterised by a well-
known set of dichotomies. The object of immediate sensation 
(pratyakṣa) is the svalakṣaṇa, i.e. the individual character of things, 
which by definition is beyond linguistic representation. The object of 
the indicator or the word and the thing indicated or the referent is the 
sāmānyalakṣaṇa, i.e. the general character of things, and the 
                                                 
75 Cf. Translation PSV V: 33ab. 
76 For the implications of Dignāga’s introduction of the abstract affix tva after 
ktaka, cf. Translation no. 14. 
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sāmānyalakṣaṇa is according to Dignāgan epistemology the domain 
of inference and language. The term sāmānyalakṣaṇa is rarely used in 
PSV and Dignāga never defines its exact scope, but limits himself to 
state without any qualifications that it is the object of inference and 
verbal communication. However, the explanation at PSV I 2c2-d1 is in 
a way an implicit definition of the content of the term: 
 
svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ hy avyapadeśyavarṇatvābhyāṃ varṇādi 
ghītvā nityatayā cānityaṃ varṇādīti manasā saṃdhatte.77  
  
“For having perceived a colour or the like through its individual and 
general characters, i.e., through what is not denotable and colourness, 
[respectively], as well as through [the general property] impermanence, 
one combines [the two] at the thought: “Colour, etc., is impermanent.” 
 
In this phrase we notice the distinction Dignāga makes between the 
general property varṇatva, i.e. colourness and the term varṇa denoting 
a particular colour. He also introduces the abstract term anityatā in 
order to explain the judgement “colour or the like (varṇādi) is 
impermanent (anityam).” Although Dignāga never defines sāmānya-
lakṣaṇa and the implications of this term in the context of Dignāga’s 
ontology and theory of knowledge have never been answered, it is 
clear as shown by PSV V:33ab quoted above that sāmānya is defined 
in terms of exclusion of other referents.  
 
6.8 Exclusion of other referents presupposes that the relation 
(sambandha) between the word and the thing it denotes is subject to 
the constraints of invariable concomitance (avinābhāva): they are 
supposed to be invariably concomitant (avinābhāvin) in the same way 
as the logical indicator and the indicated. Dignāga assumes that the 
relation (sambandha) between the word and its referent is comparable 
to that of the inferential sign (hetu or liṅga) and the thing it indicates, 
which shows that Dignāga established his philosophy of language on 
the basis of his logical theory. This is confirmed by a passage in the 
chapter on the role of exemplification (dṣṭānta) presented at PSV 
IV:578 in which he explains the connection between the word and its 
referent in terms of the rules that must be observed for establishing the 
connection between the indicator and the thing indicated. In other 
words, they are subject to the triple constraints of the trairūpya.79 The 
                                                 
77 For a translation and analysis of this phrase, cf. Translation no. 1. 
78 Cf. Translation no. 9.  
79 Cf. Translation no. 9. 
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severe criticism which Kumārila, for instance, levelled at Dignāga’s 
view of śabda as similar to the logical reason of an inference takes this 
assumption for granted,80 and PSV V and contemporary sources 
indicate beyond doubt that Dignāga established the apoha theory on 
the analogy of his philosophy of logic.  
 
6.9 Thus the postulated similarity of the logical indicator and the 
word are fundamental to the apoha theory. The question is how 
Dignāga avoids the absurd implication that the word occurs at the 
thing it indicates in the same way, for instance, as the logical indicator 
smoke, which could justifiably be said to occur at the thing it indicates 
viz. fire. His presentation and vocabulary makes constant use of the 
locative to denote the referent, which any word denotes. However, 
words do not occur at their referents like logical indicators. The word 
‘smoke,’ for instance, does not occur at smoke, nor at fire. The theory 
would thus seem to be based upon patently absurd assumptions. 
Dignāga’s critic, Kumārila, subjected this apparent absurdity to a 
thorough examination in the Śabdapariccheda chapter of his Śloka-
vārttika. The problem relates to the semantics of the locative and the 
ambiguities entailed by the application of the trairūpya to the presup-
positions of verbal knowledge without adjusting the expressions of the 
theory of logic to a different although comparable context, that of 
verbal knowledge.81 
 
6.10 Since Dignāga elaborated the apoha thesis on the basis of his 
philosophy of logic, it is essential to understand how the connection 
(sambandha) between a term and the thing it denotes is established as 
invariably connected (avinābhāvin). In PSV V: 50b towards the very 
end of the chapter, Dignāga describes how the connection between the 
word “panasa”, breadfruit tree, and a prototypical instance of a 
breadfruit tree is taught. The discussion centres on the question of 
whether or not verbal cognition is comparable to inference in the 
situation where someone is taught the denotation of words. Dignāga 
answers that learning the denotation of a word is not inference because 
learning the denotation of a word is the condition of apoha and thus of 
verbal cognition as inference. This paragraph addresses the process of 
                                                 
80 See Kumārila’s criticism at ŚV Śabdapariccheda 68-98. Cf. 6.9 below. 
81 Dignāga’s statements are ambiguous as their interpretation depends upon the 
meaning of his use of the locative. See PSV V: 34 and Translation no.s 416, 419 
where I suggest that it is possible to interpret the use of the locative in terms that are 
compatible with its use in Sanskrit grammatical literature and lexicography. 
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vyutpatti: teaching the denotation of a word by ostentation 
(hastasaṃjñā). 
 
6.11 Dignāga’s description of vyutpatti assumes that someone 
points to a prototypical example of a breadfruit tree, and explains “this 
is a breadfruit tree” (ayaṃ panasa). Thereby the learner understands 
the connection between the term “panasa” and the thing it denotes. 
Dignāga puts weight on the deitic function of the demonstrative 
pronoun “this” (ayaṃ) which accompanies the ostentation because the 
syntactical agreement between the pronoun and the term “panasa,” 
the name of the object, secures the grammatical validity of the 
reference. In PSV V: 50c Dignāga continues explaining that the 
connection (sambandha) between the word and its referent is mentally 
constructed at the thought “this is the word for that thing.” Vyutpatti 
thus implicates two separate moments: first, the moment of learning 
how a term is used by observing its application to its referent, and 
second, the subsequent moment of constructing the connection in the 
mind (manas).82 Dignāga closes the paragraph by pointing out that the 
connection between any term and the thing it denotes is similar to the 
connection between inference and inferred (anumānānumeya-
sambandha).  
 
6.12 However, the mentally constructed connection needs to be 
reified. That is, the person who is learning the denotation of a name 
like the word “panasa” or any other term through vyutpatti must 
ascertain that it refers to all instances of the breadfruit tree and not 
only to the prototype, which his teacher is showing him. However, it is 
impossible to justify the invariable connection of the term panasa and 
its referent, the breadfruit tree, by showing how it applies to every 
single instance as instances are infinite. Dignāga addresses the 
problem at PSV V:2b that a general term like “existent” does not 
denote all particulars (bheda) because 
 
it is impossible (aśakyaḥ) to tell (kartum) the connection (sambandhaḥ) of 
particulars [with a general term like ‘existent’] when they are infinite; and 
as the connection of the word [with particulars] is not told (aktasam-
bandhe śabde), it is not justified that it denote its referent because merely 
its own form is cognized (svarūpamātrapratīteḥ). 
 
                                                 
82 In a different context Dignāga explains that vyutpatti relates to observed instances 
of referents (dṣṭārtha), in other instances to those that are not observed 
(adṣṭārtha). Cf. Translation no. 631. 
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Denotation thus presupposes that the connection of a term like 
“existent” and its referent is established, which is not possible on the 
assumption that its connection with every particular instance is 
ascertained by enumeration showing every single referent, as 
particulars are infinite. In addition the use of the word “existent” is 
ambiguous as it denotes many different things like substances or 
qualities and so on. As mentioned above Dignāga addresses the 
problem of infinity of particulars at PSV V:2ab and presents at PSV 
V: 34 a solution to this classical problem of induction.  
 
6.13 He explains at that  
 
the word’s connection is feasible (sambandhasaukaryam) and there is no 
ambiguity (vyabhicāritā) as it is not observed (adṣṭeḥ) [to apply] to the 
referent of other words and is also (api) observed (darśanāt) [to apply] to 
a member (aṃśe) of its own referent.  
 
The explanation pivots on the implication of “observation” (darśana) 
and “non-observation” (adṣṭi) because Dignāga claims that the 
feasibility of the connection (sambandhasaukarya) depends upon the 
application of e.g. the term “existent” to an example of its referent and 
non-observation of its application to the referent of other words. The 
question is what the two terms imply in terms of theory of cognition. 
The following explanation gives the answer: Dignāga assumes that 
non-observation is the fundamental element of the process of 
reification. In fact, he equates non-observation to joint absence of 
word and referent and observation to their joint presence: 
 
For (hi) joint presence and joint absence (anvayavyatirekau) are a means 
(dvāram) to the word's denoting its referent. And these two are its 
application to what is similar and its non-application to what is dissimilar. 
In this case, however (tu), application to all that is similar is by necessity 
not statable with regard to any [referent] whatsoever (kva cit) because 
stating it is impossible (ākhyānāsambhavāt) as the referent is infinite 
(arthasyānantye). On the other hand, stating its non-application to what is 
dissimilar is possible, even though it is infinite (atulye saty apy ānantye), 
through mere non-observation (adarśanamātrena); and just therefore (ata 
eva ca) it has been explained that [the word's] denoting its own referent 
(svārthābhdhānam) is an inference from [its own referent's] exclusion 
from these [other referents] (tadvyavacchedānumānam), from its not 
being observed [to apply] to other [referents] than its own relata (svasam-
bandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanāt).  
 
6.14 Dignāga thus claims that it is easy to justify the connection by 
means of joint presence (anvaya) and absence (vyatireka) but he omits 
Introduction 51 
addressing the implications of the term (saukarya). We must therefore 
assume that the meaning of the term was evident to contemporary 
philosophers and that there was no need for explaining its 
implications. Dignāga’s presentation shows that the feasibility of the 
connection (sambandhasaukaryam) depends on the fact that the word 
is observed to apply to an instance of its referent and not observed to 
apply to the referents of other words. Non-observation, however, is of 
a different order than that of temporarily not observing a referent that 
is not where it would be expected to be, because it has been removed 
from its locus. It is noteworthy that Dignāga’s use of non-observation 
does not address non-observation of things that have been temporarily 
removed from their expected place, but rather the universal non-
existence in time and space of other things in the locus of the thing to 
which the indicator refers, and the same goes for the word and its 
denotation. Thus non-obervation ascertains the non-occurrence of 
other words or indicators in a context where the observer is able to 
perceive that e.g. the word “tree” denotes a tree and not any other 
thing with which it is incompatible in terms of its nature and the word 
used to denote it, and on the basis of this observation to generalize the 
non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent, and thereby 
to ascertain the invariable concomitance of word and referent. 
 
6.15 Dignāga’s use of the term “feasibility” becomes clear from the 
writings of non-buddhist philosophers, who address the implications 
of sambandhasaukarya. Dignāga presupposes that a person who is 
being taught the connection of word and referent (vyutptti) by 
ostentation (hastasaṃjñā) is standing in some place (ekadeśastha) 
next to a prototypical instance of the referent (artha), i.e., a member 
(aṃśa) of the domain of similar referents. A knowledgeable person 
points to the referent explaining that “this x is y”. As the referent thus 
defined occurs in a particular locus and no special conditions apply to 
it and its locus, the ekadeśastha may reify the application of y to any 
given x through the means of their joint presence (anvaya) and 
absence (vyatireka), their joint absence being ascertained merely 
through not observing (adarśanamātra) the application of y to any 
other thing but the referent x, inferring that y denotes all instances of 
similar things to the exclusion of all things occurring in the domain of 
dissimilar things.  
 
6.16 As mere non-observation of other things in the locus of the 
prototypical aṃśa is easily performed, Dignāga assumes that the 
reification of the connection between y and x is feasible on the basis of 
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mere non-observation, emphasizing the role of vyatireka, joint 
absence, as the primary means of establishing the connection, the 
object of non-observation being the non-existence (abhāva) of other 
referents in the locus of the prototypical example. It is therefore 
understandable that vyatireka was interpreted as the primary cause of 
exclusion being supported by mere non-observation of the word’s 
application to the referents of other words. It is obvious that non-
observation in this case does not refer to temporary non-observation of 
referents that might have been observed to occur in the locus of the 
taught referent on other occasions. The absense of other referents is 
substantial: no non-tree (avkṣa) is ever observed where a tree (vkṣa) 
is found. It is therefore possible to conclude from the use of any given 
term that the referents of other words are not found in the locus of the 
referent of a particular word which therefore excludes them from its 
scope. It is thus obvious that verbal knowledge as inference is based 
upon joint absence of word and referent, which presupposes the non-
existence (abhāva) of other things in the locus of the thing inferred.  
 
6.17 Only on this assumption is it possible to avoid the paradox of 
uncertainty and the ensuing doubt about the nature of the referent. As 
Dignāga explains:  
 
If, however, the inference were by means of joint presence 
(anvayadvāreṇa), the word ‘tree’ should not give rise to doubt 
(saṃśayaḥ) appearing as śiṃśapā, etc. (śiṃśapādyābhāsaḥ), about one 
and the same entity (ekasmiṃ vastuni). Yet, in the same way as there is 
doubt about it, there will also be doubt appearing as earthenness and 
substanceness, etc. However, since the word ‘tree’ is not observed to 
denote what is non-earthen, etc., the inference is only by means of joint 
absence (vyatirekamukhenaiva). 
 
In this explanation Dignāga addresses the implications of verbal 
knowledge as inference. The explanation addresses the extension of 
individual terms. The term “tree,” for instance, denotes different kinds 
of trees such as the śiṃśapā or the like. The argument addresses the 
logical implications of basic predication: a śiṃśapā is a tree, and a tree 
is an earthen object, and a substance, and so on. As there are more 
trees than śiṃśapās, and more earthen things than trees, and more 
substances than earthen things, the individual terms are related in a 
logical hierarchy according to their individual extension, which makes 
it possible to infer from the application of the term śiṃśapā that it is a 
tree (vkṣa), earthen (pārthiva), and a substance (dravya), and existent 
(san) and knowable (jñeya). Consequently the inference is based upon 
joint absence as it presupposes the exclusion of all non-trees from any 
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tree, which is the function of the word “tree,” and only exclusion of 
non-trees ascertains the validity of the inference. This raises the 
question of the purpose of a term like “non-tree.” 
 
6.18 Dignāga addresses this question in the commentary on PSV 
V:43b, which is a crucial paragraph of the apoha chapter:  
 
For the [word] does not exclude a different general property (anyāṃ 
jātim) for each individual substance (pratidravyam), but rather (kiṃ tarhi) 
with the intention of denoting the things to be excluded 
(vyavacchedyavivakṣayā) by means of a single general property (ekena 
sāmānyadharmena). And on this point it has been explained (uktaṃ 
cātra) that the inference [of the referent] is from mere non-observation [of 
the word’s application] to what belongs to the class of dissimilar things 
(vijātīye 'darśanamātreṇānumnam). 
 
Any word or speech element is thus seen to denote a prototypical 
observed instance of the referent but not to denote things that fall 
outside the scope of denotation of the word whose connection is being 
taught, i.e. anything that is dissimilar to the referent. Thus observation 
is context bound, as learning the denotation of any term relates to 
observation of individual instances of the referent and individual 
instances of the word applied to denote the referent. However, an 
inferential rule has to be established which makes it possible to infer 
that the word “tree” denotes the referent tree irrespective of its 
individual character. Whatever is dissimilar to the prototypical object 
is characterized by a single property (ekadharman) which is its being 
non-x. In order to express the absence of the property of being non-x 
in things that are x Dignāga coined the negative term non-x, which has 
the purpose to denote the single property (dharma) of things that are 
non-x. Thus the term non-x is derived from the positive term x by 
means of vivakṣā as a convenient means for denoting things that are 
dissimilar to any x. The terms “tree” and “non-tree”mirror a privative 
relation that concerns the non-existence of non-x in the locus of any x. 
Although Dignāga does not attribute reality to things that are 
aggregates of atoms, which are the only ultimate things that are 
ontologically real, it is obvious nonetheless that objects have a derived 
secondary reality, in spite of which it is still possible to maintain that 
cows or trees are discernible entities to which one may refer by the 
word “cow” or “tree”.  
 
6.19 This leads inevitably to the conclusion that the inferential 
status of verbal cognition is based upon the fact that any instance of a 
thing is dually marked: by its individual character which is only 
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accessible through perception and as such inexpressible and by its 
general character which is defined by exclusion, as the identity of any 
given cow as the referent of the word “cow” is due to the fact that it 
excludes non-cows. It is not possible to construe non-existence of non-
cows in the locus of any cow as an instance of double negation on 
which many discussions about apoha pivot. However, double negation 
does not exist. The word non-cow for instance is merely a secondary 
derivative of the word cow. It has been coined to denote anything that 
is not a cow: a typical apoha inference therefore reads “it is a cow as it 
is not a non-cow.” Non-cow, however, is only a generalized referent 
denoting the single property (ekadharma) that defines the negated 
referent of the word cow.  
 
6.20 Dignāga equates verbal cognition to inference by means of 
joint absence (vyatirekamukha),83 which explains why commentators 
compare apoha to vyatireka and unanimously refer to Dignāga´s 
apoha theory as “having joint absence as the chief thing” 
(vyatirekapradhāna).84 Classical Indian scholars interpret vyatireka as 
characterized by non-existence (abhāvalakṣaṇa),85 and Dignāga 
assumes that joint absence of word (śabda) and referent (artha) is 
equivalent to mutual non-existence of any speech unit and non-speech 
unit and any referent and non-referent, which is implied by his claim 
that existence of the nature of one thing presupposes the non-existence 
of the nature of other things.86 Jayamiśra, Kumārila’s commentator, 
interprets apoha in terms of itaretarābhāva “mutual non-existence,” 
which mirrors Dignāga’s basic assumption that apoha presupposes 
mutual non-existence of excluded and not excluded.87 With this 
background this study will address Dignāga’s attribution of all the 
commonly acknowledged features of real general properties to 
exclusion. 
 
6.21 Dignāga evidently conceived apoha as a substitute for real 
general properties. As mentioned above (5.2) the remarkable mīmaṃ-
saka philosopher Kumārila attributes the view to Dignāga that 
exclusion of non-cows (agonivtti) is equivalent to a general property 
                                                 
83 Cf. PSV V: 34: vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam.  
84 Cf. Translation no 188; Pind 1999: § 8. Kumārila´s commentator Jayamiśra refers 
to followers of Dignāga´s apoha theory as vyatirekavādins, cf. ŚVṬ 46, 18.  
85 Cf. Translation no 425. 
86 Cf. Translation PSV V: 45 and the statement: ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti.  
87 Cf. e.g. Translation no.s 466, 517, 523. 
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(sāmānya).88 Śāntarakṣita quotes the verse at TS 914 and his 
commentator Kamalaśīla explains that exclusion of non-cows as 
general property means general property as qualified by exclusion89 
(apohalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyam), and elsewhere he expressly equates 
apoha to non-existence (abhāva).90 This interpretation of the 
underlying purpose of the apoha theory is, for instance, confirmed by 
Kumārila, who states loc. cit. that “it is obvious that those who 
imagine that exclusion of non-cows (agonivtti) is the denotable 
general property (sāmānya) have designated by the term ”exclusion of 
non-cows” (agopohagir) nothing else but [the general property] 
cowhood (gotva) which is a real object (vastu).” Kumārila’s 
conclusion is clear: apoha is just another name for sāmānya, general 
property. Thus he indirectly corroborates the assumption that apoha is 
a substitute for general properties. However, the role of apoha as 
semantic justification for denotation similar to that of real general 
properties leaves many questions unanswered. 
 
6.22 Kumārila continues his criticism asking Dignāga to explain 
”what the entities (bhāva) [viz. cows] are, whose nature consists in 
exclusion of horses or the like (aśvādinivttyātma), as it has been 
explained [viz. by me, Kumārila] that a non-entity (abhāva) is 
equivalent to another entity (bhāvāntaram).” Thus, Kumārila, on the 
one hand, equates preclusion or exclusion, nivtti or apoha, with the 
category of general property (sāmānya), on the other hand, he 
interprets Dignāga’s view of exclusion as involving nothing but the 
privative opposition between different entities (bhāva), one being the 
negation of the other and thus a non-entity (abhāva), which Kumārila 
interpets as just a different entity (bhāvāntaram).91 Kumārila’s obser-
vation is not invented ad hoc. Indeed, there are statements in the fifth 
chapter of PSV that corroborate Kumārila’s introductory remarks of 
the apohavāda chapter of Ślokavārttika; and Dharmakīrti, for instan-
ce, addresses the question of how the general property is exclusion of 
other referents (katham idānīm anyāpohaḥ sāmānyam) at PVSV 
39,1ff in an important and theoretically charged paragraph of the 
                                                 
88 Cf. ŚV Apohavāda 1: agonivttiḥ sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ yaiḥ parikalpitam / gotvaṃ 
vastv eva tair uktam apogohagirā sphuṭam. 
89 Cf. Dharmakīrti’s definition of the general property of referents as qualified by 
exclusion: arthānāṃ yac ca sāmānyam anyavyāvttilakṣaṇam, yanniṣṭhās ta ime 
śabdā, na rūpaṃ tasya kiñcana, PV II 30ab. 
90 Cf. TSP p. 960,15. 
91 Cf. ŚV Apohavāda 1-2. Kumārila connects elsewhere in ŚV apoha as sāmānya to 
abhāva; cf. the important discusion in Śūnyavāda 135ff. 
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apoha section of PVSV.92 And the assumption that anyāpoha is 
equivalent to sāmānya is mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi too in an 
interesting discussion recorded in PSV II:4c.93 However, the question 
is, in what way apoha could be presented as a general property in 
contrast to real general properties as semantic condition for the 
application of words (pravttinimitta). Since the Buddhists rejected as 
untenable the idea that extramental real general properties inherent in 
things are grounds of application of words, they were somehow forced 
to present a theoretically consistent explanation of the cause of 
denotation, which dispenses with real general properties like existence 
(sattā) and substanceness (dravyatva) or the like.  
 
6.23 The apoha thesis is centred on exclusion as qualifier of the 
referent of any word. In a central passage Dignāga claims that words 
denote things (bhāva) as qualified by preclusion (nivtti) of other 
referents (arthāntaranivttiviśiṣṭa).94 In a theoretically related 
fragment—presumably from the SPVy—we find a similar phrase 
which substitutes vastu for bhāva, claiming that the referent is a real 
                                                 
92 I made the following observation in Pind 1991 p. 271-72:”One thing is clear: the 
apoha theory represents Dignāga’s solution to the epistemological problem raised by 
his denial of the existence of universals (jāti or sāmānya). As is well-known, they 
were conceived by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika tradition as ubiquitous entities inherent in 
substances (dravya), thereby differentiating them (viśiṣṭa) as belonging to a certain 
class of things having certain definable features. In fact, Dignāga’s apoha theory 
only becomes fully understandable when we realize that he used it as a substitute for 
universals, in contexts where the Nyāyavaiśeṣika school of philosophy would 
formulate its theories with reference to the existence of universals. Thus, for 
instance, the Dignāgan expression arthāntaranivttiviśiṭa is the exact equivalent of 
the Nyāyavaiśeṣika jātiviśiṣṭa. Moreover, in the important section of the vtti on PS 
V 36d [q.v.], he explicitly attributes the properties of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika universal 
(jāti) to the apoha ... It appears from a revealing passage in the vtti ad PS II 16, in 
which Dignāga shows the consequences of the assumption that universals are real 
entities, that certain philosophers attempted to solve the problem of how to justify 
the existence of universally valid connections between properties [e.g., between 
smoke and fire], by claiming that knowing the universal in a single substratum is 
equivalent to knowing it in all. This claim is understandable since it was tacitly 
assumed that universals would always instantiate in the same way. Hence they could 
serve as a means of establishing universally valid connections of the kind that was 
required by the development of contemporary logical theory. However, if one rejects 
the idea of the universal as untenable, one is left with the problem of accounting for 
the possibility of universally valid connections. Dignāga evidently solved this 
fundamental epistemological problem with reference to the apoha theory.” 
93 Cf. Translation no. 2.2 (1) where Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation is quoted and 
translated. 
94 Cf. the crucial paragraph PSV V: 36d. 
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object qualified by preclusion: nivttiviśiṣṭaṃ vastu śabdārthaḥ.95 It is 
thus clear that the śabdārtha is conceived as a real object (vastu) or 
entity (bhāva) qualified by nivtti. These definitions of denotation and 
the concomitant function of nivtti raise the obvious question of what 
a term like nivtti denotes in this particular context. Neither nivtti nor 
its synonyms have verbal implications per se. In grammatical contexts 
nivtti is recorded in the sense of cessation or removal, which implies 
preclusion and is thus semantically related to apoha in the sense of 
exclusion. It is difficult, however, to relate these terms and their well 
attested denotations to verbal knowledge and inference as described 
by Dignāga in PSV V. In order to understand the implications of 
Dignāga´s statements it is necessary to review each of his claims. In 
the first place it is necessary to address the claim that verbal 
knowledge is inferential, because it presupposes invariable 
connection, i.e. concomitance between the word and its referent. 
 
6.24 The evidence recorded in PSV V clarifies the issue. It shows 
unexpectedly that the apoha theory pivots on the concept of non-
existence (abhāva) and describes non-existence of other referents or 
words in the referent (arthe) or in the word (śabde) as the foundation 
of preclusion of things and words, thus seemingly imitating well-
established philosophical usage among Sanskrit grammarians and non-
Buddhist philosophers: it is not inherent real general properties in 
things or words that are the causes of application of words and identity 
of words, but rather non-existence or preclusion of other, whether 
things or words. Thus Dignāga attributes the properties of real general 
properties to exclusion of other referents. A crucial passage at PSV V: 
45 explains that the statement that “the nature of one thing is the non-
existence of the nature of other things” (ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram 
iti), has been formulated with regard to (prati) the denotable [object].” 
Thus the sāmānyalakṣaṇa lies outside the domain of perception and 
must be considered an abstract entity comparable to a type.  
 
6.25 The main question is in what way it is possible for Dignāga to 
maintain that non-existence of other things understood as exclusion or 
preclusion of other referents and real general properties are 
homologous without generating an aporia similar to the one that 
pertains to the thesis that each general property inherent in every 
single object of denotation is the cause of application of words 
(pravttinimitta). Dignāga’s claim at PSV V: 36d that properties 
                                                 
95 Cf. Translation no. 182. 
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(dharma) of exclusion like “being one, eternity, and extension to each 
single particular” (ekatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāpti) are similar to 
those of real general properties (jāti)96 is difficult to understand with 
the background of apoha as characterized by joint absence (vyatireka) 
or non-existence (abhāva). Dignāga’s justification for this claim is 
particularly illuminating.  
 
6.26 He explains that these properties are confined to exclusion 
 
because (1) [exclusion of other referents] is not a particular (abhedāt), 
because (2) its substratum is not discontinued (āśrayasyāvicchedāt), and 
because (3) its referent is cognized completely (ktsnārthapratīteḥ).  
 
The explanation first addresses the question of the distribution of 
apoha among the particulars like a real general property whose 
postulated oneness (ekatva) is transformed into a particular because of 
its distribution among the particulars. This argument is only 
understandable with the background of the postulate that “exclusion of 
other referents,” anyāpoha is qualified by non-existence (abhāva) of 
other referents in the referent. And non-existence is not, like real 
general properties, divisible because mere non-existence as qualifier 
of things implies absence of other things from their substrata. It is 
noteworthy that Dignāga introduces the term āśraya, substratum, to 
justify that anyāpoha is eternal like general properties, because this 
term was commonly used among contemporary grammarians and 
philosophers to denote the substratum of real general properties. The 
argument seems obscure, but Dignāga intends to explain that since 
apoha has substrates and as substrates of non-existence are not 
discontinued, anyāpoha is eternal. The substratum of anyāpoha thus 
mirrors the objects (vastu) or things (bhāva) which according to 
Dignāga are qualified by preclusion of other referents (anyārtha-
nivttiviśiṣṭa). As all substrata of the same kind are qualified by non-
existence of other referents Dignāga concludes that their knowledge is 
comprised by exclusion of other referents. It is noteworthy that 
Dignāga takes care to emphazise that exclusion is not just another type 
of general property (bhāva)97. However, non-existence per se is an 
                                                 
96 Cf. PSV V: 36d. 
97 Cf. PSV V: 36c; 38d; cf. Siṃhasūri’s critique at NCV 735,17-18: abhāvāntara-
tvād arthāntarāpohasyāpohavān arthaḥ śabdavācyo na bhavati, ato nāpoho 
viśeṣaṇaṃ nāpohavān so 'rtha iti yadi tvayeṣṭam: “If you claim that since the 
exclusion of other referents is not a different [kind of] entity, exclusion is not a 
qualifier and the referent is not exclusion possessing.” NCV 734,20: atha svamatena 
brūṣe na sāmānyaṃ na vyāvttimad iti kutas tadviśiṣṭavastvabhidhānam. khapuṣpa-
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indivisible absence, and the universal non-existence of other referents 
in any particular referent, e.g. a tree, is the object of inference which 
qualifies verbal knowledge (śābda) as not different from inference. 
 
6.27 As shown in PSV V: 34 Dignāga claims that the inference is 
based upon joint absence which he qualifies as inference from 
exclusion of what is other than the referent. Dignāga never presents an 
apoha inference, but Mallavādi’s commentator Siṃhasūri gives an 
example of such inference at NCV 732,10-13:  
 
arthāntarāpohaḥ sad ity asan na bhavatīti nāsadbhāvamātram evocyate, 
kiṃ tarhi, arthāntarāpohena viśiṣṭaṃ vastv eva sad ity ucyate, yasmin 
vastuni so 'pohaḥ kriyate, tac ca dravyaṃ śabdārthaḥ, nāpohamātram. sa 
cāpohaviśiṣṭo 'rtho dravyādiḥ sacchabdena vyāpto 'parityāgāt, na tu 
sākṣād uktaḥ: 
 
 “Exclusion of other referents as in the statement “it is existent as it is not 
non-existent” does not merely express its being non-existent, but rather, 
that the entity for whose sake the exclusion is effected, is indeed an entity 
which, being qualified by exclusion of other referents, is said to be 
“existent.” And this substance is the referent of the word, not mere 
exclusion. And the referent that is qualified by exclusion viz. a substance, 
etc., is encompassed by the word “existent” because it is not rejected by 
it, but it is not denoted directly.”  
 
At 752,21-22 he presents a similar example of an apoha 
inference98: 
 
yatraivādarśanam uktaṃ vkṣābhāve 'vkṣe, tato vyavacchedānumānam 
'avkṣo na bhavati' iti. evaṃ ca ktvā vkṣaśabdād dravyatvādyanu-
mānam upapannam bhavati:  
 
“Only with regard to the thing about which non-observation is stated, 
i.e. with regard to the non-existence of a tree which is a non-tree, the 
inference is from its exclusion from this [non-tree] at the thought “it is 
not a non-tree”; and on such grounds the inference of substanceness, 
etc., from the word “tree” is justified.” 
 
Verbal cognition as inference is thus based upon what the inferred 
thing is not e.g. a tree which is not a non-tree. The latter term is as 
                                                                                                                  
śekharaviśiṣṭavandhyāputrābhidhānavat: “Now, if you say in accordance with your 
own theory that [exclusion of other] is neither a general property, nor is [the 
referent] exclusion possessing, then how could the [word] denote a thing as qualified 
by it [viz. exclusion]. It is like denoting the son of a barren woman as qualified by a 
wreath of sky flowers”!  
98 Cf. Translation no. 427. 
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mentioned above an instance of what Dignāga designates as vyavac-
chedyavivakṣā intention to denote the excluded objects, “non-tree” 
denoting things as qualified by the single property (ekadharma), non-
existence of trees, and the term “tree” as excluding these. As appears 
from Siṃhasūri’s presentation of an apoha inference the negation “is 
not” (na bhavati) merely conveys the notion of negation of non-
existence (abhāva), and in the present context the notion of negation 
of non-existence of non-trees. An apoha inference would thus seem to 
be an instance of the type of inference known as kevalavyatirekin 
which is a purely negative type.99  
 
 
                                                 




6.28 Dignāga attempted to show that observation of a prototype of 
the referent of a word teaches the relation of the word to its referent, 
which is reified by mere non-observation, i.e. by not observing that 
the word denotes other things. Thus the apoha doctrine pivots on non-
existence (abhāva) of other things in the referent. Exclusion is thus in 
the final analysis a matter of ontology. The theory, so it seems, 
presupposes an extreme ontological parsimony: things are aggregates 
of atoms which by definition are beyond perception. Dignāga quotes a 
sāmkhya verse to the effect that atoms are not perceptible. Thus words 
denote things as aggregates of atoms, and the aggregates are the things 
that exclude other things in accordance with their nature. What 
Dignāga’s critics found unaceptable was the idea that an absence may 
qualify things like a general property. The qualifying function 
however, is constructed on an absence of other things from the 
referent. It is in the nature of the referent to exclude from its locus any 
other referent. The absence is thus basically inscribed in the nature of 
the referent as a defining property. The idea appears to have been that 
the absence of other things from any particular referent is equivalent 
to a general property and as absence is indivisible, the apoha theory 
avoids the ontological problems of the view that denotation 
presupposes real general properties inherent in things.  
 
6.29 Dignāga established the apoha theory on the analogy of real 
general properties. As he rejects the assumption that denotation 
presupposes that real general properties inherent in the objects of 
denotation define the identity of verbal denotation and cognition, he 
must have realised that a possible way of accounting for the identity 
and difference of things as referents, i.e. as denotable objects, would 
be to start from the principle of the mutual absence of any given x 
from the loci of all non-x. This could be formalised by means of joint 
presence and absence (anvayavyatireka) as a qualifier-qualified 
relation in which the predominant joint absence of all non-x from any 
given locus of x qualifies the latter as x. Induction presupposes, of 
course, vyutpatti, teaching the connection of any given word to the 
thing it denotes, which involves identification of the referent by 
ostentation accompanied by the use of the demonstrative pronoun 
“this,” as Dignāga explains at PSV V 50b-c.  
 
6.30 Dignāga conceived exclusion or preclusion as a generalized 
absence of all non-x from all x. Thus the inferential component of the 
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theory is based on the principle that since no non-x is found in the 
locus of any x it is safe to conclude that the term used to denote x 
accomplishes this through joint absence (vyatireka). The connection 
established presupposes observing a knowledgable person who 
teaches the denotation by pointing at the referent (if the referent is an 
observable entity) saying this is x, the use of the demonstartive 
pronoun ascertaining through co-reference (sāmānādhikaraṇya) the 
linguistic validity of the reference. Since non-existence of other things 
in the referent is indivisible, non-existence does not entail the usual 
problems that attach to the theory of real universals. If they are 
singular real entities they become particulars when divided among the 
infinite number of individual referents. This problem, however, does 
not affect non-existence which being indivisible is adduced by Dignā-
ga for defining the identity of things. If any x is not non-x, and non-x 
as already mentioned is not to be understood as anything but a term 
derived from the positive term for the purpose of denoting things that 
are not x, it becomes easy to understand why Dignāga thought it 
would be possible to interpret any statement like the referent (artha) 
of the word ’tree’ as not a ’non-tree’ to one implicating the non-
existence of non-trees at any tree. 
 
6.31 It is not clear how Dignāga understood the qualifying function 
of non-existence as it is nothing but an absence. However, it is an 
absence of something from something else: non-trees are absent from 
trees. Dignāga apparently thought that this would define trees in 
general and that this universally applicable observation would qualify 
as a substitute for real general properties and thus constitute the 
ground of application of words. Thus, in the final analysis the 
inferential component of the theory concerns the possibility of 
establishing an inferential canon that involves non-existence as a 
premise: the use of the word tree leads to the inference: it is a tree 
because it is not a non-tree. The inference, however, is about things 
and exclusion is exclusion of other referents or other speech units, not 
denotations or representations. 
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 § 1. [1] It has been explained that there are two means of cognition 
(pramāṇadvayam).1 But some2 think that verbal cognition (śābdam)3 
is a separate means of cognition (pramāṇāntaram) too.4 Now (*tatra)5 
 
[2] verbal cognition is not a means of cognition separate from 
inference (anumānāt).6 That is, a [word] denotes7 (bhāṣate) its own 
referent (svārtham)8 by exclusion of other [referents] (anyāpohena) 
like [the general property] ‘being produced,’ and the like.9 [1] 
 
[3] Since (hi)10 a word11 (śabdaḥ) indicates (dyotayati)12 through 
exclusion of other referents13 (arthāntaravyavacchedena), that part 
(aṃśa)14 of the object (viṣayaḥ)15 to which (yatra) it is applied 
(prayujyate), being connected [to it] as invariaby concomitant 
(avinābhāvitvasambandhaḥ),16 (*tasmāt) [verbal cognition] does not 
differ from inference.  
 
§ 2. [4] On the other hand, some claim17 that a general term18 
(jātiśabdaḥ) denotes all its own particulars19 (svabhedān sarvān 
evāha). But when they are denoted a particular term serves the 
purpose of restriction (niyamārthaṃ viśeṣaśrutiḥ).20  
 
[5] To this it is replied that  
 
a general term (jātiśabdaḥ) does not (na) 
 
‘denote’ (vācaka iti), as [2c1] will state (vakṣyate),  
 
   particulars (bhedānām).21 [2a] 
 
[6] In the first place, a general term like ‘existent’ (jātiśabdas tāvat 
sadādiḥ) does not denote substances, etc. 
 
[7] because they are infinite (ānantyāt).22 [2b1] 
For (hi) it is impossible (aśakyaḥ) to tell (kartum)23 the connection 
(sambandhaḥ) of particulars [with a general term like ‘existent’] 
when they are infinite;24 and as the connection of the word [with 
particulars] is not told (aktasambandhe śabde),25 it is not justified 




§ 3. [8] Moreover, [a general term like ‘existent’ does not denote 
particulars] 
 
because of ambiguity (vyabhicārataḥ). [2b2] 
 
For just as (yathā hi) the word ‘existent’ applies to substance 
(dravye), so it also [applies] to quality, and so on (guṇādiṣv api); 
consequently (iti) there will be doubt (saṃśayaḥ syāt) because of 
ambiguity (vyabhicārāt), but there will be no denotation 
(nābhidhānam).29 
 
§ 4. [9] Someone believes (yo 'pi manyate) that the general term 
[‘existent'], on the other hand, is used to denote the mere general 
property (*jātimātre) or its mere inherence relation (*tadyogamātre 
vā)30 because the connection is feasible and because there is no 
ambiguity (sambandhasaukaryād avyabhicārāc ceti).31  
This is not justified32 (tad ayuktam); for [the general term ‘existent'] 
does not [denote] these two either (*na hi tayor api),33  
 
[10] (vācakaḥ) neither the general property nor the inherence 
relation, because it is not “heard apart”34 (apthakśruteḥ) from 
[words] whose referents35 (bhedārthaiḥ) are particular [general 
properties]. [2cd] 
 
[11] That is (tathā hi), there would be no co-reference 
(sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na syāt) with words like ‘substance’ 
(*dravyādiśabdaiḥ) whose referents are particular [general properties] 
(*bhedārthaiḥ), like, for instance, ‘existent substance’ (*sad 
dravyam), ‘existent quality’ (*san guṇaḥ), and ‘existent action’ (*sat 
karma); but this is observed (tac ca dṣṭam).36 [12]For existence (sattā) 
or its inherence relation (tadyogaḥ) is neither a substance (dravyam) 
nor a quality (guṇaḥ),37 but is rather (kiṃ tarhi) of a substance 
(dravyasya) or of a quality (guṇasya).38 [13]It is, moreover, explained 
that (āha ca)39 
 
[a word] denoting a quality and one denoting the bearer of that 
quality (guṇaguṇyabhidhāyinoḥ) have different case affixes 
(vibhaktibhedaḥ) because of a restrictive rule. However, for two 
words that denote a substance (dravyaśabdayoḥ) co-reference is 
acknowledged (sāmānyādhikaraṇyasya prasiddhiḥ).40 (VP III 14:8) 
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[14] And in this context it is explained that the connection is 
denotable through the property of the relatum 
(sambandhidharmeṇa vācya ucyate).41 That is, it [viz. the 
connection] is denoted on the assumption that it is a state of action 
(bhāvaḥ ktvoktaḥ);42 and a state of action is connected with the 
other [relatum] (bhāvaś cānyena yujyate).43 [3] 
 
[15] For connection means ‘state of connecting’:44 it [namely the state 
of connecting] is connected to the other [relatum]45 in the same way 
as the state of colouring (rāgādivat), etc.46 Therefore, assuming (iti 
ktvā) that the connection is denotable through the property of the 
relatum, doubt (āśaṅkitam)47 about (prati) the claim (idan tat) that a 
word, on the other hand, does not denote the connection by its own 
property (svadharmeṇa)48 is meaningless (nāsti). Consequently (ataḥ) 
its [viz. the connection’s] denotability (vācyatvam) by a general term 
is not at all (naiva) justified (upapadyate). 
 
§ 5. [16] Some claim49 (*ye tv āhuḥ),50 on the other hand, that [the 
general term ‘existent’ denotes] the mere general property possessor 
as intended object (jātimadmātraṃ *vivakṣitam) because it is co-
referential with particular terms (viśeṣaśabdaiḥ *sāmānādhikaraṇyāt), 
because the connection is feasible (*sambandhasaukāryāt), and 
because there is no ambiguity (*avyabhicārāc ca).  
Now (*tatra)51  
 
[17] it does not (na) [denote]52 the general property possessor 
(tadvataḥ)53 because it is not self-dependent (asvatantratvāt).54 [4a] 
 
[18] For even in these circumstances (evam api hi) the word ‘existent’ 
(sacchabdaḥ) denotes (āha) a substance whose general property and 
the word’s own form are merely subordinate 
(jātisvarūpamātropasarjanam),55 but [it does] not [denote the 
substance] directly (na sākṣāt).56 Consequently (iti) there is no co-
reference (sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ)57 as it is without particulars 
(atadbhedatve) because it does not imply particulars like pots that are 
included in it58 [namely existence] (tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepāt); 
for when there is no pervasion (na hy asatyāṃ vyāptau) [of particulars 
by the word ‘existent’], there is no co-reference.59 [19]For instance, 
since the word ‘white’ denotes a substance as merely qualified by its 
own referent, namely the quality [whiteness], it does not imply the 
sweet quality, and so on, even if it exists in the substance.60 And 
therefore it is without particulars (atadbhedatvam).61 The [absurd] 
Translation 79 
consequence is the same in the present case too (evam atrāpy 
prasaṅgaḥ).62  
 
§ 6. Moreover, [the general term ‘existent’ does not denote the 
general property possessor] 
 
[20] because of transfer (upacārāt).63 [4b1] 
 
[21] For (hi) the word ‘existent’ denotes (āha) in terms of a real 
referent (bhūtārthena) either its own form (svarūpaṃ vā) or the 
general property (jātiṃ vā).64 As it is applied to these [two] (tatra 
pravttaḥ), it is transferred (upacaryate) to the general property 
possessor (tadvati).65 For a [word] that is transferred [to its referent] 
does not denote this referent (artham) as its primary referent66 
(paramārthenāha).  
 
§ 7. [22] And [the general term ‘existent’ does not denote the general 
property possessor] because resemblance (*sārūpyasya) is 
 
impossible (asambhavāt).67 [4b2] 
 
[23] And resemblance with the property (guṇasārūpyam) in the general 
property possessor (tadvati ca) is neither possible through transfer of 
notion (pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ) nor through influence of the property68 
(guṇopakārāt). 
 
§ 8. [24] Why is it not [possible] through transfer of notion?  
Because when there is transfer (upacāre sati), 
 
[such] idea's form is different69 (buddhirūpasya bhinnatvāt), like, 
for instance, the transfer of [the notion] ‘king’ to the servant (rājño 
bhtyopacāravat).70 [4cd] 
 
[25] For instance (tadyathā), when71 the word ‘master’ is used of the 
servant at the thought72 ‘the servant is master’ (*yo bhtyaḥ, sa 
svāmī),73 an identical notion of king and servant does not arise.74 [26] 
And the general term is transferred to the general property possessor.75 
 
§ 9. [27] And76 because [the general property and general property 
possessor] are not denoted successively (krameṇa)77 like [in the 
statement] “jasmine, conch shell, and so on, are white.” [5ab] 
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For (*hi)78 things about which (*yatra) the cognition is the same, 
(*tatra) are observed (*dṣṭam) to be denoted in succession 
(*krameṇābhidhānam79) like, for instance, [in the statement] “the 
jasmine, the nightlotus and the conch shell are white” (*śuklaṃ 
kundaṃ kumudaṃ śaṅkham iti).80 [28] And the word is applied 
simultaneously (sakt] to the general property and the general 
property possessor. Consequently (*iti) similarity due to transfer of 
notion does not exist.81 
 
§ 10. [29] If82 [the general property possessor] were similar to [the 
property] because of the influence of the property (guṇopakārāt 
tādrūpye) [on a substance], there would be [perception of] degree 
of intensity83 [of a quality] without its perception (prakarṣaḥ syād 
vinā dhiyā).84 [5cd] 
 
[30] If the general property possessor were to have the nature of the 
property as a consequence of the influence of the property 
(guṇopakārāt) [on the substance], like, for instance, [the influence of 
the red colour on] a crystal (sphaṭikavat), in that case there would be a 
perception of degree of intensity [of the red colour] 
(prakarṣabuddhiḥ) that is not dependent upon the perception of 
degree of intensity of the quality85 (guṇaprakarṣabuddhyanapekṣā)86 
in the substance (dravye). [31] For (hi) the perception of the red colour 
(raktabuddhiḥ) in a crystal does not occur as dependent upon the 
perception of the proximate substrate87 (upadhānabuddhyapekṣā) 
because someone who has not been taught [about it] (avyutpannasya) 
does not perceive the difference.88 [between the crystal and the 
proximate substrate] (*bhedbuddhyabhāvāt). 
 
§ 11. Moreover, 
 
[32] due to the form of the merged property (saṃsargirūpāt),89 it 
follows [absurdly] that there would be false knowledge about all 
[referents]90 (sarvatra mithyājñānam prasajyate). [6ab] 
 
[33] Since (hi) every verbal cognition is separated from its referent 
(arthe) by the form of the merged property91 
(saṃsargirūpavyavahitaḥ), (tataḥ) it will be false (ayathārthaḥ) in the 
same way as [the cognition of the red] crystal.92 
 
§ 12. Furthermore, 
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[34] if the general properties, and so on,93 are many 
(sāmānyādibahutve) and the listeners apprehend (grāhakeṣu)94 
them simultaneously95 (yugapat), the influence (upakāraḥ) [of the 
properties] will be in conflict96 (virudhyeta). [6c-7a] 
 
[35] And when (yadā ca) the possessor of the properties (guṇavatas 
śuklādeḥ) that is white, and so on, has many apprehending listeners 
(grahītāraḥ) because of qualifiers like ‘pot’, ‘earthen’, ‘substance’, 
‘existent,’ ‘white’, ‘sweet’, ‘odorous,’97 (tadā) the influence of the 
properties is in conflict. For then it would not be possible98 to define a 
substance in the form of a single property (ekaguṇarūpeṇa) because 
of absence of difference (aviśeṣāt).99 Nor would it be possible 
partially (ekadeśena) to obtain knowledge (anubhāvitum) about the 
form of its properties (guṇarūpam) because the [substance] as a 
whole100 (ktsnasya) is apprehended101 in the form of ‘pot’, and so on. 
(ghaṭādirūpapratīteḥ). 
 
[36] Or if [the influence] is through all [the properties], there will be 
a confused perception (mecakekṣaṇam).102 [7b] 
 
[37] If, on the other hand, all [the general properties] like potness 
simultaneously exert their influence on the [substance as a] whole 
(upakāro yugapat ktsnasya kriyate), (tataḥ) there will be a confused 
perception103 (mecakadarśaṇam) because it is impossible to 
apprehend them one by one (pratyekam) in the form of ‘pot’, and so 
on, (ghaṭādirūpagrahaṇābhāvāt) and because [the substance] 
simultaneously assumes the form of all104 [of its general properties] 
(yugapat sarvarūpāpatteḥ).105 
 
§ 13. [38] As regards the particulars, the general property, and its 
connection the fault is the same,106 because also with respect to 
these the [form of the] general property (*jātiḥ], the own form [of 
the word] (*svarūpam), or [the form of the general property as] 
connected with the latter are not justified.107 [7c-8b] 
 
For even though they are denoted in the form of particulars 
(*bhedarūpena),108 the particulars are [39] necessarily109 (avaśyam) to 
be denoted in the form of the general property (*jātirūpena) on the 
grounds that [40] [the word] primarily denotes the general property110 
and is transferred to the particulars111 (jātau mukhyo bhedeṣūpacārita 
iti). Thus all the problems (*doṣāḥ) like those that were asserted with 
regard to the general property possessor,112 are to be asserted113 
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(*vācyāḥ). Moreover, [41] because of the possibility (sambhavataḥ)114 
that (iti)115 [the word] denotes the general property (*jāter 
vācakaḥ)116 having superimposed (*adhyāropya) the word's own 
form (*śabdasvarūpam) upon the general property (*jātau) as its 
denotable object (*abhidheyāyām),117 the relation of the general prop-
erty (*jātiyogaḥ) is to be denoted in the form of the general property, 
namely [in the form of] existence (*sattā), etc. Thus also in this case 
(*atrāpi) the problem is to be asserted respectively 
(*yathāsambhavam). 
 
§ 14. [42] The general property possessor, moreover, (tadvāṃś ca) is 
claimed to be a particular only (bheda eva iṣṭaḥ), and this has 
already been repudiated previously (sa ca pūrvaṃ nirāktaḥ). [8cd] 
 
For concerning a general term (*jātiśabde) it118 has already been 
refuted above (*prāg niṣiddhaḥ)119 stating that 
 
“a general term does not denote particulars.”120 [2a] 
 
And this is also said of the general property possessor (*jātivataḥ).121 
 
§ 15. [43] It has certainly been explained (nanu coktam) that the 
general term (jātiśabdaḥ)122 denotes the mere general property 
possessor123 (*jātimanmātrasya vācakaḥ), but not (na tu) in the form 
of a particular (*bhedarūpena).124  
 
[44] If this is the case (yady evaṃ),125 
 
[45] the mere general property possessor (tadvadmātran tu), 
nevertheless, has already been considered (vicāritam) as it is either 
the relation or the [general property] existence (sambandhaḥ sattā 
veti) [that is denoted].126 [9ab] 
For (*hi)127 ‘mere general property possessor' (*tadvadmātram) 
means ‘the property of being a general property possessor' 
(*tadvattvam);128 and (*ca), the bhāva affix (*bhāvapratyayaḥ) is 
used to denote a connection or a property (*sambandhe guṇe vā).129 
Thus, for instance, it is said (*yathāha):130  
 
[46] “[The bhāva affixes tva and tā] denote a connection131 
(sambandhābhidhānam) when [introduced] after compounds, 
[words] ending in kt and taddhita affixes (samāsakttaddhiteṣu), 
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except (anyatra) when [introduced] after idiomatic expressions, 
[words] whose form is not distinct, and [words] whose connection 
is invariable (rūḍhyabhinnarūpāvyabhicāritasambandhebhyaḥ).”132 
 
And in this context (*tatra) it has already been explained133 that “[a 
general term] does not (*na) 
 
denote (vācakaḥ) either the general property or [its] relation 
(yogajātyoḥ) [with the general property] because it is not “heard 
apart” (apthakśruteḥ) from [words] whose referents are particular 
[general properties] (bhedārthaiḥ).” [2cd] 
 
§ 16. [47] If the referent that is the property possessor (tadvān), 
namely a [single] pot and so on, (ghaṭādiḥ) does not reside in cloth 
and so on, (na paṭādiṣu vartate), how can this referent be a general 
property ?!134 [9cd-10a] 
 
[48] For (hi) a general property is resident in many135 [objects] 
(anekavtti); [49] and if136 (tac ca) this [general property] is a [single] 
general property possessor (*sāmānyavān) like a pot, how [50] 
(katham) can it be justified to claim, when this [namely the pot] does 
not reside in cloth,137 and so on, that it is their general property?138 
 
§ 17. [51] It certainly (nanu ca) denotes the general property possessor, 
[52] so what purpose does it serve (kimartham) to attribute to this 
(*tatra) [namely the general property possessor] the property of a 
general property (*sāmānyatādhyāropeṇa)?139  
Since (yasmāt) the word ‘existent’ does not denote the general 
property possessor (*tadvato na vācakaḥ),140 as it has been asserted 
that it denotes the general property,141 [53] and [the general property] 
existence, and so on, does not exist at [general properties] such as 
existence,142 [54] (tasmāt) it is necessarily (*avaśyam) to be assumed, 
that it is the referent143 that has the property of a general property 
(arthasya *sāmānyatā).144 [55] And the referent is not a [general 
property] because (yasmāt) 
 
with regard to it (*atra)145 the word alone (*kevalaḥ)146 is the same 
(*samaḥ).147 [10b] 
 
For (*hi) general property possessors like pots are the same148 
because they are denotable (*vācyaḥ) by the word ‘existent,’ [56] but 
not because of some general property possessor (kenacit tadvatā);149 
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[57] and [the general property] existence and its relation (sattāyogau 
ca) have been rejected previously.150  
 
§ 18. [58] And it [namely a word] is not thought to be without a 
cause of application (animittaḥ). [10c] 
 
And a word (*śabdaḥ) is not observed (*dṣṭaḥ)151 to be the same 
(*abhinnaḥ)152 with respect to different things (*bhinneṣu) without a 
cause of application.153 Therefore it is not justified that it [namely the 
word] be [their] general property154 (*sāmānyam);155 [59] and therefore 
there is no qualifier-qualified relation156 (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā).  
 
§ 19. [60] Suppose, on the other hand,157 that [a thing like a pot] 
possessing the general property existence (sadguṇam) is resident in 
the same (ananyasmim) substance,158 there will be a qualifier-
qualified relation as the word ‘existent' causes the expectation of a 
complement like ‘pot,' in the same way as [the complement] ‘bluer,' 
and so on, (nīlatarādivat).159 
 
[61] If [the the general property existence is resident] in one and the 
same (ekatra) [property possessor] in the same way as, 'blue,' and 
so on,160 [10d], 
 
it will be used to denote the connection or the property (*sambandhe 
guṇe vā syāt),161 
 
[62] and this is not the case. [11a1] 
 
[63] For the word ‘blue’ (nīlaśabdo hi) <denotes a substance that has 
the property blueness>. Since it [namely the substance] does not exist 
in another [substance] that is bluer, and so on, (*nīlatarādāv 
anyatrāsati) it is not justified (*na yujyate) that [the substance] is a 
general property possessor (*tadvat).162 For it has already been 
explained163 that blueness and its connection (*nīlatvatatsam-
bandhau) are not the referents of the word (*śabdārthau).164 
 
§ 20. Moreover (*kiṃ ca),  
 
[64] even if165 it were assumed (upetyāpi)166 [to be the case], it is not 
so (naitad)167 because a general property is without general 
properties168 (jāter ajātitaḥ). [11a2-b]169 
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Even though it were assumed that the general property blueness 
(*nīlasāmānyam) is [resident] in [substances] that are bluer, and so 
on, (*nīlatarādiṣu) nevertheless (*tathāpi) the general property 
existence is not found to be possessed of the general property potness, 
and so on. [65] (naivaṃ sattājātir ghaṭatvādijātimatī) in the same way 
as the quality blue (*nīlaguṇaḥ) which is divided into three kinds [is 
possessed of the general property blueness], [66] so that, when it 
resides in a substance, having appropriated these particular [general 
properties] (yatas tān viśeṣān upādāya dravye <vttau>), one would 
expect a particular [term] like ‘pot' as a complement.170 Therefore 
this [example) is not to be considered either. 
 
§ 21. [67] In these circumstances it is then (evaṃ tarhi) said that 
although [particulars] are not expressly denotable (aśabdavācyā), 
there will nevertheless be the expectation of a particular [term] 
(bhedākāṅkṣā) as ‘pot', and so on, are implied171 (ghaṭādiṣv 
arthākṣipteṣu). For the referent possessing the general property 
[existence] (tadvān hy arthaḥ)172 is necessarily (avaśyam) connected 
to some general property (kenacit sāmānyenānubaddhaḥ) from 
among potness, etc.173 (ghaṭatvādīnām).174 
 
[68] Even in the case of implication (arthākṣepe 'pi), there is 
uncertainty (anekāntaḥ).175 [11c] 
 
[69] For implication (arthākṣepaḥ) means obtainment of certainty 
according to the state of the case176 (*yasminn arthād niścayotpattiḥ), 
[70] like, for instance, the certainty that NN is eating at night (rātri-
bhojane) on the basis of [the statement] that he does not eat during the 
day (divā na bhuṅkta iti).177 In the present context, however, [71] (iha 
punaḥ), when one says ‘existent’ (sad ity ukte) there is no certainty 
about ‘pot’, etc. Therefore (iti) there is no implication (nāsty 
arthākṣepaḥ) as there is doubt. 
§ 22. Since178 (*yasmāt) it is not justified under any circumstances 
(*na katham api)179 that a general term (*jātiśabdaḥ) denotes particu-
lars, a general property, the connection [with a general property], or 
the general property possessor180 (*bhedasāmānyasambandhajāti-
madvācakaḥ), 
 




[73] Therefore, what was stated previously namely that 
 
it, [i.e a word] denotes its own referent through exclusion of other 
[referents] like [the inferential indicator] ‘being a product,’ etc. 
[1cd],  
 
is settled182 (*tad eva sthitam).183 
 
§ 23. [74] It is, moreover, explained184 that 
 
a word does not indicate [its referent] in toto, although it is 
denotable in many ways.185 On the contrary (tu), it performs its 
purpose which is exclusion186 in accordance with its own connec-
tion (svasambandhānurūpyāt).187 [12] 
 
[75] Even though a word has many properties188 it only indicates by 
means of that [property] by virtue of which it does not deviate189 
from its referent,190 but not by virtue of the word's being a quality 
[of ether], etc.191 (śabdaguṇatādibhiḥ).192 [13]193 
 
§ 24. [76] If the word's referent (*śabdārthaḥ) is merely exclusion of 
other (anyāpohamātram) [referents], how then (katham) could words 
like ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ (*nīlotpalādiśadānām) be co-referential 
(*sāmānādhikaraṇyam) and related as qualifier and qualified 
(*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ)?  
And why would that not be the case?  
Because (yasmāt) the excluded object (*apohyam) of general and 
particular terms (*sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdānām) is different (bhinnam).194  
[77]This problem does not exist. For even though they (te 'pi hi) 
 
[78] have separate referents (bhinnārthāḥ) because of difference of 
excluded [objects] (apohyabhedāt), they are [each]195 incapable 
(jaḍāḥ) of indicating the particulars of their own referent 
(svārthabhedagatau).196 But they are [each] qualifier and qualified 
because together their effects are not separate (ekatrābhinnakār-
yatvāt). [14] 
 
[79] For words like ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ (*nīlotpālādiśabdā hi), although 
their excluded objects are different, become co-referential (samānā-
dhikaraṇāḥ) by combining197 (upasaṃharantaḥ) their own apoha 
referent198 (svam apohārtham) into one (ekatra) [referent] for the sake 
of disclosing the particulars of their own referent199 (svārthabheda-
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vyañjanārtham), in the same way as ‘uprightness’ and ‘crow's nest’ 
(ūrdhvatākākanilayavat).200 That is (tathā hi), they are each 
(pratyekam) a cause of doubt as to the particulars of their own 
referent.201 And since a referent that is to be manifested as associated 
with another word is impossible202 (śabdāntarasahitavyaṅgyārthā-
sambhavāc ca), they are [each] like qualifier and qualified203 
(viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhūtāḥ). 
 
§ 25. [80] Then, why is it that this [namely the term ‘blue lotus’] has 
one and the same object (ekādhikaraṇam) as ‘blue lotus’ means that it 
is neither [just] blue nor [just] lotus, but it is both blue and lotus 
(*nīlaṃ ca tad utpalaṃ ceti nīlotpalam iti)?204 
 
[81]It [namely the object] is neither blue alone (kevalaṃ nīlam) nor 
lotus alone (kevalam utpalam)205 because the denotable [object] is 
[their] aggregate (samudāyābhidheyatvāt).206 [15a-c] 
 
[82]For (*hi) it207 [namely the referent blue lotus] is indicated by the 
words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ (nīlotpalaśabdābhyām) when combined 
(sahitābhyām), but not alone (na kevalābhyām). [83] For alone 
(*kevalau hi),208  
 
they are as meaningless209 as the phonemes. [15d]  
 
[84]For just as (yathaiva hi) the speech unit nī and the speech unit la, 
even though they exist, are meaningless with regard to the articulation 
‘nīla’ [‘blue’],210 so also in this case (*evam atrāpi).211 
 
§ 26. [85]This is an inadequate illustration (viṣama upanyāsa). For no 
(na hi) referent whatsoever is indicated, when the [individual] 
phonemes are articulated.212 It is indicated, however, when they are 
combined as ‘nīla’ [‘blue’].  
 
[86]If no referent is understood on the basis of the phoneme (varṇe) 
whereas [it is understood] on the basis of the two syntactical words 
(padadvaye), the [referent] is still on this [assumption] (tatrāpi) 
indicated alone (kevalam) since it is its denotable [object] 
(tadvācya iti).213 [16] 
 
[87]For just as214 (yathaiva hi) the speech units nī and la (*nīlaśabdau) 
are empty of the referent blue (*nīlārthaśūnyau), so the words ‘lotus’ 
and ‘blue’ are empty of an aggregate referent (*samudāyārtha-
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śūnyau); [88]and with regard to the claim that the speech units nī and 
la do not indicate any referent whatsoever,215 the denotable object 
(*vācyaḥ) of the word 'blue' is the general property [blueness].216 
Consequently (*iti) it is indicated alone (*kevalam);217 and since it is 
not justified that its denotable object be [the general property 
blueness] as connected to the quality [blue] as connected to the 
substance [lotus],218 it is indicated by [89]aggregates that are empty of 
referents (arthaśūnyair samudayair) in the manner of the phonemes. 
[90]Because [their] referent is denotable by separate219 words (bhinna-
śabdavācyenārthena), they are said to have separate referents 
(bhinnārthāḥ). Therefore it is justified that there be co-referentiality 
and a qualifier-qualified relation, if the referent of a word is exclusion 
of other [referents]220 (*anyāpohe śabdārthe). 
  
§ 27. [91]For (*hi) it is not justified that the word's referent 
(*śabdārthaḥ) is another referent221 (arthāntaraḥ).  
On what grounds?  
[92]Because (*hi), the object222 of the two component referents223 (ava-
yavārthayor adhikaraṇam) may either be different or not different224 
from these225 (tato bhinnaṃ syād abhinnaṃ vā). [93]Now (*tatra), in 
the first place (*tāvat), it is not different because (*yasmāt)226 
  
there is no singularity of the aggregate (samudāyaikatā) since 
mutual non-difference follows [absurdly] (mitho 'bhedaprasaṅ-
gataḥ).227 [17ab] 
 
[94]For if (yadi hi) the aggregate is one, the two referents, namely lotus 
and blue are not different.228 And therefore it follows229 [absurdly] 
that they are mutually (*parasparam) non-different because they are 
not different from the one230 [aggregate]. Moreover, 
 
[95]because plurality of the aggregate follows [absurdly] (samūhā-
nekatāsakteḥ). [17c] 
 
[96]Because the aggregate is not different from the many [parts], the 
[absurd] consequence is that it is plural (anekatāprasaṅgaḥ), and 
therefore it does not exist. Even if it is assumed that the aggregate 
exist, there is no co-reference of [97]the [two words] whose referents 
are the blue [quality] and [the object] lotus231 (nīlotpalārthayoḥ) 
because [98]when they occur in one [word]232 (ekatrāpi vartamānau), 
 
the two words do not reject their own referent. [17d] 
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The referents of the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ in isolation are their own 
general properties, and these [referents] are the same [99]even when 
[the two words] are combined (samuditayor api). Therefore (*iti), 
[100]how could there be co-reference233 (kutaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam)?!  
[101]This problem does not exist. Both of them (dvāv api) have 
particulars as their referent (*viśeṣārthau) because particulars are 
included in the general property234 (sāmānye viśeṣāntarbhāvāt). They 
have a form that is identical with having the general property as their 
referent (tulyarūpau sāmānyārthena). [102]The application of the 
second word is for the purpose of making known the fact that they 
have a particular as their referent235 (viśeṣārthavattvajñāpanarthaṃ 
dvitīyaśabdaprayogaḥ). In these circumstances the two [words] 
(*dvāv api) are co-referential because they have the aggregate as 
referent. 
[103]Here, in the first place (atra tāvat), the word ‘blue’ (nīlaśabdena) 
denotes [the general property blueness or the blue quality] without 
distinction (*abhedena),  
 
but not the general property236 [substanceness] (na jātiḥ). [18a1] 
 
[104]For (*hi) the word ‘blue’ does not denote in a general way237 
(sāmānyenāha) the general property substanceness (dravyajātim), so 
how (*kutaḥ) could the particular be imagined to be included in the 
general property substanceness (*dravyajātau)?  
[105]It certainly (nanu ca) denotes in a general way the substance 
which possesses [the] blue [quality], and its particulars such as 
cranes238 (balākādayaḥ) and lotuses239 are included in it.240  
[106]It is not justified that this is the case (ayuktam evam bhavitum).  
[107]Why241 (*kasmāt)? 
 
Because it already has been explained above.242 [18a2] 
 
[108]For (*hi) the denotation of the general property possessor 
(*tadvadabhidhānam) has already been rejected above (pūrvam eva 
niṣiddham) by [the statement]  
 
“[a general term does] not [denote] the general property possessor 
because it is not self-dependent” [4a], etc.  
 
Translation 90 
The claim that it is because a particular is included in the general 





Because of doubt (saṃśayāt). [18b1] 
 
[111]For it is observed that a general term causes (*sāmānyaśabdāt) 
doubt about the particulars; [112]and it is not justified that [a term] 
which causes doubt denote. [113]By implication,244 however (syāt tv 
arthataḥ), the particular term would cause (*viśeṣaśabdāt) a cognition 
of the general property (*sāmānyapratītiḥ) because it does not deviate 
from [it] (*avyabhicārāt).245  
 
[114]In that case (tarhi), the claim that particulars are included in the 
general property is not set forth because [particulars] are denotable 
objects, but rather (*kiṃ tarhi), 
 
[115]because of not being excluded (*anapohanāt). [18b2] 
 
Since (*yasmāt) the word ‘blue’ does not exclude sesamum, and so 
on,246 (*tilādim) in the same way as [it excludes] jasmine 
(*kundādivat), and so on, (*tasmāt) [sesamum, and so on,] is said to 
be included in it. And on this assumption they are included among the 
denotable objects [of the word ‘blue’]. 
 
If both [words, namely ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’] have paticulars as their 
referents (*bhedārthau), the two words would become synonyms. 
And it is observed that 
 
[116]with regard to a synonym, [the referent] is understood from a 
single one.247 [18c] 
 
[117]For (hi) the addition of another synonym to a synonym whose 
referent is not understood or whose referents are many (anirjñā-
tānekārthe) serves the purpose of making known the same referent as 
the first-mentioned.248 [118]For this surely is the raison d'être249 of 
synonyms250: [119]They denote their referents successively, not 
simultaneously;251 [120]and thus no qualifier-qualified relation 
(viśeṣanaviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ) exists because the word ‘blue’ alone 
indicates the referent lotus.252 Therefore, in the first place, there is a 
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problem with regard to [the aggregate's] not being different [from its 
parts].  
 
§ 28. [121]And just as [there is a problem] if it [namely the aggregate] 
is not different [from its parts] (*yathābhede), so also if it is different 
[from its parts] (tathā bhede 'pi): The difference of the aggregate 
from the members of the aggregate (samudāyibhyaḥ) is to be proved. 
For it is not possible that it [namely the aggregate] resides in these 
(teṣu) [namely the members], or these in it (tatra), whether 
completely (kārtsnyena) or partially253 (ekadeśena); and even if it 
were assumed 
 
that [the aggregate] is different [from its parts], both [co-reference 
and the qualifier-qualified relation] are non-existent. [18d] 
 
Also in this case co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation are 
impossible. [122]For this254 will either be of the two referents or of the 
two words; and255 it has already been examined that with regard to the 
two referents it [namely co-reference and the qualifier-qualified 
relation] will either be of the quality and the general property, or of 
the general property possessor; and similarly with regard to the two 
words, it [namely co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation] 
will either be of the two words denoting the quality and the general 
property, or of the two words denoting the general property possessor. 
Now (*tatra), 
 
[123]even if the two referents, namely the general property and the 
quality were to reside in one and the same referent (ekārthavttitā), 
there is no general-particular property relationship between them256 
(sāmānyaviśeṣatvam). [19a-c] 
 
[124]For even if the quality blue and the general property lotus were 
co-referential because they reside in one and the same substance 
(ekatra dravye vtteḥ), they are not related as qualifier and 
qualified.257 [125]For258 the quality blue (*nīlaguṇasya) has no relation 
to the general property lotusness (*utpalajātiyogaḥ), nor has the 
general property lotusness (*utpalajāteḥ) any relation to the quality 
blue (*nīlaguṇayogaḥ). 
 
[126]And both [co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation] do 




When (*yadā) the quality blue (*nīlaguṇaḥ) and the general property 
lotusness (*utpalajātiḥ) reside260 in the referent (*arthe) that is the 
property possessor261 (*tadvati), (*tadā) they are not co-referential 
[127]because the two substances do not reside elsewhere (dravyayor 
anyatrāvtteḥ).262 Nor can they be related as qualifier-and qualified 
[128]because of the impossibility that both or one of them possess the 
general and the particular property (dvayor ekasya vā sāmānyaviśe-
ṣavattvāyogāt).263 Thus, in the first place, both [co-reference and 
qualifier-qualified relation] are impossible with regard to the two 
referents.264 And just as they are [impossible] with regard to the two 
referents, 
 
so also with respect to the two words that denote the mere general 
property and the mere quality. [20ab] 
 
[129]Since (hi)265 the two words that denote the general property and 
the quality (*jātiguṇābhidhāyakau) are entirely different266 (atyanta-
bhinnau), (*tasmāt) they are not co-referential (*tayoḥ sāmānādhi-
karaṇyābhāvaḥ);267 and since the two [properties] are not connected 
[with one another], there is no qualifier-qualified relation between the 
two words denoting them268 (*tacchabdayoḥ).269 Thus, in the first 
place, these two [namely co-reference and qualifier-qualified relation] 
do not to exist270 when [the two words] denote the mere general 
property271 and the mere quality (*jātiguṇamātrābhidhāyakatve).272 
 
And if they denote the general property possessor, [130]the conse-
quence is that [the substratum] is similar and dissimilar 
(tulyātulyam).273 [20cd] 
 
Since274 (*yasmāt) the two words denote one and the same substance 
(ekaṃ dravyaṃ) as qualified by a general property275 [namely lotus-
ness] and a quality [namely blueness] (*jātiguṇaviśiṣṭam), (*tasmāt) 
the referent (*adhikaraṇam) is similar (*tulyam); and since they 
denote a substance while denoting two different qualifiers, it is 
dissimilar (*atulyam). Therefore it is not ascertained that they are co-
referential. 
 
§ 29. [131]If [it is objected that] there is no intention to express the 
dissimilarity (atulyatvāvivakṣā) [of substratum]. [21a] 
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[132]Suppose you think: “Since the difference that is caused by the 
relata is not intended to be denoted (*sambandhiktabhedā-
vivakṣāyām) there will be co-reference on the basis of such similarity 
[of substratum] (tulyatvaṃ tāvad upādāya).276 [133]For also in the case 
where (yatrāpi hi)277 [‘blue’ and ‘lotus’] are said to be co-referential 
because they are causes of a cognition having the same form278 
[134](tulyākārabuddhihetutvāt), (*tatra) the other differences like the 
lotus buds are not intended to be denoted, although they do in fact 
exist.”279  
This is an inadequate illustration (*viṣama upanyāsaḥ).280 [135]The 
function of the expression [‘blue lotus’] is to denote the (tatra) 
[referent of the expression ‘blue lotus’] to the extent that it is 
apprehended [136]when supported by the exclusions of both [terms] 
(ubhayavyudāsānughīte).281 Thus the intention to denote this much282 
is justified (tadmātrasya vivakṣā prayujyate).283 [137]But if the dif-
ference that is caused by the relata (sambandhikte) is not intended to 




[138]there would be similarity of cow and horse, etc.285 [21b] 
 
And if the difference between a cow and a horse,286 and so on, that is 
caused by the relata [the general properties] cowhood and horsehood , 
and so on, is not intended to be denoted, [139]there is similarity of the 
entity because of its not being the denotable object287 (anabhidheya-
tvena). Therefore the [absurd] consequence is that ‘cow’ and ‘horse’ 
become co-referential in the same way as ‘lotus’ and ‘blue.’288 
 
§ 30. [140]Suppose [you think that] there is a difference of [generic] 
form in these289 (tatrāktiviśeṣaś cet). [21c] 
 
Suppose you think (*yadi manyate):290 “Since the difference of 
material shape291 (*saṃsthānaviśeṣa) in a cow and a horse is 
explained to be [their generic] form (*ākti),292 this [generic form] 
exists.293 [141]Since (hi) the two denotations of these two [namely as 
‘cow’ and ‘horse,’ respectively] are caused in this way by the [generic 
form], which is the cause of the manifestation of their own general 
properties,294 why would there be no intention to denote this 
difference [of generic form],295 [142]but not [no intention to denote a 
difference of generic form] of a referent (arthasya) that has the 
properties blueness and lotusness (nīlotpalatvavataḥ)? Therefore (*iti) 
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[the words ‘cow’ and ‘horse’] are not co-referential in the same way 
[as the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’].”296  
 
In that case, 
 
[143]the many [generic] forms become commingled (anekāktisaṅ-
karaḥ). [21d] 
 
[144]Many material shapes would co-occur (anekasaṃsthānasamā-
veśaḥ) in one entity because it manifests many general properties; 
[145]and this is not observed.297 
 
§ 31. [146]In addition (api ca), 
 
[their substance would be] similar (*tulyam). [22a1] 
 
[147]Moreover, [the words] ‘cow’ and ‘horse’ and so on would have a 
similar or dissimilar referent (adhikaraṇam) because it is not 
denotable, and because it manifests [the general properties] existence, 
and so on, and cowhood, etc.298 [148]Also in this case co-reference 
obtains [absurdly], as the dissimilarity is not intended to be expressed. 
 
§ 32. [149]And even if it is claimed, it is not the case. [22a2] 
 
[150]Even in the case where (yatrāpi) ‘existent’, ‘lotus’, and 
‘substance’, and so on, are claimed to be co-referential, (*tatra) [co-
reference] does not obtain. [151]For if (yadi) ‘cow' and ‘horse' are not 
co-referential [152]because [a cow and a horse] manifest different 
general properties, [153]in the same way also a lotus is observed to 
manifest [the general properties] existence (sattā) and substanceness 
(dravyatva), etc.  
 
§ 33. Moreover, 
 
[154]Quality (guṇa) and action (karma) do not manifest [general 
properties].299 [22b] 
 
[155]For the [absurd] consequence is that quality and action, since they 
do not possess material shape (asaṃsthānavattvāt), do not manifest 
the general properties contained in them (tadgatasāmānyānabhi-
vyaktiprasaṅgaḥ). If it is claimed that [156]the difference between 
substance, and so on, is due to the fact that they manifest their own 
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general properties because of difference of power (śaktibhedena), but 
not because of difference of material shape,300 this [claim] is not 
justified301 because it is assumed that the powers are different, even 
though an entity is devoid of difference, like, for instance, the entity 
lotus. And as regards the statement that it is because [the powers] are 
the causes of manifestation of different general properties, [157]it is to 
be explained whereby the difference between [the general properties] 
cowhood and horsehood is established.302 
 
§ 34. Here we shall explain how: [158]In the first place, for the 
grammarians (śābdānām) [the difference between the general 
properties] is caused by the words that denote [them] (abhidhāyaka-
śabdaktaḥ). For their difference is the one between arbitrary terms 
(yadcchāśabdeṣu) because they [namely the general properties] are 
their objects of denotation.303  
Now (*tatra), 
 
[159]if the difference is due to the difference of [the words that] 
denote [the general properties], the difference does not exist per se 
(svataḥ*).304 [22cd] 
 
For (*hi) in those circumstances the mere verbal difference (*śabda-
mātrabhedaḥ) of the different general properties (*viśiṣṭasāmānyā-
nām) is not intrinsic (*svābhāvikaḥ). [160]For one should not say as a 
consequence of transfer in terms of identity [of the general property] 
with the word that denotes [it] to the non-different [general] entity 
(aviśiṣṭe … vastuni), that cows, and so on, are different because they 
are causes of manifestation of different general properties (viśiṣṭa-
sāmānyābhivyaktihetutvād gavādayo viśiṣṭāḥ). Suppose [it is objected 
that] difference is also observed because of difference of denotation, 
like [the proper name] Caitra, etc. This [objection], however, is not 
justified (na) because exactly this is subject to [the above-mentioned] 
criticism,305 and because one and the same [referent] is the denotable 
object of several synonyms.306 Just as it [applies] to this, so the 
[proposition] “the difference does not exist per se (svataḥ)” applies to 
the word (*śabde). Also in a word (*śabde) like ‘cow' there is no 
difference that is cognized per se, but rather (kiṃ tarhi), [161]with 
regard to it [viz. the word] the analysis is like that concerning the 
referent (arthe), namely that the difference (*bhedaḥ) is caused by the 
general property (*sāmānyaktaḥ)307 [in the word].308  
Certainly, (*nanu ca) a word-particular (*śabdaviśeṣaḥ) such as 
‘cow' is perceptible (pratyakṣaḥ)!  
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Even though a [word] particular is perceptible (*pratyakṣe saty api 
viśeṣe), [162]it does not, however, denote (sa tu nābhidhāyakaḥ) 
because it is not observed together with the referent (*arthena 
sahādṣṭavāt),309 and because a [word] like [163]śākaṭika310 [i.e., 
‘carter'] denotes the same referent311 when it is used by children,312 
etc. Therefore the difference between words is caused by the general 
property. 
 
§ 35. The Vaiśeṣikas, however (*tu), claim that the general properties 
(*sāmānyānām) that are manifested by the material shapes of their 
own substrata (*svāśrayasaṃsthānebhir abhivyaṅgyānām) also have 
an intrinsic difference (*svābhāviko bhedaḥ) because it is, for 
instance, said [at VS X.11] that “[the cognition] ‘head', ‘back', 
‘stomach', and ‘hand' is due to their particular313 [general proper-
ties].”314 As far as they are concerned, however,315 
 
[164]circularity follows [absurdly], if the difference is due to the 
manifestation [effected] by the manifesting [substance] (vyañjaka-
vyaktito bhede).316 [23ab] 
 
For on their explanation circularity obtains: [165]What is the intrinsic 
nature of a substance (dravyasvabhāvaḥ)? The fact that it manifests its 
own general property (svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvam). And what is the 
intrinsic nature of the general property (sāmānyasvabhāvaḥ)? The fact 
that it is manifested by its own substance (svadravyābhivyaṅgyatvam). 
Thus (*iti) it has no force (*asāmarthyam). 
 
§ 36. Moreover (kiṃ ca), 
 
[166]a single (ekasya) [substance and general property] would have a 
multitude of intrinsic natures317 (svabhāvānaikatā) because of 
mutual ‘multi-manifestation'318 (bahuvyakteḥ parasparam). [23cd] 
 
It is called ‘multi-manifestation' because of the manifestation of many 
as well as the manifestation by many.319 [167]For (hi) many general 
properties such as existence320 (sattādeḥ) are manifested by a 
substance (dravyāt).321 Thus (*iti) a single substance (*ekasya 
dravyasya) would have many intrinsic natures (*anekasvabhāvaḥ 
syāt); and because existence is manifested by many substances 
(*anekadravyāt) that are earthen, etc. (pārthivādeḥ),322 existence 
would have many intrinsic natures; [168]and if the difference altogether 
(sarvathā) is assumed to be due to difference of relation to a [general] 
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property323 (guṇasambandhabhedāt), difference of power324 (śakti-
bhedāt), and difference of denotation325 (abhidhānabhedāt), the [ab-
surd] consequence is that a single (*ekasyāpi) [substance or general 
property] would have a multitude (anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ) [of intrinsic 
natures].326 An inserted verse (*antaraślokaḥ) states: 
 
If one imagines that the difference is due to difference of [general] 
property, power, and denotation, the [absurd] consequence is that a 
single [substance or general property] will have a multitude [of 
intrinsic natures] because it possesses many [intrinsic natures]. [24] 
 
Thus, in the first place, there is no co-reference (evaṃ tāvat 
sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ).327 
 
§ 37. [169]The qualifier-qualified relation (viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvam) has 
already been explained above on the grounds that it is not self-
dependent (asvātantryāt).328 [25ab] 
 
For the impossibility of the qualifier-qualified relation (*viśeṣaṇa-
viśeṣyatvāsambhavaḥ) has already been explained if the general 
property possessor is denoted (tadvadabhidhāne). Thus co-reference 
and qualifierqualified relation are only justified when exclusion of 
other referents is the referent of the word, but not otherwise. 
 
§ 38. Now (tatra) 
 
[170]the denotable objects of general terms, particular [general] 
terms, and synonyms are not excluded (na sāmānyabhedaparyāya-
vācyanut), although they are different.329 [25cd] 
 
[171]For even though [the referents'] being different is the same (tulye 
'pi hi anyatve), the word does not exclude the referents of general 
terms, particular [general] terms, and synonyms.  
How can this be?  
[172]Because they are not in conflict (avirodhāt).330 In the first place 
(tāvat), the excluded object (apohyam) of a synonym is the same 
because [synonyms] are not applied simultaneously (yugapad apra-
yogāt).331 And it is not justified that it rejects its own referent (na ca 
svārthapratikṣepo yuktaḥ).332 [173]A particular [general] term,333 more-
over, approves (anumodate) that the general term334 has excluded 
another referent335 (arthāntaraṃ vyudastam) for the sake of its own 
particulars336 (svabhedeṣu) because they are in need of it (arthi-
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tvāt).337 [174]For just as (yathā hi) a śiṃśapā [tree] is not a palāśa 
[tree], and so on,338 it is not a pot, and so on, either.339 [175]Thereby 
(etena) it is also explained why it does not reject the referent of a 
general term's general term (sāmānyasāmānyaśabdārthāpratikṣepa 
uktaḥ).340 [176]Similarly, why would a general term (sāmānyaśabdaḥ) 
not tolerate that its own referent341 is being restricted to the intended 
referent342 (abhiprete viṣaye vyavasthāpyamānam) by a particular 
[general] term or a particular [general] term's particular [general] 
term?343 Thus, since they are not in conflict (*avirodhāt), the 
exclusion of the referent of a general term, and so on, is not justified 
(*na sāmānyādiśabdārthāpoho yuktaḥ).344 [177]And an aggregate345 
(samūhaḥ) denotes a separate referent (arthāntaravācakaḥ) in the 
same way.346 [178]And thus it is justified, in the manner explained 
previously (yathoktam prāk)347 that a general term and a particular 
[general] term, whether they are two348 or many349 (dvayor bahūnāṃ 
vā), denote a separate referent that is qualified by these (tadviśiṣṭār-
thāntaravācakatvam), while being applied to the general property 
which is their own referent. 
 
§ 39. [179]It is, moreover, explained that 
 
a350 particular [term] is not rejected (nojjhitaḥ) by its own general 
[term] because that alone is expected as a complement (tadmātrā-
kāṅkṣaṇāt)351 nor is it included (nopāttaḥ) [by it] because doubt 
arises (saṃśayotpatteḥ). But in case of identity [of referent] 
(sāmye), they have the same reference (ekārthatā).352 [26] 
 
[180]A353 general property, even if there are several (anekam api), is 
included by a particular general [term]354 because it does not 
deviate [from the general property],355 but their qualifier and 
qualified relation is not symmetrical (tulyā).356 [27] 
 
 
§ 40. [181]In this context, moreover, what is the reason357 why a 
particular [general] term (*bhedaśabdaḥ) excludes the referent of 
other particular [general] terms (*bhedāntaraśabdārtham apohate)? 
 
[182]A particular (bhedaḥ) [general term] certainly excludes the 
referent of other particular [general terms] because they are in 
conflict [with one another]358 (virodhitvāt). [28ab] 
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[183]For words whose referents are particulars are in conflict with one 
another (parasparavirodhino) because they are appropriating [their] 
common property359 (sāmānyārthāpahāritvād), in the same way as 
the sons of a king [are appropriating their common property]; and 
therefore they do not tolerate (kṣamante) one another's property.360 
[184]For instance,361 when the word ‘śiṃśapā’ is used together with 
(*saha) the word ‘tree’ in [the statement] “this tree is a śiṃśapā” 
(*vkṣo 'yaṃ śiṃśapā), it confines (*vyavasthāpayati) treeness 
(*vkṣatvam) to its own object (*svaviṣaye) by excluding (*vyavac-
chidya) it from khadira, etc.; and likewise with regard to the 
remaining [particular terms]. Thus, in the first place (*tāvat), it is 
justified that a particular term excludes the referents of other 
particular terms because they are appropriating one and the same 
property362 (ekadravyāpahāritvāt). 
 
§ 41. [185]But why does the [word 'śiṃśapā'] exclude a referent that is 
the particular of a different general property (sāmānyāntarabhedā-
rtham), namely a pot, and so on, (ghaṭādim) which is without 
connection (asambaddham) [to the word ‘śiṃśapā’]?363  
Because 
 
[186]referents that are particulars of other general properties 
(sāmānyāntarabhedarthāḥ) are in conflict about its [i.e., śiṃśapā's] 
own general property (svasāmānyavirodhinaḥ).364 [28cd] 
 
[187]For there is conflict (virodhaḥ) between the word ‘tree’ and ‘pot’, 
etc. because they are appropriating earthenness, etc. (*pārthivatvād-
yapahāritvāt). For the [word ‘śiṃśapā’] approves (abhyanumodate) 
that [pot, etc.] is being excluded (nirākriyamāṇam) by the [word 
‘tree’], in the same way as [one approves that] the enemy of a friend 
[is being excluded] (*mitraśatruvat);365 [188]and it is understood by 
implication (arthāt) that it [namely pot, etc.] is excluded by the (word 
'śiṃśapā').366 [189]Thereby [etena] one is to understand that the 
exclusion (nirākaraṇam) and the toleration (upekṣaṇam) of the 
particulars of another general property such as quality and of their 
particulars such as colour is caused by a connection series 
(sambandhasambandhataḥ ktam), in the same way as [the exclusion 
of] the enemy of a friend's friend (mitramitraśatruvat) and [the 
toleration of] the friend of the enemy of a friend (mitraśatru-
mitravat).367 
 
 § 42. [190]In this context,368 however, 
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they are not its excluded [referents] directly (sākṣāt). [29a] 
 
[191]For the word ‘śiṃśapā’ does not exclude pot, and so on, directly.  
Why? 
 
There must be no identity [of referent] with [that of] the general 
[term] (sāmānyatulyatā). [29b] 
 
[192]For if it were to exclude directly, it would have a referent 
(tulyārthaḥ) identical with [that of] the word ‘tree.’ 
 
[193]In those circumstances there would be no exclusion of other 
particulars [by the word ‘śiṃśapā’], just as [there is no exclusion of 
the particulars] by this (teneva) [namely the word ‘tree’].369 [29cd] 
 
[194]For in the exact same way as (yathaiva hi) the word ‘tree’ would 
not exclude palāśa, and so on,370 the word ‘śiṃśapā’ would not 
exclude (palāśa, etc.) either because of identity [of referent]. [195]If it 
is [objected] that this problem does not exist because [the word ‘tree’ 
and the word ‘śiṃśapā’] are different as they exclude few and more 
referents,371 such [an objection] is not justified (ayuktam). [196]For just 
as the words ‘tree’ and ‘śiṃśapā,’ when denoting an entity (vastu) as 
qualified by treeness and śiṃśapāness (*vkṣatvaśiṃśapātvaviśiṣṭam), 
[in your system] denote an entirely different referent (*atyantabhin-
nārtham), in the same way the referent must not be confused 
(asaṅkīrṇenārthena) in our system (iha) either.372 However, by 
implication (arthāt) there will be exclusion of few and more 
[referents].373 
 
§ 43. [197]If a particular [term] excludes the referents of other 
particular [terms], how then could there be co-reference of a quality 
with other qualities like in [the statement]: “The sweet taste is sticky, 
cool, and heavy (madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto guruś ceti)?374 There is 
no conflict (*virodhaḥ) in this case because [198]the co-reference 
(sāmānādhikaraṇyam) of [one] quality with other qualities consists in 
their not being in conflict with its substratum (*āśrayeṇāvirodhitvam) 
because they are resident in the same substance (*ekadravya-
vttitvāt).375 [30] 
 
Because they inhere in the same referent (*ekārthasamavāyāt), a 
quality like stickiness (*snigdhatvādiguṇaḥ) is transferred to the 
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sweet taste (*madhure rase) that is found in the substance.376 Thus 
(iti)377 there is no problem. 
 
§ 44. [199]Or rather,378 the exclusion is due to not being observed 
(adṣṭatvāt). [31a] 
 
[200]Or rather, a particular term excludes because it is not observed to 
denote the referent of another particular term (bhedāntarārthe).  
But why [do you say] ‘not observed’ (na dṣṭa iti)?379  
Because being in conflict (*virodhitvāt) with some (*kaiścit),380 
[201]although the referent [of the word] is natural (svabhāvike 'py 
arthe), is understood as boasting of one's manliness (āhopuruṣikā 
pratipannā).381 
 
§ 45. [202]In these circumstances (evaṃ tarhi) 
 
a general [term] would exclude its own particulars382 
(svabhedanut). [31b] 
 
[203]If [a particular term] excludes [the referents of other particular 
terms] because of not being observed (adarśanena) [to denote these], 
[their] exclusion would follow [absurdly] since also a general term 
(*sāmānyaśabdasya) is not observed to denote its own particulars 
(*svabhedeṣu).383 
 
[204]This is not the case (na) because [a general term] is observed 
[to denote its own particulars] when it is connected with other 
[factors]384 (anyayuktasya). [31c] 
 
[205]For a general term indicates a particular, when it is observed 
together with motive and context, etc.385 (arthaprakaraṇādibhiḥ)386. 
 
[206]Thus doubt (saṃśayaḥ) reflects these (*tadābhaḥ). [31d] 
 
In these circumstances it is justified that doubt caused by a general 
term387 reflects its particulars (*sāmānyaśabdād bhedābhāsaḥ388 saṃ-
śayo yuktaḥ), even though it has previously been observed to denote 
these389 [particulars], in the same way as uprightness390 (teṣv api 
dṣṭapūrvaḥ, ūrdhvatāvat391).392 
 
[207]If [it is claimed that] it is not justified that there be doubt. [32a] 
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The following is meant: If the idea is that the [general term] is 
perceived [as denoting its own particulars] only as accompanied by 
motive and context, and so on, (arthaprakaraṇādisahita eva), then 
how could there be doubt”? 
 
[208]If [the particular] is ascertaineded (niścite), the [doubt] is 
caused by [the general term] alone. [32b] 
 
It is not claimed that the doubt is caused by [the general term] as 
accompanied by motive, etc. (arthādisahitāt), but rather that if [the 
particular] is ascertained [by the general term] as accompanied by 
motive, and so on, there is subsequently doubt caused by the [general 
term] alone393 (kevalāt). 
 
[209]If [it is objected that a general term] alone (kevalaḥ) is not 
found to denote a particular (bhede).394 [32c] 
 
Suppose it is objected: In your system395 (*iha) a general term396 
alone is not observed to denote particulars. It is, for instance, claimed 
(*yathoktam) that  
 
a general term does not denote particulars. [2a] 
 
[210]It is observed with regard to the listener (śrotvyapekṣayā). 
[32d] 
 
[211]For when (yadā hi) the listener asks for397 the exclusion of other 
general properties, like, for instance, when he asks: “Is a tree earthen 
(pārthivaḥ) or does it consist of the five principal elements (pañcama-
hābhautikaḥ),” (tadā) the application of the [word] ‘earthen’ alone is 
possible.  
[212]How then could he be in doubt becauser of the application of the 
word ‘earthen’ when the tree has been ascertained?  
[213]When [the tree] has been ascertained, he is in doubt about the 
other [word] due to [the general term] alone. He hears the word 
‘earthen’ alone; and so (*iti), in the first place (*tāvat), there is an 
application [of a general term] alone. Consequently (*iti) there is no 
problem (*doṣaḥ). 
 
§ 46. [214]And just as398 (yathā ca) the general property (*sāmānyam) 
in the referent399 (*arthe) is its exclusion of other referents, in the 
same way (*tathā)  
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[215]the general property in a word (*śabde sāmānyam) is explained 
(*ucyate) as its exclusion of other words. [33ab] 
 
[216]In the exact same way as the general property (sāmānyam) ‘being 
produced’ (ktakatvam) is [said] to indicate ‘impermanence’ (anitya-
tvagamakam) by exclusion of what is not a product (aktakavyudā-
sena),400 the general property in a word (śabde) is said to be its ex-
clusion of other words (śabdāntaravyavacchedena); and only through 
this (tenaiva ca) does it indicate its referent (arthapratyāyakaḥ).401 
With regard to this [viz. the speech unit],402 moreover,403 [217](tatrāpi) 
 
there is identity when there is doubt about the referent. [33c] 
 
[218]When (yatra) a word like ‘akṣa’ 404 causes doubt about its 
referent, namely a part of a cart, etc.405 (śakaṭāṅgādau), (tatra) there 
is identity of speech unit406 (śabdasyaikyam). 
 
[219]However, when there is doubt about it, there is difference 
(anekatā) [of speech unit]. [33d] 
 
[220]When (*yatra) there is doubt about whether a speech unit like 
‘bhavati,' (*bhavatiśabdādau) is ending in [the taddhita affix] śat, 
and so on,407 (*tatra) it is to be regarded as difference of speech unit 
(śabdabhedaḥ), in spite of the identity of sound408 (śrutisāmye 'pi), 
like, for instance, ‘ka iha.’409 
 
§ 47. [221]Again, why does the first-mentioned problem410 not follow 
[absurdly] if the word's denoting its own referent is through exclusion 
of other referents?  
Because (*yasmāt)411 
 
[222]the word’s connection is feasible412 (sambandhasaukaryam) 
and there is no ambiguity413 (vyabhicāritā) as it is not observed 
(adṣṭeḥ) [to apply] to the referent of other words414 and is also 
(api) observed (darśanāt) [to apply] to a member415 (aṃśe) of its 
own referent.416 [34] 
 
[223]For (hi) joint presence and joint absence (anvayavyatirekau) are a 
means (dvāram) to the word's denoting its referent.417 And these two 
are its application418 to what is similar and its non-application to what 
is dissimilar.419 [224]In this case, however (tu), application to all that is 
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similar is by necessity not statable with regard to any [referent] 
whatever420 (kva cit) because stating it is impossible (ākhyānāsam-
bhavāt) as the referent is infinite (arthasyānantye).421 On the other 
hand,422 stating its non-application to what is dissimilar is possible, 
even though it is infinite423 (atulye saty apy ānantye), through mere 
non-observation424 (adarśanamātrena); and just therefore425 (ata eva 
ca) it has been explained that [the word's] denoting its own referent 
(svārthābhidhānam) is an inference from [its own referent's] 
exclusion from these426 [other referents] (tadvyavacchedānumānam), 
from its not being observed [to apply] to other [referents] than its own 
relata427 (svasambandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanāt). [225]If, however,428 the 
inference were by means of joint presence (anvayadvāreṇa), the word 
‘tree’ should not give rise to doubt (saṃśayaḥ) appearing as śiṃśapā, 
etc. (śiṃśapādyābhāsaḥ), about one and the same entity (ekasmiṃ 
vastuni). Yet, in the same way as there is doubt about it, there will 
also be doubt appearing as earthenness and substanceness, etc. 
However, since the word ‘tree’ is not observed to denote what is non-
earthen, and so on, the inference is only by means of joint absence 
(vyatirekamukhenaiva).  
 
[226]Moreover it is explained that (*āha ca)  
 
‘treeness’, ‘earthen’, ‘substance’, ‘existent’, and ‘knowable’ are 
[each] a cause of doubt, in reverse order (pratilomyataḥ), about 
four, three, two, and one [properties]. In opposite order (anyathā) 
they serve the purpose of ascertainment (niścaye).429 [35] 
 
This is an inserted verse430 (*ity antaraślokaḥ). 
 
§ 48. [227]And without the means of connection431 (sambandhadvāraṃ 
muktvā) the word (śabdasya) or432 the inferential indicator (liṅgasya 
vā) is incapable of indicating its own referent (svārthakhyāpanaśaktir 
asti), [228]because it is impossible to indicate it in toto (sarvathā) as it 
has a multitude of properties (dharmabahutve).433 And because it does 
not denote particulars434 (bhedānabhidhānāt) there is no ambiguity 
about its own referent. [229]Thus, in the first place (evaṃ tāvat), the 
first mentioned problem does not exist435 (*pūrvoktadoṣābhāvaḥ).  
 





[231]there is agreement (abhinnatā) [of the general term ‘existent’] 
with [words] whose referents are its particulars437 (tadbhedārthaiḥ) 
as the rejection of other referents (vyāpter anyaniṣedhasya)438 
pervades [the particulars]. [36ab] 
 
[232]Since (hi) the function (ktyam) of the general term 
(sāmānyaśabdasya) [‘existent’], namely exclusion of other referents 
(arthāntaravyudāsaḥ), is through not rejecting its own particulars439 
(svabhedāpratikṣepeṇa), (iti) co-reference with a particular term is 
justified (bhedaśrutyā saha sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapannam).440 
[233]Therefore the problem of being “heard apart” from [words] whose 
referents are its own particulars does not exist (*svabhedārthaiḥ 
pthakśrutidoṣo nāsti).441 For it is co-referential [with the particular 
term] as regards the other referent that is denotable by both terms.442 
[234]That is (tathā hi), there is no ambiguity with regard to its own 
referent443 (svārthāvyabhicāraḥ) because alone it does not denote the 
other (*kevalasyānyatrāvtteḥ).444 
 
§ 50. [235] Nor does the last mentioned problem445 exist.  
Why? 
 
[236]Because [exclusion of other referents] applies directly446 (sāk-
ṣād vtteḥ), and because [exclusion of other referents] it is not a 
particular447 (abhedāc ca). [36c] 
 
[237]For (hi) a word does not apply to its own particulars (*svabhede-
ṣu) while being dependent upon another referent448 (arthāntaram 
upādāya). Therefore the problem of not implying its own particulars 
(*svabhedānākṣepadoṣaḥ) because of its dependence449 (pāratantrye-
na) does not exist, nor does the problem of transfer of denotation 
(bhāktadoṣaḥ) exist,450 nor the problem of not denoting because the 
particulars are infinite (nāpi bhedānavasthānād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ), 
451 nor the problem of not being a general property because of not 
pervading [the particulars]452 (avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣaḥ), be-
cause the mere exclusion of other referents is without division453 
(arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvāt) and because it is not a sub-
stance454 (adravyatvāc ca). Precisely therefore455 (ata eva) one does 
not have to pursue its relation to other particular general properties 
(*sāmānyaviśeṣāntarayogānusaraṇam) because it excludes other 
referents directly456 (sākṣād arthāntarapratiṣedhāt). [238]Thus, since 
the above-mentioned problems do not exist, only exclusion of other 
referents is the proper (sādhuḥ) referent of the word. 
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§ 51. [239]And [the last-mentioned problem does not exist] 
 
because the attributes of a general property are confined (jātidhar-
mavyavasthiteḥ) [36d] 
 
to it457 (*atra).  
 
[240]Moreover, the attributes of a general property (jātidharmāś ca), 
which are characterized by being one,458 permanence, and extension 
to each single459 [particular] (ekatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāpti-
lakṣaṇā), are confined to it only460 (atraiva vyavatiṣṭhante) because 
[exclusion of other] is not a particular461 (abhedāt) because its sub-
stratum is not discontinued462 (āśayasyāvicchedāt), and because its 
referent is cognized completely463 (ktsnārthapratīteḥ). [241]Thus, 
since the said problems do not exist and the merits [of exclusion of 
other referents] are superior464 (guṇotkarṣāt), a word denotes (āha) 
things (bhāvān) exclusively (eva) as qualified by preclusion of other 
referents465 (arthāntaranivttiviśiṣṭān). 
 
§ 52. If so, 
 
[242]whereby466 is the restriction of exclusion [of other referents 
effected] (apohaniyamaḥ kasmāt)? [37a] 
 
[243]If some asserts: “The word ‘colour’ excludes taste, and so on, but 
not the rest of the colours when it denotes either colour (anyatama-
varṇābhidhāne) even though they are completely different (*atyanta-
bhinnāpi). Whereby is this [restriction] effected (kiṃktaḥ)?  
On the other hand, such a problem does not exist for some who claims 
that [the general property] colourness is the same (abhinnam) only in 
[the colour] blue, and so on, but not in taste, etc.”467 
 
[244] This problem does not exist because  
 
[what is] current in the world (lokarūḍhaḥ) is not adhered (na 
mśyate) to.468 [37b] 
 
[245]For Bhagavat has said: “One should not become attached to a 
regional expression,469 nor should one disregard a name (sañjñām) of 
the world.”470 Therefore we too do not adhere to expressions current 
in the world471 (lokavyavahārāḥ) whether they have a cause of 
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application (*naimittikāḥ) or are technical designations472 (pāribhāṣi-
kāḥ) as having real referents473 (bhūtārthatvena), but observe them 
(anugamyante) exactly as the world does474 (lokavad eva). And in the 
world (loke) the word ‘colour’ is only acknowledged (siddhaḥ) to 
denote [the colour] blue, and so on, but not to denote taste, etc.475 
 
§ 53. [246]And with respect to [the general property] colourness 
(rūpatve) this [questioning] is the same.476 [37c]  
 
[247]And what is the reason why colourness does not reside in taste, 
and so on, according some who is of the opinion that it resides in 
entirely different [colours like] blue, etc?477 Or, just as it does not 
reside in taste, and so on, it does not reside in yellow, etc.  
[248]There is a reason for this.478 In that the essential nature [of blue, 
etc.] is different,479 visibility (*cākṣuṣatvam) is only the same in blue, 
and so on, but not in taste, etc.  
 
[249]If visibility [is the cause of restriction], [the application of the 
word ‘colour’] is caused by an action (kriyāktaḥ).480 [37d] 
 
[250]For visibility means perceptible by the eye (cakṣuṣā *grāhyam). 
And thus the word ‘colour’ would be used to denote blue, and so on, 
having an action as its cause of application481 (kriyānimittaḥ), but not 
having a general property as its cause of application (jātinimittaḥ).482 
[251]For what purpose does [the general property] colourness serve, if 
visibility is the same [in the blue colour, and so on, but not in taste, 
etc.]?483 [252]If, on the other hand (atha), the cause of the connection484 
of colourness is said to be visibility,485 [253]even so (evam api) it 
follows [absurdly] with respect to visibility that the inherence (sama-
vāyaḥ) [of colourness] is caused by an action486 (kriyāktaḥ), or that 
the manifestation of colourness487 (rūpatvābhivyaktir vā) [is caused 
by an action]. [254]Or again, whereby (kasmāt) is the restriction 
(niyamaḥ) [effected] with respect to visibility?488 [255]Therefore one 
must by necessity rely upon [visibility's] being essential [to the blue 
colour, etc.].489  
 
[256]And [colourness] follows [absurdly] in substance, etc.490 [38a] 
 
[257]And because substance (dravya-), number (saṅkhyā-), and size 
(parimāṇa-), and so on, are visible (cākṣuṣatvāt), colourness in these 
would follow [absurdly].491 Moreover,  
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[258]there would be no difference between white, etc.492 [38b] 
 
[259]As visibility is uniform there will be no difference between blue 
and yellow, and bluer and bluest.493 Therefore, without visibility the 
word ‘colour’ is necessarily494 to be observed (anugantavyaḥ) as 
denoting blue and yellow, and so on, even though they are entirely 
different because it is current usage495 in the world (loke rūḍheḥ), but 
not to denote taste, etc. Therefore, what is to be determined, namely 
the exclusion of other [referents] is restricted. 
 
§ 54. [260]And if496 the word denotes its referent without dependence 
upon preclusion of other referents, then (*tarhi)  
 
[261]its validity (siddhiḥ) [for denoting its referent] would only be 
by means of joint presence (anvayād eva), [38c] 
 
[262]but the word's [validity]497 for denoting its referent (arthābhidhā-
ne) would not be by means of joint presence and joint absence 
(anvayavyatirekābhyām), and this is maintained.498 [263]Yet, since the 
denotation fulfills its purpose499 by means of restriction of either 
[term] or both [terms of a statement],500 the denotation of the referent 
is also by means of joint absence, like, for instance, “[the technical 
term] karman denotes what the agent (kartuḥ) most wants to obtain 
(īpsitatamam) [by his action]501 [A I.4.49]. 
 
§ 55. [264]It is certainly the case (nanu ca) that if the word's referent is 
merely exclusion of other [referents], it would only (eva) denote its 
referent by means of joint absence (vyatirekāt).  
Such would be the case (syād etad evam) if joint presence were not 
maintained. [265]However, 
 
[the word's] concomitance (*vyāpti) is not claimed to be with a 
principal (mukhyena) [38d] 
 
entity502 (bhāvena). [266]For (hi) it has been stated that “it is impos-
sible that a general property (jātiḥ) occur in entities, whether it be 
separate (*vyatiriktā) or not separate (*avyatiriktā) [from its sub-
strata].”503 But if the referent is qualified by the exclusion of other 
referents504 (arthāntarāpohaviśiṣṭe 'rthe) without the general proper-
ty,505 the word's joint presence and joint absence do not have different 
referents in accordance with the [statement at PS V 34a:] “since it is 
not observed [to apply] to the referent of other words.” 
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§ 56. [267]Someone, however, objects506 that if507 everything manifest 
like a cow is a modification that is due to something non-existent 
(gavādi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ), it follows [absurdly] that 
[everything manifest] has an existent nature (prayuktam asataḥ sad-
ātmakatvam) that is due to something non-existent because of the 
[absurd] consequence of its being the nature of everything (sārvāt-
myaprasaṅgāt).”508 Regarding this (*tatra) [we ask you], 
 
[268]wherewith is existence (sattvam) connected,509 according to 
[you] who assume (abhyupagacchataḥ) that everything is continu-
ously connected with what is non-existent (asatsamanvitaṃ 
sarvam) because [existence] is the nature of many things? [39] 
 
[269]If it is assumed that everything is continuously connected with 
something non-existent, in that case, what other non-existent things 
such as cows will be the objects of attribution of existence on account 
of which nature?510 For while [you] assume that all cows, and so on, 
are continuously connected with something non-existent, the rejoinder 
(uttaram) that their having an existent nature follows [absurdly] from 
what is non-existent (asataḥ sadātmakatvam prāptam), is not 
justified. [270]Moreover, as regards [the] claim that there would be no 
difference of notion (pratyayābhedaḥ) with regard to something 
existent and something non-existent, for the notion of primordial 
materiality (praktipratyayaḥ) is observed with regard to a modi-
fication, like, for instance, the notion of clay with regard to a plate, 
and so on,511 (*tatra) [we ask you], 
 
[271]how is the cognition of difference established, although there is 
no difference of what is non-existent,512 if you maintain that there 
is a cognition of the difference of plate, and so on, although they 
are not different from clay? [40] 
 
[272]For just as the difference of cognition of a plate, and so on, is 
assumed to be due to some means or other (kenāpi vidhinā)513– 
although [plates, etc.] are not different from clay (*mdbhyo 
'bhinnatve 'pi)–when the [absurd] consequence is that there is only a 
['clay'] cognition, (tathā) in the same way, why is it not maintained 
that the difference of cognition of what is existent and what is non-
existent is due to the residual traces of verbal difference (śabdabheda-
bhāvānāvaśāt]?514 For in your opinion too (tavāpi hi), 
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the ultimate form of the constituents is beyond the reach of vision. 
What has come within the reach of vision, however, is void like an 
illusion (māyā).515 
 
§ 57. [273]The example516 [you have] adduced, namely that the 
cognition of a cow is due to the observation of dewlap, and so on, 
is in conflict with your own theory.517 On the contrary, they have 
mutually different excluded referents.518 [41] 
 
[274]For how could someone,519 to whom the cognition of a cow (*go-
pratyayaḥ) as precluded from non-cows (*agonivttaḥ), assert that it 
is caused by the observation of dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādidarśana-
nimittaḥ)? [275]Having assumed [this],520 the example is in conflict 
even with your own theory (svamataviruddhaḥ).521 For the excluded 
[object] is different with regard to a cow and a dewlap because of 
verbal difference522 (śabdabhedāt). 
 
[276]The idea, however, that this [namely the cognition of one thing 
(ātmāntara)] is not dependent [upon the observation of non-
existence of other things],523 is created out of your own imagina-
tion,524 for the word does not denote any individual form (*sva-
rūpam) whatsoever that is exempt from exclusion (nirapoham) [of 
other referents]. [42] 
 
[277]For it has previously been demonstrated that the general form in a 
dewlap, etc. (sāsnādiṣu), does not exist without dependence upon the 
non-existence of other referents (*sāmānyarūpam arthāntarābhāva-
nirapekṣaṃ na bhavati).525 The526 individual form,527 however, (sva-
rūpam tu) is not denotable (*vyāvahārikam) in this (tena) [form] 
because it is inexpressible (anabhilāpyatvāt). 
 
§ 58. [278]And as to the objection that there is no first cognition 
(ādyapratyayaḥ),528 
 
[279]our view is established because there is no beginning.529 [43a] 
 
For (*hi) there is no first cognition since the transmission of the cause 
and effect of discourse is without beginning (*vyavahārakāryakāra-
ṇapāramparyānāditvāt).530 [280]However, the following two problems 
concern someone who recognizes first cognition,531 namely that 
[281]neither is it [namely the word] capable of universally pervading 
the general property possessors,532 nor533 is the general property 
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(*jātiḥ) capable [of pervading the general property possessors]534 as 
resident in a single or in all [general property possessors] (*eka-
samastavttiḥ) whether it is separate (*vyatiriktā vā) or not separate 
(*avyatiriktā vā) from the general property possessors.535 
 
§ 59. [282]Nor is the claim justified that no cognition occurs at all 
(pratyayavttir eva nāsti).536  
 
because exclusion is [in the form of a single] common [property]537 
(sāmānyena nirākteḥ). [43b] 
[283]For the [word] (saḥ) does not exclude a different general property 
(anyāṃ jātim) for each individual substance538 (pratidravyam), but 
rather (kiṃ tarhi) with the intention of denoting the things to be 
excluded539 (vyavacchedyavivakṣayā) by means of a single common 
property (ekena sāmānyadharmena).540 And on this point it has been 
explained (uktaṃ cātra) that the inference [of the referent] is from 
mere non-observation [of the word’s application] to what belongs to 
the class of dissimilar things (vijātīye 'darśanamātreṇānumānam).541 
However, this problem542 concerns only you (tavaiva): if [the word] 
were to apply by universally pervading [the referents] pertaining to its 
own class of similar things (svajātīyavyāptyā varteta), the pervaded543 
would be infinite (*vyāpyasyānantyam). Therefore, like in the 
statement “It is a non-horse because it is horned” (*viṣāṇitvād anaśva 
iti), the inference is from its exclusion from this [namely a horse] 
(tadvyavacchedānumānam)544 because of not observing the general 
property of being horned in a horse (aśve viṣāṇitvādarśanena), but the 
white horses, etc. (*karkādīn) are not excluded each separately 
(pratyekam), nor is every single cow, etc. (*ekaikagavādīn)545 appre-
hended.546 Also you maintain the theory that cognitions are based 
upon exclusion and continuous application547 (*vyāvttyanuvtti-
buddhimatam); and the principle (nyāyaḥ) in this treatise (atra) is the 
same (tathā). 
 
§ 60. [284]The notion of identity and difference (ekānekatvakalpanā) 
is not justified on the assumption (upetya) of non-existence of the 
nature of other things since (hi) it is concerned with an entity.548 
[44a-c] 
 
[285]For (hi) it is justified to conceive of the identity and difference of 
a thing whose nature is existent (*sadātma), but not on the assump-
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tion of non-existence of the nature of other things (*ātmāntarābhāv-
am abhyupetya).549  
 
[286]The consequence is the same for  
 
you too, as regards the powers in the unmanifest. [44d] 
 
[287]For if (*hi) the powers of the modifications are identical (vikāra-
śaktīnām aikye) in the unmanifest, there would be no difference 
between the modifications. If, on the other hand, they are different, 
that would be in conflict with the unity of primordial materiality 
(pradhānasya) because it is not different from the powers. 
 
[288]This theory (cintā), moreover, concerns the denotable object of 
the word, not the domain of the senses (*indriyagocare). Since it 
[namely the denotable object] is not included (*prakṣiptaḥ)550 in 
[what is perceptible such as] words, and so on, it does not have 
different sensefaculties [for cognizing it] (*bhinnendriyaḥ).551 [45] 
 
[289]For the object of sensation is not denotable552 (anirdeśyaḥ). The 
statement “the nature of one thing is the non-existence of the nature of 
other things” (ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti),553 has been formula-
ted with regard to (prati) the denotable [object]. Therefore it [namely 
the denotable object] is not included in what is perceptible (pratyakṣe 
prakṣepaḥ). 
 
§ 61. In this context, moreover (*atra ca), 
 
[290]the referent554 of the syntactical word (padasya) is imagined555 
(vikalpitaḥ) when abstracted (apoddhāre)556 from the sentence 
(vākyāt). Yet the referent of the sentence which is called intuition 
(pratibhā) is in the beginning (ādau) produced by that [namely the 
syntactical word].557 [46] 
 
[291]Even though the syntactical word is unreal (asat)558 as abstracted 
from the sentence, its referent is determined by invention559 
(utprekṣayā)560 according to the [grammatical] tradition,561 because it 
is not used in isolation562 (kevalasyāprayogāt) in the same way as a 
stem and an affix (praktipratyayavat) [are not used in isolation].563 
And this invention apprehends a referent that is not justified 
(ayuktārthagrahaṇī)564 in other traditions.565 Therefore this different 
referent566 (arthāntaram) has been brought forward (utkṣiptam); 
Translation 113 
567because for those who have not repeatedly experienced the connec-
tion between the word and its referent (*anabhyastaśabdārtha-
sambandhānām) the intuition of the referent of the sentence 
(*vākyārthapratibhā) has in the beginning (*ādau) the syntactical 
word568 as a means of apprehension of the referent (*padārthagra-
haṇopāyā). [292]Yet only (eva) the sentence and its referent are the 
principal speech unit and the principal referent569 (mukhyau śabdār-
thau) because they are indivisible (tayor abhinnatvāt).570 The other 
belief in apprehending speech units and [their] referents (*śabdārtha-
grahaṇābhimānaḥ) in the interval between them571 (*tadantarāle) is 
due to invention572 (*utprekṣayā), for [invention] is unfettered573 
(*niraṅkuśatvāt).574 
 
§ 62. [293]Those who reject intuition of the referents (*artheṣu … 
pratibhāṃ hitvā) and imagine that the referent of the sentence 
(vākyārtham) is something different, namely an external referent575 
(bāhyam artham) or their connection576 (tatsambandhaṃ vā), their 
[view] is also (teṣām api) mere imagination (kalpanāmātram).577  
Why? 
 
[294]Because (hi) even without an external referent, according to 
repeated practice578 (yathābhyāsam) a cognition (pratipatti) is 
produced in various ways (anekadhā)579 by sentences in imitation 
of one's own ideas580 (svapratyayānukāreṇa). [47] 
 
[295]Although the external referent does not exist,581 a cognition about 
purposeful action582 (arthakriyāpratipattiḥ) that has various forms 
(nānārūpā) arises from a sentence, as well as representations by 
imitation of one's own ideas583 (svapratyayānurūpyeṇa) dependent 
upon latent impressions from repeated practice584 [in a former 
existence] with regard to the referents585 [of a sentence] (arthābhyā-
savāsanāpekṣā),586 like hearing [the sentence] “The tiger [is near 
by],” or the like (vyāghrādiśrutivat).587 Or, even if its [referent] is the 
same588 (tadaviśeṣe vā), nevertheless, in those who are impassioned 
(rāgiṇām) a cognition (pratītiḥ) arises from hearing a love poem589 
(śṅgārakāvyasya śravaṇāt) that reflects their passion (rāgānurūpā), 
but in those who are devoid of passion (vītarāgānām) it reflects their 
aversion (saṃvegānurūpā). 
 
§ 63. [296]Moreover, the [intuition] of some who knows the 
connection (sambandhābhijñasya) [between the word and its 
referent]590 is claimed to be [intuition] of a referent (arthe) as 
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excluded (vyavacchinne) from the referents of other sentences 
(vākyāntarārthebhyaḥ)591 Therefore it [namely intuition] does not 
differ from inference.592 [48] 
 
Moreover, the intuition of someone who knows the connection 
[between the word and its referent] is different for each sentence 
(*pratyekam vākye) in the same way as for [each referent of] the 
syntactical words (*padārthavat).593 Therefore it [namely intuition] 
does not differ from inference. 
 
[297]However, the cognition (pratipattiḥ), entailing different repre-
sentations, that arise due to a sentence594 does not transgress595 
(*nātivartate) [the domain of] sensation (*pratyakṣam) either, as it 
is self-awareness.596 [49] 
 
Intuition597 (*pratibhā), however,598 is sensation (*pratyakṣam) as it 
is self-awareness599 (*svasaṃvedanam). Consequently it does not 
transgress [the domain of] this [namely sensation]. 
 
§ 64. [298]If, in the first place, it is justified, in the case of words 
having a cause of application (naimittikeṣu),600 that they denote their 
referents (arthābhidhānam) through exclusion of other referents 
(anyāpohena), how then [is it justified] in the case of those that are 
arbitrary (yādcchikeṣu)?601 
 
[299][it is] also [justified] in the case of arbitrary terms because their 
referents are without distinction602 (*arthābhedāt). [50a] 
 
[300]For (hi) an arbitrary term like the word ‘ḍittha’, which denotes an 
aggregate (samudāyavācī),603 denotes the members of the aggregate 
(*samudāyinaḥ) without distinction604 (abhedenāha).  
[301]What then is the difference between a general term and an aggre-
gate term?605  
[There is] none whatsoever!606 According to acknowledged usage607 
(prasiddhivaśāt) a general term in some cases (kvacit) is transferred to 
each single (pratyekam) part (avayaveṣu), as, for instance, in the 
statement: “one should not eat the village swine”608 (abhakṣyo 
grāmyasūkara iti). In other cases (kvacit) it [applies] directly 
(mukhyaḥ) [to the parts]. [302]It is, for example, said that 
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without reference to number, quantity, and material shape the 
denoting [word] (vācakaḥ) applies to water, or the like,609 whether 
a [single] drop or a multitude [of drops].610 (VP II 156) 
 
In certain cases (*kvacit) it does not refer to a part (*avayave)611 [of a 
referent]. For instance,  
 
[303]the word which applies to [a referent] that is qualified by 
material shape, colour, and parts, is not recognized to apply to 
[each single] component [of these]. (VP II 155) 
 
When [applied] to [a referent] that is qualified by material shape 
(*saṃsthānaviśiṣṭa) [the terms] 'circular' (*vtta), 'spherical' 
(parimaṇḍala), 'oblong' (dīrgha), and quadrangular (caturaśra), and 
in the same way 'fist' (muṣṭi), 'knot' (granthi), 'wreath' (*mālā), and 
'ear-ring' (kuṇḍalaka) do not denote the parts.612 [304]When [applied] 
to [a referent] that is qualified by colour (varṇaviśiṣṭe): [the terms] 
'speckled' (citraḥ) and ‘variegated’(kalmāṣaḥ), and so on,613 [do not 
denote the parts]. [305]When [applied] to [a referent] that is qualified 
by parts (avayavaviśiṣṭe): [the terms] ‘hndred' (śatam), 'thousand' 
(sahasram), 'prastha',614 'droṇa',615 'month' (māsa), 'year' (saṃvat-
sara), and 'weight' (tulā) do not apply to the parts.616 [306]And in some 
cases an aggregate term (samudāyaśabdaḥ) comprises each single 
[part]617 (pratyekam parisamāpyate), as, for instance, [in the 
statement]: “The village came back” (grāma āgataḥ).618 [307]In some 
cases it is transferred (upacaritaḥ) [to each single part], like [VS 
V.2:18]: “The action of the ātman is explained by the action of the 
body” (kāyakarmaṇā 'tmakārma vyākhyātam).619 In some cases it 
does not refer to the parts [of the aggregate], as for instance, [the 
words] 'troop' (yūtham), and forest620 (vanam).621 
 
§ 65. [308]Now how could the cognition of a referent (arthapratītiḥ) 
from a word whose connection has not been told (*aktasambandha-
śabdāt)622 be an inference about it like, for instance, from [the 
statement] ‘this is a Jack-fruit tree’ (ayam panasa iti)?623 
[309]In that case there is no cognition of the referent from the word 
'Jack-fruit tree.'  
Why? 
 
[310]Because [it's] referent is shown (*arthadarśanāt) (?) by 
someone to whom [its connection] is known (pratītena).624 [50b] 
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Since the [word's] referent is established625 (*arthasiddhatvāt) by an 
acknowledged authority (*vddhena) to whom the connection is 
known (*pratītasambandhena)626 [311]by means of the demonstrative 
pronoun 'this'627 (ayaṃśabdena) and ostentation628 (*hastasaṃ-
jñayā),629 there is no cognition of the referent (*arthapratītiḥ) due to 
the word ‘Jack-fruit tree,’ [312]but rather, it is the name [of the 
referent] that is taught (saṃjñāvyutpattiḥ).630 [313]The co-reference 
(sāmānādhikaraṇyam) of this [namely the word ‘Jack-fruit tree’], 
whose purpose is that of [teaching] a name,631 with the demonstrative 
pronoun ‘this’ is just632 for the purpose of showing the connection 
(sambandhapradarśanārthaṃ tu),633 [314]on the assumption (iti ktvā) 
that [the connection] is the denotable object of both [terms].634 
[315]And since the word ‘Jack-fruit tree’ does not have this [namely the 
Jack-fruit tree] as its referent, its purpose is that of [teaching] a 
name.635  
 
§ 66. [316]Then (tarhi) only the connection will be the word's object of 
cognition (*prameyam).636 
 
The connection is not (*na) [the word's object of cognition] 
because it is imagined.637 [50c] 
 
[317]Since (hi) the connection is created in the mind (manasā 
kalpyate), after having perceived the referent Jack-fruit tree and the 
word ‘Jack-fruit tree’ by the other means of cognition [namely 
sensation],638 at the thought: “This [word] is [the denotation] of that 
[referent]” (*asyāyam iti), in the same way as the inference-
inferendum connection (anumānānumeyasambandhavat),639 (*tataḥ) 
verbal cognition (śābdam) is not a separate means of cognition. 
 
§ 67. [318]Now why is it that the remaining [means of cognition] 
namely comparison (upamānādi), and so on,640 are not separate 
means of cognition? 
 
[319]The remaining [means of cognition] are explained in the 
[previously prescribed] manner.641 [50d] 
 
[320]Firstly, comparison has the purpose of cognizing the similarity642 
in a cow and a gayal, and so on. In this context (tatra) the cognition 
that results from listening to another643 (parata upaśrutya) is verbal 
cognition (śābdam). And when (yadā) one imagines (kalpayati)644 the 
similarity in the mind (manasā) after having apprehended the two 
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referents by means of the other means of cognition (pramāṇāntareṇa) 
[namely sensation], (tadā) it is not a separate means of cognition 
either.645 Nor is similarity when apprehended in this way an object of 
cognition (prameyam).646 In the same way also the other [means of 
cognition] are to be rejected (parikṣiptavyāni) since they are not 









[1] uktaṃ pramāṇadvayam(1). kecic chābdam api <pramāṇāntaraṃ manyante>. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 191a7: pramāṇāntaracodanāvakāśadānāyāha: uktaṃ 
pramāṇadvayam iti; 191b1: kecic chābdam apīti. 
(1) Cf. tshad ma gñis su brjod pa la V : tshad ma gñis bśad pa yin no K. This 
nominal sentence is syntactically ambiguous and open to interpretation. V translates: 
“the means of cognition are explained as [i.e. to be] two;” K: “The two means of 
cognition are [already] explained.” 
 
1 Jinendrabuddhi explains this statement with reference to Dignāga's definition 
of the means of cognition at PSV I:2ab. The purpose is to present the greater merit 
of Dignāga’s theory of the actual means of cognition and to refute the views 
presented by other philosophers, cf. PSṬ Ms B 191a7-191b1: yat prāk pratijñātaṃ 
“pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇe dve eva” iti tad uktaṃ pramāṇadvayam iti 
svapramāṇaguṇodbhāvanataḥ parapramāṇapratiṣedhataś ca. See Hattori 1968: 24, 
76 no. 1.11.  
In the first chapter of PSV Dignāga sets forth his theory of sensation (pratyakṣa) 
introducing the crucial distinction between svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣana. Svalak-
ṣaṇa denotes the individual character of any given thing as observable through 
sensation, which Dignāga claims is beyond linguistic representation, whereas 
sāmānyalakṣana designates the general character of things as known either by 
means of an inferential indicator (liṅga) or communicated through language. 
Although Dignāga never explicitly defines sāmānyalakṣaṇa, it appears indirectly 
from a passage recorded at PSV I 2c2-d1 that sāmānyalakṣaṇa is comparable to 
general properties like colorness (varṇatva) and impermanence (anityatā): svasā-
mānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ hy avyapadeśyavarṇatvābhyāṃ varṇādi ghītvānityatayā 
cānityaṃ varṇādīti manasā saṃdhatte: “For having apprehended a color and so on 
through its individual and general characters, i.e., through what is not denotable and 
colorness, [respectively], as well as through [the general property] impermanence, 
one combines [the two] at the thought: “Color, and so on, is impermanent.”  
This passage shows unequivocally that sāmānyalakṣaṇa is equivalent to 
sāmānya “general property,” which contemporary grammarians and philosophers 
claimed to be a real singular property inherent in things and the cause of application 
of words (pravttinimitta). Dignāga, however, rejects the theory of real universals 
and substitutes anyāpoha “exclusion of other [referents]” for real general properties. 
He defines apoha as equivalent to preclusion (nivtti) or non-existence (abhāva) of 
all instances of non-x in all instances of x, thereby qualifying any instance of x as 
x(excluded from non-x). See PSV V 34ff, and cf. no. 9 below on Dignāga’s 
introduction of the abstract affixes tva or tā to denote anyāpoha as the general 
property of things and as cause of application of words. 
 
2 Jinendrabuddhi does not identify any of the contemporary scholars whose 
philosophy of verbal cognition Dignāga addresses in this paragraph, but merely 
identifies his protagonists as Sāṅkhya, and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b1: 
Kapilādayaḥ. It is noteworthy, however, that Dignāga, in the crucial paragraph at 
PSV II:4c, mentions the views of contemporary philosophers who claim that there is 





1. No example is mentioned because any given example is already well known to the 
listener (prasiddhivaśena); 
2. The word and its referent are identified in verbal cognition in terms of abhedopacāra. 
That is, the cognition of the word (śabdajñāna) and that of the referent (arthajñāna) become 
fused. This, on the other hand, is not the case with the relation that holds between the logical 
indicator and the thing it indicates. Consequently it is impossible to assert that the word and 
the inferential indicator are similar;  
3. Only the sentence (vākya) has status as an independent speech unit, and a sentence 
cannot be an inferential indicator (cf., however, PS V:48-49 § 63 below). 
 
The two Tibetan versions of PSV II:4c diverge semantically and syntactically 
from each other, and the limited number of pratīkas quoted by Jinendrabuddhi at 
PṬS Ms B 60b4-61a1 are not in every case sufficient for restoring the Sanskrit 
original of this important paragraph. It is obvious that the translator of V was 
uncertain about some of the readings of his manuscript. For instance, śugs kyis K : 
don yod pa'i V of the following passage must translate arthāpattyā because K in 
general renders Sanskrit arthāpatti by Tibetan śugs. The noun phrase don yod pa'i, 
however, shows that the translators of V identified the first lexeme of this compound 
as Sanskrit artha, but could not correctly identify the second term on the basis of 
their manuscript and presumably interpreted it as a form of sattā (?) to be construed 
with the following word, otherwise the Tibetan reading of V: don yod pa'i is 
inexplicable. Whatever the reading of the Sanskrit manuscript may have been, the 
incomprehensible translation of V shows that the first word of the compound must 
have been equivalent to Sanskrit artha, and in this way V corroborates, although 
indirectly, the suggested interpretation of śugs kyis K as equivalent to Sanskrit 
arthāpattyā.  
 
1. Dignāga addresses the first view in the following passage: 
 
K (Kitagawa 1973 453b2-10 = P 110b2-5): grags pa'i dbaṅ gi rjes su dpag pa 
las sgra las byuṅ ba tha dad par yaṅ grub bo || kha cig dpe ma bstan pa las khyad 
par yod do źes zer ro || de lta na yaṅ gaṅ du rtogs pa'i phyir dpe gcig gam gñis ma 
bstan pa der sgra las byuṅ ba ni dper na du ba las me byuṅ ba'i rjes su dpag pa lta 
bur śugs kyi rjes su dpag par thal bar 'gyur ro || 
V (Kitagawa 1973 453a2-9 = P 29a6-8): rab tu grags pa'i dbaṅ gis dpe ni bstan 
par mi bya'o źes kha cig gis rjes su dpag pa las sgra tha dad du 'byed par byed do || 
de ltar grags pa'i phyir dpe bstan par mi bya ba yin na ni dper na dud pa las me 
rjes su dpog pa lta bu der don yod pa'i rjes su dpog pa yaṅ sgrar thal bar 'gyur ro ||:  
 
“Some assert that verbal cognition is different from inference as no example is 
stated (dṣṭāntānabhidhānam) because [the word's application to similar instances 
and non-application to dissimilar instances] is well known (prasiddhivaśena) [to the 
listener]. Even so (evam api), in which case one (dṣṭāntasyaikasya) or two 
examples (dvayor vā) are not stated because [the positive and negative examples] 
are well-known [to the listener], it follows by implication (*arthāpattyā) that 
inference like, for instance, inference of fire from smoke (*dhūmād agnyanu-
mānavat), is [absurdly] verbal cognition (śābdaprasaṅgaḥ).” (1) 
(1) For the Sanskrit fragments of this paragraph, cf. PSṬ Ms B 60b3-60a1: 





dvayor veti … śābdaprasaṅga iti. Jinendrabuddhi explains at PSṬ Ms B 60b3-4 that 
the reason why śābda is not inferential is that [the word’s] existence to denote 
similar things and its non-existence to denote dissimilar things is an established fact 
to the listener, for which reason examples are not stated: sapakṣavipakṣayoḥ 
sadasattve śrotuḥ siddhe iti dṣtāntānabhidhānam. The remaining part of his 
explanation, however, sheds no further light on the topic. 
Kumārila presents this view in similar terms at ŚV Śabda° 33: dṣṭāntāna-
bhidhānaṃ ca dhūmādau vyabhicāritam, prasiddhatvād dhi tatrāpi na dṣṭānto 
'bhidhīyate: “The not stating an example, moreover, is ambiguous in the case of 
smoke, and so on, for also in that case an example is not stated since it is well 
known.”  
Cf. also Śabda° 35cd: śabdānumānayor aikyaṃ dhūmād agnyānumānavat: 
“language and inference become identical just as the inference of fire from smoke;”  
The writer Bhāmaha, who composed Kāvyālaṅkāra, a treatise on poetics, was 
evidently familiar with an argument similar to the one Dignāga is addressing. This 
appears from his exposition at Kāvyālaṅkāra VI.7: pratītir artheṣu yatas taṃ 
śabdaṃ bruvate apare, dhūmabhāsor api prāptā śabdatāgnyanumāṃ prati: “Other 
[scholars] claim that a word is that due to which there is a cognition of objects; but it 
follows [absurdly] that also smoke and light [from fire] have status as words.” 
 
2. Dignāga mentions the second view in the following paragraph: 
 
K (Kitagawa 1973 453b2-10 = P 110b2-5): 
gźan ni sgra las byuṅ ba la sgra daṅ don tha mi dad par ñe bar btags pa yin te | 
de ltar don las rjes su dpag pa las ni ma yin no źes bya ba ni khyad par yin no źes 
zer ro || sgra daṅ tha mi dad pa ñe bar btags pa de lta na yaṅ ji ltar don la rjes su 
dpag pa yin źes brjod par bya ste |  
V (Kitagawa 1973 453a2-9 = P 29a6-8):  
gźan dag ni don gyi sgra la tha mi dad kyi | sgras ñe bar brtags pa ste don de ñid 
rjes su dpog pa ni ma yin no źes bya ba ni khyad par ro źes zer ro || de lta na yaṅ 
sgras tha mi dad du ñe bar brtags pa las don rjes su dpog go źes ji lta brjod par bya 
|: 
 
“Other [scholars], however, argue (anye tv āhuḥ) that the difference (*viśeṣaḥ) 
[between inference and verbal cognition] is that in verbal cognition (*śābde) the 
word is transferred to the referent in terms of non-difference 
(*śabdenārthābhedopacāraḥ) [of the referent] from the word. Thus, there is no 
inference of the referent (*evaṃ nārthe 'numānam). Consequently (*iti) there is a 
difference. As this is the case, it is to be explained (*vaktavyam) how it is inference 
of the referent (katham arthe 'numānam), since the word is transferred [to it] in 
terms of non-difference [from it]?”(1) 
(1) For the Sanskrit fragments of this paragraph, cf. PSṬ Ms B 61a1-2: anye tv 
āhur ityādi … katham arthe 'numānam iti; cf. loc. cit. below. 
In this short passage Dignāga presumably addresses Bharthari's view that in 
verbal cognition any given word and its referent become fused in terms of 
abhedopacāra; cf. Bharthari's use of the phrase so 'yam to illustrate abhedopacāra 
(cf. Iyer 1969: 206), e.g., at VPV I 101,3: so 'yam iti vyapadeśena sambandhopa-
yogasya śakyatvāt; VPV 105,3-4; VPV I 126,4-5: so 'yam iti sañjñinā śaktyavac-




tions of abhedopacāra several times in ŚV, cf. Pratyakṣa° 171: nanu jātyādirūpe 'pi 
śabdābhedopacārataḥ, pravartamānā mithyā syād buddhī rūpeṣu buddhivat. 186: 
yadi cābhedarūpeṇa śabdenārthaḥ pratīyate, ekarūpatvam akṣādau devanādeḥ 
prasajyate. Śabda° 26: tulyākāratayāpy atra śabdajñānārthataddhiyām, agnidhūme-
ṣv adṣṭatvān na bhedas tannivāraṇāt. 
Jinendrabuddhi explains the view Dignāga is criticizing in a interesting passage 
at PSṬ Ms B 61a1: śabdo hi svarūpeṇābhinnarūpam evārthaṃ pratyāpayati. na tv 
evaṃ dhūmādayaḥ. na hi dhūmād agniṃ pratyayati pratyāpayati vā. katham arthe 
'numānam ity arthasyānekarūpatvāt. tatra hi kiṃ svarūpeṇa so 'rtho gamyate uta 
sāmānyarūpeṇa? sarvathaivānupapattiṃ manyate. tathā hi yadi vkṣādayaḥ śabdāḥ 
sattvādibhiḥ sāmānyākārair vkṣādikam arthaṃ pratipādayeyuḥ sarvaśabdānām 
ekārthatā prasajyeta sāmānyākārānām anekārthasādhāraṇatvāt. atha viśeṣarūpeṇa 
tad ayuktam, asādhāraṇasya rūpasya pratipādayitum aśakyatvād iti sarvathā 
śabdārthatvābhāvaḥ: “For a word makes its referent known only in a form that is 
identical with its own form, but smoke and so on does not. For [in verbal cognition] 
fire is not known or made known from smoke. So how is there inference of the 
referent? Because the referent has numerous forms. Is the referent in that case 
understood in its own form or in the form of [its] general properties? In every single 
case there is thought to be no justification. That is, if a word like ‘tree’ were to 
indicate a referent like a tree by means of the forms of its general properties such as 
existence, the [absurd] consequence would be that all words have one and the same 
referent because the forms of the general properties are common to many referents. 
If, on the other hand, it is understood in its own form, that would be unjustified 
because it is impossible to convey knowledge of an individual referent. 
Consequently the word has in every single case no referent.” 
 
Before addressing the third view Dignāga answers a question his opponent is 
asking about how the referent is inferred, when the word is transferred to it in terms 
of non-difference. This passage is important for understanding the rationale of the 
apoha theory: 
 
K (Kitagawa 1973 453b13-454b4 = P 110b5-8): śiṅ gi sgra'i brjod par bya ba ni 
don gźan ma yin no || gal te yaṅ rdzas kyi sgras ni don de ñid go bar byed pa yin la | 
raṅ bźin gźan gyis ni rdzas ma yin pa las ldog pas so || 'on te śiṅ gi sgras kyaṅ rdzas 
ma yin pa las ldog pa go bar byed do źe na | gal te go bar byed kyaṅ don gyis yin 
gyis | sgras ni ma yin pas ñes pa med do źe na | gal te śiṅ la sogs pa' i śiṅ tshig kho 
na la tshad ma brjod na ni ñes pa med par 'gyur na | a khya ta la sogs pa'i sgra 
rnams de'i raṅ bźin ma yin pas kyaṅ don go bar byed pa yin no ||. 
V (Kitagawa 1973 453a11-454a1 = P 29b1-3): śiṅ gi sgra'i brjod bya' i don 
gźan ma yin pas rdzas kyi sgras don de ñid go ru zin kyaṅ tsul gzan gyi sgo nas 
rdzas gźan ma yin pa las bzlog pa go ba yin no || gal te śiṅ gi sgras rdzas ma yin pa 
las log pa go bar byed du zin mod kyis kyaṅ don las yin gyi sgras las ni ma yin no || 
de' phyir skyon med de źe na | skyon du ni mi 'gyur la rag la | śiṅ la sogs pa'i tshig 
las gźan pa'i sgra ñid tshad mar brjod par bya ste | bya ba brjod pa'i sgras kyaṅ 
don gyi tshul de ñid go bar byed do ||:  
 
“The referent that is the denotable object of the word ‘tree’ is not a different 
[referent from a substance] (vkṣaśabdābhidheyo 'nyo 'rtho na bhavati). Even 





indicates a different form [of it] (rūpāntaram) by excluding it from non-substances 
(adravyanivttyā). 
Surely (nanu ca) also the word ‘tree’ (vrkṣaśabdenāpi) indicates its exclusion 
from non-substances. 
Even so, it does so by implication, not explicitly (arthāt, na śabdāt), therefore 
there is no problem.  
If only syntactical words like ‘tree’ were claimed to be a means of cognition 
(yadi vrkṣādipādāny eva pramāṇam ucyeran), there would be no problem (na syād 
doṣaḥ), but also verbs (ākhyātaśabdair api) that do not have their form 
(*atadrūpaiḥ) [i.e. they end in a tiṅ affix in contrast to nouns that end in a sup affix] 
indicate the object.”(1) 
(1)The inserted Sanskrit fragments stem from PSṬ Ms B 61a4ff, q.v. below. The 
theoretical implications of this paragraph are difficult to assess because Dignāga's 
exposition is concise and difficult to contextualise as he never explains in detail how 
he understands the denotation of verbs and verbal inflectional affixes with the 
background of the apoha thesis. I assume that Dignāga would analyse any finite or 
non-finite verbal form on the analogy of the apoha thesis–like his analysis of the 
function of nominal affixes (cf. no. 349 below)–as consisting of a verbal root 
denoting the action itself and a tiṅ affix denoting person, temporal, and modal 
aspects of the action, each form excluding its complement. Such verbal forms are 
considered to denote a not finished action (apariniṣpanna) in contrast to nouns that 
denote finished referents (pariniṣpanna). In view of the importance of this 
paragraph I reproduce Jinendrabuddhi's interesting exegesis of it at PSṬ Ms B 61a4-
62a3, omitting a few insignificant phrases indicated by … . The historical context of 
this debate is obscure, but the claim that general property (sāmānaya) is exclusion of 
other referents (śabdārthānyāpoha), which is Dignāga’s assumption too, appears to 
mirror the view of his opponent, whereas Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis aims at 
explaining the difference between the two versions of the apoha doctrine: yathaiva 
tava śabdārthānyāpohaḥ sāmānyam tathā mamāpi. etāvaṃs tu viśeṣo mayā tac 
chabdākāroparaktaṃ pratīyata ity abhyupagatam iti darśayate. vkṣaśabdābhidheyo 
yo 'rthaḥ so 'nyo ghaṭādir na bhavati. anyaśabdārthābhāvenātra vkṣaśabdābhidhe-
yo bhāgo lakṣyate. etad uktaṃ bhavati: “arthāntaravyāvttyupalakṣito yo vastuno 
bhāgaḥ sa eva vkṣaśabdasyārtha” iti. tenaiva tasya sārūpyāt, na tu sattvādibhiḥ 
sādharaṇair ākārair asādhāraṇena vā rūpeṇeti manyate .  
nanu ca dravyaśabdenāpi śākhādimān arthaḥ pratyāpyate. na cāsau tadrūpaḥ. 
tataś cāsārūpye 'py abhidheyatvadarśanāt, na śabdasārūpyenārthapratyāyanam iti. 
 ata āha: yady apītyādi. apiśabdena dravyaśabdo dravyabhedānāṃ vyabhicārān 
na vācikaḥ. abhyupetyottaram ucyata ity artham āviṣkaroti. rūpāntaram ākāran-
taram. “tasyaiva vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgaḥ.” (a) tena ca saha dravyaśabdasya sārūp-
yam asty evety abhiprāyaḥ. tat punā rūpāntaram adravyanivttyupalakṣitavastuno 
rūpāntaraṃ dravyanivttyopalakṣyata iti darśayitum idam uktam: adravyanivttyeti. 
nanu cetyādi. na kevalaṃ dravyaśabdenādravyanivttyupalakṣitavastuno rūpānta-
raṃ dravyaśabdasārūpyaprāptiyogyaṃ gamyate, api tu vkṣaśabdenāpi. tathā hi 
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ dśyate: dravyaṃ vkṣa iti, na hi bhinnārthayos tad upapad-
yate. na ca tena saha tasya sārūpyam iṣyate. tatas sa eva doṣo 'sārūpye 'pi 
śabdārthatvadarśanāt, nābhidhānasvasārūpye nārthābhidhānam ity abhiprāyaḥ. 
arthāt, na śabdād iti. vkṣaśabdād evādravyanivttir avinābhāvinaḥ sā pratīyate. 
mūḍhas tu śabdād eva gamyata iti manyate. sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ tu viśeṣasahitasya 




ny evetyādi. subantāny eva padāni. yadi śabdanibandhane pramāṇam ucyeran, na 
syād doṣaḥ. tathā hi teṣāṃ pariniṣpannarūpo 'rtha “idam tad” iti pratyavamarśa-
yogyo buddhau sanniviśata iti. tena sahābhedopacāraḥ sambhavati śabdasya, na tu 
nāmapadāny eva pariniṣpannārthabhidhāyīny ucyante, kiṃ tarhi tiṅantāny api. yad 
āha: ākhyātaśabdair apītyādi. ākhyātaśabdaiḥ pacati paṭhati evamādibhiḥ. aliṅgā 
asaṃkhyāpūrvāparībhūtāvayavāpariniṣpannasvarūpā kriyocyate. na ca tathāvi-
dhasya idaṃ tad ity aghītasya buddhyā śakyo 'bhedopacāraḥ kartum. nāpi pariniṣ-
pannarūpaḥ śabdātmā sādhyamānākāratāṃ pratipadya(n)te:  
“Just as general property according to you is exclusion of other referents so it is 
according to me too. However, the difference is of such kind that I assume that the 
[general property] is understood as 'coloured' by the form of its word. This is what 
he illustrates. The referent that is the denotable object of the word ‘tree’ is not a 
different one like a pot. The part that is the denotable object of the word ‘tree’ is in 
this case implied by its not being the referent of other words. That is, only that part 
of the object that is indirectly indicated through negation of other referents is the 
referent of the word ‘tree’ because it agrees with that only, but not with common 
forms like existence or a not common shape. Such is the idea … . 
The word ‘substance’ certainly also indicates a referent on which there are 
branches, and so on, and this [word] does not agree with that [referent]; and 
therefore there is no indication of the referent due to the word’s being in agreement 
because it is observed to be denotable, even though there is no agreement.  
Therefore he says ’even though’ and so forth. By the word ’though’ he makes the 
issue clear, namely that the word 'substance' does not denote particular substances 
because of uncertainty. Having assumed [that it does], a rejoinder is formulated. A 
different form means a different aspect namely a certain part of the same object, and 
the word 'substance' is only in agreement with this [aspect]. Such is the underlying 
opinion. In order to show that this different form is indirectly indicated by negation 
of non-substance, the following is stated: “by negation of non-substance.” 
“Certainly,” and so on. Not only does the word 'substance' imply another form 
of the object through negation of non-substance, which is capable of being in 
agreement with the word 'substance', but the word ‘tree’ does so too. That is, one 
observes that they are coreferential as in the statement: “a tree is a substance,” for 
this is not justified of two different referents. And it is not claimed that one is in 
agreement with the other. Therefore the problem is precisely this, that since one 
observes that [a tree] is a referent [of the word 'substance'], even though there is no 
agreement [of the word 'substance' with the referent tree], there is no denotation of 
the referent when there is no proper agreement with the denotation. Such is the 
underlying intention. 
“By implication, not explicitly.” Due to the word ‘tree’ alone one understands 
the negation of non-substance because a tree is invariably connected to [substance]. 
A fool, however, believes that it is understood explicitly. However, there is co-
reference of [the word 'substance'] when combined with the particular [term ‘tree’] 
because it applies to a particular [namely a tree], but the word ‘tree’ does not 
express the negation of non-substance. 
“If only syntactical words like 'tree,' etc.” Syntactical words that are nouns 
terminate exclusively in the affixes denoted sup. If they were said to be a means of 
verbal construction, there would be no problem. That is, their referent, whose form 
is finished, is absorbed into the mind as capable of the identification “this is such 





possible, but not only syntactical words that denote a finished referent are said [to be 
a means of verbal cognition], also syntactical words that end in the affixes denoted 
tiṅ. As he explains: “also by means of verbs, etc.” i.e. by verbs such as “he is 
cooking,” “he is reading.” An action is said to be without gender and number, and to 
have a form that is not finished in terms of anterior and posterior parts, and [a 
syntactical word] like this is not capable of being transferred in terms of non-
difference from [the action], as it is not perceived by the mind as “this is such and 
such [an action].” Nor does the nature of a speech unit whose form is finished 
indicate the appearence of [the action] that is in the process of being realised.” 
The last paragraph is particularly interesting because Dignāga does not address 
in PSV V the question of how the thesis of anyāpoha applies to denotation of verbal 
action (kriyā) like pacati “he is cooking.” Kumārila addresses the question in a few 
kārikās at ŚV Apoha° 139f qu. TS 973f; cf. the discussion at TS 1143f with TSP ad 
loc. 
(a) Jinendrabuddhi alludes to a statement found in Dignāga’s lost Dvādaśaśatikā: tasya vastunaḥ 
kaścid bhāgo ’ rthāntaravyāvttyā loke gamyate; cf. Pind 1991 no. 1. For the term “part,” cf. no. 15 
below. 
 
3. After this discussion Dignāga continues addressing the third view according to 
which only a sentence (vākya) is the principal speech unit. He has Bharthari's 
position in mind, cf. PS V:46-47 §§ 61-62. Both Tibetan translations of this passage 
diverge considerably from each other. In general K appears to be more reliable than 
V, but not in every case. Thus, for instance, the crucial term tshig ‘syntactical word’ 
(= Sanskrit padam, cf. A I.4:14] is missing in K. 
 
K (Kitagawa 1973 454b4-8 = P 110b8-111a1]) gaṅ źig ṅag kho na sgra yin la de 
rtogs pa'i thabs ni 'dod pa de dag gi sgra daṅ mthun par don rtogs pa yod pa ma 
yin te | de ltar khyad par gyi cha ñe bar bzuṅ nas rjes su dpag pa las sgra las byuṅ 
ba tha dad do źes brjod do ||; 
V (Kitagawa 1973 454a1-5 = P 29b3-4): gaṅ dag ṅag kho na sgra yin te | tshig ni 
de rtog par byed pa'i rgyu ma (sic) yin la | sgra de'i ṅo bo tsam las don rtogs pa'i 
phyir ro źes khyad par can gźan tsam ñe bar blaṅs nas rjes su dpag pa las sgra tha 
dad du brjod ces brjod do ||: 
“According to those who claim that only the sentence is the speech unit (yeṣāṃ 
ca vākyam eva śabdaḥ), and that the syntactical word (*padam) is a means of 
understanding it (tadadhigamopāyaś ca), there is no (teṣāṃ nāsti) cognition of the 
referent in agreement with the words (*śabdānurūpeṇa). Thus, having assumed a 
slight difference (viśeṣaleśam) they assert that verbal cognition is different from 
inference.”(1)  
(1) For the Sanskrit fragments of this paragraph, cf. PSṬ Ms B 62a3-5: yeṣāṃ ca 
vākyam eva śabda iti … tadadhigamopāyaś cetyādi … teṣāṃ nāstītyādi … iti 
viśeṣaleśa iti. (°leśa em. [cf. Ms 62a7: viśeṣaleśaḥ] : °veṣaṇam Ms). 
Dignāga is addressing Bharthari’s view. This is underlined by Jinendrabuddhi 
who introduces Bharthari’s concept of sādhanaśakti (for which cf. Vākyapadīya 
III.7:2), cf. PSṬ Ms B 62a5-6: vākyārtho hi bāhyo vā syāt <sādhya>sādhanasam-
bandhātmā,(a) sādhanaśaktiniveśānughītā niravayavā kriyā vā, āntaro vā pratibhā-
lakṣaṇaḥ, trayam api caitad asattvabhūtam “idaṃ tad” iti pratyavamarśātikrāntam, 
na ca tathābhūtenārthena “so 'yam” ity abhedopacāraḥ śakyaḥ kartum: “For 




between the means of accomplishment [of an action, i.e., any given kāraka] and [the 
action] to be accomplished, or whether it is the partless action assisted by the 
residence of the powers in the means of accomplishment [of the action], or whether 
it is internal characterized by intuition, these three things, however, are unreal, 
transcending the identification judgement (pratyavamarśa) “this is such and such a 
thing;” and it is impossible to state a transfer in terms of identity like “this is such 
and such a thing” with a referent of this kind.”  
(a)sādhya° conj. (cf. bsgrub par bya ba T) : om. Ms  
 
3 Cf. the definition of śābdam at PSṬ Ms B 191b1: śabdād upajātam asannikṣṭe 
'rthe jñānaṃ śābdam: “Verbal cognition is an awareness, which follows from a 
word, about a referent with which one is not in [direct] sense contact.” ŚBh 32,3: 
śāstraṃ śabdavijñānād asannikṣṭe 'rthe vijñānam; ŚV Śabda° 3; TSP 530,22ff.  
 
4 That is, not only implication (arthāpatti) and the rest are separate means of 
cognition, but also śābdam, cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b1: na kevalam arthāpattyādīnīty apy 
arthaḥ. For the nature and number of pramāṇas admitted by the various Indian 
schools of philosophy, cf. Hattori 1968: 78 no. 1.12. 
 
5 Cf. de la V : om. K. 
 
[2] na pramāṇāntaraṃ śābdam anumānāt. tathā hi saḥ(1) ktakatvādivat svārtham 
anyāpohena bhāṣate. Qu. TSP 589,17-18, cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b1-2: na pramāṇān-
taraṃ śābdam ity āha. tathā hi sa ityādi … ktakatvādivad iti; 191b6: anyāpohena 
bhāṣata iti.  
(1)saḥ Ms B 191b2 and v.l. at TSP : tat TSP, cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b2, claiming that 
saḥ by force of implication is to be construed with an implicit śabdaḥ: sa iti 
sāmarthyaprāptaḥ śabde sambadhyate. The variant tat, referring to śābdam, is 
meaningless in the context because verbal cognition does not function as an 
indicator according to Dignāgan epistemology. The reading tat is not recent, 
however, since Mallavādi's rephrasing of PS V:1 reads tat for saḥ, cf. NCV 674,17-
18.  
 
6 For Dignāga's explanation of what constitutes the inferential nature of verbal 
cognition, cf. the theoretically important passage at PSV V:34 and no. 9 below. 
Kumārila contrasts at ŚV Śabda° 15 the views of Sāṅkhya and other schools on 
śābda with those of the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas who include verbal cognition 
in inference: tatrānumānam evedam bauddhair vaiśeṣikaiḥ śritam bhedaḥ sāṅkhyā-
dibhis tv iṣṭo na tūktaṃ bhedakāraṇam. For the Vaiśeṣika definition, cf. Candrā-
nanda ad VS IX:19: yathā kāryādismtisavyapekṣam anumānaṃ trikālaviṣayam 
atīndriyārtham ca tathaiva śābdaṃ saṅketasmtyapekṣaṃ trikālaviṣayam atīndri-
yārthaṃ ca. ato 'numānenaikayogakṣematvād anumānam evety uktaṃ bhavati. In 
contrast to this explanation, the statement at PBh § 256 shows that Praśastapāda 
regards the word as an indicator like the inferential indicator (liṅga) and thus subject 
to the constraints of the triple format of inference (for which, cf. PBh § 247: 
śabdādīnām apy anumāne 'ntarbhāvaḥ, samānavidhitvāt. yathā prasiddhasama-
yasya liṅgadarśanaprasiddhyanusmaraṇābhyām atīndriye 'rthe bhavaty anumānam, 
evaṃ śabdādibhyo 'pīti). For the relation between the trairūpya and śābda, cf. no. 9 





word (śabda) functions in the same way as an inferential indicator (liṅga), is also 
propounded at NS II.1:50-52; cf., e.g., NSBh ad NS 50: yathānupalabhyamāno liṅgī 
mitena liṅgena paścān mīyata iti anumānam. evam mitena śabdena paścān mīyate 
'rtho 'nupalabhyamāna ity anumānaṃ śabdaḥ. See Biardeau 1964: 127; 205. 
 
7 According to Kamalaśīla, Dignāga is using bhāṣate with the same value as 
dyotayati (for which, see no. 12 below), cf. TSP 540,7f, equating bhāṣaṇam with 
dyotanam, i.e., the act of indicating, making known: tatra bhāṣaṇam = dyotanam, 
jñāpanam iti yāvat; Ms B 191b5-6: bhāṣaṇasya śabdadharmatvena rūḍhatvād 
dṣṭāntadārṣṭāntikayor vaiṣamyaṃ mā bhūd iti dyotayatīty āha. 
 
8 Throughout PSV V Dignāga uses the term artha of the thing or referent 
denoted by the following classes of speech units: 1. affixes (pratyaya), to which 
Pāṇinian grammar attributes distinct denotations, 2. words (śabda) [usually common 
nouns or adjectives in the nominative, cf. the Pāṇinian definition of the nominative 
as denoting the mere referent of the nominal stem (prātipadikārthamātra, cf. A II 
3:46); this class also includes the referents of proper nouns], 3. compounds 
(samāsa), and 4. sentences (vākya), utterances or judgments. The referents (artha) of 
words are infinite, cf. PSV V:2b above and the expression arthasyānantye at PSV 
V:34 below. Dignāga does not address the artha of verbs in PSV V, but mentions 
ākhyātaśabda at PSV II:4c; cf. no. 2. above and the passages quoted at paragraph 2., 
especially Jinendrabuddhi’s interesting explanation of Dignāga’s introduction of the 
denotation of verbs in the context of the apoha thesis.  
 
9 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b2: yathā ktakatvādi liṅgaṃ trairūpyayogāt svārthaṃ 
prakāśayati, tathā śabdo 'pīty arthaḥ. anena dṣṭāntena śabdasya liṅgatvaṃ paridī-
payan śābdasyānumānatvalakṣaṇam udbhāvayati: “The meaning is as follows: just 
as the indicator [the general property] ‘being produced', and so on, indicates its own 
referent because of being connected with the triple form [of the indicator], so also 
the word. While illustrating the word's being an indicator by means of this example 
he explains the definition of verbal cognition as being one of inference.” 
For Dignāga’s description of the logical property of ktakatva in inference, cf. 
PSV II:23, q.v. infra no. 14. 
Dignāga's mention of the logical indicator ktakatva to illustrate his claim about 
the inferential nature of śābda would indicate that verbal cognition is assumed to be 
subejct to the constraints of the trairūpya as defined at PSV II:5cd: anumeye 'tha 
tattulye sadbhāvo, nāstitāsati.(1) (PS II:5cd) anumeyo hi dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī. 
tatra darśanaṃ pratyakṣato 'numānato vā(2). uttarakālaṃ dharmasya sāmānyarū-
peṇa tajjātiye ca sarvatraikadeśe <vā> sadbhāvaḥ <siddhaḥ>. kuta etad iti? tattulya 
eva sadbhāva <ity> avadhāraṇāt. na tarhi vaktavyam: <atattulye nāstitaiveti>. etat 
punar niyam<ārtham>: asaty eva nāstitā, nānyatra, na viruddha iti. Restored, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 64b1-66b6: anumeye 'tha tattulya iti … nāstitāsatīti … anumeyo hītyādi 
… dharmaviśiṣto dharmīti. tatra darśanam iti … pratyakṣata iti … anumānato veti 
… uttarakālam iti … dharmasya sāmānyarūpeṇeti … tajjātiye ceti … kuta etad iti … 
sarvatra sadbhāvo 'nyatraikadeśe 'pīti … vyavacchedaphalatvād vākyānām. iṣṭataś 
cāvadhāraṇād etad labhyata ity āha: tattulya evetyādi … na tarhi vaktavyam iti … 





The Tibetan versions of this crucial passage diverge from each other and the 
Sanskrit evidence:  
K (Kitagawa 1973 455b9ff = P 111a6-111b1): rjes dpag bya daṅ de mtshuṅs la || 
yod daṅ med la med pa 'o || (PS II:5cd) rjes su dpag pa ni chos khyad par can gyi 
chos can yin te | de la dus phyis chos kyi spyi'i tshul gyis mṅon sum nam rjes su 
dpag pas mthoṅ ba 'o || de'i rigs la yaṅ mtha' dag gam phyogs cig yod pa ñid do || de 
gaṅ las źe na | de daṅ mtshuṅs pa kho na la yod źes ṅes par gzuṅ ba'i phyir yin gyi 
yod pa kno na źes ma yin no || de ltar na med pa lam med do źes brjod pas mi byo 'o 
źe na | 'di ni med pa ñid la med pa yin gyi | gźan pa la 'aṅ ma yin 'gal ba la ma yin 
no źes ṅes pa'i don du 'gyur ro ||.  
V (Kitagawa 1973 455a9ff = P 30a1-4): rjes dpag bya daṅ de mthun la || yod daṅ 
med ñid la med pa 'o || (PS II:5cd) rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyi khyad par du 
byas pa'i chos can no || de la mṅon sum mam rjes su dpag pas mthoṅ gi rjes la de'i 
rigs daṅ mthun pa la yaṅ spyi'i tshul gyis phyogs thams cad dam phyogs gcig la yod 
par grub pa 'o || ci'i phyir źe na | de daṅ mthun pa kho na la yod ces ṅes par gzuṅ 
ba'i phyir ro || de daṅ mthun pa la yod pa kho na'o źes ni brjod par mi bya ba'i 
phyir ro || med pa ñid las med pa źes pas ni slar yaṅ de ñid ṅes par bya ba'i don du 
ste | med pa ñid la med pa ñid yin gyi gźan la yaṅ ma yin la 'gal ba la yaṅ ma yin no 
źes pa'i don to ||.  
 
As PSV V:1 shows, Dignāga primarily mentions ktakatva in order to emphasise 
that the logical indicator and the word share the function of indicating through 
exclusion of other referents. He defines at PSV V:34 (for which, see below § 46) the 
inferential nature of verbal cognition as tadvyavacchedānumānaṃ svārthābhidhā-
nam without any reference to the canonical format of the trairūpya. There is, 
however, a passage in PSV IV where Dignāga explicitly draws a parallel between 
the role of trairūpya in inference (anumāna) and verbal cognition (śābda). 
Commenting at PSV IV:5 on the role of the explicit formulation, in parārthānu-
māna, of the second and third criteria of the trairūpya, Dignāga compares their role 
in svārthānumāna to that of verbal cognition (śābda). As Jinendrabuddhi observes 
in his comment at Ms B 178a4-7 (see below), the ascertainment obtained through 
svārthānumāna presupposes recollection of the two states of affair as defined by the 
second and third criteria of the trairūpya, without being dependent upon their 
explicit formulation (arthadvayaparāmarśapūrvako hy abhidhānānapekṣaḥ svār-
thānumānaniścayaḥ). Dignāga continues asserting that after one has apprehended a 
word through immediate sensation (pratyakṣa), the mere fact that one recollects the 
second and third criteria of the trairūpya is sufficient for knowing the referent 
denoted by it (tathā hi śabdaṃ pratyakṣata upalabhya tasy“ānyatra sajātīye sattāṃ 
smarati, asati cāsattām.” tāvataiva cābhidheyaṃ pratipadyate). 
The Tibetan versions of PSV IV:5 diverge from each other, and, moreover, 
interpret the crucial phrase śābda iva as if the actual reading were śabda (loc.) eva K 
: śabda (nom. sic) iva V.  
K (Kitagawa 1973 521b4-8 = P 150b4-7): gaṅ źig la cuṅ zad rab tu grub pa yin 
pa'i phyir gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba brjod pa yaṅ sgrub byed yin no || sgra kho na la don gñis 
rtogs pa'i phyir ram gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ bas źugs kyis gñi ga bstan pa'i phyir gñi ga brjod 
par mi bya 'o || rjes su dpag pa la yaṅ tshul 'di yin par mthoṅ ste | gal te rtags 'di 
rjes su dpag par bya ba la ṅes par bzuṅ na gźan du de daṅ rigs mthun pa la yod pa 
ñid daṅ | med pa la med pa ñid dran par byed pa de'i phyir 'di'i ṅes pa bskyed par 





V (Kitagawa 1973 521a4-10 = P 65b2-4): 'ba' źig tu cuṅ zad grub pa ñid du 
'gyur ba yin no || gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba gcig brjod pas kyaṅ sgrub byed du 'gyur te | sgra 
bźin du don gñis rtogs pa'i phyir gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba gcig gis gñis ka bstan pa'i phyir 
don gyi śugs kyis gñis brjod pa yin no || don rjes su dpog pa la yaṅ rigs pa de ñid 
blta'o || gaṅ rjes su dpag par bya ba la rtags 'di ṅes par gzuṅ bar byas nas gźan la 
de'i rigs yod pa dran par byas te | med pa la med pa ñid kyis bdag ñid kyis ṅes par 
skyed par byed do ||: 
 
“Since some [example] is well-known (*prasiddhatvāt) to someone (kasyacit) 
the formulation of one or the other [example] is also a means of proof (anyataroktir 
api sādhanam); Since the two states of affair are already known (*arthadvayapra-
tītatvāt) in the same way as in verbal cognition (śābda iva) or since they both are 
shown implicitly (*arthāpattyā) by one or the other (*anyatareṇa), both of them are 
not stated (ubhayānabhidhānam). This is also observed to be the method in the case 
of inference: If the logical indicator is ascertained at the object of inference 
(anumeye), one recalls [its] existence elsewhere at what is similar and [its] non-
existence where [what is similar] is absent (anyatra sajātīye sattāṃ smarati, asati 
cāsattām). Therefore one realises oneself its ascertainment (*niścayaḥ).”  
 
The inserted Sanskrit equivalents and phrases have been extracted from 
Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 178a4-7: kasyacid ityādi. Parāvabodhanār-
thaṃ parārtham anumānam. parasya ced anyataradṣṭāntapratipādyo 'rthaḥ 
prasiddhaḥ, ‘nyataroktir api sādhanaṃ prasiddhokter anarthakatvāt. apiśabdo 
'vadhāraṇārthaḥ. śābda ivetyādi. pratītatvamātraṃ sādharmyam upādāya śābda 
iveti dṣṭānto veditavyaḥ, nānabhidhānam. anyathā śābdasya svārthānumānatvād 
ayuktam etad nidarśanaṃ syāt, prasaṅgābhāvāt. na hi svārthānumāne dṣtānta-
prasaṅgo 'sti, arthātmakatvāt. arthadvayaparāmarśapūrvako hy abhidhānānapek-
ṣaḥ svārthānumānaniścayaḥ. tathā hi śabdaṃ pratyakṣata upalabhya tasya “anya-
tra sajātīye sattāṃ smarati, asati cāsattām.” tāvataiva cābhidheyaṃ pratipadyate. 
tasmāt pratītatvamātram upā<dā>ya dṣṭāntaḥ kta iti. ubhayānabhidhānam iti. 
  
Dignāga's claim about the inferential nature of verbal cognition was interpreted 
by his contemporaries as well as later writers as a statement about the word's being 
subject to the constraints of the trairūpya. The view that the word indicates its 
referent in accordance with the canon of the trairūpya was addressed and severely 
criticized by Kumārila in ŚV Śabda° 68-98, who asks whether it makes sense to 
apply the canon of the trairūpya to describe verbal cognition as the second and third 
member of the logical canon are presented in terms of existence of the logical 
indicator at some instance of the indicated and its non-existence at all dissimilar 
instances. The criticism evidently centres on whether it makes sense that the locative 
denotes a word’s existence or non-existence at something. However, there is no 
reason to assume that Dignāga’s use of the locative indicates that he believed that 
the denotation of words or utterances is dependent on their being observable at the 
objects or state of affairs they denote like any inferential indicator, but rather that 
they are observed to denote their referents at the time of vyutpatti (cf. PSV V:50c 
below), the locative being used to introduce their denotation like in traditional 
Sanskrit and lexicographical literature. The use of the locative at PSV V:34 is to be 





Related discussions about trilakṣaṇa śabda are found in Mallavādi's NC, cf. 
NCV 666,12ff (ktakatvādiliṅgavac chabdas trilakṣaṇo ’anyāpohena svārthaṃ 
gamayatīti), and in YD 101,8ff. Jinendrabuddhi summarises some of Kumārila's 
critical observations, namely that it is incorrect to talk about the referent of the word 
as a property possessor because the fact of being a property possessor does not fit 
the referent of the word since it is the thing to be indicated, like impermanence, and, 
moreover, one does not observe the pakṣa of the word at the referent, but rather at 
the speaker as he speaks, which goes to show that śābda is a separate means of 
cognition, cf. PSṬ Ms B 192a2-4: kathaṃ punaḥ śabdasya trairūpyam? kathaṃ ca 
na syāt? dharmiṇo 'yogāt. tathā hi śabdārthasya na dharmitvam upapadyate 
pratyāyyatvād anityatvavat. na cārthe śabdasya pakṣadarśanaṃ vaktari sthitatvāt 
tatraivopalabdheḥ. tasmāt pramāṇāntaram evedaṃ yathāsamayam arthapratipatti-
hetutvāt.  
Jinendrabuddhi’s answer to this critique is influenced by Dharmakīrtian and 
post-Dharmakīrtian philosophy, in which the question of whether or not the alleged 
inferential nature of verbal cognition reflects the canon of the trairūpya is answered 
by claiming that verbal cognition is subject to the constraints of the trairūpya 
because words indicate the intention (vivakṣā) of the speaker. Thus the speaker is 
the dharmin, any given word is the pakṣadharma, the sapakṣa is any previously 
perceived possessor of vivakṣā (vivakṣāvān pūrvānubhūtaḥ), and vipakṣa its 
exclusion (tadvyatirekaḥ). 
Cf. the discussion Ms B 192a4-6: tad etac chābdasya prāmāṇyaviṣayāparijñā-
nād evam ucyate. na hi tasya bāhye 'rthe prāmāṇyaṃ … kva tarhi? vivakṣāyām. 
tatra cāsty(3) eva śabdasya trairūpyam. tathā hi vivakṣāvān puruṣo dharmī, vivakṣā 
sādhyadharmaḥ. vivakṣāvaty evopalambhanāc chabdasya pakṣadharmatvam. vivak-
ṣāvān pūrvānubhūtaḥ sapakṣaḥ. tadvyatireko vipakṣa iti kathaṃ trairūpyaṃ na 
sambhavati? For the unabridged text of this discussion, cf. Appendix 2. 
The view that a speaker’s words make it possible to infer his underlying inten-
tion (vivakṣā) can be traced to Bharthari, cf. VP III.14:197cd: anumānaṃ vivak-
ṣāyāḥ śabdād anyaṃ na vidyate; TS 906, TSP 357,8ff; cf. Kamalaśīla's answer to 
Kumārila's criticism at TS 1514-24, and the related statement at PVSV 107,22-24: 
na hi śabdā yathābhāvaṃ vartante yatas tebhyo 'rthapraktir niścīyeta. te hi vaktur 
vivakṣāvttaya iti tannāntarīyakāḥ. tām eva gamayeyuḥ.  
(1)Qu. NV 301,2, cf. PVin II Vol. I: 31.  
(2)tatra … vā qu. ŚVṬ (Uṃveka) 142,8; PVin II Vol. I: 30,4-5.  
(3)cāsty em. : cājjhy Ms 
 
[3] śabdo hi yatra viṣaye prayujyate tasya yenāṃśenāvinābhāvitvasambandhas 
taṃ ktakatvādivad arthāntaravyavacchedena dyotayati(1), <tasmād anumānān> na 
bhidyate(2). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b3-6: śabdo hi yatra viṣaye prayujyata iti … 
tasya yenāṃśeneti … vkṣādiśabdasyāvinābhāvitvasambandhaḥ(3). yena tu samban-
dhas taṃ ktakatvādivad arthāntaravyavacchedena dyotayati … na tat tato bhid-
yate. 
(1)Cf. TSP 540,3-4: tat (sic) ktakatvādivad arthāntaravyavacchedena dyotayati. 
(2)Cf. PSṬ Ms B 192a1-2: tasmād eva viśeṣāc chābdam anumānād bhidyata iti. 
(3)°tvasambandhaḥ em. : tvaṃ sambandho Ms 
 
10 The particle hi (cf. ni VT : yaṅ K) is syntactically equivalent to Sanskrit 





gloss hiśabdo yasmādarthe inserted by Dignāga in a Sanskrit fragment from 
Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, q.v. no. 182. As a rule the translators of KV render Sanskrit 
hi by the Tibetan topicalization particle ni; cf. Obermiller, Indexes II 71a. 
 
11 The term śabda is somewhat ambiguous: It denotes any given speech unit 
posited by the Sanskrit grammarians through grammatical analysis, from phonemes 
through syllables to affixes and finished words. Most of the examples mentioned by 
Dignāga belongs to the last-mentioned category, but he evidently regards phonemes 
and affixes to be definable within the theoretical framework of the apoha theory, cf. 
Pind 1991 and no. 349 below. Like Bharthari Dignāga considers any given speech 
unit posited apart from a sentence as a useful grammatical fiction, the sentence 
being the principal speech unit, cf. § 61 below. 
 
12 Dignāga uses dyotayati with the same value as prakāśayati or prakāśaka, the 
function of the logical indicator (hetu, liṅga) and the word (śabda) being structurally 
similar; cf. the use of the cpd. dyotakadyotya at PS II:33a-c: liṅgasyānyena 
sāmānyaṃ viśeṣāś ca liṅgino na dyotakadyotyam, qu. Ms B 81b5. This is the only 
instance where Dignāga uses the verb dyotayati of the action of denoting. Cf. the 
similar use at YSBh 139,2-3 (ad YS III.17): sarvābhidhānaśaktiparihtā gakārau-
kāravisarjanīyāḥ sāsnādimantam arthaṃ dyotayantīti.  
For the use of dyotana, dyotaka, dyotya in Sanskrit grammar, cf. DSG s.vv. 
dyotaka; Renou, Terminologie s.v. dyut.  
 
13 For a contemporary definition of apoha, cf. Bhāmaha’s Kāvyālaṅkāra VI.16: 
anyāpohena śabdo ‘rtham āhety anye pracakṣate, anyāpohaś ca 
nāmānyapadārthāpāktiḥ kila: “Other [scholars] explain that a word denotes its 
referent through exclusion of other referents; and the name “exclusion of other 
referents” means, as it is reported (kila), the removal (apākti) of other referents 
(padārtha).” 
Exclusion or negation, i.e., apoha, nirākaraṇa, nivtti, pratikṣepa, pratiṣedha, 
vyāvtti, vyavaccheda, vyudāsa—Dignāga uses these terms indiscriminately—which 
presupposes the predominance of joint absence (vyatireka) over joint presence 
(anvyaya), contrasts with vidhi, i.e., an affirmative statement, which presupposes 
joint presence of the word and an observed instance of its referent, cf. NCV 668,17: 
anyāpoho hi vyatirekamātram: “For exclusion of other referents is nothing but joint 
absence”; PSṬ Ms B 191b3: anyapohenety arthāntaravyāvttyā, na dṣṭavad 
vidhirūpeṇa: “Through exclusion of other [referents], that is, by means of exclusion 
of other referents, not in an affirmative form like the way in which it is observed.”  
The term dṣṭavat denotes, as Jinendrabuddhi explains in his comment on PS 
II:15 (cf. below) the referent as observed at the time when the connection 
(sambandhakāla) is being taught. He is referring to the process of vyutpatti, namely 
teaching someone the connection (sambandha) between word and referent by 
hastasañjñā and ayaṃśabda. This implies that someone is confronting a particular 
object or state of affairs/action through direct sensation (pratyakṣa) while being 
taught the connection, which implies an affirmative statement like “this x is y.” 
Thus, it constitutes an instance of joint presence (anvaya) as opposed to joint 
absence (vyatireka). For Dignāga's view of vyutpatti, cf. §§ 65-66 below. 
Dignāga will address the fundamental assymmetry of anvaya and vyatireka at 




constitutes the difference between affirmation and exclusion or negation, cf. the 
exposition at PS II:15: dṣṭavad vidhirūpena yadi liṅgaṃ prakāśayet, sarvatrādar-
śanān na syāt sarvathā vā gatir bhavet(1). 
 For the Tibetan versions of PS II:15 and PSV ad loc., cf. K (Kitagawa 1973 
463b6-464b4 = P 113a4-8): mthoṅ bźin bsgrub pa'i raṅ bźin gyis || gal te rtags ni 
gsal byed na || thams cad rtogs par mi 'gyur ba 'am || yaṅ na thams cad rtogs par 
'gyur || (PS II:15) gal te ji ltar me la du ba mthoṅ de ltar dus phyis gsal bar byed na 
'gar yaṅ gsal bar byed pa ñid du mi 'gyur te | ci ltar me med thams cad la ma mthoṅ 
ba de bźin du de me thams cad la mthoṅ ba ma yin no || gal te yaṅ ci ltar mthoṅ ba 
de ltar gsal bar byed pa yin na | 'bar ba daṅ rno ba la sogs pa'i khyad par daṅ ldan 
par yaṅ gsal bar byed pa'i gyur ro || gaṅ gi phyir spyi'i raṅ bźin ñid kyis me ma yin 
pa bkag nas gsal bar byed pa de'i phyir | bsgrub pas kyaṅ 'di'i raṅ bźin de ñid 
mthoṅ ṅo źes rtogs pa yin gyi khyad par gyi raṅ bźin ni ma yin no ||.  
V (Kitagawa 1973 463a8-464a3 = P 31b7-32a3): gal te mthoṅ ba bźin gtan 
tshigs || sgrub pa'i sgo nas 'jug pa ni || thams cad rtogs par mi 'gyur ram || yaṅ na 
thams cad rtogs par 'gyur || (PS II:15) gal te yaṅ dper na me la dud pa mthoṅ ba 
bźin du phyis kyi tshe yaṅ 'jug par byed na ni nam yaṅ rtogs par mi 'gyur te | dper 
na me mtha' dag la ma mthoṅ ba bźin du me 'di yaṅ mi rtogs par 'gyur ro || gal te ji 
ltar mthoṅ ba bźin du rtogs par byed na ni gsal ba daṅ rno ba la sogs pa'i bye brag 
rnams kyaṅ rtogs par 'gyur ro || gal te me ma yin pa rnam par bkag ste spyi'i tshul 
gyis 'jug par byed na ni de'i phyir sgrub pa'i sgo nas 'jug pa la yaṅ tshul de ñid 
blta'o źes śes par bya'o ||: 
 
“If the indicator were to indicate in an affirmative form in the way in which it 
was observed [previously], there would be no [indication] because of [the 
indicator's] not being observed at all [instances of the indicated], or there would be a 
cognition [of the indicated] in toto (PS II:15).  
For (hi) if smoke (*dhūmaḥ) subsequently (*paścāt) were to indicate in the way 
in which it was [previously] observed at fire (yadi hi yathāgnau drṣtaḥ)(2) it would 
never indicate. For just as it has not been observed at all (*sarvatra) [instances of] 
absence of fire (*agnyabhāve), so also it has not been observed at all (*sarvatra) 
[instances of] fire (*agnau). And if (yadi ca)(3) it were to indicate in the way in 
which it was observed [previously], it should also indicate its [namely the fire’s] 
particular features such as its flames and temperature, etc. (4)However, since (yatas 
tu) it only indicates in a general form (sāmānyarūpeṇaiva) by excluding non-fire, 
(*tatas) it is understood that it is only this form of it that is observed, although in an 
affirmative form, not the form of the particular features (vidhināpi tad evāsya rūpaṃ 
dṣṭam iti gamyate, na viśeṣarūpam).” 
(1)pādas abc have been restored on the basis of Ms B 71a5-6: dṣṭena tulyaṃ 
dṣṭavat. yathā sambandhakāle liṅgam upalabdhaṃ tathā yadi prakāśayed ity 
arthaḥ. vidhimukhenāgnir atra bhavatīti, na vyāvttimukhenāgnir evātra nānagnir 
evaṃ sarvatrādarśanān na syāt prakāśanavidhir iti prakāśayed iti prakrāntatvāt; 
pāda d is restored on the basis of the parallel at NCV 707,12: agatir vā sarvathā 
bhavet.  
For the use of dṣṭavat in a similar context, cf. PS III:44 quoted at NVC 727,9-
10: dṣṭavad yadi siddhiḥ syāc chauklyarūpaguṇāśritāt, kramavat prātilomye 'pi 
dvitryekārthagatir bhavet, and the untraced quotation (from Dignāga?) at NCV 
678,13-14: sarvatra liṅginy adarśanāt, na dṣṭavat pratipattiḥ. 





(3)Qu. Ms B 71b1.  
(4)This clause has been restored on the basis of the pratīka and the subsequent 
paraphrase at Ms B 71b3-4: yatas tv ityādi. etad darśayati: yasmād dhūmo 'gniṃ 
sāmānyarūpeṇaiva prakāśayati … tasmād … vidhināpi tad evāsya rūpaṃ dṣṭam iti 
gamyate.  
 
As Jinendrabuddhi points out in his commentary, cf. note(1) above, the difference 
between vidhi and vyāvtti is that a statement affirming the presence of fire would be 
'here is fire' (agnir atra bhavati), as opposed to a statement having the canonical 
exclusion form 'here is fire only, not non-fire' (agnir evātra, nānagniḥ).”  
Śāntarakṣita quotes a fragment on vidhi from Dignāga's Hetumukha at TS 
1096a: “asambhavo vidher” uktaḥ sāmānyāder asambhavāt. śabdānāṃ ca vikalpā-
nāṃ ca vastuno 'viṣayatvataḥ(1): “Affirmation is impossible,” as it has been stated, 
since general properties, and so on, are impossible because words and represen-
tations do not have an entity (vastu = general property) as object.”  
For Dharmakīrti's related view of vidhi, cf. his statements at PVSV 27,8-12: 
vastugrahe anumānāc ca dharmasya ekasya niścaye, sarvadharmagraho ’pohe na 
ayam doṣaḥ prasajyate. (PV I 46). na kevalaṃ pratyakṣadṣṭe pramāṇāntarāvttiḥ 
kvacit. yadānumānam api vastu vidhinā pratyāyayati na vyavacchedakt, tadā 
ekadharmaniścaye tadavyatirekāt sarvadharmaniścaya iti pramāṇāntarāvttiḥ. 
PVSV 65,19-22: yadi hi vidhirūpeṇa vastv eva śabdair vikalpair vāpi viṣayīkriyeta 
so 'yaṃ sarvārthasarvākārapratītiprasaṅgo ‘sāmānādhikaraṇyādayaś ceti manya-
mānaḥ praṇetā nyāyaśāstrasyānyāpoha viṣayāv etau prāha. 
(1) aviṣayatvataḥ conj : viṣayatvataḥ TS. The conj is corroborated by TSP ad loc. 
TSP however, presupposes the reading vastutaḥ = paramārthataḥ (sic), for 
vastunaḥ. Cf. TSP 417,8: yady vidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho 'bhyupagamyate, kathaṃ tarhi 
Hetumukhe lakṣaṇakāreṇa “asambhavo vidheḥ” ity uktam … sāmānyalakṣaṇāder 
vācyasya vācakasya ca paramārthato 'sambhavāc chabdānāṃ vikalpānāṃ ca 
vastutaḥ paramārthato viṣayāsambhavāt paramārtham āśritya “vidher asambhava” 
ukta ācāryeṇa.  
 
Jinendrabuddhi continues addressing at Ms B 191b6-192a2 an objector's 
question regarding the statement 'anyāpohena bhāṣate ktakatvādivat' and the 
contrast between vidhi and apoha: athānyāpohena bhāṣata ity etat kimartham? 
yāvatā ktakatvādivad bhāṣata ity anenaiva anumānāc chābdasyābhedaḥ pratipā-
ditaḥ. asti prayojanam. ktakatvādikaṃ hi liṅgam arthāntaravyavacchedena 
svārthaṃ pratipādayatīti prāg etad upapāditam. tato yad anyāpohenety etan 
nocyeta, tadā pramāṇāntaravādinām iyaṃ kalpanā syāt: ktakatvādiliṅgam 
arthāntaravyāvttyā svārthaṃ pratyāpayati, śabdas tu vidhimukhena. tasmād eva 
viśeṣāc chābdam anumānād bhidyata iti. atas tannirāsārtham etad uktam: “Suppose 
someone asks: “What purpose does the statement 'it [namely a word] denotes 
(bhāṣate) its own referent (svārtham) through exclusion of other [referents]' serve 
insofar as a word's non-difference from inference already is indicated by the 
statement “in the same way as the [inferential indicator, the general property] ’being 
produced, etc.'”? There is a purpose. For it has already been justified previously that 
the logical indicator 'being produced,' and so on, indicates its referent through 
exclusion of other referents. Consequently, if he did not say ‘through exclusion of 
other [referents],’ the adherents of the theory that [verbal cognition] is a means of 




‘being produced’ indicates its own referent through exclusion of other referents, 
whereas a word does so through affirmation (vidhimukhena). Because of this 
difference, verbal cognition differs from inference.” Therefore, in order to rebut this 
[view] this is stated.” 
 
14 The technical term aṃśa ‘part’ or attribute denotes any given general property 
as defined by exclusion of other referents. Things are qualified by a multitude of 
properties constituting a logical hierarchy, whose characteristics are defined by their 
position in the hierarchy. These properties, however, are not real general properties 
that are resident in the things they qualify, but are, according to Dignāgan 
epistemology, defined by exclusion of other things; cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b4-5: bahavo 
hy abhidheyasyārthasyāṃśāḥ sattvajñeyatvādayo na ca taiḥ sarvair vkṣādiśab-
dasyāvinābhāvitvasambandhaḥ: “For the denotable object has a multitude of parts 
such as ‘existence’, ‘knowability’, and so on, and the word ‘tree’ is not connected 
with all of these as invariably concomitant.” Cf. PS V:12-13, 34 with PSV V ad loc.  
A similar use of aṃśa to denote any given part of the referent occurs in the 
alleged fragment from Dignāga's Hetumukha: grāhyadharmas tadaṃśena vyāpto 
hetus tridhaiva saḥ, Frauwallner 1982: 840; for the Dignāgan use of grāhya, cf. 
Dharmakīrti's PV I 89 with Manorathanandin's PVV ad loc. 
Dignāga uses the synonymous term bhāga ‘part' in the Sanskrit fragment from 
Dignāga’s Dvādaśaśatikā quoted in Siddhasenagaṇin’s Tattvārthabhāṣyavyākhya V 
24: yathāha Dvādaśaśatikāyām: yady apy uktam aprasaktasya kimarthaṃ prati-
ṣedhaḥ? iti naivaitat pratiṣedhamātram ucyate, kin tu tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo 
'rthāntaravyāvttyā loke gamyate yathā viṣāṇitvāḍ anaśva iti: “As he claims in the 
Dvādaśaśatikā: Even though it is objected: What purpose does the negation of what 
is not applicable [e.g. the term anaśva] serve ? [We answer that] it is not mere 
negation that is expressed, but rather a certain part of the object in question is 
inferred in ordinary language (loke) through exclusion of other referents like, for 
instance, in the inference: it is a non-horse because it is horned.” Cf. Pind 1991: 269 
no. 1. 
Dharmakīrti quotes a slightly edited version of it at PVSV 62,26: arthāntara-
vyāvttyā tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo gamyate; cf. PSṬ Ms B 205a3: tasya 
vastunaḥ kaścit bhāgo 'rthāntaranivtyā gamyate. Jinendrabuddhi seems to quote a 
similar passage from Dignāga at PṬS Ms B 61a6: etad uktaṃ bhavati: arthāntara-
vyāvttyupalakṣito yo vastuno bhāgaḥ sa eva vkṣaśabdasyārtha iti: “Only that part 
of the object that is implied by exclusion of other referents is the referent of the 
word ‘tree’.”  
 
15 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b3-4: yasyārthasya pratyāyanārtham(1) uccāryate, sa tasya 
viṣayaḥ pratyāyyatvāt(2), yathā(3) liṅgasya liṅgī: “the referent for the sake of 
indicating which [the word] is articulated, is its object (viṣaya) because it is the thing 
to be indicated, in the same way as the bearer of the inferential indicator (liṅgī) is 
[the object] of the inferential indicator (liṅga).  
(1)em. (cf. go bar byed pa T) : prayatvāyāyanārtham Ms 
(2)em. (cf. go bar bya T) : °āpya Ms  
(3)em. : ayamā? Ms 
 
16 avinābhāvitva “the being invariably concomitant” defines the sambandha 





the thing indicated viz. the referent (artha) or the thing inferred. Dignāga addresses 
the fundamental assymmetry that holds between the two relata of the indicator-
indicated connection in a crucial passage at PS II 19-20 that fortunately is extant in 
Sanskrit:  
 
nanu dvigatatvāt sambandhasya saṃyogivad liṅgidharmanā liṅgena bhavi-
tavyam. naitad asti. 
 
sambandho yady api dviṣṭhaḥ sahabhāvyaṅgaliṅginoḥ 
ādhārādheyavad vttis tasya saṃyogivad na tu. [19] 
 
yathā hi saty api dvigatatve sambandhasya, na kadācid ādhāra ādheyadharmā 
bhavati nāpy ādheya ādhāradharmā, tathā na kadācil liṅgaṃ liṅgi bhavati liṅgi vā 
liṅgam. saṃyogī yathaikas tathā dvitīya iti na tadvad iha. tathā hi 
liṅge liṅgi bhavaty eva liṅginy evetarat punaḥ 
niyamasya viparyase 'sambandho liṅgaliṅginoḥ. [20] 
 
yasmāl liṅge liṅgi bhavati eva, tasmād yuktaṃ yad agnivad dhūmo dravyatvā-
dīnām api prakāśakaḥ, na taikṣṇyādīnām. yasmāc ca liṅginy eva liṅgaṃ bhavati, 
nānyatra, tasmād yuktaṃ yad dhūmo dhūmatveneva pāṇḍutvādibhir api prakāśa-
yati, na dravyatvādibhir iti. evaṃ hi avadhāraṇavaiparītyena sambandho liṅgaliṅ-
ginoḥ:(1) 
 
“Certainly the indicator (liṅga) will have the property of the indicated 
(liṅgidharman) because the connection (sambandha) relates to both [the indicator 
and the indicated] in the same way as [a conjunction relates to its two] conjuncts 
(saṃyogivat)! This is not the case. 
 
Even though the relation between the together connected indicator and indicated 
resides in both, [nevertheless] its mode of existence is like [that of] a container and 
the contained, but not like [that of] conjuncts. [19] 
 
Because, just as the contained never has the property of the container or the 
container never has the property of the contained, even though the relation is found 
to be resident in both, so also the indicator is never the indicated, nor is the indicated 
ever the indicator. In the case of a conjunct, however, one is just like the other. 
Therefore the case is not the same in this context. 
That is, 
 
The indicated only exists at the indicator; and the latter, in turn, exists only at the 
indicated. If the restriction is inverted, there is no connection of indicator to 
indicated. [20] 
 
Since the indicated necessarily exists at the indicator, it is correct that smoke, in 
the same way as [it indicates] fire, also indicates substanceness, and so on, but [it is] 
not [correct] that it indicates [fire's] temperature, etc.; and since the indicator exists 




it [indicates] through smokeness, also indicates through the property of being 
smoke-coloured, and so on, but [it is] not [correct] that it indicates] through 
substanceness. Therefore, if the restriction is transposed there is no relation of 
indicator to indicated.” 
 
Dignāga apparently never defines sambandha in terms of avinābhāvitva in PS or 
PSV, but Siṃhasūri takes it for granted at NCV 627,21-22, q.v. below no. 26. 
Jinendrabuddhi’s gloss at PSṬ II Ms B 72b6 avinābhāvitvaṃ sambandhaḥ explains 
Dignāga’s use of the term sambandha at PS II 20a: sambandho yady api dviṣṭhaḥ; 
cf. the definition of sambandha at Ms B 183a7: avinābhāvitvaṃ hi sambandha iti.  
(1)For the Sanskrit fragments, cf. 1. NCV: 678,5ff; 2. NCV: 699,18; 3. NCV: 
678,18–679,19; 4. PM: 43; NCV: 679,16 (pāda a). 
 
[4] ye tv āhur: jātiśabdaḥ svabhedān sarvān evāha, ukteṣu tu niyamārthaṃ 
viśeṣaśrutir <iti>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 193a4-7: ye tv āhur jātiśabda ityādi … 
jātiśabda iti. svabhedān iti … sarvān evāheti … ukteṣu tu niyamārthaṃ viśeṣaśrutir 
iti. 
 
17 Here as elsewhere Dignāga seems to quote the work he is addressing. It is not 
possible to ascertain the identity of the work and its author. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the term niyama is used by Bharthari in a similar context, cf. no. 21 
below.  
 
18 The theory of denotation to which Dignāga refers is based upon the 
assumption that a general term denotes all particulars through transfer of the general 
property to every individual substance in the form of non-difference (abhedopa-
cāra). That is, the general property and the thing in which it is claimed to be 
instantiated become identified through co-reference, in the same way as when one 
transfers the properties of a lion to a brāhmaṇa boy like in the statement “the 
brāhmaṇa boy is a lion.” 
Cf. Siṃhasūri's lucid exposition of the view Dignāga is addressing at NCV 
627,11-13: yasmāt sacchabdo jātisambandhino jātim upādāyātmarūpeṇa dravyādīn 
abhedopacārād āha, tasmād abhedopacārahetunā vyapadiśyate jātiśabda iti. yathā 
siṃho māṇavaka iti siṃhaśabdo māṇavakaguṇān upādāyābhedopacārapravtter 
abhedopacārahetunā vyapadiśyate guṇaśabda iti: “Since the word 'existent,' while 
being based upon the general property, in its own form denotes substances, and so 
on, that are the relata of the general property due to transfer in the form of non-
difference, it is designated as ‘general term' on account of transfer in the form of 
non-difference. Just as the word ‘lion' in the statement ‘the young brāhmaṇa is a 
lion', while being based upon the qualities of the young brāhmaṇa is designated as 
‘quality word' on account of transfer in the form of non-difference because it applies 
by transfer in the form of non-difference.”  
Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of the view at Ms B 193a2-3 is similar: kathaṃ 
punar anabhidheyā satī jātir vyapadeśahetuḥ? abhedopacārahetutvād guṇavat. 
yathā “siṃho māṇavaka” iti śauryādiguṇaviśeṣaḥ siṃhamāṇavakayor abhedopacā-
rahetur bhavan vyapadeśahetur bhavati, guṇaśabda iti, tathā jātir api śabdasya 
bhedair abhedopacārahetur iti sādhyavyapadeśahetuḥ: “How, moreover, is the 
general property the cause of designation (vyapadeśahetu), when it is not denotable? 





quality (guṇavat). For instance, in the statement ‘the young brāhmaṇa is a lion,' a 
particular quality like bravery, being the cause of transfer in the form of non-
difference of the lion with the young brahmin, is the cause of designation; in the 
same way the general property is the cause of transfer of the term [denoting it] in the 
form of non-difference of [the general property] with the particulars. Thus it is the 
cause of designation of that which is to be indicated.” 
The subsequent explanation at NCV and PSṬ would indicate that Dignāga 
addresses views comparable to those traditionally ascribed to Vyājapyāyana by 
Kātyāyana at vārt 35-44 on A I.2:64, namely that a term denotes a class property as 
resident in individual substances; cf. no. 21 below. 
Dignāga's well-known definition of pratyakṣa at NM (T 1628 3b15-17; T 1629 
8c9-11) is terminologically indebted to this view, although this does not imply that 
he considers qualifiers to be real entities rather than products of kalpanā, cf. TSP 
456,15-19 quoting and explaining the passage: “yaj jñānam arthe rūpādau (so read) 
viśeṣaṇābhidhāyakābhedopacāreṇāvikalpakaṃ tad akṣam akṣaṃ prati vartata iti 
pratyakṣam” iti. viśeṣaṇaṃ jātyādi, abhidhāyakaṃ nāma, tayor abhedopacāro 
jātyādimadbhiḥ sañjñinā ca. abhedopacāragrahaṇam upalakṣaṇaṃ yatrāpi bhedena 
grahaṇam: asya gotvam asyedaṃ nāmeti, tatrāpi kalpaneṣyata eva.  
Notice that throughout PSV V Dignāga uses the terms jāti and sāmānya 
interchangeably to denote any given general property.  
 
19 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 193a4-5: svasyā jāter bhedān(1). yā jātir yasya śabdasya 
vyapadeśahetuḥ, sā tasya svam bhavati. bhidyante parasparato viśiṣyanta iti 
bhedāḥ. yathā jāter dravyaguṇakarmāṇi. 
(1)em. : °ām Ms 
 
20 Jinendrabuddhi addresses the implications of the expression sarvān eva at PSṬ 
Ms B 193a: sarvān evāha, na kiñcid eva. tathā hi brāhmaṇo na hantavya ity ukte 
sarve brāhmaṇajātibhedā Māṭharādayo na hanyanti. yadi jātiśabdo niravaśeṣān 
svabhedān āha, kimarthaṃ tarhi brāhmaṇaḥ Kauṇḍiṇya ānīyatām iti viśeṣaśrutiḥ? 
yāvatā brāhmaṇaśabdenaiva Kauṇḍiṇyo 'bhihita iti: denotes all, i.e., not just some. 
That is, when it is said that one should not kill a brāhmaṇa, all individuals of the 
brāhmaṇa class like the son of Maṭhara are not to be killed. If a general term 
denotes all its particulars without exception, then what purpose does a particular 
term serve, like when it is said ‘bring the brāhmaṇa, son of Kuṇḍina' inasmuch as 
the son of Kuṇḍina is denoted by the word ‘brāhmaṇa?'”  
The example brāhmaṇo na hantavya is taken from Patañjali's comment at Mahā-
bh I 242,24f on vārttika 39: dharmaśāstraṃ ca tathā, whose implications Patañjali 
explains in the following way: evaṃ ca ktvā dharmaśāstraṃ pravttam: Brāhmaṇo 
na hantavyaḥ … brāhmaṇamātraṃ na hanyate … yadi dravyaṃ padārthaḥ syād 
ekaṃ brāhmaṇam ahatvā … anyatra kāmacāraḥ syāt: “And on this assumption [viz. 
that a term denotes a class property] the dharmaśāstra proceeds: [The injunction] 
‘one should not kill a ‘brāhmaṇa'' means ‘one does not kill any brāhmaṇa at all' … 
If an individual substance were the referent denoted by the word one could do as one 
pleased by abstaining from killing one brāhmaṇa;” cf. Scharff 1996: 118-19.  
Mallavādi alludes to the view that the application of a term denoting particulars 
merely has the purpose of restricting the scope of the general term; he presents his 
view at in a kārikā based upon PS V 2: na jātiśabdo bhedānām ānantyād 




and the passage op. cit. 606,10-13 in which Siṃhasūri explains that every new term 
that is added to the preceding general term, like for instance ‘brāhmaṇa,' has the 
purpose of restricting the scope of the general term in accordance with the intended 
meaning. Thus any term that is articulated subsequently to the general term with the 
function of restricting its scope is a particular term. Consequently restriction is the 
establishing of its own referent, i.e., it is a restriction with respect to the referent: 
niyamārthā punaḥpunaḥśrutir vivakṣitārthā, kasmāt? tadarthatvād viśeṣārthatvād 
viśeṣaṇārthatvāt pūrvaśruteḥ sāmānyaśruter brāhmaṇādeḥ. tasmāc chravaṇakāla-
krameṇa punaḥśrutir iti viśeṣaśabda ucyate. ko 'sau niyamo nāma? ity ucyate: 
niyamaḥ svārthavyavasthāpanaṃ vivakṣite 'rthe 'vadhāraṇam.  
Cf. also Bharthari's discussion of the restrictive function of punaḥśrutiḥ at VP 
II:64ff (cf. the expression niyamārthā punaḥśrutiḥ, 64b). 
Jinendrabuddhi comments briefly on the subject of restriction at Ms B 193a7 by 
introducing the delimitative/restrictive particle (avadhāraṇa) eva, which Simha-
sūris’s explanation presupposes: Kauṇḍinya eva na Māṭhara iti yathā kriyā hi 
dravyaṃ ninayatīti ukte punar nādravyam iti niyamārtham ucyate yathā gamyeta 
dravyam eveti: “Only (eva) Kauṇḍinya, not Māṭhara. Just as when it is said “for an 
ation moves a substance (towards something),” and, in addition, it is said for the 
sake of restriction, “not a non-substance,” so that one understands “only a 
substance.”  
For Dignāga’s use of eva as semantically equivalent to vyatireka “joint absence” 
or exclusion, cf. PSV V 38c § 54 below. 
 
[5] <tatrocyate:> na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ vācaka iti vakṣyate(1). Restored, cf. 
NCV 627,10-11: na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ vācaka iti vakṣyate; PSṬ Ms B 193a7: 
vācaka iti vakṣyata iti; NV 326,10; TSP 342,12-13.  
(1)Cf. rjod par byed pa źes brjod par bya 'o V : brjod par byed pa ma yin no K. 
 
21 Dignāga refers to the occurrence of vācakaḥ in pāda 2c, which is to be 
construed with 2a; Cf. PSṬ Ms B 193b: sākāṅkṣatvād aparisamāptaṃ vākyam iti 
vakṣyamānena padenākāṅkṣāvicchedaṃ darśayati: “Thinking that the clause is 
incomplete because it entails expectation of a sentence complement (sākāṅkṣatvāt) 
he excludes the expectation of a sentence complement by means of the syntactical 
word that is going to be used (i.e., vācakaḥ).”  
The problems which PS V 2a-c caused its Tibetan translators are basically due to 
the fact that in Sanskrit the negation does not cliticise on the verb like in classical 
Tibetan. This excludes the possibility of using it as a morpheme syntactically 
independent of the verb unlike the negation na in Sanskrit. In the present case the 
negation na of 2a has to be construed twice with vācakaḥ. Since the translators of K 
and V have followed the common practice of translating 2a as a syntactically 
independent clause, they were unable to construct the negation with rjod par byed 
pa = vācakaḥ twice. Although V loc. cit. reproduces correctly the sentence 
complement vācaka iti vakṣyati as rjod par byed pa źes brjod par bya'o, the 
introduction of med before the complement is syntactically and semantically 
impossible, whereas the use of mi would have been syntactically correct. K, on the 
other hand, uses min, and, moreover, correctly adds, as if to compensate for the 
syntactical ambiguity of min, another negation after the sentence complement, so 





2b1 mtha' yas phyir daṅ (= ānantyāt) without any syntactical connection with 2a. V 
introduces correctly the negation min in 2d, cf. no. 34 below. 
 
[6] jātiśabdas tāvat sadādir <dravyādīnāṃ na vācakaḥ>. Restored, cf. NCV 
627,11: jātiśabdas tāvat sadādir iti, cf. re źig rigs kyi sgra yod pa la sogs pa rdzas 
la sogs pa rnams kyi brjod par byed pa ma yin te V : om. K. 
 
[7] ānantyāt. ānantye hi bhedānām aśakyaḥ sambandhaḥ kartum. na 
cāktasambandhe śabde 'rthābhidhānaṃ yuktaṃ svarūpamātrapratīteḥ. Restored, 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 193b1: ānantyāt; NCV 627,14: ānantyād iti hetuḥ; TSP 342,13; NCV 
606,21-22; Ms B 193b1-3: ānantye hi bhedānām ityādi. aśakyaḥ sambandhaḥ 
kartum iti … na cāktasambandhe śabde 'rthābhidhānaṃ yuktam iti; 193b6: 
svarūpamātrapratīter iti; NCV 627,14-16;21;23. NCV 706,21: ānantye hi 
bhedānām ityādi granthavyākhyānanyāyavat. 
 
22 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 193b1: ānantyād ity upapattiḥ. kasyānantyāt? praktatvād 
bhedānām eva; cf. the similar explanation at NCV 627,14-15, indicating that it is 
based upon the same source as Jinendrabuddhi's ṭīkā: ānantyād iti hetuḥ. 
kasyānantyāt? bhedānām, yasmāt te pūrvaṃ praktā na cānyaḥ śrūyate; TSP 
342,12-14: ayam eva ca aktasamayatvād iti hetur ācāryadiṅnāgena “na jātiśabdo 
bhedānāṃ vācakaḥ, ānantyād” ity anena nirdiṣṭaḥ. tathā hi “ānantyād” ity anena 
samayāsambhava eva nirdiṣṭaḥ. Uddyotakara presents the argument at NV 324,3-4 
as follows: sacchabdaḥ piṇḍānāṃ vācako bhaviṣyatīti na yuktaṃ piṇḍānāṃ 
ānantyāt; cf. no. 29 below for Uddyotakara’s reproduction of Dignāga’s argument.  
 
23 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s gloss at PSṬ Ms B 193,2: ākhyātuṃ: karoter 
anekārthatvāt; cf. the identical gloss at NCV 627,17: kartum ākhyātum; karoter 
anekārthatvāt.  
 
24 Siṃhasūri interprets ānantya as denoting: 1. spatial remoteness, cf. NCV 
627,16: na hi pāṭaliputrādisthā dravyādaya ihasthena sacchabdena sahākhyātuṃ 
śakyāḥ: “For it is not possible for one who is situated here simultaneously to denote 
substances, and so on, that are situated in Pāṭaliputra, and so on, by means of the 
word 'existent;'” cf. Jinendrabuddhi's similar explanation at Ms B 193b3-4: ye 
vidūradeśavartino na ta ihasthānāṃ svasya pratiyoginaḥ sambandhitvenākhyātuṃ 
śakyāḥ; 2. infinity in terms of the variety of particulars, cf. NCV 627,16: ānantyād 
vā dravyādīnām. tathā hi te ghaṭapaṭarathādibhedenānantāḥ. evaṃ tāvat 
sambandhibhedād bhedam abhyupagamyedam ucyate, na tu tasya vastunaḥ svagato 
bhedo 'sti. tatredam eva kāraṇaṃ yat sambandhāntaraviśiṣṭābhidhāyī śabdaḥ 
sambandhāntaraviśiṣṭaśabdavācyam asamartho vaktum, gavāśvādivat. tasmād 
bhedānām avācakaḥ: “Or because substances, and so on, are infinite. That is, they 
are infinite because of the difference between pot, cloth, wagon, etc. Thus, in the 
first place, this is said on the assumption that the difference is due to difference of 
the relata. The difference of the entity [from other entities], however, is not 
understood per se. This then is the reason why a denoting word which is qualified by 
one connection is incapable of denoting the [entity] that is the denotable object of a 
word that is qualified by another connection, like [the words] ‘cow’ and ’horse,’ etc. 




Siṃhasūri's use of the term sambandhibheda would seem to allude to VP 
III.1:33: sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu jātir ity ucyate. tasyāṃ 
sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ. One cannot therefore exclude the possibility that Dignāga 
has Bharthari's view of sattā in mind. 
 
25 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 193b6: yo bhedair anākhyātasambandho na sa teṣāṃ vācako 
mlecchaśabdavat.  
Siṃhasūri explains sambandha in terms of avinābhāvitva, cf. NCV 627,21-22: 
aktasambandha ity anākhyātasambandhe śabda iti dviṣṭhatve 'pi sambandhasya 
śabdasyaivāvinābhāvitvād arthapratyāyakatvaṃ darśayati: “By the statement ‘as 
the connection [of the word] has not been told’ viz. as the connection of the word 
has not been stated, he shows that although the connection is resident in two things 
[viz. the word and the thing it denotes] the word exclusively indicates its referent 
because of being invariably concomitant with it.” 
For the technical term avinābhāvitva as defining the scope of sambandha, cf. 
Dignāga's use above of the term avinabhāvitvasambandha for defining the nature of 
the relation between a word and its denotation at PSV V §1 with no. 17. The term 
aktasambandha refers to the situation before the denotation of any given word has 
been taught by pointing at its referent (vyutpatti). Dignāga addresses the theoretical 
implications of vyutpatti below at PSV V 50bc (§ 65). The term aktasambandha 
occurs once in Bharthari’s VP III 166c. 
 
26 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 193b 2: tad etad dhetudvayam uktam: ānantyaṃ 
sambandhāśakyatve(1) hetuḥ, anākhyātasambandhatvaṃ punar anabhidhāne(2): 
“The following two reasons are formulated: infinity is the reason for the 
impossibility of connection; the reason, moreover, for not denoting is the fact that 
the connection is not told.”  
A similar explanation is found at NCV 627,22: atra cānantyaṃ 
pāramparyeṇānabhidhānahetuḥ: tato hi sambandhāśakyatā, sambandhāvyutpatter 
anabhidhānam: “And in this case infinity is indirectly the reason for not denoting. 
For because of this [infinity] the connection is impossible, and as a consequence of 
not teaching the connection there is no denotation.” 
Dharmakīrti argues in the same way at PVSV 47,7-10: syād etad ānantyād 
vyaktīnām aśakyaḥ śabdena sambandhaḥ kartum. evaṃ satīdam ānantyaṃ tadvaty 
api samānam. jātyāpihi viśiṣṭā vyaktaya eva vaktavyā ity 
aktasambandhasyānabhidhānād avaśyaṃ tatra sambandhaḥ karaṇīyaḥ. sa ca na 
śakyate.  
(1)°tve hetuḥ em. : °tvahetuḥ Ms  
(2)°āne em. : °āno Ms 
 
27 The technical term svarūpa denotes the phonetic form of any linguistic item 
without reference to its denotation. It is used by Pāṇini at A I.1:68: svaṃ rūpaṃ 
śabdasya śabdasañjñā to indicate that the own form of a linguistic item refers to that 
element itself, and not to the thing it denotes. The term was interpreted differently in 
the grammatical tradition. Some considered the svarūpa to be any particular instance 
of any given linguistic item, whereas others considered it to be identical with the 
word type, cf. Bharthari's exposition at VP I:68-69, 83; Pind 1991. See DSG, 





In the present case Dignāga is using the term in the original sense, cf. NCV 
627,23-68,7: yatra śabdasyārthena sambandho 'vyutpanno yathā mlecchaśabdānāṃ 
tatra śabdamātraṃ pratīyate nārtha ityādi: “When the connection of the word with 
[its] referent has not been taught as in the case of the words of non-Aryans, only the 
speech unit is understood, not the referent.” A similar explanation, presumably 
based on the same source, in all likelihood SPVy, is given at Ms B 193b6: 
mlecchaśabde hi śabdasvarūpamātram eva pratīyate, nārthaḥ. 
 
28 Uddyotakara reproduces almost verbatim the content of this paragraph at NV 
324,4-6: sacchabdaḥ piṇḍānāṃ vācako bhaviṣyatīti na yuktaṃ piṇḍānām ānantyāt. 
na hy ekasya śabdasyānekadravyaguṇaprapañcena sambandha ākhyātuṃ śakyaḥ. 
na cānākhyāte śabdārthasambandhe śabdād arthapratipattir yuktā, 
svarūpamātrapratīteḥ: “It is not justified to claim that the word ‘existent’ will 
denote the particulars because they are infinie. For it is impossible to tell the 
connection of a single word with a multitude of many substances and qualities. And 
in that the connection of the word with its referent is not told it is not justified that 
the cognition of the referent follows from the word because it is merely the own 
form of the word that is cognized.” 
Uddotakara may have used the infinitive ākhyātum because he found it in the 
source he was quoting, which in all likelihood is Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa cf. no. 30 
below. 
 
[8] kiṃ ca, vyabhicārataḥ. yathā hi sacchabdo dravye vartate tathā guṇādiṣv(1) 
apīti. vyabhicārāt saṃśayaḥ syāt, nābhidhānam. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 193b7: 
kiñceti; 194a1-2: vyabhicārata iti, NCV 661,13: yat tūktan tvayā: vyabhicarata iti; 
Ms B 193b7: yathā hītyādi; NCV 661,14: sacchabdo hi yathā dravye vartate(1) 
tathā guṇādiṣv(2) apīti. Vyabhicārāt saṃśayaḥ syāt, nābhidhānam(3); Ms B 194a1: 
dravyābhāve 'pi guṇe darśanāt. tadabhāve 'pi ca dravyakarmaṇor iti; sarvatra 
vyabhicārataḥ(4) saṃśayaḥ syāt, nābhidhānam.  
(1)Cf. 'jug pa V : yin pa K.  
(2)guṇā° em. : ghaṭādiṣu NCV.  
(3)Cf. 'khrul pa'i phyir the tshom du 'gyur gyi, rjod par byed pa ni ma yin no V : 
brjod par byed pa ni ma yin gyi 'khrul pa'i phyir the tshom za bar 'gyur ro K.  
(4)°cārataḥ em. : cāraḥ Ms 
 
29 Uddyotakara reproduces Dignāga's argument in a more elaborate form at NV 
324,6-9, presumably on the basis of Dignāga's lost Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa: 
vyabhicārāc ca. sacchabdaśravaṇāc ca dravyaguṇakarmāṇīti pariplavamānā 
buddhir avatiṣṭhate; na ca yasmād abhidhānāt pariplavate buddhis tad abhidhānam 
iti yuktam vaktum. tasmāt sacchabdo bhedānāṃ na vācaka iti: “Moreover, [the 
general term ‘existent' does not denote the particulars] because of ambiguity. 
Moreover, from hearing the word ‘existent' the mind remains in a state of confusion 
as to substance, quality, or action; and it is not justified to claim that the denotation 
due to which the mind is confused is denotation. Therefore the word ‘existent' does 
not denote the particulars.”  
Dignāga's arguments for the impossibility that general terms denote the 
particulars are mentioned by Kumārila at Tantravārttikam on MS III 1:12 p. 39,16ff: 




Jinendrabuddhi closes his exegesis of this paragraph with the following 
discussion at Ms B 194a2-5, which presupposes Dharmakīrtian philosophy: nanu ca 
jātiśabdāt sarvasvabhedapratītiḥ. na hi sarveṣu saṃśaya upajāyate. na ca 
sarvasvabhedābhāve kadācij jātiśabdasya kvacid arthāntaravttir upalabdhā; tat 
kuto vyabhicāraḥ? naiṣa doṣaḥ. na hi jātiśabdena bhedābhedarūpasaṃsparśena 
pratyāyayate. na ca samastabhedarūpaṃ nāma teṣāṃ sāmānyam asti yac 
chabdenābhidhīyeta, bhedarūpaparityāge teṣām eva jātitvaprasaṅgāt. na ca 
bhedarūpeṇa vyāptir asti, parasparavyāvttatvād(1) bhedarūpasyeti, nāsty asiddhiḥ.  
(1)Cf. PV I 40-42 and PVSV 24,24 ad loc.  
 
[9] yo 'pi manyate <jātiśabdas(1) tu jātimātre(2) tadyogamātre(3) vā> 
sambandhasaukaryād avyabhicārāc ceti, tad ayuktam(4). <tayoś ca na>.(5) Restored, 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 194a5-7: yo 'pi manyata iti … sambandhasaukaryād avyabhicārāc 
ceti … tad ayuktam iti.  
(1)Cf. rigs kyi sgra tsam V : sgra de K.  
(2)rigs tsam K : om. V.  
(3)de daṅ ldan pa tsam la ni V : de daṅ ldan pa'i K. Ms B does not make it 
possible to resolve the question of which version is preferable. From the point of 
view of syntax and content V is better than K. I assume that the affix la V is used to 
reproduce the Sanskrit locative. The reading'brel pa can yin te | sla ba'i phyir K is, I 
assume, a mistake for 'brel pa sla ba'i phyir based on a faulty manuscript reading.  
(4)This clause is not reproduced in VK. Assuming that it is an integral part of the 
original Sanskrit version of this paragraph, it presumably belongs here. 
(5)For this restoration, cf. no. 34 below. 
 
30 The two locatives are used to express “in the sense of” or “to denote,” a usage 
that is well known in Sanskrit grammatical literature. For tadyoga = tayā = jātyā 
yogaḥ = sambandhaḥ, cf. TSP 340,23; NSBh ad NS II 2:62: yasya jātyā yogas tad 
atra jātiviśiṣṭam abhidhīyate gaur iti; cf. the reference to tadyoga at PV III 173: 
tasmād jātyāditadyogā nārthe teṣu ca na śrutiḥ. 
The relation to which Dignāga's opponent is referring is samavāya 'inherence,' 
which is defined at PBh §§ 373 as follows: ayutasiddhānām 
ādhāryādhārabhūtānāṃ yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ; cf. TSP 
313,15: samavāyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ (quoting an unidentified work by 
Uddyotakara).  
PBh § 384 uses the expression sattāyogaḥ to denote the inherence of the general 
property existence in substances, qualities, and actions: yathā dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ 
sadātmakasya bhāvasya nānyaḥ sattāyogo 'sti, evam avibhāgino vttyātmakasya 
samavāyasya nānyā vttir asti.  
Bharthari mentions the view at VP II 126 that a general term denotes the 
inherence relation (saṃsarga). The underlying assumption is that since the 
inherence relation is not perceived apart from its relata i.e. the general property and 
the thing in which it inheres through the inherence relation, it is unreal (asatya) as 
the denotatum of any given general term as only the object as related to the general 
property (saṃsṣṭa) through the inherence relation is real. Since Bharthari's svavtti 
on VP II 126 is no longer extant, I quote Puṇyarāja's ṭīkā ad loc.: atha 
jātiguṇakriyātmakasyārthasyāsatyabhūtaḥ saṃsarga eva śabdārtha iti pañcamaṃ 
pakṣaṃ darśayitum āha: asatyo vāpi saṃsargaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścid iṣyate (VP II 





tadvyatirekeṇānupalabhād asatyabhūta evocyate. tasmāt saṃsṣṭaḥ padārtha eva 
satyabhūta iti. 
 
31 The expression yo 'pi no doubt refers to a particular philosopher, whose view 
Dignāga briefly mentions. Although it is not possible to identify him, he must have 
been a Vaiśeṣika because the doctrine Dignāga addresses in this paragraph is 
characteristic of Vaiśeṣika philosophy: the claim that a general term like sat denotes 
either the mere general property or the mere inherence relation of the general 
property is only understandable with the background of Vaiśeṣika ontology. When 
Dignāga's opponent claims that the connection is easy to establish with the general 
property existence, it is because it is conceived as one and indivisible. The same is 
true of the connection of the general property to the thing in which it resides because 
the connection or inherence is one and indivisible like the general property 
existence. Since general properties instantiate identically giving rise to the same 
cognition in each individual instance, and the connection which connects by way of 
inherence (sambandha = samavāya) any given substance to the general property is 
one and the same like the general property itself, it follows that the problems of the 
individuals being infinite and the ambiguity of the denotation of the word ‘existent’ 
do not obtain. The unity of existence is explained at VS I.2:18: salliṅgāviśeṣād 
viśeṣāliṅgābhāvāc caiko bhāva iti; Praśaṣṭapāda explains the unity (ekatva) of 
general properties as such at the related paragraph PBh § 367: dravyādiṣu 
vttiniyamāt pratyayabhedāc ca parasparataś cānyatvaṃ pratyekaṃ svāśrayeṣu 
lakṣaṇaviśeṣād viśeṣalakṣaṇābhāvāc ca ekatvam; cf. also §§ 361ff; and he deduces 
the unity of inherence at PBh § 377: na ca saṃyogavan nānātvaṃ 
bhāvaliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣāliṅgābhāvāc ca bhāvavat sarvatraikaḥ samavāyaḥ; cf. also 
§§ 373ff.  
Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of the opponent's claim at Ms B 194a5-7 
presupposes this theoretical background: sukaro hi jāter ekatvāt, saty api 
bahuviṣayatve pratyekaṃ sarvātmanā parisamāptatvāt, sāmīpyāc 
cāśrayasamīpatayā sambandhaḥ. sambandhasya ca svāśrayasamavāyasya 
vyabhicāro 'pi nāsty eva. bhedānāṃ hy anekatvāt parasparam abhāve tu bhāvād 
vyabhicāro yujyate, na tu jātau yoge vā tayor abhedāt tadabhāve ca śabdasyāvtteḥ: 
“For the connection (sambandhaḥ) is feasible (sukara) due to the unity of the 
general property because it pervades every single entity completely, although the 
referents are many, and because of [its] proximity due to the proximity of [its] 
substrate. Nor is there ambiguity with regard to the relation, i.e., its inherence in its 
own substrate. For it is correct that there is ambiguity with regard to the particulars 
because they are many, and, moreover because they occur as mutually non-existent, 
but not with regard to the general property or the relation because they are not 
particulars and because the word would not apply if they did not exist.” 
 
32 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 194a7-194b1: yuktyā na sambandhyata ity arthaḥ. kā punar 
atra yuktiḥ? āgamākhyaṃ pramāṇam. kathanṃ tayā na sambadhyate: “bhedārthair 
apthakśruteḥ:” “The meaning is that it is not in agreement with reasoning. What, 
moreover, is reasoning in this case? It is the means of knowledge called āgama 
(received doctrine). In what way is it not in agreement with this [reasoning]? 
“Because it is not “heard apart” from [words] having particular [general properties] 




Jinendrabuddhi's explanation connects the phrase tad ayuktam with PS V 2d, as 
if the latter followed immediately after it. It is not possible to decide if his 
explanation reflects the readings of the Ms he was using for his ṭīkā. 
 
33 The negation na of PS V 2a has to be construed with vācakaḥ of 2c, cf. 
NMañjGBh 137,15-16: atra na jātiśabdo yogajātyor vā bhedārthair apthakśrutair 
(sic) ity ato vācaka iti sambadhyate.  
V 106,29-30 has placed the negation min after rjod byed. This is correct from the 
point of view of Tibetan syntax in that the negation in Tibetan necessarily cliticizes 
on the verb, although strictly speaking it is not part of the original Sanskrit version 
of 2cd. The negation necessarily carries over from 2a to 2c, and Dignāga therefore 
had to incorporate it as part of the vtti on 2cd. K, on the other hand, reproduces the 
negation ma yin te immediately before rjod byed that translates vācakaḥ, evidently 
imitating the syntax of the underlying Sanskrit at the cost of producing a 
syntactically and semantically misleading Tibetan translation. However, the 
negation preceding vācakaḥ is correctly reproduced in K § 15, where 2cd is quoted 
in the following form without consideration for the usual metrical constraints: ldan 
pa daṅ rigs rjod par byed pa ma yin te | khyad par gyi don daṅ tha mi dad pas thos 
pa'i phyir ro.  
The demonstrative pronouns de dag gi K : de dag V probably render Sanskrit 
tayoḥ in agreement with yogajātyoḥ of 2c. There is no reason to assume that de dag 
and de dag gi reproduce the correlative *tasya of yo 'pi because both K and V 
usually distinguish between singular and plural/dual. For such constructions, cf., 
e.g., PVSV 29,7: yo 'pi manyate … tasyāpi (+ PV I 52); 66,7: yo 'pi … āha tasyāpi; 
67,1-6: yo 'pi manyate … iti, tasyāpi. 78,24-26: yo 'pi … tasyāpi.  
 
[10] vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthair apthakśruteḥ. Qu. Ms B 194b1; ŚVṬ 
49,25; NR 422,8; NMañjGBh 137,16. 
 
34 Dignāga is using the technical term apthakśruti as a synonym of co-reference 
(sāmānādhikaraṇya), which entails inflectional identity of case affixes. It refers to 
the fact that there is no auditive perception of difference of case affix (vibhakti) 
between that of the term sat and the term it qualifies, e.g., dravya (n.) or guṇa (m.); 
cf. the mention of apthakśrutidoṣa at PSV V:36ab. Kumārila uses the term pthak 
‘apart’ (= vaiyadhikaraṇya) as opposed to abhinna ‘one with’ (= 
sāmānadhikaraṇya) at ŚV Anumāna°: 25b (cf. Randle 1930: 270). The somewhat 
odd term (a)pthakśruti is known from indigeneous Sanskrit phonology, cf. Renou, 
Terminologie s.vv. pthak-, and śruti. Uddyotakara reproduces Dignāga’s argument 
at NV 323,17-18 (cf. op. cit 325,19-20) as follows: bhedārthair 
abhinnavibhaktikatvāt, cf. no. 37 below. 
 
35 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 194b1: bhedā arthā yeṣām iti bhedārthā viśeṣaśabdās; tair 
apthakśrutiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam. apthag ekasminn adhikaraṇe śrutir iti ktvā: 
“‘Having particular [general properties)] as referents’ means ‘whose referents are 
particular [general properties],’ namely particular terms. ‘Not hearing apart’ from 
these means ‘co-reference’ in that the hearing is not separate with regard to one and 






[11] tathā hi <sad dravyam, san guṇaḥ, sat karmeti(1) bhedārthair 
dravyādiśabdaiḥ> sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na syāt. tac ca dṣṭam. Restored, cf. NCV 
730,26: tathaiva hi dārṣṭāntikatvena tvanmataṃ pradarśanam eva yāvat 
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na syāt; Ms B 194b2: tac ca dṣṭam iti. 
(1)Cf. Candrānanda in Vaiśeṣikasūtravtti 3,12: sad dravyaṃ san guṇaḥ sat 
karma iti and no. 37 below. 
 
36 The opponent assumes that the word ‘sat’ exclusively denotes sattā or the 
relation of sattā to the thing it qualifies as distinct from the substance, quality or 
action in which it inheres. Dignāga therefore concludes that observable instances of 
co-reference like the phrase “sad dravyam” are in conflict with the theory of 
denotation to which the opponent is subscribing. The phrases sad dravyam, and so 
on, are syntactically similar to compounds and Dignāga and his commentators 
therefore interpret them as as if they were compounds. This appears from his 
statements at PSV V:35ab addressing the above-mentioned problems. 
The content of this paragraph presupposes Vaiśeṣika philosophy, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
194b1: dṣṭā hy āptebhyo 'pthakśrutiḥ sad dravyam ityādi tad na syāt: “For co-
reference as in sad dravyam, and so on, that is observed from trustworthy authorities 
would not occur,” and ibid. 194b2: jātisambandhābhidhānapratijñā śāstradṣṭena 
sāmānādhikaraṇyena bādhyata ity arthaḥ: “The thesis that it denotes the connection 
of the general property is in conflict with the co-reference that is observed in 
śāstra;”cf. Candrānanda ad VS I.1:7: sad dravyaṃ san guṇaḥ sat karma iti sattā 
trayāṇām aviśeṣaḥ, and ad VS I.2:7: “sad iti yato dravyaguṇakarmasu.” bhinneṣu 
dravyādiṣu triṣu yato jāyate 'sat sat' iti buddhiḥ sā sattā.  
Uddyotakara reproduces Dignāga's argument as pūrvapakṣa at NV 223,17-21: 
tatra na tāvaj jātir abhidhīyate bhedārthair abhinnavibhaktikatvāt. yady ayaṃ 
jātivācakaḥ sacchabdo bhavati sad dravyam iti bhedavācinā dravyaśabdena saha 
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na prāpnoti, na hi bhinnārthavācakānaṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ 
paśyāmaḥ, na hi gavāśvam iti sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ dṣṭam: “In the first place, [the 
word 'existent'] does not denote the general property because it has case affix in 
common with [words] whose referents are particular [general properties]. If the 
word 'existent' denotes the general property, co-reference with the word 'substance' 
that denotes a particular [general property] as in [the statement] 'a substance is 
existent' does not obtain. For we do not observe that [words] denoting different 
referents are co-referential, for co-reference is not observed like [it is not observed] 
in [the dvandva compound] 'cows and horses' (cf. A II 4:11).” 
 
[12] na hi sattā <tadyogo(1) vā> dravyaṃ guṇo vā bhavati, kiṃ tarhi, dravyasya 
guṇasya vā. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 194b3-4: na hi sattā … kiṃ tarhi, dravyasya 
guṇasya veti; see parallel at NCV 730,25-28: yathā na hi sattā dravyaṃ guṇo vā 
bhavati … kiṃ tarhi dravyasya guṇasya vā.  
(1)Cf. de daṅ ldan pa la (sic) V : ldan pa K.  
 
37 According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga alludes to the definition of sattā at VS I 
1:8-10: dravyaguṇakarmabhyo 'rthāntaraṃ sattā. ekadravyavattvān na dravyam. 
guṇakarmasu ca bhāvān na karma na guṇaḥ: “Existence is a different thing from 
substance, quality, and action. It is not a substance because it is possessed by a 
substance. Because [existence] is resident in qualities and actions, it is neither a 




dravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvapratiṣedho bhāvena vyākhyātaḥ: “The negation of being 
a substance, a quality, and an action is explained in accordance with [the general 
property] existence;” cf. PSṬ Ms B 194b4: yasmād dravyaguṇakarmabhyo 
'rthāntaraṃ sattety uktam. sambandhasya ca dravyādipratiṣedho(1) bhāvena(2) vyā-
khyātaḥ: “Since it is explained that “existence is a different thing from substance, 
quality, and action,” and that the negation of the inherence relation's being a 
substance, etc. (dravyatvādi), is explained in accordance with existence.”  
Candrānanda explains at VSV 61,18: yathaikadravyavattvān na dravyaṃ bhāvo 
guṇakarmasu ca bhāvān na karma na guṇa evaṃ samavāyo 'pi: “Just as existence is 
not a substance because it is possessed by a substance, and it is not a quality or an 
action because it is resident in qualities and actions, so also inherence.” 
(1) Although T corroborates the reading dravyādi° the correct reading must be 
dravyatvādi°. 
(2) bhāvena conj : bhāve tu Ms. The reading bhāve tu is meticulously reproduced 
at T 154,35 as dṅos po la ni bśad pa 'o, although it is meaningless in the context. In 
spite of that the Tibetan translator evidently preferred to translate what he read in his 
Ms, and made no attempt to “correct” it. 
 
38 Jinendrabuddhi limits himself to explaining at Ms B 194b4-5 that the meaning 
is that a sixth triplet. whose charateristic is to indicate a relation should be 
introduced: sambandhalakṣaṇayā(1) ṣaṣṭhyā bhavitavyam ity arthaḥ. The Sanskrit 
grammarians attribute to the sixth triplet the semantic function of indicating a 
relation (sambandha); cf. CV II.1:95: ṣaṣṭhī sambandhe. VP III.7:143: sambandhaḥ 
kārakebhyo 'nyaḥ kriyākārakapūrvakaḥ śrutāyām aśrutāyāṃ vā kriyāyāṃ so 
'bhidhīyate. DSG s.v. ṣaṣṭhī. Jinendrabuddhi's remark, although basically correct, 
does not bring out all the grammatical implications of Dignāga's concise statement. 
As the following quotation of VP III.14:8 indicates, Dignāga wants to point out that 
co-reference (sāmānādhikaraṇya) is impossible if it is assumed that the word ‘sat’ 
denotes the relation of the general property existence (sattā) to any given substance, 
quality or action. For in such a case the grammarians prescribe the introduction of 
the sixth triplet after the term that denotes the item with which it is connected, that 
is, one would expect a phrase like sad dravyasya showing the difference (bheda) as 
opposed to the phrase sad dravyam where the two relata coalesce through 
abhedopacāra. Dignāga addresses the grammatical implications of the concept of 
relation at PS I:22ab (v. Hattori 1968: 43-44, 138 4.17), cf. PS II:10b, where he 
objects to those who consider sambandha to be anumeya that one would expect that 
the sixth triplet is introduced after the term denoting the item that possesses the 
relation: ṣaṣṭhī srūyeta tadvati; cf. PSṬ Ms B 68b2-3: sambandhavivakṣāyāṃ hy 
agniśabdaḥ ṣaṣṭhyantaḥ syāt: “For if the relation were intended to be expressed the 
word ‘fire’ should end in the sixth triplet.”  
Uddyotakara reproduces a more explicit version of Dignāga's argument as 
pūrvapakṣa at NV 323,21-324,3: atha dravyādivttitvāt sattāyā eva dravyādiśabdaiḥ 
saha sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ tathāpi pāratantryāt sattāyā guṇatvam, 
guṇaguṇyabhidhāyinoś ca śabdayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na dṣṭam iti yathā 
śaṅkhasya śauklyam iti. etena sambandho vyākhyātaḥ: “If, on the other hand, 
existence is co-referential with words like ‘substance’ because existence is resident 
in substances, and so on, nevertheless because of its dependence [upon the general 
property existence] existence has status as a property (guṇatvam) and two words that 





co-referential, like, for instance, [the statement]: ‘Whiteness of conch-shell’. Hereby 
the relation is explained.” 
(1)em. (cf. 'brel pa'i mtshad ñid T) : svasam° Ms  
 
[13] āha ca: vibhaktibhedo niyamād guṇaguṇyabhidhāyinoḥ 
sāmānādhikaraṇyasya prasiddhir dravyaśabdayoḥ (VP III.14:8). Restored, cf. the 
parallel at NCV 631,9-10: āha ca: vibhaktibhedo niyamād ityādi.  
 
39 The Vākyapadīya quotation is missing in K. Moreover, Jinendrabuddhi does 
not comment upon it, which might indicate that it was not included in the material 
he used for his ṭīkā. There is no reason to believe, however, that it has been 
interpolated because Mallavādi quotes a similar verse in the same context as appears 
from Siṃhasūri's quotation at NCV 631,9-10, q.v. above no. [13]. An edited version 
of the verse, presumably by Dignāga, was known to Uddyotakara, cf. no. 41 below. 
 
40 As mentioned above Dignāga quotes this verse with the intention of 
corroborating his analysis, namely that the introduction of the sixth triplet after the 
word denoting a substance as connected with the property existence is required by a 
grammatical rule. The verse constitutes part of Bharthari's reflections on the 
problems discussed by Patañjali at Mahā-bh I 399,4ff. (ad A II 1:57), which 
Helarāja explains thus at VPP Vol. II 154,1-5: paṭasya śukla iti 
dravyaguṇābhidhāyipadaprayoge śābdo guṇapradhānabhāvaḥ. tathā hy 
atropasarjanaṃ pradhānopakārapariṇataṃ svārtham ācaṣṭa iti guṇavibhaktiṃ 
ṣaṣṭhīm upādatte. pradhānaṃ tu svātmany avasthitam aparopakārīti prathamayā 
yujyata iti niyato vibhaktibhedo vyadhikaraṇe viṣaye. vīraḥ puruṣa ityādau tu 
sāmānādhikaraṇe viṣaye dvāv api dravyaśabdau svaniṣṭhaṃ svārtham ācakṣate. 
tathā ca prathamaiva: “When syntactical nominals denoting a substance and a 
quality are used, like in the expression ‘white colour of cloth,’ the relation between 
the secondary and the principal item (pradhāna) is verbal. That is, in the present 
case the subordinate item denotes its own referent as brought into the service of the 
principal item. Thus it assumes the sixth triplet which is the affix of the subordinate 
item. The principal item, however, being confined to itself is not subsidiary to the 
other. Therefore it is constructed with the first triplet. Thus the difference of nominal 
affix is restricted to the domain where there is no co-reference. However, in the 
domain where there is co-reference, as in an expression like ‘the man that is a hero’ 
even two words that [each] denote a substance denote their own referent as 
selfcontained. And thus only the first triplet [is used].”  
Uddyotakara quotes at NV 326,5-6 a similar but slightly revised version of VP 
III.14:8. Dignāga must have edited it with the intention of adapting Bharthari's 
analysis to his own treatment of the question of sambandhaḥ. It is quoted towards 
the end of Uddyotakara's rebuttal of Dignāga's argument. Since Uddyotakara 
apparently used the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa for his criticism of the apoha theory, the 
verse no doubt stems from this work: tasmāt sāmānādhikaraṇyānupapattir adoṣaḥ: 
“vibhaktibhedo(1) niyamād guṇaguṇyabhidhāyinoḥ, sāmānādhikaraṇyasyāsiddhiḥ 
saddravyaśabdayor” iti etad anena pratyuktam: “Therefore it is not a problem that 
there is no justification for co-reference. Hereby [the verse claiming that] “[A word] 
denoting a quality and one denoting the bearer of that quality have different case 
affixes because of a restrictive rule. For the two words ‘existent’ and ‘substance’ co-




Jinendrabuddhi closes his exegesis of this paragraph with a brief discussion of 
the problem of the denotation of general terms like dravya in relation to expressions 
showing vaiyadhikaraṇya like sad dravyasya, in which one general property 
seemingly is connected with another, which contradicts the assumption that general 
properties are not connected with one another, cf. PSṬ Ms B 194b5-7: nanu ca 
dravyādiśabdair api jātimātraṃ dravyatvādy ucyata iti. tatra kaḥ sambandho jāter 
jātyantareṇa yataḥ ṣaṣṭhy ucyeta(2)? naiṣa doṣaḥ. dravyatvavad dravyam iha 
matvarthīyalopaṃ ktvā darśitaṃ vaiyadhikaraṇyapradarśanārtham. yady evaṃ 
sacchabde 'pi matvarthīyalopāt sāmānādhikaraṇyam bhaviṣyati. yadā tarhi 
matvarthīyo notpadyate sattāmātravivakṣitatvāt, tadā na prāpnoti; na ca tadā sad 
dravyasyetīṣyate: “It is certainly the case that terms like ´substance´ also denotes the 
mere general property such as substanceness. In that case what kind of connection to 
another general property does the general property have so that one would use the 
sixth triplet? There is no problem. In this case the general property possessor of 
substanceness is referred to as ‘substance’ by eliding the affix denoting possession 
in order to illustrate absence of co-reference. If that is the case, there will be co-
reference even in the case of the word ‘existent’ as a consequence of the elision of 
the affix denoting possession. When in that case the affix denoting possession is not 
introduced because the mere general property existence is intended to be denoted, it 
does not obtain; and then the clause “sad dravyasya” is not called for.” 
(1)°o ni° conj. : °ani°. 
(2)em. : °ata Ms 
 
[14] sambandhaś cātra sambandhidharmeṇa vācya ucyate. tathā hi bhāvaḥ 
ktvoktaḥ, bhāvaś cānyena yujyate. Restored, cf. Ms 195a1: sambandhaś cātretyādi. 
naiva hi svadharmeṇābhidheyatvāt sambandho vācya ucyate, kiṃ tarhi, 
sambandhidharmeṇa. … tathā hītyādi. 195a3: bhāvaś cānyena yujyata iti; 195a5: 
bhāvaḥ ktvokta iti.  
 
41 A Connection is basically dviṣṭha, that is, it involves two terms namely the 
state of connecting and the thing that is being connected to something else. Thereby 
it only becomes denotable through the introduction of the sixth triplet after the word 
denoting the other relatum.  
Dignāga addresses the question of the denotability of sambandha in his criticism 
at PS II:10cd of the view that the object of inference (anumeya) is the connection; 
cf. PS II:10c1; 
K (Kitagawa 1973 459b16-460b3 = P 112a7-8): gaṅ gi phyir yaṅ 'brel pa ni | 
brjod min | (10c1) raṅ gi chos daṅ 'brel pa ni gźan la brjod par bya yin la | de lta bu 
la rjes su dpag par bya ma yin gyi |.  
V (Kitagawa 1973 459a18-460a3 = P 31a3-4): raṅ gi chos kyi<s> 'brel par ni || 
brjod par mi bya'o || gźan ma brjod pa ni de ltar rjes su dpag par bya ba ma yin te:  
“For the connection (*sambandho hi) is not denotable by virtue of its own 
property (avācyaḥ svadharmeṇa),(1) but is denotable with respect to something else 
[viz. its relatum], and thus it [i.e. the relation] is not the inferendum (na caivam 
anumeyaḥ).”(2)  
Jinendrabuddhi comments upon the phrase avācyaḥ svadharmeṇa in a way that 
is reminiscent of Dignāga's explanation at PSV V:3, cf. PSṬ Ms B 68b7: 
sambandhanaṃ hi sambandha iti bhāvarūpeṇa sambandhaśabdenābhidhānāt. 





sambandha iti. tataś ca sambandhy eva sa bhavatīti na svarūpeṇa sambandho 
abhidhīyate: “For connection means the action of connecting because [the 
connection] is denoted by the word ‘connection’ in the form of a state of action; and 
a state of action is connected with the other relatum. Thus the expectation of the 
complementation of the other relatum arises at the thought: connection of what? 
And therefore it [viz. the connection] is only a relatum. Thus the connecion is not 
denoted in its own form.” 
The idea that sambandha is only understood as an entity that connects relata is 
formulated by Bharthari in his description of samavāya at VPV II 435: 
sambandhidharmā saṃyogaḥ svaśabdenābhidhīyate | sambandhaḥ samavāyas tu 
sambandhitvena gamyate ||; cf. Dharmakīrti's explanation at PVSV 92,4-8: 
sambandhasya tu svarūpeṇa anabhidhānam uktam. abhidhāne sambandhitvena 
buddhāv upasthānāt: “The relation is said not to be denoted in its own form because 
when denoted it becomes present to the mind as having relata.” Karṇakagomin 
explains at PVSVṬ 345,19 the crucial last clause as follows: tatra rājapuruṣayoḥ 
sambandha ity ucyamāne rajñaḥ puruṣa(4) ity asya vyatirekasya hetuḥ sambandhaḥ, 
tadā sa sambandhaḥ sambandhirūpeṇa pratīyate: “When in this case it is said that 
there is a relation between the king and the servant the relation is the cause of the 
difference [of case affix] as in the expression ‘king's man.’ Then this relation is 
understood in the form of its relata;” Karṇakagomin mentions, at PVSVṬ 345,16, 
Dignāga as Dharmakīrti's authority for claiming that sambandha is not denotable: 
kathaṃ tarhy ācāryadiṅnāgena tasyāvācyatvam uktam. To support the analysis he 
quotes the following verse 348,31-346,2: asattvabhūtas sambandho rūpaṃ tasya na 
ghyate. nābhidhānaṃ svarūpeṇa sambandhasya kathañcaneti: “The relation is not 
a thing. Its form is not apprehended. The relation is in no way whatsoever denoted in 
its own form.” This verse may stem from one of Dignāga's lost works. If so, the 
most likely source would be the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa. It is closely related to 
Bharthari’s VP II:46: kāryānumeyaḥ sambandho rūpaṃ tasya na dśyate 
asattvabhūtam atyantam atas taṃ pratijñāyate: “The relation is something that is to 
be inferred from its effects. Its form is not observed. Therefore it is recognized that 
it is not at all a thing.” 
(1)qu. Ms B 68b7.  
(2)qu. Ms B 69a1.  
(3)em. : sambandhyantarā kākhyā Ms 
(4)PVSVṬ rājapuruṣayor which, evidently, is a mistake for rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ.  
 
42 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 195a5: bhāva ity abhiprāyeṇoktaḥ. The techical term bhāva 
denotes the state of action expressed by action nouns like pāka or sambandha; cf. 
Rocher 1966; 1968: 23 § 13; Renou, Terminologie s.v. 
 
43 Connection means that of any given x to any given y. The two terms of the 
relation constitute its relata (sambandhin). Cf. PSṬ Ms B 195a1-3: iha kaścic 
chabdārthaḥ kenacic chabdenābhidhīyamānaḥ 
sambandhyantarākāṅkṣopajanahetuḥ. tathā hi samuccayaḥ sam-
uccayaśabdābhidhāne parākāṅkṣopajanahetur bhavati. sa eva cādyupādānaḥ(1) 
kasyeti ākāṅkṣām upajanayati(2). bhāvaś ca bhāvasādhanena śabdenābhidhīyamāno 
niyatam anyaviṣayām ākāṅkṣāṃ janayatīti: “In this case when a certain word 
referent is being denoted by a certain word it is the cause of generating expectation 




the cause of generating expectation [of the complementation] of the correlate when 
being denoted by a word denoting accumulation. The [word denoting accumulation] 
comprising [the word] ‘and’, and so on, with certainty generates expectation [of 
complementation] at the thought '[accumulation] of what'? (3) And a state that is 
denoted by a word having a state [of action] as its means of realisation(4) necessarily 
generates expectation concerning the other relatum.”  
After this explanation Jinendrabuddhi addresses the additional question of 
whether or not the analysis of the relation applies to the general property, like when 
one talks about the general property of a horse, cf. PSṬ Ms B 195a3-5: nanu ca 
jātāv apy evaṃ yuktam abhidhātum. jātir api hi jātiśabdenābhidhīyamānā sam-
bandhirūpeṇābhidhīyate: jātir aśvasya gor veti. naitad asti. saty api sambandhitve 
jāter jātirūpaṃ nāvahīyate. sambandhasya punaḥ sambandhitve rūpahānir eva, 
asati sambandhāntare sambandhitvānupapatteḥ. tathā cānavasthāprasaṅgaḥ.  
(1)The translator of T has misunderstood the cpd. cādyupādāna < cādi < ca + ādi 
+ upā° as vādin + upā°, cf. the translation rgol pas ñe bar len pa 155,16.  
(2)em. : °āṃ nopaja° Ms  
(3)Cf. Patañjali's illustration of the concept of accumulation at Mahā-bh I 434,10: 
samuccayaḥ: plakṣaś cety ukte gamyate etan nyagrodhaś ceti.  
(4)For the concept of bhāvasādhana, cf. Renou, Terminologie s.v. bhāva. 
 
[15] sambandhanaṃ hi sambandhaḥ(1): <so 'nyena yujyate> rāgā<di>vat. tasmāt 
sambandhidharmeṇa sambandho vācya iti ktvāśaṅkitaṃ(2) svadharmeṇa tu nāsti 
sambandhasya vācakaḥ śabda ity idan tat(3) prati nāsti. ato naivāsya jātiśabdena 
vācyatvam upapadyate(4). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 195a5-195b1: sambandhanaṃ hi 
sambandha iti … rāgavat … tasmāt sambandhidharmeṇa sambandho vācya iti 
ktvāśaṅkitam iti … svadharmeṇa tv iti. svarūpeṇa nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ 
śabda iti. idaṃ tad iti pratyavamarśāyogyarūpatvenāsattvabhūtatvāt svarūpābhi-
dhānaṃ praty āśaṅkaiva nāsti. ato naivāsya jātiśabdena vācyatvam upapadyata iti.  
(1)Cf.'brel par byed pas 'brel pa ste K : brel pa ni V, after which V adds gdon mi 
za bar 'brel par 'gyur ba'i ṅes pa med de: “For the connection is necessarily 
without certainty as to what is to be connected.” This phrase has no counterpart in K 
except perhaps the final de that may correspond to the demonstrative de (= saḥ) of 
K. PSṬ is of no help in settling the problem.  
(2)The word āśaṅkitam has no identifiable counterpart in VK; the immediately 
preceding absolutive ktvā is perhaps reproduced by phyir, which could be justified 
semantically considering the usage of Sanskrit ktvā, cf. V 108,9, K 109,9.  
(3)VK do not reproduce the expression idaṃ tad prati that is to be construed with 
āśaṅkitam. In view of the uncertainty of the readings of KV and the apparent 
discrepancy between PSṬ and the text reflected in the Tibetan translations of KV, 
the suggested Sanskrit restoration of this paragraph, although it is corroborated by 
Jinendrabuddhi's ṭīkā, may not in every detail reflect the original version. 
(4) The phrase naivāsya jātiśabdena vācyatvam upapadyata iti introduced by 
ataḥ is reproduced as two śloka pādas in V: ’di yi rigs kyi sgra yis ni // brjod par bya 
ba ñid mi ’thad /. K translates as prose omiting the negation ma before yin no. If 
indeed the phrase consists of two pādas, which one cannot reject offhand because 
Jinendrabuddhi’s use of iti indicates that the phrase is part of a quotation and the 
phrase seemingly does not deviate from the śloka metrics of PS, their existence 






44 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 195a5: bhāvatvam asya darśayati. 
 
45 Cf. 'brel par byed pa yin te K : 'gegs byed pa srid do V. 
 
46 K misunderstands the purport of the example and translates 'dod chags = 
Sanskrit rāga “passion;” V translates correctly kha ba sgyur ba = rāga “the action of 
colouring,” cf. PSṬ Ms B 195a6: rāgavat (chos bźin sic T). rāgaḥ is quoted as an 
example of action nouns (bhāva) derived by the affix ghañ in Kāśikā on A III 3:18: 
bhāve vācye dhātor ghañ pratyayo bhavati: pākas tyāgā rāgaḥ. 
 
47 I interpret āśaṅkitam in accordance with A III 3:111: napuṃsake bhāve ktaḥ.  
 
48 For Dignāga's use of rthe technical term svadharma, cf. VP III.3:4 
nābhidhānaṃ svadharmeṇa sambandhasyāsti vācakam atyantaparatantratvād 
rūpaṃ nāsyāpadiśyate. The term applies to any given noun that is not subject to the 
grammatical operation of introducing the sixth triplet that denotes the relation (nanu 
ṣaṣṭhī sambandhasya kāryam, Helarāja introducing loc.cit.), cf. VPP Vol. I 128,10-
11: tatra svena asādharaṇena dharmeṇa svabhāvenopalakṣitasya vācakaṃ 
pratyāyakam abhidhānaṃ ṣaṣṭhīvyatiriktaṃ nāsti, idantayā svarūpānavadhāraṇāt. 
 
[16] <ye tv āhur> viśeṣasabdaiḥ <sāmānādhikaraṇyāt sambandhasaukāryād 
avyabhicārāc ca> jātimadmātraṃ <vivakṣitam(1) iti>. Restored, cf. viśeṣasabdair 
ityādi ... jātimadmātraṃ sāmānyarūpam, PSṬ Ms B 195b2-4, cf. no. 50 below.  
(1)brjod par ’dod pa yin no K : brjod par bya ’o V. The Sanskrit restauration 
suggested by K is not supported by PSṬ. V appears to presuppose the reading 
abhidheyam. 
 
49 Jinendrabuddhi introduces the opponents' theory at Ms B 195b2-5 as follows: 
pūrvadoṣābhāvāt pakṣāntaropanyāsaḥ: dravyādayo viśeṣaśabdāḥ. taiḥ sāmānadh-
ikaraṇyam ekārthavttitvāt. yatraiva hi dravye sattāṃ pravttinimittam upādāya 
sacchabdo vartate. dravyaśabdo 'pi dravyatvanimittas tatraiva. tasmāt sāmānādhi-
karaṇyam upapadyate tadvadabhidhāne ‘sad dravyam’ iti. na ca sambandhāśakyatā 
tanmātrasyābhinnatvāt. na hy atra bhedā ucyante, kin tu yat teṣāṃ jātimadmātraṃ 
sāmānyarūpam. tasya ca ekatvāt sukaraḥ sambandho vyabhicārābhavaś ca. tada-
bhāve śabdasyāpravtteḥ: “Another thesis is exemplified since it is without the 
previous faults: Particular general terms are ‘substance,’ etc. Since they refer to the 
same referent (ekārtha) it is co-referential with these. For the word ‘existent,’ being 
based upon its cause of application viz. the general property existence, applies to the 
same substance as the word ‘substance’ whose cause of application is substanceness. 
Therefore co-reference like in the statement ‘existent substance’ is justified if it 
denotes the possessor of the general properties. Nor is there any impossibility of 
relation because that alone (tadmātra) is without division. In this case the particulars 
are not denoted, but rather that which is their general form viz. the mere fact of 
possessing the general property (jātimadmātra). And as this is one the relation is 
feasible and there is no ambiguity because without this [viz. the relation] the word 
does not apply.”  
Cf. the similar explanation at NMañjGBh 137,9-11: sacchabdaḥ sattāṃ 
pravttinimittam āśtya tadvati dravye pravttaḥ śuklaśabdaś ca guṇaṃ pravttini-




'existent,' by being based upon existence as its cause of application, is applied to a 
substance as possessed of this [viz. existence], and the word 'white,' by being based 
upon a quality as its cause of application, is applied to the same thing (tatraiva). 
Thus there is co-reference by virtue of direct application.” 
 
50 I assume that la la dag ni … zer ro V : gaṅ yaṅ zer ba'i K is equivalent to gaṅ 
la la dag ni of V 106,10 = ye tv āhuḥ.  
 
51 Cf. de la V : om. K. 
 
[17] tadvato nāsvatantratvāt. Qu. NCV 623,17; ŚVṬ 60,3; NR 423,10; PVSVṬ 
200,11-12; NMañj 296,6; NMañjGBhg 137,13 and 138,8-9, cf. PSṬ Ms B 195b5: 
asvatantratvād iti. 
 
52 The re-occurrence of vācakaḥ follows from 2c, cf. TSP 382,8: tadvato na 
vācakaḥ śabdo 'svatantratvāt. 
 
53 The term tadvat is used as a technical term for jātimat, cf. PSṬ Ms B 195b5: 
tadvad iti jātimad ity arthaḥ; NMañj 295,31: nanu ko 'yaṃ tadvān nāma: tad 
asyāstīti tadvān iti: “Now what is this thing called tadvān: tadvān means that ‘x has 
y’;” cf. A V 2:94: tad asyāsty asminn iti matup.  
 
54 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 195b5: asvatantratvād iti parāpekṣatvād iti. Siṃhasūri quotes a 
verse from another source, possibly from Dignāga's Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, in which 
the same argument occurs, cf. NCV 735,24: asvātantryād, bhedāj, jāter ajātitaḥ (cf. 
PS V:11b). 
 
[18] evam api hi sacchabdo jātisvarūpamātropasarjanaṃ(1) dravyam āha, na 
sākṣād iti tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepād atadbhedatve sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ. 
na hy asatyāṃ vyāptau <sāmāṇādhikaraṇyabhāvaḥ>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
195b6: evam api hītyādi; TSP 382,8-11: sacchabdo jātisvarūpopasarjanaṃ dravyam 
āha, na sākṣād iti tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepād atadbhedatve sāmānādhikaraṇ-
yābhāvaprasaṅga uktaḥ; cf. Ms B 196a2: na sakṣād iti … tadgataghaṭādibhedā-
nākṣepād iti; Ms 196a6: sa evātadbhedatve sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ, cf. NCV 
616,24: atadbhedatve sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ; NCV 618,16: atra bhāṣyeṇa para 
evottaram āha: na hy asatyāṃ vyāptāv ityādi, cf. PSṬ Ms B 196a7: na hy asatyām 
ityādi.  
(1)°mātra° em. (cf. tsam KV; Ms B 195b6: mātragrahaṇam) : om. TSP. 
 
55 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 195b6-7: jātiś ca svarūpaṃ ceti dvandvaḥ(1). svarūpaśrutyā 
śabdasvarūpam uktam. te upasarjanam apradhānaṃ(2) yasya tat tathoktam. 
Mātragrahaṇaṃ dravyagatadharmāntaraviśeṣapratiṣedhārtham. kathaṃ punaḥ 
svarūpaṃ dravyasyopasarjanam. yavatā jātir eva tadupasarjanam. śabdo hi 
svarūpaviśiṣṭāṃ jātim abhidhatte taduttarakālaṃ śabdasvarūpaviśiṣṭajātiviśiṣṭaṃ 
dravyam. naiṣa doṣaḥ. upakārakopakāriṇo 'pi hi bhavanty upakāriṇaḥ svaviśeṣaṇā-
pekṣasya viśeṣaṇasya pradhānopakāre mahati vartamānatvāt: “‘General property’ 
and ‘own form’ is a dvandva compound. By the word ‘own form’ is meant the 
word's own form. That of which these two are subsidiary members (upasarjanam), 





has the purpose of negating particulars viz. the other properties that occur in a 
substance.  
But how can the [word's] own form be a subsidiary member of the substance 
insofar as only the general property is its [viz. the substance's] subsidiary member? 
For the word denotes the general property as qualified by its own form, and 
thereafter it denotes the substance as qualified by the general property as qualified 
by the word's own form.  
This is not a fault. For they are also assisting and assisted because the assisted 
that is dependent upon the qualifier, being dependent upon its own qualified, is of 
great service to the primary thing [viz. the qualified].”  
The view which Dignāga addresses and Jinendrabuddhi explains is related to a 
view which Bharthari expounds at VP III.1:6: svā jātiḥ prathamaṃ śabdaiḥ sarvair 
evābhidhīyate, tato 'rthajātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā.  
(1)em. : ta dvanṭhaḥ Ms  
(2)For upasarjana = apradhāna, cf. Renou, Terminologie s.v.  
 
56 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 196a2-3: na sākṣāt = nāvyavadhānena. jātisvarūpagrahaṇam 
ubhayavyavadhānenādhikapāratantryopadarśanārtham(1): “Not directly, i.e., 
indirectly. The use of ‘general property’ and ‘own form’ is for the purpose of 
showing that the dependence is excessive because of the intervention of both.”  
(1)For the Ms B 196a2-3: nāvyavadhānena. tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepād iti. 
yat tajjātimat tadgatā ye viśeṣā ghaṭādayas teṣām anākṣepād ity arthaḥ. Jāt-
isvarūpagrahaṇam ubhayavyavadhānenādhikapāratantryopadarśyanārthaṃ read: 
nāvyavadhānena. jātisvarūpagrahaṇaṃ ubhayavyavadhānenādhikapāratantryopa-
darśanārthaṃ tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepād iti. yat tajjātimat tadgatā ye viśeṣā 
ghaṭādayas teṣām anākṣepād ity arthaḥ. In Ms the clause jātisvarūp°, and so on, has 
by mistake been separated from the word it comments upon, with the result that the 
explanation becomes incomprehensible. The error is also found in the corresponding 
passage at T 156,33-34.  
 
57 Cf. Uddyotakara's reproduction of Dignāga's argument at NV 324,9-12: 
jātimanmātrābhidhāyako 'pi sacchabdo na bhavati. kasmāt? asvatantratvāt. na hi 
sacchabdāt tadbhedā ghaṭādayo gamyanta iti tadvadghaṭādibhedānākṣepāt 
sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ: “Nor does the word 'existent' denote the mere general 
property possessor. Why? Because it is not self-dependent. For one does not get to 
know its particulars such as ‘pot,’ etc. Thus there is no co-reference as it does not 
imply the particulars of the general property possessor such as ‘pot.’” The analogous 
exposition of Dignāga's argument at ŚVṬ 60,7ff appears to be a verbatim quotation 
from another Dignāgan text: atra bhikṣur āha: jātiśabdaḥ sadādi tadviśiṣṭam eva 
dravyam abhidadhaṃ na tadgatam eva ghaṭādiviśeṣarūpam ākṣipati. paratantro hy 
asau sattāṃ nimittīktya dravye pravartate, na tu svatantraḥ. sarvaviśeṣaṇāviśiṣṭaṃ 
dravyaṃ vakti. tataś ca ghaṭādes tena sacchabdenānākṣepān nāsti tadvācinā 
sāmānādhikaraṇyam. na hy ekopādhiviśiṣṭe dravye 'bhihite paropādhinā sāmā-
nādhikaraṇyaṃ bhavati: “Here the monk objects: The general term ‘existent’, and 
so on, while denoting a substance as qualified by this [viz. existence] only, does not 
imply the form of the particulars like pots that are included in it. For it [viz. the 
general term ‘existent’] is dependent since it applies to the substance by making the 
general property ‘existence’ its cause of application, but it is not self-dependent. It 




co-reference with the word denoting it [viz. ‘pot’] since the word ‘existent’ does not 
imply ‘pot,’ etc. For when a substance that is qualified by one attribute is denoted, 
there is no co-reference with another attribute.”  
Cf. the succinct paraphrase of Dignāga's objection at NCV 648,7-8: yad uktaṃ 
tvayā: ghaṭādibhedānākṣepitvāt sacchabdasya jātisvarūpopasarjanadravyamātrā-
bhidhānāt pāratantryād ghaṭādibhedābhedatvāt taiḥ saha sāmānādhikaraṇyābhā-
vaḥ: “As you have objected: Since it does not imply particulars like pot because the 
word ‘existent’ only denotes substances having as subordinate members the general 
property and the (word's) own form because it is dependent, and because particulars 
like pot are not its particulars, there is no co-reference with these” (this quotation 
may stem from Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa). PVSVṬ 153,21 (ad PVSV 34,19: 
tadvatpakṣoditaḥ): yathā kila sāmānyam abhidhāya tadvati vartamānaḥ śabdo 
'svatantraḥ syāt tataś ca śabdapravttinimittabhūtena sāmānyena vaśīktasya śab-
dasya vyaktigataparasparabhedānākṣepāt taiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na syāt. 
 
58 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 196a2-3: yat tajjātimat tadgatā ye viśeṣā ghaṭādayas teṣām 
anākṣepād ity arthaḥ. Jinendrabuddhi continues addressing the meaning of ākṣepa at 
196b3-6: atha ko 'yam ākṣepo nāma: atyāgaḥ. nanu ca ghaṭādayo 'py atyaktā eva 
sattāśrayatvāt tadāśrayasya cābhidhānāt. na, ghaṭatvādīnām anākṣepāt. sacchabdo 
hi sattāpāratantryāt tato bhinnarūpān ghaṭatvādīn nākṣipati, ghaṭatvādirūpa-
sanniveṣāc ca tad vastu ghaṭaḥ paṭo(1) vā bhavati, na svato vastumātrasya viśeṣā-
bhāvāt. tasmād yathaiva paṭaśabdena(2) ghaṭatvādyasaṃsargād ghaṭādayo nākṣip-
yante, tathā sacchabdenāpi. tataḥ kim? tataḥ sa evātadbhedatve sāmānādhi-
karaṇyābhāvaḥ. kathaṃ ktvā? yad iha sacchabdena ghaṭādayo nākṣipyante, tato na 
tasya te bhedāḥ. na hy anākṣiptā bhedā dṣṭāḥ: “Now what is this so-called 
implication? It is the not leaving out. Certainly also pots, and so on, are not left out 
because they are the substrata of existence, and because [the word ‘existent’] 
denotes its substrate. No, because potness, and so on, is not implied. For the word 
‘existent' since it is dependent upon existence does not imply potness, and so on, 
whose nature is different from it [viz. existence]. A thing may be either a pot or a 
piece of cloth because the nature of general properties like potness are resident in it, 
but is is not [a pot or a piece of cloth] per se(3) because a mere thing is without 
distinction. Therefore, just as a pot, and so on, is not implied by the word ‘cloth' 
because the general properties like potness are not connected [with cloth], it is not 
implied by the word ‘existent' either. What follows from that? Therefore there is no 
co-reference in that it is without its particulars. On what grounds? If pot, and so on, 
are not implied by the word ‘existent,’ then these are not its particulars insofar as 
particulars that are not implied are not observed. And because they are not its 
particulars it cannot be co-referential with the words denoting these.”  
(1)em. (cf. snam bu T) : ghaṭo Ms  
(2)em. : ghaṭa° Ms T.  
(3)Cf the well-known statement ascribed to Bharthari: na hi gauḥ svarūpena 
gauḥ, nāpy agauḥ, gotvābhisambandhat tu gauḥ; cf. Rau 1977, WSt II 3: 123; Rau 
1981: 95 no. 6. 
 
59 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 196a7-196b1: vyāptir ākṣepaḥ. yathā rūpaśabdenānākṣepe 
madhurādīnām atadbhedatvād na tacchabdaiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam bhavati. na hi 
bhavati rūpam amlam iti. vyāptau tu bhavati rūpaṃ nīlam iti: “Implication means 





sweet, etc. because they are not its particulars, there is no co-reference with words 
denoting these. For the expression ‘sour colour’ is impossible. But when there is 
pervasion the expression ‘blue colour’ is possible.”  
The two examples mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi were also used by Mallavādi 
who appears to have copied them from a ṭīkā, cf. NCV 618,14ff. Mallavādi 
incorporates part of Dignāga's formulation into his own exposition, cf. NCV 618,16: 
na hy asatyāṃ vyāptau, and apparently also part of the ṭīkā, of which Siṃhasūri has 
preserved a fragment addressing the question of the impossibility of co-reference 
due to lack of pervasion (vyāpti), cf. NCV 618,14-15: ṭīkāyāṃ coditam “anākṣiptair 
avyāptair api sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhaviṣyati vivakṣāvaśād 'idaṃ viśeṣyam idaṃ 
viśeṣaṇam” iti: “In the ṭīkā it is objected: there will be co-reference with [words] 
that are not implied, i.e., not pervaded [e.g., by the word ‘existent’] by virtue of the 
intention to state 'this is the thing to be qualified, this is the qualifier'.”  
 
[19] tadyathā <śuklaśabdaḥ> svābhidheyaguṇamātraviśiṣṭadravyābhidhānāt saty 
api dravye madhurādīn nākṣipati. tataś cātadbhedatvam. evam atrāpi prasaṅgaḥ. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 196b1-3: tad yathetyādi … śuklaśabdasya svābhidheyo 
guṇaḥ pravttinimittatvāc chuklatvam. sa tanmātraviśiṣṭadravyābhidhānāt saty 
api(1) tasmin dravyātmani madhurādīn nākṣipati … tataś cātadbhedatvam iti … 
evam atrāpi prasaṅga iti, cf. NCV 619,18-19: tataś cātadbhedatvam … evam ihāpi.  
(1)api em. (cf. yod kyaṅ T) : tat(au?) pi Ms 
 
60 Cf. ŚVṬ 60,7-14: yathā madhuraśabdena mādhuryopādhiviśiṣṭaṃ 
khaṇḍadravyam abhidadhatā tadgatāparaśuklādyanākṣepāt tena na sāmānādhika-
raṇyaṃ yathaitan madhuraṃ śvetam iti tathaitenāpi na bhāvyaṃ san ghaṭa iti: “Just 
as there is no co-reference with the word ‘sweet’ denoting the substance sugar as 
qualified by the attribute sweetness because of not implying other [qualities] like 
[the quality] white that is included in it. Like, for instance, the [co-reference] ‘this 
[substance] is sweet and white’ will not be possible, so also the [co-reference] 
‘existent pot.’” 
 
61 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 196b2-3: na hi tasya śuklatvavad madhuratvādayaḥ 
pravttikāraṇam: “For the general property sweetness is not the cause of application 
of the [word ‘white’] as is the general property whiteness.” 
 
62 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 196b4: sacchabdena(1) ghaṭādīnām anākṣepaḥ, anākṣepāc 
cātadbhedatvam ity arthaḥ: “The meaning is this: The word ‘existent’ does not 
imply pots, etc.; and since it does not imply (pots, etc.), it has no particulars.” The 
idea that the denotation of one term does not imply the denotation of other terms has 
a parallel in Bharthari's claim at VP III.3:4, in the context of a discussion of 
prakarṣa, that the different distinguishing properties that are found in substances are 
not denoted by any given particular term that denotes its referent as excluded from 
other referents and thus does not imply the denotation of other terms: vidyāmānāḥ 
pradhāneṣu na sarve bhedahetavaḥ. viśeṣaśabdair ucyante vyāvttārthābhidhāyi-
bhiḥ. Mallavādi appears to quote this verse (or a version of it) in his rebuttal of 
Dignāga's argument (it may, in fact, have made up part of Dignāga's own 
argument), cf. the explanation at NCV 622,23-27: pradhāneṣu viśeṣyeṣu vidyamānā 
api bhedahetavo dharmāḥ sarve nocyante, kaścid eva viśiṣṭo vivakṣitaḥ kenacid 




caritārthatvāt tasya guṇabhūtatvāt. ata eva ca te viśeṣaśabdā ity ucyante vyāvttār-
thābhidhāyitvād iti (my underlining); cf. also Helarāja ad loc. VVP I 205,15ff. 
(1)sac˚ em. (cf. yod pa'i T) : tac˚ Ms 
 
[20] upacārāt. Qu. Ms B 197a2; NMañjGBh 137,13. 
 
63 Jinendrabuddhi explains that Dignāga introduces this argument in order to 
show that in the case of abhedopacāra it is impossible that the general property 
possessor be the denotable object because the word only denotes the form of the 
general property existence upon which it is imposed, cf. PSṬ Ms B 196b7-197a1-2: 
ihedam uktaṃ jātiśabdena tadvato 'bhidhānam iti. tadvati ca śabdasya matuplopād 
abhedopacārād vā vttiḥ. tatra matuppakṣe śuklādivad abhidhānaṃ sambhavatīti 
sati vācyatve doṣa uktaḥ. abhedopacāre tu tasyaiva samāropitasya sattārūpasyābh-
idhānād vācyatvam eva tadvato na sambhavatīti darśayitum āha: “Here it is argued: 
The general term denotes the posessor of the general property. And the word applies 
to the general property possessor through elision of the matup affix or through 
transfer in terms of non-difference. Denotation is possible on the theory of elision of 
the matup affix, in the same way as the elision of the matup affix after [the word] 
‘white.’  
 
[21] sacchabdo hi(1) bhūtārthena svarūpaṃ vā jātiṃ vāha. tatra pravttas tadvaty 
upacaryate. na hi(2) yo yatropacaryate sa tam arthaṃ bhūtārthenāha. Restored, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 197a2-4: svarūpaṃ veti … jātiṃ veti … tadvaty upacaryata iti … na tu yo 
yatrety … yo yatropacaryate na sa tam artham bhūtārthenāha; ŚVṬ 61,20-21: 
sacchabdo 'pi bhūtārthena svarūpaṃ jātiṃ vāha. tatra pravttas tadvaty 
upacaryamāṇe gauṇaḥ syāt; NCV 624,12: na hi yo yatropacaryate sa tam arthaṃ 
bhūtārthenāha.  
(1)hi conj. (cf. yod pa'i sgra ni K : sgra ni V) : 'pi ŚVṬ ('pi is probably w.r. for 
hi) 
(2)So read with NCV (cf. ni KV) and NMañjGBh 138,6, q.v. no. 67 below : tu 
Ms  
 
64 Jinendrabuddhi explains that Dignāga mentions svarūpa in accordance with 
the view of those who claim that the own form of a word (śabdasvarūpaṃ) is 
denotable, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197a2: ye śabdasvarūpaṃ vācyam icchanti, tanmatena. 
The reason why Dignāga alludes to this view is undoubtedly because Bharthari 
claims that the word denotes its svarūpa before its connection with the referent, cf. 
VP I:66: prāk sañjñinābhisambandhāt sañjñā rūpapadārthikā, cf. VPV 125,5-6 ad 
loc.: yāvat sañjñinā tu saṃjñā na sambaddhā tāvan na saṃjñipadārthiketi; VP 
III.1:6ab svā jātiḥ prathamaṃ śabdair sarvair evābhidhīyate; Helarāja Vol. I 17,8 
ad loc. quotes VP I:66ab. For the alternative view that the word denotes the general 
property, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197a2: ye jātim, na tu svarūpam (scil. icchanti). 
 
65 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 197a3: jātimati. svarūpābhidheyavādināṃ tu jātāv apy 
upacaryate. 
 
66 Jinendrabuddhi illustrates this statement by quoting the example of the transfer 
of the word ‘king’ to the servant, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197,4: tadyathā rājaśabdaḥ puruṣa 





include svarūpa among the principal denotata of the word ‘existent,’ cf. NMañjGBh 
138,3-6: sacchabdena jātiḥ khyāpyate sattālakṣaṇaḥ. tatra pravttas tadvaty 
upacaryate 'sau. na ca yaḥ śabdo yatropacaryate sa tasya vācakaḥ. na hi yo 
yatropacārato vartate sa tam arthaṃ paramārthato bravīti yathā siṃhaśabdo 
māṇavakam. NV 324,12-14: atha vā, asvatantratvād iti sacchabdaḥ prādhānyena 
sattāyāṃ vartate. tatra vartamānas tadvaty upacaryate, yac ca yatra vartamānam 
anyatropacaryate na tat tasyābhidhāyakaṃ mañcaśabdavad iti: “Alternatively, 
‘because of not being self-dependent': The word ‘existent' applies principally to [the 
general property] existence. While being applied to this it is transferred to the 
possessor of the general property, and that which, while being applied to one thing, 
is transferred to some other thing does not denote this [other thing], like the word 
‘seats’ [which stands metonymically for the persons sitting on them](1)” 
As an illustration of the view which Dignāga criticizes Jinendrabuddhi quotes 
VP III.14:347 at Ms B 197a5: mañcaśabdo yathādheyaṃ mañceṣv eva vyavasthitaḥ 
tattvenāha tathā jātiśabdo dravyeṣu vartate: “A general term applies to substances 
in the same way as the word 'seats' which being restricted to the seats only denotes 
what is supported [by the seats] as identical [with them],” and he continues at 
197a5ff: so rājety(2) upacaryamāno rājaśabdo bhūtārthena <na> bhtyam 
abhidhatte … sa eva tu rājārtho bhinnādhikaraṇa ucyate. Helarāja explains loc.cit at 
VPP Vol. II 310,27f: mañcāḥ krośantīti kriyāsambandhasyādheye mañcasthe 
prāṇiny upapatter ādhārarūpābhedenādhāravacano 'pi mañcaśabdas tadādheya-
vacana iti niścīyate'; cf. NCV 624,14-15: mañcaśabdo mañcasthān mañcasvarūpā-
pannān eva brūte na puruṣatvāpannān iti. Dignāga may therefore have had 
Bharthari's position in mind. Since Mallavādi quotes VP III.14:347 in the same 
context (cf. NCV 624,13), it is highly likely that Dignāga either quoted it or alluded 
to in the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, the work that Mallavādi together with other 
Dignāgan works relied upon for his criticism. Dignāga's crtitique of the theory of 
transfer of the general term to the general property possessor is alluded to at PVSVṬ 
153,23-24 (ad PVSV 34,19: tadvatpakṣoditaḥ): upacaritā ca tadvati śabdapravttir 
ityādiko dosa iti.  
(1)For this example, cf. NSBh ad NS II 2:62: sthānāt: mañcāḥ krośanti iti 
mañcasthāḥ puruṣāḥ abhidhīyante: “Due to placement like [the statement] “the 
stages are shouting,” by which the people located on the stages are denoted;” see 
also Karṇakagomin's PVSVṬ 153,17–20 and Manorathanandin's PVV 280,4–10 ad 
PV I 64, respectively.  
(2)so rājety conj : (s)a jyeyarājyety Ms 
 
[22] <sārūpyasya cā>sambhavāt. Restored, cf. NMañjGBh 137,13: asambhavāt; 
ibid. 138,9. 
 
67 Cf. NMañjGBh 138,8-13: atha sattoparaktatatsvarūpe dravye sārūpyāc 
chabdasya vttir bhaviṣyatīti ced āha – “asambhavād” iti tatsārūpyasyāsambhavād 
ity arthaḥ. na hi sattayā sārūpyaṃ dravyasya nīlena yathā sphaṭikasya nīrūpatvāt 
tasyāḥ. atha yathā āktau pratyayasaṅkrāntyā ‘gavayo 'yam' ityādau tathā ghaṭā-
dau satpratyayasaṅkrāntyā ‘san ghaṭaḥ’ iti bhaviṣyati. tad api na. kutaḥ? Asam-
bhavāt. katham asambhavaḥ? dravyasya sattāktyasambhavād dravye satpratyaya-
saṅkrāntyabhāvaḥ: “If is is claimed that the word will apply by virtue of 
resemblance [of the substance with the general property] to a substance whose own 




impossible,” that is, the resemblance [of the substance with the general property] is 
impossible. For a substance does not resemble [the general property] existence in the 
same way as a crystal [resembles] the blue colour because [the general property 
existence] is colourless. If, on the other hand, the expression 'a pot is existent' will 
be due to transfer of the notion 'existent' to the pot in the same way as in the 
expression 'this is a gavaya' by way of transfer of notion to the form, that too is not 
justified. How can that be? Because it is impossible. Why is it not possible? There is 
no transfer of the notion 'existent' because it is impossible that a substance has the 
form of existence”  
The view which Dignāga criticizes is related to Bharthari's description of 
sattaupacārikā at VP III.3:40: sphaṭikādi yathā dravyaṃ bhinnair upāśrayaiḥ, 
svaśaktiyogāt sambandhaṃ tādrūpyeṇopagacchati; cf. no. 88 below. 
 
[23] tadvati(1) ca <guṇasārūpyaṃ> na pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ sambhavati, nāpi 
guṇopakārāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197a6: syād upacāraḥ. upacārasya 
sārūpyanibandhanatvāt. sārūpyanirūpanāya tadvati cetyādinā vivaraṇam 
ārabhyate, 197b2-3: na pratyayasaṅkrāntita ity … nāpi guṇopakārād ity … 
sambhavati.  
(1)Cf. ldan pa las K, for which read ldan pa la. 
 
68 Siṃhasūri explains at NCV 622,25ff that there are two types of transfer, one 
based upon similarity (sārūpya) and one based upon influence of the attribute 
(guṇopakāra): dvayī hi upacārasya gatiḥ: sārūpyāt: yathā yamalayor anyatarasmin 
‘sa evāyam' iti pratyayasaṅkrānteḥ, rājño bhtye 'mātyādau ‘rājā' iti vā pratyayaḥ. 
guṇopakārād vā, upadhānānurāgād iva sphaṭike raktatvādibuddhiḥ: “There are two 
ways of transfer: 1. through similarity, like, for instance, from transfer of notion to 
either one of two twins thinking ‘one is just like the other’, or the notion ‘king’ to 
the kings servant viz. the minister, and so on, or 2. due to the influence of a quality 
like, for instance the perception of redness, and so on, in a crystal due to the 
influence of [the red colour of] a proximate substrate.” Dignāga addresses both types 
in the following paragraphs. 
 
[24] kathaṃ na pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ? upacāre sati, buddhirūpasya bhinnatvād 
rājño bhtyopacāravat. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197b6-7: kathaṃ na pratya-
yasaṅkrāntitaḥ? upacāre sati buddhirūpasya bhinnatvād iti. … rājño 
bhtyopacāravad iti; cf. the parallel version at NMañjGBh 137,14: vttirūpasya 
bhinnatvād rājñi bhtyopacāravat. 
 
69 Cf. NMañjGBh 138,18-20: nanūpacārād anyaviṣayaḥ pratyayo 'nyatra 
saṅkrāman dśyata ity āha: “vttirūpasya bhinnatvād” bhedenopalabhyamānatvād 
iti: “It is certainly the case that due to transfer a cognition that is concerned with one 
thing is observed in the sense of something else by being transferred. With this 
[objection] in mind he says: “Because the form of the application is different,” i.e. 
because it is observed to be different.” 
 70 The parallel version quoted at NMañjGBh 137,14 (q.v. above no. [24])—it 
probably stems from the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa—expresses the opposite idea, the 
transfer of the notion ‘servant’ to the king; Bharthari makes use of the same simile 





on the simile as such, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197b6: jātau vttaḥ śabdas tadvaty upacaryate. 
na copacāre sati tulyākāro buddhir bhavati. etad dṣṭāntena pratipādayati: “While 
being applied to the general property, the word is transferred to the general property 
possessor. And in the case of transfer the cognition does not have the same form. 
This he shows by means of an example.” In Uddyotakara's exposition of the 
argument at NV the relation between the two terms is not inverted, cf. NV 324,15-
16: tadvati na ca guṇasārūpyāt pratyayasaṅkrāntiḥ, yathā svāmiśabdasya bhtye: 
“And there is no transfer of cognition to the general property possessor due to 
similarity of property, like [the transfer] of the word 'master' to the servant.”  
 
[25] tadyathā. Qu. Ms B 197b7. 
 
71źes bya ba la K, would indicate the presence of a Sanskrit locative. 
 
72 Cf. bran la raṅ gi sgrar brjod pa ni V : om. K.  
 
73 Cf. gaṅ mi de ni ṅa raṅ ṅo V : ṅa(1) gaṅ yin pa de ni bran yin no K. In contrast 
to KV supports the statement of pāda d.  
(1)ṅa em. : ṅag K. 
 
74 Cf. blo mtshuṅs par skye ba ni ma yin no V : blo mtshuṅs par 'gyur ba ma yin 
no K. Although the translation of this paragraph is tentative as neither KV nor Ms 
makes it possible to form a clear idea of its syntax and vocabulary, the gist of it 
seems clear enough: Dignāga wants to point out that the assumption that the alleged 
transfer of the idea of the general property existence to its possessor (tadvat) due to 
similarity is impossible because in secondary usage the transfer of one term to 
something else, like when a king refers to his minister as ‘master’ or ‘king’, does not 
entail that the cognitions of the two things to which the term is applied directly and 
secondarily coalesce: they are still separate, like the notions of 'king' and 'servant;' 
cf. NCV 624,24-25: tatra na tāvat pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ sārūpyād upacāraḥ 
sambhavati sārūpyāsambhave pratyayasaṅkrāntyabhāvāt svāmibhtyayor bhin-
natvāt: “In this case, in the first place, transfer is impossible through transfer of 
notion due to resemblance because there is no transfer of notion in that there is no 
resemblance because the master and the servant are different.” NMañjGBh 138,13-
17 explains the parallel as an illustration of the transfer of the word ‘king’ to the 
servant: upacāre hi ‘yo 'haṃ sa evāyam’, ‘rājā bhtyaḥ’ ity upacārād lokasya rājā-
dau pravttiḥ pratyayabhedenopalabhyata iti tad iha bhākta(ḥ) “vttirūpasya 
bhinnatvād rājñi bhtyopacāravad” iti: “For in the case of transfer like “he is what I 
am: the servant is king,” it is observed that people's usage with regard to the king, 
and so on, is accompanied by difference of notion.” 
 
[26] upacaryate ca <jātiśabdas tadvati>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197b: 
upacaryate cetyādi. 
 
75 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 197b7-198a1: tad evaṃ tadvaty upacāravacanāj jātau mukhya 
ity uktam bhavati. tad etena yau mukhyopacaritaśabdābhidheyau, na tayoḥ 
sārūpyaṃ: tadyathā rājabhtyayoḥ: “Thus, on account of the statement about 
transfer to the general property possessor it is [eo ipso] stated that [the general term] 




similarity of the two denotable objects of a word that applies directly and in a 
transferred sense, like for instance [the lack of similarity] of a king and his servant.” 
 
[27] krameṇānabhidhānāc ca kundaśaṅkhādiśuklavat. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
199a2-3: krameṇānabhidhānāc ceti … kundaśaṅkhādiśuklavad iti(1).  
(1)em. : °khyā° Ms  
 
76 Jinendrabuddhi introduces this paragraph by clarifying the concept of 
similarity, cf. PSṬ Ms B 198b6-199a2: sārūpyam indriyapratyayasaṅkrāntyā vā 
paricchidyeta śābdapratyayasaṅkrāntyā vā. tatrendriyapratyayasaṅkrāntyā 
jātitadvatoḥ sārūpyaṃ nāvāsīyata iti pratipāditaṃ prāyam etat sāmānyasyādar-
śanaṃ pratipādayat “sāmānyaṃ yady api syāt tu tatrānyat tasya darśanam āśra-
yādarśanān na syād” (PS II:16abc) ityādinā. na hy adśyena saha kasyacit 
sārūpyaṃ śakyate pratyetum. śābdapratyayasaṅkrāntyāpi nāvasīyata iti darśayann 
āha: “Similarity may either be defined through transfer of sense cognition or 
through transfer of verbal cognition. Now, it has already been shown in outline by 
PS II:16abc(1), showing that the general property cannot be observed, that the 
similarity of the general property and the general property possessor is not to be 
determined through transfer of sense cognition. For it is impossible to cognize the 
similarity of something with something that is not observable. Showing that it is not 
ascertained by transfer of verbal cognition either, he formulates (PS V:5a).”  
(1)For a translation of PSV II:16, cf. no. 500 on PSV V:38d. 
 
77 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 199a2-3: jātitadvatoḥ krameṇa 
śabdaprayogasyābhāvād ity arthaḥ. yadi jātau tadvati ca krameṇa śabdaprayogaḥ 
syāt, tato yādśaḥ śabdāj(1) jātau pratyayo bhavati tādśa eva tadvatīti syāt 
pratyayasaṅkrāntiḥ. na ca krameṇa śabdaprayogaḥ, kiṃ tarhi sakd eva. tataś caika 
eva pratyaya iti. kutaḥ pratyayasaṅkrāntir iti: “The meaning is this: Because there is 
no application of the word to the general property and the general property possessor 
in succession. If the word were to be applied successively to the general property 
and the general property possessor, the notion about the general property that is due 
to the word would be exactly like the notion about the general property possessor. 
Thus there would be transfer of notion. Yet, the word is not applied in succession, 
but rather, it is applied simultaneously. And therefore there is only one notion. So 
how could there be transfer of notion?.” Uddyotakara and Mallavādi appear to quote 
Dignāga's argument from another source, probably the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, cf. 
NV 324,17 = NCV 625,10: kramavttyabhavāt: “because [the general term] does not 
apply in succession.” Although Mallavādi applies the argument to Dignāga's own 
theory, the subsequent explanation loc. cit. no doubt imitates the original Dignāgan 
formulation: na hi krameṇa sakd uccaritaḥ śabdaḥ … tadvati vartate. Uddyotakara, 
however, does not explain the argument.  
(1)°āj em. : °ā Ms 
 
78 For the semantics of the topicalisation particle ni VK, cf. no. 10 above. 
 
79 Cf. rim gyis brjod par mthoṅ ste V : rim pa yin par brjod pa de mthoṅ ste K. 
 
80 Cf. kun da daṅ ku mu ta daṅ duṅ dkar po K : me tog kun da daṅ me tog ku mu 





(1)The use of the morpheme gi after duṅ would indicate the presence of the sixth 
triplet after each of the terms (in the manner of expressions like 'paṭasya śuklaḥ'); it 
is not corroborated, however, by K and the parallel at Ms B 235b6-7: yathā 
śuklatvaviśeṣaṇasyābhinnatvāt kumudādayo 'bhinnākāreṇa pratyayena pratīyante: 
“śuklaṃ kumudaṃ kundaṃ śaṅkham” iti, which is adopted here. 
 
[28] sakc ca jātitadvatoḥ śabda<prayoga iti>(1) nāsti pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ 
sārūpyam. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 199a4,6: sakc ca jātitadvatoḥ 
sabda<prayoga>(1) iti … nāsti pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ sārūpyam.  
(1)°<prayoga iti> conj., cf. sbyor ba'i phyir K : om. VT; cf. the use of 
śabdaprayoga at Ms B 199a2-3, q.v. above. 
 
81 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 199a6: pratyayasaṅkrāntito yad avasīyate, nisargasiddhaṃ 
sārūpyaṃ tan nāstīty arthaḥ.  
 
[29] guṇopakārāt tādrūpye prakarṣaḥ syād vinā dhiyā. Restored, cf. Ms 199a7-
199b1: guṇopakārāt tādrūpye prakarṣaḥ syād iti … vinādhiyeti; qu. ŚVṬ 66,3 with 
w.r. °opakārato dravye. 
 82 Jinendrabuddhi introduces the argument at Ms B 199a6-7as follows: mā bhūt 
svataḥ sārūpyaṃ, jātyuparāgāt tu tad dravyaṃ svayam atadrūpyam api tathā 
prakāśate. yathā sphaṭika upadhānāvaśāt svayam atadrūpo 'pi tadrūpatayā: “Let 
there not be similarity per se. However, because of the influence of the general 
property a substance appears in this way, even though it is not identical with the 
general property per se, in the same way as a clear crystal by dint of a proximate 
substrate appears as if it were similar to it, even though it is not similar to it;” cf. 
NCV 625,12-14: syān matam: guṇopakārād iti. tan nāpi guṇopakārāt sphaṭikavad 
viśeṣaṇaprakarṣam aghītvā viśeṣye pratyayaprasaṅgāt: “Suppose the idea is that it 
is due to influence of the property. However, it is not due to influence of the 
property in the same way as a crystal because the [absurd] consequence is that there 
would be a notion of the qualified without having perceived the degree of the 
qualifier.” Uddyotakara relates briefly the argument at NV 324,17: guṇoparāgāt. 
yathā nīlaḥ sphaṭika iti.  
 
83 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 199b1: prakarṣa iti viṣayeṇa viṣayiṇyāḥ prakarṣabuddher 
nirdeśaḥ. prakarṣabuddhiḥ syād ity arthaḥ. kasmāt punar ayaṃ doṣa upanyasyati? 
yāvad dṣṭaiva dravye prakarṣabuddhiḥ. 
 
84 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 199b1-2: guṇaprakarṣabuddhyā vinety arthaḥ.  
 
[30] yadi sphaṭikavad guṇoparāgāt tadvān guṇasvarūpo bhaved, evaṃ sati dravye 
<guṇa>prakarṣabuddhyanapekṣā(1) prakarṣabuddhiḥ syāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
199b2: yadi sphaṭikavad guṇoparāgāt tadvān guṇasvarūpo bhaved, evaṃ sati 
līlataraḥ paṭa iti dravye viśeṣaṇaprakarṣabuddhyanapekṣā prakarṣabuddhiḥ syāt.  
(1)Cf. yon tan 'phel ba'i blo K. 
 
85 The argument that the perception of prakarṣa presupposes perception of 
prakarṣa of the quality is remarkable in that prakarṣa, at least in the grammatical 




to Dignāga, is said to rely on other properties that inhere in the substance, such as 
luminousity (bhāsvaratva), whereas prakarṣa is not supposed to be a property of the 
general property as such; cf. VPV I 122,5ff with Paddhati ad loc.; Iyer 1969: 271f; 
Helarāja on VP III.3:3ff. However, as Jinendrabuddhi explains at Ms B 199b2-4, in 
this context the term guṇa denotes the quality as merged with the substrate 
(saṃsargiguṇa)(1), but not the quality as such, e.g., whiteness; cf. no. 87 below. 
Jinendrabuddhi's discourse on the use of the term prakarṣa at Ms B 199b7-200a4 
addresses the apparent ambiguity of its use in the context of Dignāga's argument. 
For, as the fictitious opponent observes, general properties do not possess prakarṣa: 
prakarṣagrahaṇaṃ guṇāpekṣapratyayasamarthanārtham anyathāvasīyamānāpi jātir 
jātimato 'rthasyopakāriṇī(2) vartate. tatas tadupakārāt tathā bhāsata iti kaścit 
pratyavatiṣṭheta. prakarṣas tu niyogatas tadavasāyāpekṣapratyayaparicchedya eva, 
dravyasya svataḥ prakarṣābhāvāt. na hi dravyaṃ svato dravyāntaram atiśayitum 
alaṃ svarūpamātreṇa vaktuṃ boddhuṃ vāśakyatvāt. nanu ca jāteḥ prakarṣābhāvāt 
tadanapekṣaviśeṣyapratyayaḥ. naiṣa doṣaḥ. viśeṣyapratyayo nīlādau viśeṣaṇāpek-
ṣaḥ. tat sadādiviśeṣaṇāpekṣo(3) viśeṣye sadityādipratyayo nīlādipratyayavad ity uk-
tam bhavati. anyathā yady aghītāpi svāśraye gotvādikā jātir gavādipratyayaṃ 
kuryeta. yadā kim apy etad dravyam iti dravyamātropalabdhau gotvādayo na gh-
yante tadāpi gavādiniścayaḥ syān, na ca bhavati. tasmān na jātinirapekṣas tadvati 
pratyayaḥ.  
(1)For the term saṃsargin, cf. no. 90 below. 
(2)em. : °kāri Ms 
(3)em. : °au Ms 
 
86 Cf. NCV 625,13-15: yathā sphaṭike raktatvādipratyaya upadhānaprakarṣam 
aghītvā bhavati tathā viśeṣaṇaprakarṣam aghītvā viśeṣye pratyayaḥ syāt. na tu 
syāt: “Just as the cognition of redness in the crystal exists without having 
apprehended the degree (of redness) of the proximate substrate, there would be a 
notion of the qualified without having perceived the degree of the qualifier. This, 
however, would not happen.”  
PSṬ Ms B 199b2-4: na ca viśeṣaṇaprakarṣe ghīte viśeṣye prakarṣabuddhir 
bhavati, dravyasya svataḥ prakarṣāpakarṣābhāvāt. na hi svata eva paṭaḥ paṭāntarāt 
kṣyate, api tu nīlatvāder āśritād guṇāt, nirupadhānasya vasturūpasya jñānāsam-
bhavāt. guṇaśrutiś ceha saṃsargiguṇābhidhāyinī, na tu śuklatvādayas tayā guṇā 
vivakṣitāḥ: “And there is no cognition of degree with respect to the qualified, when 
the degree of the qualifier has not been apprehended because increase and decrease 
[of the property] of a substance does not exist per se. For one piece of cloth is not 
per se set off from another piece of cloth, but rather because of the property that is 
resident in it viz. blueness, for it is impossible to get to know the form of a referent 
that is without an property. And in this case the word ‘property’ denotes the property 
as merged [with the substance], whereas [the general property] whiteness, and so on, 
are not intended to be denoted by it [viz. the term 'property'] as properties.”  
 
[31] na hi sphaṭike upadhāna<buddhy>apekṣā pravartate raktabuddhiḥ, 
avyutpannasya bhedabuddhy<-abhāvāt>. Restored, cf. Ms 199b5-6: na hītyādi. 
upadhānena hi tadrūpatām āpādite sphaṭike nopāśrayādhigamāpekṣā pravartate 
raktabuddhiḥ. kasmād ity āha: avyutpannasyetyādi. na hy avyutpannasya sphaṭiko-






87 The example of a crystal(1) reflecting the colour of a proximate substrate is 
also mentioned by Bharthari in a similar context at VP III.3:40, describing the 
apparent tādrūpya of a crystal with variously coloured proximate substrates: 
sphaṭikādi yathā dravyaṃ bhinnarūpair upāśrayaiḥ, svaśaktiyogāt sambandhaṃ 
tādrūpyeṇeva(2) gacchati: “Just as a substance like a crystal comes into connection 
as if by way of similarity, with variously coloured proximate subtrates due to the 
fitness of its own powers;” cf. the similar use of iva at VPV I 147,3-4 relating 
various views about the relation between śabda and dhvani: śabdena saṃsṣṭo 
dhvanir upāśrayānurāga iva sphaṭikādīnām avibhakta upalabhyate; in his comment 
Vṣabhadeva substitutes upadhāna for upāśraya, cf. Paddhati 147,11-13: 
yathopadhānoparakto raktasphaṭiko na tato vivekenāvadhārayituṃ śakyaḥ tathā 
sphoṭena saṃsṣṭo dhvanir na vivekenāvadhāryata ity apare.  
One cannot exclude the possibility that Dignāga in rejecting this view has 
Bhathari's position in mind. 
(1)For the simile of the crystal, cf. Houben 1995: 261-62 (with references).  
(2)On the reading of this verse, cf. Houben 1995: 257 no. 406. 
 
88 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 199b6-7: na hy avyutpannasya sphaṭikopadhānayor 
bhedabuddhir bhavati. sa hi sphaṭika evāyam etadākāra iti vyavasyati. 
vyutpannasya tu rakto 'yam sphaṭika iti niścayānupapattir eva: “For someone who 
has not been taught [about it] has no idea of the difference between the crystal and 
the proximate substrate. For he will ascertain: ‘It is the crystal alone that has such 
and such an appearance’. But for someone who has been taught [about it] there is no 
justification for the ascertainment: ‘This crystal is read’.”  
A similar argument is mentioned by Kumārila at ŚV Pratyakṣa° 143: 
sphaṭikādau tu lākṣādisvarūpā yā matir bhavet, avyutpannasya sā mithyā vyutpan-
nānāṃ hi bhedadhīḥ. 
 
[32] saṃsargirūpāt sarvatra mithyājñānaṃ prasajyate. Qu. Ms B 200a5. 
 
89 Dignāga is using the term saṃsargin to denote a property (guṇa) as merged 
with its substrate, cf. its use by Bharthari, e.g., at VPV I 123,3, and VP III.5:1, with 
Helarāja's explanation VPP Vol. I 192,5: saṃsargi ādhāreṇa saṃsṣṭaṃ rūpa-
sambhedena vartamānam, na sambandhamātram; Iyer 1969: 270. According to 
Jinendrabuddhi saṃsargin = viśeṣaṇa or guṇa, cf. PSṬ Ms B 200a6: saṃsargi 
viśeṣaṇaṃ guṇa ity eko 'rthaḥ.  
 
90 That is, if one assumes that similarity is due to influence of the property on the 
substance, cf. PSṬ Ms B 200a5f: guṇopakārāt tādrūpyābhyupagame.  
 
[33] sarvo hi śābdaḥ pratyayo 'rthe(1) saṃsargirūpavyavahitas, tataḥ 
<sphaṭikavad> ayathārthaḥ syāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 200a6-7: sarvo hītyādi … 
sarvo hi śābdaḥ pratyayo 'rtheṣu(2) saṃsargirūpavyavahitaḥ. tato … yathā nīlaḥ 
sphaṭika iti ghṇato 'yathārthaḥ pratyayaḥ … tathā … ayathārthaḥ syāt.  
(1)Cf. don la K : don daṅ V. 
(2)em. : pratyayārth° Ms 
 
91 The cognition is separated from its referent (arthe vyavahitaḥ) insofar as the 





92 Uddyotakara and Mallavādi apparently use the same source, presumably the 
Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, for their exposition of the pūrvapakṣa, cf. NV 324,18: 
ayathārthajñānotpattiprasaṅgāc ca: “And because it follows (absurdly) that false 
knowledge would arise; NCV 625,14ff ayathārthajñānotpatteḥ, yathā sphaṭike 
raktatvādipratyaya mithyāpratyayas tathā viśeṣaṇasarūpapratyayo viśeṣye syāt: 
“Because false knowledge originates. Just as the notion of redness, and so on, in the 
crystal is a false notion, the notion about the qualified that is similar to the qualifier 
will be [a false notion] about the qualified.” Jinendrabuddhi explains the argument at 
Ms B 200a6-200b1: yadi guṇopakārād guṇini tādrūpyaṃ syāt, evaṃ sati yathā nīlaḥ 
sphaṭika iti ghṇato 'yathārthaḥ pratyayaḥ, sphaṭikasya svato 'nīlatvāt, tathā sarva 
eva ghaṭaḥ paṭa ityādiḥ(1) śābdaḥ pratyayo 'yathārthaḥ syāt, dravyasya svato 
ghaṭādirūpābhāvāt; na ceṣyate: “If there be similarity in the qualified because of the 
influence of the property, this being the case, just as the notion of the one who 
apprehends that ‘the crystal is blue’ is false because the crystal is not blue per se, 
every verbal notion like ‘pot’ and ‘cloth’ will be false because the substance does 
not per se have the form of a pot, and so on, nor is it claimed [to be the case].”  
(1)em. : °ādiśāb°. 
 
[34] sāmānyādibahutve ca yugapad grāhakeṣu ca, upakāro virudhyeta. Restored, 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 200b1-2: sāmānyādibahutve cetyādi … yugapad grāhakeṣu ceti … 
tadopakāro virudhyeta guṇaktaḥ. 
 
93 According to Jinendrabuddhi ādi implies quality (guṇa), and action (kriyā), cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 200b2: ādigrahaṇād(1) guṇakriyāgrahaṇam. 
(1) ādi° em. : ā° Ms 
 
94 Dignāga uses the term grāhaka with the same value as grahīt = pratipatt, for 
which, cf. VP I:53c with VPV ad loc. 
 
95 For this argument, cf. NV 325,17-18: yugapadasambhavāc ca, and NCV 
625,16: yugapadasambhavāc ca. Once again Uddyotakara and Mallavādi seem to 
quote from the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa. 
 
96 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 200b2: yadaikakālaṃ bahavaḥ pratipattāro bhinnair viśeṣaṇair 
ekam arthaṃ pratipadyante tadopakāro virudhyeta guṇaktaḥ: “When many 
listeners at the same time understand the same referent by means of different 
qualifiers, the influence [on the general property possessor] that is effectuated by the 
properties will be in conflict.” Cf. Dharmakīrti’s related criticism at PV I:54-55 and 
PVSV p.30 ad loc.  
 
[35] yadā ca bahavo grahītāro bhavanti guṇavataḥ śuklādeḥ tadyathā ghaṭaḥ, 
pārthivo, dravyaṃ, sañ, chuklo, madhuraḥ, surabhir ityevamādiviśeṣaiḥ, tadā guṇo-
pakāro virudhyate. na hi śakyaṃ tadā dravyena ekaguṇarūpeṇa sthātum aviśeṣāt(1). 
nāpy ekadeśena guṇarūpam anubhāvituṃ śakyam, ktsnasya ghaṭādirūpapratīteḥ. 
Restored, cf. NCV 625,16-19: yadā ca bahavo grahītāro bhavanti guṇavataḥ 
śuklādeḥ tadyathā ghaṭaḥ, pārthivo, dravyaṃ, sañ, chuklo, madhuraḥ, surabhir 
ityevamādiviśeṣaiḥ, tadā guṇopakāro virudhyate. na hi śakyaṃ tadā dravyena 





anubhāvituṃ śakyam, ktsnasya ghaṭādirūpapratīteḥ; Ms B 200b3-5: tadyatheti … 
na hi śakyam ityādi. … aviśeṣāt … nāpy ekadeśena guṇarūpam anubhāvituṃ 
śakyam … ktsnasyetyādi.  
(1)Cf. khyad par med pa'i phyir ro V 110,28 : khyad par med pa'i phyir K 
111,28. 
 
97 Since any given referent has a multitude of properties, it would require a 
multitude of speakers to convey them at the same time and therefore, by implication, 
a multitude of listeners for decoding what the speakers say. This is inconsistent with 
the way in which verbal knowledge is conveyed; cf. NCV 633,11ff where Siṃhasūri 
explains Dignāga's argument with reference to the speaker (vakt) as opposed to the 
grahīt decoding what the speaker says: ekasminn arthe ghaṭādau 
ghaṭatvapthivītvadravyatvasattvādibhinneṣu vaktṣu kaścid ghaṭa iti brūte kaścit 
pthivītyādi yāvat san iti. tatra ghaṭābhidhāne so 'rtho ghaṭarūpeṇa ktsno 
vābhidhīyate ekadeśena vā? na tāvat ktsnaḥ, tasminn eva kāle vaktrantarasya 
pārthivatvenābhidhānāsambhavaprasaṅgāt: “When someone among the speakers 
that are divided between potness, earthness, substanceness, existence, and so on, 
says ‘pot’, about the same referent viz a pot, and so on, and some says ‘earth’, and 
so on, up to ‘existent’, in that case, is this referent denoted in toto in the form of 
‘pot’ or is it denoted partially? In the first place it is not denoted in toto because the 
[absurd] consequense is that it would be impossible for another speaker at the same 
time to denote is as ‘earthen’;” cf. NCV 634,5-6: yathā paraṃ prati tvadudāhta-
ghaṭapārthivatvoktau “yadi ghaṭatvena samastaṃ vastu viśiṣṭaṃ tataḥ pārthivatvas-
yāvakāśābhāvān na yujyate” iti iṣṭo doṣaḥ: “Like the mistake you have pointed out, 
in opposition to the opponent, in your statement about potness and earthenness 
which you have quoted as examples, namely that if the entity as a whole is qualified 
by means of potness it is not justified because there is no room for earthenness.” 
 
98 There are three ways (trayī gatiḥ) in which one might cognize a thing as 
Jinendrabuddhi explains: 1. cognition of the form of any property among the many 
that define an entity; 2. cognition of the form of all (its qualities) partially, i.e., one 
by one; 3. cognition of the form of all qualities in toto, cf. PSṬ Ms B 200b3-4: atra 
trayī gatiḥ. anyatarasyaiva vā guṇasya rūpaṃ pratipadyeta, sarveṣām api vā 
ekadeśaḥ, sarvātmanā vā sarveṣām eveti.  
 
99 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 200b4-5: tatra na tāvad ekaikasyaiva, aviśeṣāt. na hi 
sattādīnāṃ kaścid viśeṣo 'sti, yata ekasyaiva rūpaṃ pratipadyeta, nānyasya: “In the 
first place, there is no [cognition] of each single [property] because of absence of 
difference. For there is no difference whatever between the [general property] 
existence, and so on, so that the form of only one would be cognized, but not that of 
another.” 
 
100 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 200b5-6: yadi hy ekadeśena viśeṣaṇarūpaṃ pratipadyeta, 
tadaikadeśo 'sya ghaṭa iti pratīyeta, tathā pārthivo dravyam ityādi: “For if one were 
to cognize the form of the qualifiers partially, one would cognize one part of its as 
‘pot’, similarly one part as ‘earthen’, ‘substance’, and so on.” 
 
101 V 110,29 adds lan cig tu (= yugapat) : om. K. The reading of V is doubtful as 





[36] sarvair vā mecakekṣaṇam. Qu. Ms B 200b6. 
 
102 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 200b6-201a1: sarvair ghaṭatvapārthivatvādibhir viśeṣaṇaiḥ 
samastasya vastuno yugapad upakāre tadrūpāpattau ghaṭādirūpasya vibhāgena 
grahaṇābhāvād avibhāgenānyonyam abhinnānekarūpagrahaṇaṃ syāt, na 
vibhāgena ghaṭo 'yaṃ pārthivo vetyādikaṃ: “If such qualifiers as potness and 
earthenness, and so on, at the same time were to exert their influence on the entity as 
a whole, then, in that it assumes [all] their forms because there is no apprehension of 
it by way of distinction between the form of ‘pot’, and so on, there will be an 
undifferentiated apprehension of their various forms because they are not mutually 
differentiated due to lack of distinction [between them], but there would not be [an 
apprehension of it] by means of distinction [into] ‘this is a pot’, or ‘this is earthen,’ 
etc.” 
 
[37] atha punaḥ sarvair ghaṭatvādibhir upakāro yugapat ktsnasya kriyate, tataḥ 
pratyekaṃ ghaṭādirūpagrahaṇābhāvād mecakadarśanaṃ yugapat sarvarūpāpatteḥ 
syāt. Restored, cf. NCV 625,19-20: atha punaḥ sarvair ghaṭatvādibhir upakāro 
yugapat ktsnasya kriyate, tataḥ sarveṣaṃ pratyekaṃ grahītṇāṃ ghaṭādirūpagra-
haṇābhāvāt sarvaguṇasaṅkareṇa mecakadarśanaṃ yugapat sarvarūpāpatteḥ syāt; 
Ms 201a1: yugapat sarvarūpāpatter(1) iti.  
(1)Cf. dṅos po thams cad cig car du thob pa yin no V : ṅo bo thams cad gcig par 
mthoṅ ba'i phyir K. 
 
103 Cf. the use of mecakavarṇa at TSP 350,22-23 (ad TS 887 = VP II:126): yad 
vā tapaḥśrutādīnām mecakavarṇavad aikyena bhāsanād eṣām eva parasparam 
asatyaḥ saṃsargaḥ. tathā hi ete pratyekaṃ samuditā vā na svena rūpeṇopalabhyate, 
kiṃ tu alātacakravad eṣāṃ samūhaḥ svarūpam utkrāmyāvabhāsata iti. VP loc. cit 
and the exposition at TSP are related to the discussion at Mahā-bh I 411,15ff. 
Amarakośa I.4:14 defines mecaka as black: kṣṇe nīlāsitaśyāmakālaśyāmala-
mecakāḥ. Ct. ad loc. explains mecaka as miśrībhavati, being mixed together, 
variegated. 
 
104 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a1-2: yatas tad dravyaṃ sarveṣāṃ rūpaṃ yugapad 
āpadyate. tad evam upakāravirodhād ghaṭādirūpeṇa grahaṇaṃ na syāt. asti ca tat: 
“Because the substance at the same time assumes the form of all [of its general 
properties]. Thus there would be no apprehension in the form of 'pot', etc. because 
the influence [of the general properties] is in conflict [with linguistic experience]. 
And yet this [apprehension] exists.” 
 
105 For this paragraph, cf. the quotation at NCV 625,19-20 (cf. no. [37] above): 
“If, on the other hand, all [of the general properties] such as potness, and so on, 
simultaneously assist the [substance as a] whole, there would be a confused 
perception due to the mixing together of all the properties in it because [the 
substance] simultaneously assumes the form of all [of the general properties] and 







[38] bhedeṣu jātau tadyoge tulyo doṣaś ca teṣv api. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
201a2-3: bhedeṣv ityādinā; Ms B 202b5-6: bhedeṣu jātau tadyoge tulyo doṣaś ca 
teṣv apītyādinā prāg eva nirāktam.  
 
106 According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga extends the problems of the theory of 
the general property possessor to the other theses mentioned in the first half of the 
verse, formulating the corresponding reasons in the second half, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
201a2-3: bhedeṣv ityādinā tadvatpakṣoditaṃ doṣaṃ pakṣāntareṣv atidiśati. uttarār-
dhena tv atraivopapattim āha.  
 
107 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 201a3: jātirūpam bhedeṣu na(1) 
yujyate, śabdasvarūpaṃ(2) jātau, śabdasvarūpayuktajātirūpaṃ sambandhe: “The 
form of the general property is not justified with regard to the particulars, the own 
form of the word is not justified with regard to the general property, and the form of 
the general property as connected with the own form of the word is not justified with 
respect to the relation.”  
(1)eṣu na yuj° em. : °eṣv ayam ayuj° Ms  
(2)°svarūp° em. : °rūp° Ms 
 
108 Cf. tha dad pa'i(1) ṅo bos K : tha dad pa'i ṅo bo la V.  
(1)tha da pa'i em. : tha da pa'i raṅ gi K. 
 
[39] avaśyam. Qu. Ms B 201a4. 
 
109 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a4: sambandhirūpaviviktasyārthātmano vācā viṣayīkartum 
aśakyatvād avaśyam ity āha: “Since it is impossible for an expression to take as its 
referent the nature of a thing as dissociated from the form of its relatum, he says 
‘necessarily.’” 
 
[40] <jātau> mukhyaḥ,(1) bhedeṣūpacarita iti(2). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a5: 
dravyatvādiṣu mukhyo bhedeṣūpacarita iti.  
(1)Cf. rigs la gtso bo K : dṅos kyi (sic) rigs dag la V. 
(2)Cf. źes V : phyir K. 
 
110 That is, general properties like substanceness, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a5: 
dravyatvādiṣu. 
 
111 For Jinendrabuddhi's remarks on what distinguishes the bhedapakṣa from the 
tadvatpakṣa, cf. no. 113 below. 
 
112 These problems comprise 1. direct and transferred application, 2. no 
denotation in succession, and 3. incompatibilty of the influence of the general 
properties [with verbal distinctions], cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a4-6: kas tarhi tadvatpakṣād 
bhedapakṣasya viśeṣaḥ? tadvatpakṣe sajjātirūpeṇa sacchabdo 'bhidhāyakaḥ, bheda-
pakṣe tu dravyādirūpeṇa. evaṃ hi bhedarūpeṇābhihitā bhavantīty eṣa viśeṣaḥ. 
tatrāpi dravyatvādiṣu mukhyo bhedeṣūpacarita iti pūrvavad eva doṣā vācyāḥ: 
mukhyopacaritavttitvam, krameṇānabhidhānam, guṇopakāravirodhaś ca: “Then 
what is the difference of the thesis about the particulars [being the denotable objects] 




On the thesis about the general property possessors [being the denotable objects] the 
word ‘existent’ denotes in the form of the general property existence, but on the 
thesis about the particulars [being the denotable objects] it denotes in the form of 
substances, etc. For in this way they are denoted in the form of particulars. Such is 
the difference. And also in that case the problems are to be stated exactly as before, 
on the grounds that (iti) it denotes substanceness, and so on, directly and is 
transferred to the particulars, namely, direct and transferred application, no 
denotation in succession, and incompatibility with the influence of the general 
properties.”  
 
113 Cf. de daṅ ldan pa la brjod pa bźin du skyon thams cad brjod par bya 'o (1) V 
: de daṅ ldan pa bźin du thams cad la ñes pa brjod par bya 'o K.  
(1)Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a5: pūrvavad doṣā vācyāḥ.  
 
[41] sambhavataḥ(1). Qu. Ms B 201a6.  
(1)Cf. srid pas V : srid pa yin no (sic) K. 
 
114 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of Dignāga's use of the word 'possibility' at 
Ms B 201a6: jātyabhidhāne “prakarṣaḥ syād vinā dhiyā” (PS V 5d) ity 
asyāsaṃbhavāt, sambandhābhidhāne 'py, ata eva sambhavagrahaṇam: “Since it is 
impossible that ‘there would be [perception of] degree of intensity [of the general 
property possessor] without perception (prakarṣaḥ syād vinā dhiyā) (of the degree 
of intensity of the property)’ (PS V:5d) if the general property as well as the relation 
are denoted, precicely therefore he uses [the word] 'possibility.'” After this 
explanation he continues addressing qestions regarding the problems of the 
denotation of the relation, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a7-201b3: nanu ca pūrvaṃ 
sambandhasyānabhidheyataivoktā(1). tat katham idānīṃ sadrūpeṇābhidhānam 
āśrīyate? kathaṃ cātrābhedopacāraḥ sambandhasyāṅgīkriyate? pūrvaṃ hy asattva-
bhūtatvād ākhyātārthasya śabdābhedopacārānupapatter anabhidhānam uktam. 
sambandho 'py asattvabhūta(2) eva. tat kutas tasyābhedopacāraḥ? sattayā sacchab-
dena vā? asati cābhedopacāre kutaḥ pūrvoktadoṣaprasaṃgaḥ? atha sattābhedopa-
cāreṇa sa ucyate, kathaṃ sadyogaśabdayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyānupapattiḥ? naiṣa 
doṣaḥ, abhyupetya sambandhābhidhānam asya doṣasyābhidhānāt. yady api 
sambandho 'bhidhīyate, tathāpi tadvatpakṣadoṣānatipattir jātimattulyakakṣatvād(3) 
iti pradarśanārtham idam uktam.  
(1)em. : °dhasyābhi° Ms  
(2)em. : 'pi vā satva° Ms  
(3)em. : °tūlya° Ms 
 
115 For Sanskrit iti, cf. źes srid pas(1) V : phyir srid pa yin no (sic) K.  
(1)Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a6: ity asambhavāt, q.v. above no. 114. 
 
116 Cf. rigs brjod pa'i (phyir) K : rdzas su brjod pa V. 
 
117 Cf. rigs kyaṅ mṅon par brjod par bya ba la K : brjod par bya ba'i rigs dag la 
V. For the assumption that the own form (svarūpa) of the word is superimposed 






[42] tadvāṃs ca(1) bheda eveṣṭaḥ sa ca pūrvaṃ nirāktaḥ. Qu. ŚVṬ 62,11; NR 
425,8; Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b3: tadvāṃś cetyādinā pakṣāntaratvam evāsya nirākaroti.  
(1)ca ŚVṬ Ms : tu NR. 
 
118 Cf. rigs kyi sgra ru 'o(1) V : om. K. 
(1)Although V is syntactically akward, I assume that this phrase translates 
Sanskrit jātiśabde, which makes sense in the present context. 
 
119 Cf. sṅar spaṅs pa yin no K : bsal źes pa ni sṅar V (this translation is akward).  
 
120 Unlike the previous translation of 2a K is not syntactically confused this time. 
V repeats the syntactically impossible first translation adding par (DC om. in 
accordance with the previous translation) after med. The qu. of 2a involves the 
reasons given at 2b viz. ānantyād vyabhicārataḥ as indicated by ŚVṬ 62,8f on ŚV 
Apoha° 128, introducing Dignāga's argument as follows: yat punar etasminn eva 
pakṣe bhikṣuṇoktam: jātiviśiṣṭeṣu abhidhīyamāneṣu svalakṣaṇāny evābhidheyāni 
prāpnuvanti, teṣāṃ ānantyavyabhicārābhyām avācyatvam uktam iti: “With regard 
to this thesis the monk has explained: 'When they are denoted as qualified by the 
general property, it follows [absurdly] that only the individual entities are denotable, 
and they are explained not to be denotable because they are infinite and because of 
ambiguity'.” 
 
121 Cf. de yaṅ(1) rigs daṅ ldan pa la yaṅ brjod pa yin no V : de yaṅ rigs daṅ ldan 
pa yin no K.  
(1)yaṅ em., cf. K : daṅ V. 
 
[43] nanu coktam. Qu. Ms B 201b3. 
 
122 Cf. rigs kyi sgra K : om. V (PN so; D conj. rigs ni ). 
  
123 Cf. rigs daṅ ldan pa tsam brjod par byed pa K : rigs daṅ ldan pa tsam gyi(1) 
brjod par byed pa V.  
(1)gyi em. : gyis V. 
 
124 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b4-5: na hy atra bhedābhedarūpeṇābhidhīyante, kiṃ tarhi 
teṣāṃ jātimatāṃ yad aviśiṣṭaṃ rūpaṃ sattāsamāropitaṃ tad eva bhedarūpāsaṃ-
sparśenābhidhīyate. tathā ca bhedapakṣāt pakṣāntaram evedam iti manyate: “For in 
this case it is neither denotable in the form of various kinds of particulars,(1) but 
rather, it is only the undifferentiated form of the general property possessors as 
transposed to the general property existence that is being denoted without touching 
on the form of the particulars. And thus this is a different thesis from the thesis 
about the particulars. This is what is meant.” 
(1) I regard bhedābheda as an instance of a reduplicated cpd. from < bheda + 
bheda with rythmical lenghthening, denoting “various kinds of particulars.” Cf. 
AiGr II.1 p. 148; Nachträge zu II.1 p. 44. 
 





125 Dignāga is going to show that the opponent's theory does not differ in 
substance from the views that the denotation of the word is the general property or 
the relation of the general property: the mere general property possessor will either 
be the general property as such or its relation, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b5-6: yady evam 
ityādinā jātiyogapakṣayor asyāntarbhāvāt pakṣāntaratvaṃ pratiṣedhayati. kathaṃ 
punas tadvanmātraṃ sattā sambandho vā syād ity āha: tadvanmātraṃ tv ityādi: “By 
the words “if this is the case, and so on,” he denies that it is a different thesis since it 
is included in the theses of the general property and its relation. To the question “in 
what way then would the mere property possessor be [the general property] 
existence or its relation,” he answers “the mere property possessor, nevertheless, 
etc.” 
ŚVṬ 62,18-19: yac cātra bhikṣuṇā jātimattvamātraṃ vācyaṃ bhaviṣyatīty 
āśaṅkya vikalpitam: atha jātimattvaṃ, kiṃ jātitadvatos sambandhaḥ kiṃ vā sāmān-
yarūpam iti. evaṃ ca vikalpya pūrvoktajātisambandhābhidhānadoṣo yojanīyaḥ ity 
uktvoktam: “Moreover, the monk supposes that the denotable object will be the mere 
property of being a general property possessor and conjectures: “Suppose [the 
denotable object] is the property of being a property possessor, is it the relation of 
the general property and the general property possessor or the form of the general 
property [that is the denotable object]?” And having conjectured thus he objects as 
follows, thinking that the previously mentioned problem of the denotation of the 
general property and the relation is applicable to the case. 
 
[45] tadvanmātraṃ tu(1) sambandhaḥ sattā veti vicāritam. Qu. ŚVṬ 63,22; NR 
425,29; Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b5: tadvanmātraṃ tv ityādi.  
(1)°mātraṃ tu Ms : °mātre 'pi ŚVṬ NR, cf. de ldan tsam ni K : de ldan tsam yaṅ 
V : de daṅ ldan pa tsam ni T; V is ambiguous as yaṅ is used to translate not only 
Sanskrit api, but also ca and tu; cf. Obermiller, Indices s.vv. ni and yaṅ.  
 
126 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b6-7: mātraśabdena bhedanirākaraṇe sāmānyaṃ 
sarvānugataṃ rūpaṃ śabdārtha ity uktam bhavati. tac ca pravttinimittatvād bhāva-
pratyayenābhidheyam. na sattāṃ sambandham vā muktvānyad upalabhyate bhāva-
pratyayasya tatraiva vidhānāt: “The word ‘mere’ is for the sake of excluding the 
particulars, and it means that the referent of the word is the general property, which 
is the form that is continuously present in everything. And since this is the cause of 
application, it is is to be denoted by means of the bhāva affix. Apart from the 
general property existence or the relation [of the general property existence] no 
other [cause of application] is found because the bhāva affix is prescribed for 
denoting this only.” 
 
127 Cf. ni K : yaṅ V. 
 
128 Cf. de ldan ñid K : de daṅ ldan pa V; cf. ŚVṬ 63,9ff: matubantād ayam 
bhāvapratyayaḥ ktaḥ, sa ca sambandhavācy api smaryate: “This bhāva affix is 
introduced after a word ending in a matup affix, and it is also traditionally thought to 
denote the relation.” 
 
129 This clause is syntactically confused in KV: 'brel pa 'am yon tan la 'gyur K 
probably translates sambandhe guṇe vā bhavati; nam 'brel pa'i yon tan du 'gyur ro 





the context, must be interpreted in the same way. The term 'property' (guṇa) 
denotes any given general property (jāti, sāmānya). 
 130 Dignāga supports his analysis with a well-known grammatical quotation 
whose source Jinendrabuddhi omits identifying, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b7: etad āgamena 
darśayitum āha: samāsakttaddhiteṣv ityādi. sambandhābhidheyatāyāṃ āgamaḥ. 
The Sanskrit grammarian Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita claims that the quotation stems from 
Bharthari's Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā, cf. Vaiyakāraṇasiddhāntakārikā 49: kttaddhitasamā-
sebhyo matabhedanibandhanam, tvatalor arthakathanaṃ ṭīkāyāṃ Hariṇā ktam. 
Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa explains in Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra ad loc. that the mention of Hari 
and ṭīkā serves to rebutt the erroneous view current among Mīmāṃsakas and other 
scholars (= Naiyāyikas) that this definition of the function of tvatal is a vārttika and 
thus by implication to be attributed to Kātyāyana(1): kttaddhitasamāsebhyaḥ (sic) 
sambandhābhidhānaṃ bhāvapratyayenānyatra rūḍhyabhinnarūpāvyabhicaritasam-
bandhebhya iti vārtikavacam iti mīmāṃsakādīnāṃ bhramam apākurvann āha tīkā-
yām, Bharthariṇā Mahābhāṣyaṭīkāyāṃ ity arthaḥ. It is, of course, an open question 
if the attribution to Bharthari is trustworthy because the attribution of the quote to 
Bharthari is very late. On the other hand, the claim that the abstract affixes tva and 
tā denote the general property (jāti), when introduced after idiomatic expressions 
and words whose connection (to existence) is invariable, is only known from 
Bharthari's Vākyapadīya; cf. Jātisamuddeśa VP III 1:48: asvaśabdābhidhānās tu 
narasiṃhādijātayaḥ sarūpāvayavevānyā tāsu śrutir avasthitā; and VP III 14 39cd 
where Bharthari explains that in the case of terms like gaurakhara the jāti is not 
expressed prior to the formation of the compound (prāg vtter jātivācitvaṃ na 
gaurakharādiṣu). The view that the abstract affixes denote existence (sattā) is 
essential to Bharthari's metaphysics, cf., e.g., Jātisamuddesa 34: sā nityā sā mahān 
ātmā, tām āhus tvatalādayaḥ. 
The idea of the invariability of connection (avyabhicaritasambandha) of 
existence to things ultimately derive from Mahābhāṣya, cf. no. 133(1) below, but 
Bharthari has elaborated the idea with the background of his metaphysics of 
existence (sattā). 
(1)Cf., e.g., NVṬ 52,4: iti Kātyāyanīyavacanāt; Nyāyakaṇikā: 20,19: iti 
vārtikakāravacanāt.  
 
[46] samāsakttaddhiteṣu sambandhābhidhānaṃ anyatra rūḍhyabhinnarūpā-
vyabhicāritasambandhebhyaḥ. Qu., e.g., Nyāsa Vol. I: 610,28-29; Mahā-bh-P Vol. 
IV: 342,2-3; VPP Vol. I 194,15 (reading abhinnayoga for abhinnarūpa with Ms C; 
Helarāja, however, only addresses the meaning of the term abhinnarūpa op. cit. 
197,8; Bharthari mentions abhinnarūpatva in a similar grammatical context at VP 
III 837c); cf. PSṬ 38, on PSV I:3d: yathoktam: samāsakttaddhiteṣu sambandhābhi-
dhānam iti; Hayes 1988: 713f. 
 
131 Dignāga mentions at PSV I:3d the view that words like daṇḍin and viṣānin 
that terminate in taddhita affixes denote their referents as qualified by a connection 
(sambandhaviśiṣṭa). This view is characteristic of Bharthari's analysis of taddhita 






132 For a concise explanation of the grammatical implications of the statement, 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b7-202a3: rājapuruṣatvaṃ pācakatvam aupagavatvam iti teṣu 
samāsādiṣu svasvāmikriyākārakāpatyāpatyavatsambandhā ucyante yathākramam. 
tad atrāpi sacchabdasya kdantatvāt sambandhābhidhānaṃ syāt. anye tv asyaivā-
pavādam āhuḥ: anyatretyādi. eṣa guṇābhidhāyitāyām āgamaḥ. rūḍhāt samāsāt: 
gaurakharatvaṃ smaratvaṃ, taddhitāt: hastitvam. atra jātimātram ucyate, na 
sambandhaḥ. taddhitād abhinnarūpāt: śuklatvam. śuklaśabdasya matvarthīyān-
tasyāpi praktyā tulyarpatvāt. atrāpi guṇa evābhidhīyate. avyabhicaritasambandhāt 
kutaḥ sattvam. na tu sattāṃ padārtho vyabhicaratīti(1). atra saiva sattābhidhīyate na 
sambandhaḥ: “When [the bhāva affixes] are introduced after these viz. 
rājapuruṣatvaṃ pācakatvam aupagavatvam, then, beginning with the compound, a 
master servant relation, an agent action relation, and a descendant originator relation 
are denoted, respectively. In this context therefore also the word 'sat' would denote 
a relation because it ends in a kt affix. Others formulate an exception to this viz.: 
Apart from, etc. This is the received tradition about denoting a property: [apart from] 
when it is introduced after a conventional term, viz. a compound: gaurakharatvam, 
after a [conventional term] ending in a kt affix: smaratvam, and after a 
[conventional term] ending in a taddhita affix: hastitvam. In these [instances] (atra) 
the mere jāti is denoted, not the relation. When introduced after [a word] ending in a 
taddhita affix whose form is not distinct(2): śuklatvam because the word śukla has 
the same form although in its original state it ends in the (taddhita) affix denoting 
possession [i.e., matup]. In this case too, it is only the property that is denoted. 
[Apart from] when it is introduced after [a term] whose relation is invariable. Why is 
it existence? “Certainly, a thing does not deviate from existence. In this case it is 
only existence that is denoted.”  
Cf. PSṬ I 38,12-17 on PSV I:3d: kriyādravyābhyām tadvatāṃ yaḥ sambandhaḥ 
sa śabdapravttinimittam. tathā hi kārakatvaṃ(3) daṇḍitvam iti bhāvapratyayaḥ 
kriyākārakādisambandhe bhavati. yathoktam: samāsakttaddhiteṣu sambandhābhi-
dhānam iti. śabdapravttinimitte ca bhāvapratyayo bhavati. tathā cāhur: “yasya 
guṇasya hi bhāvād dravye śabdaniveśaḥ, tadabhidhāne tvatalāv”(vārtt 5 on A V 
1:119) iti. pācako daṇḍīti ca kttaddhitau. tasmād atra sambandhe bhāvapratyayaḥ.  
(1) For this statement, cf. Mahābhāṣya ad A II.3:1 vārtt 11, Vol. I 443,5-8; VP 
III.3:51.  
(2) For the grammatical implications of the term abhinnarūpa, cf., e.g., Helarāja 
on VP III.14:136c: vtter abhinnarūpatvāt; Kaiyaṭa's lucid remarks on Mahābhāṣya 
ad A V 2:94, vārtt 3: “guṇavacanebhyo matupo luk.” śuklādaya evābhinnarūpā 
guṇe tadvati ca dravye vartamānā ghyante; and on A V 2:94, vārtika 4: avyati-
rekād iti guṇaguṇinoḥ so 'yam ity abhisambandhād abhedādhyavasāyād utpattir eva 
matupo nāstīty arthaḥ.  
(3) The reading kārakatvaṃ is odd. One would expect pācakatvaṃ followed by 
daṇḍitvaṃ as examples of the rule that the abstract affixes tā and tvam denote the 
relation, when introduced after kt and taddhita derivatives like pācaka and daṇḍī, 
mentioned a few lines below. Cf. Padamañjarī Vol. IV 106,8 (ad A V 1:119): 
pācakatvam iti kriyākārakasambandhaḥ. 
 






[47] tadvān artho ghaṭādiś cen(1) na paṭādiṣu(2) vartate, sāmānyam arthaḥ sa 
katham? Qu. ŚVṬ 63,17-18; NR 426,8-9; Cf. PSṬ Ms B 202a3-4: tadvān 'rtho 
ghaṭādiś cetyādinā … sāmānyam arthaḥ sa katham iti.  
(1)cen na ŚVṬ 63,17-18; NR 426,8-9 : ca Ms  
(2)em. : ghaṭādiṣu NR, cf. snam bu sogs pa (sic) V : bum pa la sogs rnams la K. 
 134 NCV 733,19 quotes a couple of similar pādas that probably stem from the 
Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa: satvān artho ghaṭādir na paṭādiṣu na vartate: “Suppose the 
referent that is the possessor of the [general property] existence is a [single] pot, etc. 
That is not the case, for it [viz. the pot] does not reside in cloth, etc.”  
Dignāga addresses in this paragraph the assumption that the denotation of the 
word 'existent' is a single instantiation of existence such as a pot. As Dignāga points 
out this contradicts the assumption that the general property existence is present in 
every single of its instantiations. For if the instantiation is restricted to a single 
referent like a pot in which the general property is resident to the exclusion of other 
referents, the idea of the general property residing in each single instantiation 
becomes untenable, if the pot does not reside in other things like cloth.  
Jinendrabuddhi explains that tadvān artho ghaṭādiḥ, and so on, states the reason 
why a single possessor of the general property existence does not reside in the many 
instantiations of existence. sāmānyam arthaḥ sa katham is the prāmāṇaphala, i.e., 
the result of the proof: that which does not reside in aneka, cannot be a general 
property, like an individual entity (svalakṣaṇa), cf. PSṬ Ms B 202a3-4: tadvān 'rtho 
ghaṭādiś cetyādnānekatrāvttitvahetuḥ sūcitaḥ. sāmānyam arthaḥ sa katham iti 
pramāṇaphalam. yad anekatra na vartate, na tat sāmānyaṃ svalakṣaṇavat, tathā ca 
tadvān. vyāpakbhāvaḥ. 
Kumārila applies Dignāga's argument to a hypothetical exclusion possessor at 
ŚV Apoha° 131ab: na caikāpohavān artho vartate 'rthāntare kvacit; cf. also NCV 
635,10: yady api tadvad ghaṭādi paṭādiṣu na vartate.  
ŚVṬ on ŚV Apoha° 131 introduces Dignāga's argument in this way: yadā 
gotvaviśiṣṭaḥ śābaleyo gośabdasya vācyatvam aṅgīktaṃ tadāsau bāhuleye nāstīti 
tatra gośabdapravttir na syād iti: “When it is agreed that the object of denotation 
of the word ‘cow’ is the brindled cow as qualified by the general property cowhood, 
this [brindled cow] does not exist in the speckled cow. Consequently the word ‘cow’ 
would not refer to this.”  
K and V differ in their interpretation of the syntax of pādas 9c-10a. If we 
disregard the syntactical problems of V 112,21-23 the Tibetan reproduction of the 
verse runs: “If the property possessor viz. a [single] referent like a pot does not 
reside in cloth, and so on, how could this referent be the general property,” whereas 
K (quite apart from its many inaccuracies: such as interpreting tadvān as if it were 
the particle tadvat = de bźin) construes sāmānyam with vartate. On this 
interpretation the verse says: “If a [single] referent like a pot is the property 
possessor and the general property does not reside in cloth, and so on, how could 
this be the referent.” 
 
[48] anekavtti(1) hi sāmānyam. Qu. Ms B 202a4.  
(1)°ti em. : °tir Ms 
 
135 For the qualification of the general property as anekavtti, cf. the definition of 





[49] tac ca. Qu. Ms B 202a5. 
 
136 Cf. gal te K : gaṅ(1) V.  
(1)The reading gaṅ is presumably based upon a misreading of yadi as yad. 
 
[50] kathaṃ <teṣām sāmānyam iti yujyate>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202a5: 
katham iti. 
 
137 Cf. snam bu la sogs pa la jug pa yin nam (sic) V : bum pa la sogs pa rnams la 
'jug pa ma yin na K. 
 
138 Cf. the phrase at 10a: sāmānyam arthaḥ sa katham. 
 
[51] nanu ca(1). Qu. Ms B 202a.  
(1) Cf.'on te yaṅ K : spyi ste V (for which read ci ste).  
 
[52] kimartham(1). Qu. Ms B 202a6.  
(1)Cf. ci'i don du K : don spyi yin V (for which read don ci yin). 
 
139 The opponent objects to Dignāga's attributing the form of the general 
property to the general property possessor, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202a5-6: nanu cetyādinā 
siddhasādhyatām āha tadvataḥ sāmānyarūpatayāniṣṭatvāt. tad aniṣṭaṃ sāmānya-
rūpādhyāropeṇa sūcayann āha: kimartham ityādi. In the light of this explanation the 
reading de la ci'i don du spyi med par sgro 'dogs par byed źe na K must be 
corrected to read de la ci'i don du spyi ñid du sgro 'dogs par byed źe na, cf. de spyi 
ñid du sgro btags pa'i don ci(1) yin V.  
(1)So read, cf. no. [52]. 
 
140 Cf. de daṅ ldan par brjod pa ma yin te K : de la 'jug pas ni brjod par mi 
bya'o V. 
 
141 Jinendrabuddhi points out that Dignāga presupposes that the opponent 
assumes that the word 'existent' denotes a real general property, when he talks about 
the feasibility of the connection and lack of ambiguity. In addition he assumes that 
(a general term) is co-referential with particular terms, which presupposes a relation 
between general and particular properties, which would be impossible if general 
properties did not exist, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202a6-202b1: evam manyate: sambandha-
saukaryam avyabhicāraṃ ca bruvatā sacchabdasya sāmānyābhidhāyitvam āśritam 
... viśeṣaśabdaiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyābhyupagamāc ca.(1) na hy asati sāmānyaviśe-
ṣabhāve sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapadyate. tathā hi sāmānyaśabdād aviśeṣeṇa 
pravartamānā buddhir viśeṣaśabdair viśeṣāntarebhyo vyavacchidya viśiṣṭe viṣaye 
vyavasthāpyate. tad asati sāmānye nopapadyate: “The idea is as follows: someone 
who claims that the connection is feasible and that there is no ambiguity relies on 
the fact that the word ‘existent’ denotes the general property [existence] … and 
because of the assumption that [the word ‘existent’] is co-referential with words 
denoting particular [general properties].(1) For co-reference is not justified when 
there is no general-particular relation. That is, an idea that arises without 





denoting particular [general properties] by being excluded from other particular 
[general properties]. This is not justified when there is no general property.” 
(1)It is difficult to construe this clause with the preceding and following; some 
part of the argument appears to be missing. T corrobotates the reading of Ms 
 
[53] sattādiṣu ca <sattādir nāsti>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b2: sattādiṣu 
cetyādi. 
 
142 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b1-3: atra ca sāmānyaṃ tadvad ity abhyupagame dvidhā 
vikalpaḥ. sāmānyasya vā sattādeḥ tatvattā syāt, tadvato vā ghaṭādeḥ sāmānate(1)ti. 
tatra pūrvaṃ na sambhavatīti darśayann āha: sattādiṣu cetyādi. na hi sattādiṣu 
jātyantaram asti niḥsāmānyatvāt sāmānyānām. tad avaśyaṃ dvitīyo vikalpo 'bhyu-
peya iti: “And if, in this case, a general property and a general property possessor 
are assumed [to exist], there are two options: either the general property existence, 
and so on, will be the general property possessor, or the possessor of the general 
property like a pot will be the general property. Now, in the present case the first 
[option] is impossible. This he shows explaining: “And at existence, etc.” For there 
are not other general properties at existence, etc. because general properties are 
without general properties(2). Therefore one is forced to adopt the second option.”  
(1)The reading sāmānatā (cf. mtshuṅs pa ñid T) is undoubtedly an error for 
sāmānyatā, cf. the remark attributed to the opponent about the attribution of 
sāmānyatā to the general property possessor.  
(2)Cf. the statement jāter ajātitaḥ, PS V:11b, q.v.; v. no. 166.  
 
[54] tasmād <avaśyam>(1) arthasya <sāmānyatābhyupeyā>(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 202b3: tasmād ityādi. arthasyeti.  
(1)Cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b2: tad avaśyaṃ dvitīyo vikalpo 'bhyupeya iti. 
 
143 That is, a single general property possessor like a pot, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b3: 
arthasyeti: praktatvāt tadvato ghaṭādeḥ.  
 
144 In spite of the reading spyi khas blaṅ bar bya 'o K : spyi'i don khas blaṅ bar 
bya V the reading must have been sāmānyatā as indicated by the pronoun sā quoted 
in pratīka at Ms B 202b3, cf. the objection that Dignāga superimposes the property 
of being a general property upon the general property possessor.  
 
[55] sā ca <nāsty arthasya>(1) yasmāt(2). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b3: sā 
cetyādi; Ms B 202b3: yasmād ityādi.  
(1)Cf. de yaṅ don la yod pa ma yin pa K : de yaṅ don la yod pa la (sic om. DC) 
ma yin pa V.  
(2)de'i phyir KV. 
 
145 'dir K : om. V probably reproduces Sanskrit atra, which I interpret as an 
anaphor referring back to arthasya. 
 
146 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b3-4: kevalagrahaṇena vācyasya tulyasya nirāsaṃ karoti. 
śabda eva vācaka eṣāṃ tulyo, na tu vācyaṃ kiṃcit tadvad ity arthaḥ: “By using [the 




Only the term that denotes them is the same, but no general property possessor 
whatsoever is the denotable object.” 
 
147 Cf. 'dir ni sgra mtshuṅs 'ba'(1) źig go K : sgra don 'ba' źig pa daṅ mtshuṅs 
V.  
(1)em. : pa K. PS V:10b may be restored as śabdo 'tra kevalaḥ samaḥ. 
 
148 Cf. 'dra ba yin gyi K : om. V.  
 
[56] na tu kenacit tadvatā. Qu. Ms B 202b4. 
 
149 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b4-5: vācakatulyatayaivaiṣāṃ tulyatvaṃ, na tu vācyena 
tadvatā kenacid vasturūpeṇety arthaḥ: “The meaning is that they are only the same 
because the word denoting them is the same, but not because of any denotable 
general property possessor whatsoever having the form of a real entity.”  
 
[57] sattāyogau ca <prāg nirāktau>(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b5: 
sattāyogau cetyādi. 
 (1)Cf. sṅar bkag pa yin no K (Ms B 202b5: prāg eva nirāktaṃ) : sṅar cuṅ zad 
kyaṅ grub pa med do V. 
 
150 That is above at 7cd, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b5-6: na sattā śabdasvarūpeṇa 
tadvatā vācyā, sambandho 'pi sattārūpeṇa. ataḥ sattvena sambandhena vā vācyena 
tadvatā tulyā bhaviṣyantīty āha: sattāyogau cetyādi. “bhedeṣu jātau tadyoge tulyo 
doṣaś, ca teṣv apī”tyādinā prāg eva nirāktaṃ jātiyogayos tatvattayābhidhānam.  
 
[58] nānimittaḥ sa ca mataḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b2: tato 'trāpi 
“nānimittaḥ sa <ca>(1) mataḥ,” cf. 202b7: nānimittaḥ. 
(1)ca em. (cf. de yaṅ rgyu mtshan med mi 'dod K : de yaṅ rgyu mtshan med par 
'dod V : rgyu mtshan med min' de yaṅ dod T). 
 
151 That is, in the opponent's śāstra. cf. no. 37. 
 
152 Cf. tha mi dad par K : gźan V (read gźan ma yin par?). 
 
153 Cf. rgyu mtshan med par K : tha mi dad kyi rgyu mtshan V. 
 
154 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 202b6-203a1: yadi ghaṭādiṣu 
śabdaḥ samaḥ sa eva tarhi śabdaḥ śabdatvena tadvāṃs teṣāṃ sāmānyam bhaviṣyatī 
ti. āha: “nānimitta” (10c) ityādi. śabdo hi teṣāṃ vācakatayā sambandhī. tad eva tu 
sambandhitvam ekanimittam antareṇa nopapadyate yasya naimittiko jātiśabda ity 
abhyupagamaḥ, etena naimittikasya yasya śabdasya yatra nimittaṃ nāsti na sa tatra 
prayogam arhati. tadyathā daṇḍiśabdo daṇḍarahite puṃsi. nāsti ca naimittasya 
jātiśabdasya ghaṭādiṣu nimittam iti: “If the word is the same with regard to pot, and 
so on, then the word as such, which is a general property possessor due to [its] 
property of being a word, will be their general property. With this in mind he says 
“not without a cause of application, etc.” For the word is their relatum because of its 
denoting them. This very property of being a relatum, however, is not justified 





term has a cause of application. Therefore the word that has a cause of application is 
not capable of being applied to the thing in which there is no cause of application, 
just like [the application of] the expression 'possessing a staff' to a man who has no 
staff. And the general term that has a cause of application does not have a cause of 
application in the pot, etc.” 
 
155 Cf. de'i phyir de yaṅ spyi ru sbyar bar mi bya'o V : de'i phyir yaṅ ci(1) rigs 
pa ma yin no K. 
(1)ci is a misspelling for spyi(r). 
 
[59] tataś ca. Qu. Ms B 203a1. 
 
156 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203a1-2: yadi hi sacchabdena sāmānyam ucyeta, tatas 
tadviśeṣaṇārthaṃ ghaṭa iti ucyeteti syāt sāmānādhikaraṇyam. asati tu sāmānyā-
bhidhāne kiṃ kena viśiṣyate. tataś cābhyupetahānam: “For if the general property 
were to be denoted by the word 'existent', then one could say 'pot' for the sake of 
qualifying it. Thus there would be co-reference. But when there is no denotation of a 
general property, what then is qualified by what? And therefore the assumption is 
given up.” 
 
[60] atha punar ananyasmin dravye vartate sadguṇam,(1) sacchabdād 
ghaṭādyākāṅkṣāyāṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ syāt, nīlatarādivat. Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 203a2-4: atha punar iti … ananyasmin(2) dravye vartata iti … sacchabdād 
ghaṭādyākāṅkṣāyāṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ syāt, nīlatarādivat.  
(1) Cf. the reading sadguṇam of paraphrase at Ms B 203a3 below no. 159 
indicating that syntactically the term belongs after vartate. 
(2) em., cf. gźan ma yin pa'i rdzas la V : nānyasmin Ms, cf. rdzas gźan la 'jug pa 
ma yin pa T, corroborated by rdzas gźan la 'jug pa ma yin la K; cf. the reading 
ananyatra no. 159 below. 
 
157 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203a3: saty api sāmānyaviśeṣabhāve 'nyathā 
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvaṃ samarthayate. 
 
158 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203a3: ananyatra dravye varti(1) sadguṇaṃ ghaṭādidravyam. 
sadguṇa iti sattāguṇa ity arthaḥ. sattāguṇo 'syeti ktvā: “The [thing] possessing the 
general property existence viz. a substance like a pot residing in the same substance. 
The expression 'sadguṇa' means 'having the general property existence' on the 
ground that is has the general property existence.” 
(1) em., cf. gźan ma yin pa'i rdzas la 'jug pa'i T : anyatra dravyavarti Ms  
 
159 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203a4-7: yathā nīlaguṇaṃ dravyam anyatra nīlatarādau 
dravye 'tadguṇe ca na vartata iti, na tat sāmānyam. tathāpi nīlam ity ukte nīla-
śabdād bhedākāṅkṣā bhavati: yad etan nīlam ity uktam, tat kiṃ nīlataram atha 
nīlatamam iti. tato bhedaśabdair viśeṣyate nīlataro nīlatamo veti. evaṃ sann ity ukte 
sattāyā anekārthavttitvād ghaṭādyākāṅkṣā bhavati: yo 'yaṃ san sa kiṃ ghaṭo 'tha 
paṭa iti. tatas tacchabdair viśeṣayiṣyāmaḥ: ghaṭaḥ paṭo veti: “For instance, the 
substance that posseses the quality blue does not reside in another substance that is 
bluer, and so on, and in one that does not possess this quality. Thus it is not a 




expectation of a complement: That thing called blue is it bluer or bluest? Therefore 
it is qualified by particular terms viz. 'bluer' or 'bluest'. In the same way, when one 
says 'existent' there is the expectation of a complement like 'pot' because existence 
resides in many referents: that existent thing is it a pot or cloth? Therefore we shall 
qualify them by means of the terms denoting them viz. 'pot' or 'cloth.'” 
ŚVṬ 64,4-8: yad api bhikṣuṇā śaṅkitam: mā bhūt piṇḍāntareṇa viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya-
bhāvaḥ. tasminn eva piṇḍe sattādiviśiṣte 'bhihite paratadgataviśeṣākānkṣāyāṃ 
viśeṣaṇādivyavahāro bhaviṣyati san ghaṭaḥ iti. yathā nīlaśabdena nīlaguṇe 'bhihite 
tadgataviśeṣāpekṣayā tarabādiviśeṣaṇaṃ bhavati nīlatara nīlatamaḥ iti: “the monk 
[viz. Dignāga] subjects the following argument to criticism: let there be no qualifier-
qualified relation without a particular substance (piṇḍa). When the same (tasminn 
eva) particular substance that is qualified by the general property existence, and so 
on, has been denoted, qualifiers, and so on, will be used because of the expectation 
of complementation of further distinctions that pertain to it, such as 'a pot is 
existent.' In the same way, when the blue quality has been denoted by the word 
'blue', a qualifier like 'tara' is used with regard to the differences that pertain to it, 
such as 'bluer,' bluest.'”  
 
[61] yady ekatrāsitādivat. Qu. Ms B 203a7, ŚVṬ 64,9; NR 426,14. 
  
160 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203a7-203b1: yady ekatrāsādhāraṇarūpe jātimati dravye 
sādhāraṇī sattā vartata iti, tatra sann ity ukte ghaṭādyākāṅkṣā bhavati. yathā nīla 
ity ukte nīlatarādyākāṅkṣā. tataś ca viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva iṣyate: “If existence that 
is common to many things resides in one general property possessing substance 
having a singular form, in that case there is the expectation of a complement like 
'pot,' when it is said 'existent'. In the same way as the expectation of the com-
plement 'bluer,' when it is said 'blue'; and therefore there is claimed to be a 
qualifier-qualified relation.” 
 
161 Cf.'brel pa'i yon tan du 'gyur ro(1) V : om. K.  
(1)Cf. the related expression'brel pa 'am yon tan la 'gyur te K 113,15-16; I 
assume that V is based upon a misreading of the original Sanskrit, which, I believe, 
constitutes an exact parallel to the above-mentioned quotation from K, and thus 
probably reproduces *sambandhe guṇe vā syāt; this suggestion fits in with the 
syntax, and, moreover, is supported by PSV on 11a1 and Ms B 203b2-3, q.v. below 
no. 163.  
 
[62] <etac ca nāsti>(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b1: tan naitad(2)apy asti. 
(1)Cf. 'di yaṅ yod min K : de lta la 'aṅ min V. 
(2)em : na etad Ms 
 
[63] nīlaśabdo hi(1) <nīlaguṇaṃ dravyam abhidhatte. nīlatarādāv anyatrāsati(2) 
tadvan na yujyate(3)>(4). Restored, cf. PṬS Ms B 203b1: nīlaśabdo hītyādi; Ms B 
203b1-3, q.v. below no. 163. 
(1) Cf. sṅon po'i sgra ni V : sṅon po'i sgra la (sic) ni K. 
(2) Cf. śin tu sṅo ba la sogs pa rnams la gźan (sic) med na K : śin tu sṅo ba la 
sogs pa med par gźan gyis V. 






(4) For the suggested restoration, cf. no. 163 below. 
 
162 It is quite impossible to construe this paragraph as it has been transmitted in 
KV, and Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase suggests that a crucial part of the original text 
is missing in both versions. I have inserted the missing part on the basis of the 
paraphrase, which no doubt reflects Dignāga's original text fairly accurately, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 203b1-3: nīlaśabdo hi nīlaguṇaṃ dravyam abhidhatte. tac cānyatra 
nīlatarādau(1) dravye na vartate. yac ca vartate nīlatvaṃ tatsambandho vā sa 
śabdārtha eva na bhavati. tato 'trāpi “nānimittaḥ sa <ca>mata” (PS V:10c) iti etat 
samānam iti: “For the word 'blue' denotes a substance possessing the quality blue. 
And this [substance] does not reside in another substance that is bluer, etc. And that 
which resides in it viz. the property blueness or its relation is not the referent of the 
word. Therefore also in this case [the statement] is the same viz. “it is, moreover, not 
considered to be without a cause of application” (PS V:10c).”  
(1)Cf. śin tu sṅo ba la sogs pa rnams la gźan med na K : śin tu sṅo ba la sogs pa 
la med par gźan gyis V. 
 
163 That is, at PSV V:10c. 
 
164 Cf. sṅon po ñid daṅ ldan pa(1) 'brel pa dag ni K : sṅon po ñid daṅ 'brel(1) pa 
ni sgra'i don ma yin no V.  
(1)Probably read de daṅ 'brel = tatsambandha, cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b3: nīlatvaṃ 
tatsambandho vā sa śabdārtha eva na bhavati. 
 
[64] upetyāpi naitaj jāter ajātitaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b3: upetyāpīti … 
naitaj jāter ajātitaḥ; cf. NCV 636,10-11: upetyāpi tu … jāter ajātitaḥ, 733,13; ŚVṬ 
64,14; NR 426,15 (reading naivam for naitat). For 11b cf. Dharmakīrti’s PV II 
156d: kathaṃ jāter ajātitaḥ. 
 
165 Cf. ci de V (DC em. mistakenly spyi de, presumably on the basis of the first 
line of the vtti, cf. V 114,16, K 115,16) : om. K; read ci ste corresponding to 
Sanskrit yady api, cf. Obermiller Index II s.v. 
 
166 Cf. upetyāpi tu: NCV 636,10. 
 
167 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b3: yady api dṣṭānte siddhiḥ syāt tathāpi <satvataḥ?>(1) 
tena sāmānyaṃ nāsti: “Even though it were assumed [to be the case], i.e., even if it 
were taken for granted with respect to the example, nevertheless there is no 
similarity between it with regard to the general property existence.”  
(1) The reading satvataḥ is problematic, cf. yod pa ñid la T, which suggest that 
the translator either interpreted his Ms reading as a locative or a genitive of sattva or 
sattā.  
 
168 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b3-4: nāsyāṃ sajjātau ghaṭatvādijātir astīti ajātiḥ: 
“Without general property means that there is no general property like potness in the 
general property existence.” NCV 636,11-12: jāter ajātitaḥ, nāsyāṃ jātir vidyata iti 
ajātir iti vigrahāt sāmānyānām asāmānyādhāratāṃ darśayati: “'Because a general 
property is without general properties'. In accordance with the analytical string 




existence], he shows that general properties are not containers of general 
properties.” Cf. the well-known nyāya “niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyāni,” e.g., at TSP 
728,13.  
 169 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b4-6: sattāyāṃ ghaṭatvādayo na santi jātiviśeṣā yathā 
nīlaguṇasya nīlatarādayo viśeṣāḥ, yatas tān viśeṣān upādāya dravye varteta. 
tadanupādāne ca tadvastusampramukharūpaṃ na ghaṭo na paṭaḥ. tasmān na 
sacchabdād ghaṭādiviśeṣākāṅkṣā yuktā. nīlaguṇa hy anekabhedaḥ. sa ekatrāpi 
dravye vartamānaḥ svabhedān upādāya yathābhisambhavaṃ vartata iti yujyate. 
tadabhidhāyino nīlaśabdān nīlatarādyākāṅkṣeti darśayati: “That is, there are no 
particular general properties like potness in the general property existence in the 
same way as the quality blue has particulars such as bluer, and so on, so that it 
would reside in a substance together with these particular [general properties]. And 
in that it does not appropriate these the chief form of their referent is neither a pot 
nor cloth. Therefore it is not justified that one expects the complement of a 
particular like 'pot' from the word 'existent'. For the quality blue is divided into 
many kinds. When it is resident in one substance it resides in it after having 
appropriated, according to circumstances, its own kinds. He illustrates the blue 
words that denote these [different kinds] by means of “expectation of the 
complement 'bluer', etc.” A related explanation is found at ŚVṬ 64,10-13: yuktaṃ 
nīle tatra nīlo guṇaḥ prakarṣāprakarṣādibhedabhinnas tarabādibhir viśiṣyate. 
sattājātis tu ghaṭādiśūnyā svātmaviśiṣṭaṃ padārthaṃ pratipādayantī naiva 
ghaṭatvādīn ākaṅkṣatīti na tatra viśeṣaṇābhidhānam bhavati.  
 
[65] naivaṃ sajjātir ghaṭādijātimatī. Qu. Ms B 203b4. 
 
[66] yatas tān viśeṣān upādāya dravye <vttau ghaṭādiviśeṣākāṅkṣā syāt>. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b4-5: sattāyāṃ ghaṭatvādayo na santi jātiviśeṣā … yatas 
tān viśeṣān upādāya dravye varteta.(1) Cf. NCV 636,15 levels Dignāga's apoha 
theory with a similar argument: yato 'satsatvato vastunaḥ aghaṭābhāvaghaṭatvādīn 
upādāya pravarteta. 
(1)Cf. gaṅ las khyad par de ñe bar blañs nas rdzas la 'jug pa na K. 
 
170 I assume that the reading bum pa ñid la sogs pa'i khyad par 'dod pa yin no V, 
is preferable to bum pa la sogs pa'i khyad par la 'jug par dogs par 'gyur pa K, 
provided that bum pa ñid is corrected to read bum pa. The technical term ākāṅkṣā is 
never used in PS V in connection with the residence of general properties in their 
loci, but always in the context of expecting the introduction of a complement to 
another term. In fact, Ms uses the term ghatādiviśeṣākaṅkṣā (cf. no. 167) in this 
particular context, which corroborates the readings of V. 
 
[67] evaṃ tarhi <ucyate> yady apy aśabdavācyā, tathāpi ghaṭādiṣv arthākṣipteṣu 
bhedākāṅkṣā bhaviṣyati, tadvān hy artho 'vaśyaṃ ghaṭatvādīnāṃ kenacit sāmān-
yenānubaddha <iti>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b7-204a2: evaṃ tarhīti … yady api 
ghaṭatvādayaḥ sacchabdavācyā na bhavanti tathāpi sattāvatārthena ghaṭādiṣv 
ākṣipteṣu bhedākāṅkṣā bhaviṣyati. ... tadvān hy artho 'vaśyam ityādi … 
ghaṭatvādīnāṃ kenacit sāmānyenānubaddhaḥ; cf. SVṬ 64,20-21 ad ŚV Apoha° 
132: aśabdavācyair eva ghaṭādibhiḥ sajjātyākṣiptair (read sajjātiśabdā°?) 





the general term 'existent' without at all being expressly denotable by it, a qualifier, 
and so on, is going to be used.” 
 
171 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b6-204a1: śabdo hi paratantro guṇāpekṣapravttitvāt 
tadākṣepāsamarthaḥ. <arthas> tu prayojanatvāt(1) pradhānaḥ. tena jātimān artha 
eva sarvabhedān ākṣipya vartate tataś ca yady api ghaṭatvādayaḥ saccabdavācyā 
na bhavanti tathāpi sattāvatārthena ghaṭādiṣv ākṣipteṣu bhedākāṅkṣā bhaviṣyati. 
tato nāsti viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ: “For the word is dependent (paratantra), and 
because it applies in dependence upon a property it is not capable of implying these. 
The referent, however, is primary because of being the purpose [of the word]. 
Therefore the very referent that is the general property possessor occurs by implying 
all the particulars. And therefore, although potness, and so on, are not denotable by 
the word 'existent', there will, nevertheless, be the expectation of a particular in 
that 'pot', and so on, are implied by the referent possessing the general property 
existence. Therefore it is not the case that there is no qualifier-qualified 
relationship.”  
(1) <arthas> tu prayojanatvāt conj. : avastu prayojanutvāt Ms, cf. T don ni dgos 
(so read with CD, ed. dogs so) pa ñid kyi phyir gtso bo 'o. 
 
172 Cf. de (red P 73a1) daṅ ldan pa'i don V : yod pa daṅ ldan pa'i don K (= 
sattāvān). Cf. Ms B 204a2: jātimān arthaḥ śabdenopādīyate. sa ca niyogataḥ eva 
ghaṭatvādīnāṃ kenacit sāmānyenānubaddhaḥ. tataś ca tatsāmānyabhedākṣepe 
ghaṭādibhedākṣepa iti. 
 
173 Cf. bum pa ñid(1) la sogs pa'i V : bum pa ñid la sogs pa K.  
(1)ñid em. : om. V. 
 
174 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 204a2: jātimān arthaḥ śabdenopādīyate. sa ca niyogata eva 
ghaṭatvādīnāṃ kenacit sāmānyenānubaddhaḥ. tataś ca tatsāmānyabhedākṣepe 
ghaṭādibhedākṣepa iti: “The referent that is the possessor of the general property is 
assumed by the word, and this [referent] is by necessity connected to some general 
property from among potness, etc. And therefore it implies a particular like a pot in 
that it implies a particular general property.”  
 
[68] arthākṣepe 'py anekāntaḥ. Qu Ms B 204a3, cf. NCV 637,6: naitad asti, 
arthākṣepe 'py anekāntaḥ. NR 426,26 arthākṣepe 'py anaikāntaḥ. ŚVṬ 64,24: 
arthākṣepo 'py anaikāntaḥ, cf. ŚV Apoha° 133ab: arthākṣepo 'pi nāsty eva.  
 
175 This statement introduces the rebuttal of the preceding argument, cf. PSṬ Ms 
B 204a2-3: imām api kalpanāṃ nirākaryann āha. 
 
[69] arthākṣepo hi. Qu. Ms B 204a3. 
 
176 Cf. gaṅ la don gyi śugs kyis V : don gaṅ la K. Since the traditional 
understanding of arthāpatti is that it is something that obtains according to the state 
of the case (cf., e.g., NBh 573,3: arthād āpattir arthāpatti), it is reasonable to 





[70] tadyathā divā na bhuṅkta iti rātribhojane(1) <niścayaḥ>. Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 204a3-4: tadyathā divā na bhuṅkta iti … tadyathā divā na bhuṅkta ity atra 
rātribhojane.  
(1)Cf. nub mo za bar V : mtshan mo K. 
 
177 This example belongs to the category of śrutārthāpatti, i.e., implication of an 
oral statement, cf. ŚBh 32,6: arthāpattir api dṣṭaḥ śruto vā 'rtho 'nyathā 
nopapadyata ity arthakalpanā; cf. the discussion at ŚV Arthāpatti° 51 in the context 
of the criticism of Dignāga's attempt to include arthāpatti in anumāna: pīno divā na 
bhuṅkte cety evamādivacaḥ śrutau rātribhojanavijñānaṃ śrutārthāpattir ucyate: 
“When hearing a statement like '(NN) is fat, and yet he does not eat during the day 
time', the knowledge that he is eating at night is what is called implication of an oral 
statement.” 
 
[71] iha punaḥ sad ity ukte na ghaṭādiṣu niścayaḥ. <iti(1) saṃśaye sati> nāsty 
<arth>ākṣepaḥ(2). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 204a3-5: iha punar ityādi … nāsty 
ākṣepa iti pramāṇaphalaṃ … na ca sad ity ukte ghaṭādiṣu niścayaḥ. kiṃ tarhi 
saṃśaya iti(1).  
(1)V seems to presuppose a reading like … niścaya iti saṃśaye sati, cf. ma ṅes 
pa'i phyir the tshom za ba yin pas V: ma ṅes pa'i phyir (sic) K. In the present 
context saṃśayaḥ that is missing in K would correspond to anekāntaḥ of PS V:11c. 
The reading kiṃ tarhi of Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase is not corroborated by the 
readings of KV which usually render this adverbial complement as 'on kyaṅ. It is 
therefore reasonable to conclude that kiṃ tarhi was not part of the original Sanskrit 
text.  
(2)em., cf. don gyis phaṅs pa (= arthākṣepaḥ) KV : ākṣepaḥ (cf. 'phaṅs pa T) Ms  
 
178 Cf. gaṅ gi phyir K : de'i phyir V. gaṅ gi phyir = yasmāt correlates with tena 
of PS V:11d; the readings of K suggest the following restoration: yasmāt sa 
jātiśabdo na katham api bhedasāmānyasambandhajātimadvācako yujyate, cf. no.s 
181-82 below. 
 
179 The reading ji ltar yaṅ … rigs pa ma yin no K would translate Sanskrit na 
katham api … yujyate. V is entirely confused. In addition to misconstruing the 
dvanda compound khyad par daṅ spyi daṅ daṅ 'brel pa daṅ rigs daṅ ldan pa K for 
which V reads tha dad 'brel pa'i spyi (NP ci) rigs daṅ ldan pa, the translators 
misunderstood the expression na katham api, construing katham as acc. of kathā in 
dependence on the verb. Thus the adverbial complement katham api is reproduced 
as the noun phrase lan 'ga' yaṅ.  
 
180 Cf. NCV 609,19f: tathā ca jātisambandhajātimadabhidhānānām asambhavād 
'anyāpohakc chrutiḥ'. 
 
[72] tenānyāpohakc chrutiḥ. Qu. Ms B 205a4; NCV 611,21; cf. NV 324,20-21: 
tasmād 'anyāpohakc chrutir' iti; PV III:164cd: tato 'nyāpohaniṣṭhatvād uktā 
'anyāpohakc chrutiḥ'; TS 1237. 
 
181 Siṃhasūri regards the śloka pāda PS V:11d as anyāpohalakṣaṇavākyam, cf. 





svārthe kurvatī śrutir abhidhatta ity ucyate ... tadanuvttyā vyāvttir yasmin vidyate 
svārthe sa ghyate na vyāvttimātram. The first line of the explanation is the 
beginning of a well-known prose fragment defining apoha, which evidently belongs 
in a similar context. The same fragment is also addressed by Mallavādi, cf. NCV 
612,5ff, just as Uddyotakara in his critique of Dignāga’s apoha theory quotes the 
śloka pāda followed by the first line of its explanation as the conclusion of the 
pūrvapakṣa, cf. NV 324,20f. The prose fragment, which was known to all 
contemporary scholars, stems in all likelihood from Dignāga’s SPVy. For the 
sources of this fragment, which I quote here in extenso, cf. NCV loc.cit., and Pind 
1999: 318-19: atha ca jātisambandhajātimadabhidhānānām asambhavāt “tenānyā-
pohakc chrutiḥ.” śabdāntarārthāpohaṃ(1) hi svārthe kurvatī śrutir abhidhatta' ity 
ucyate; hiśabdo yasmādarthe. yasmād vkśaśabdo ’vkṣanivttiṃ(2) svārthe kurvan 
svārthaṃ vkṣalakṣaṇaṃ pratyāyayatīti ucyate, evaṃ nivttiviśiṣṭaṃ vastu 
śabdārthaḥ, 'dravyādi san', na nivttimātram, alakṣaṇīyam eva ca syān nivtti-
mātram, avastutvāt, kharaviṣāṇakuṇṭhatīkṣṇatādivarṇanāvat: “And since the 
denotations of the general property, of the relation, and of the general property 
possessor are impossible, the word excludes other [referents]. For (hi) it is claimed 
that the word 'denotes' in that it excludes the referents of other words for the sake of 
its own referent. The word hi is used in the sense of 'because': Because it is claimed 
that the word ‘tree’ while precluding the word ‘non-tree’ (2) for the sake of its own 
referent indicates its own referent as having the character of a tree. Thus the word's 
referent is a thing (vastu) as qualified by preclusion, [i.e.] an existent thing like a 
substance, but not mere preclusion; for (ca) mere preclusion would indeed be 
indefinable because it is an unreal thing, like [the unreal referents of] descriptions 
like bluntness or sharpness of hare's horns.”  
For the referent as an entity (vastu) qualified by the non-existence or exclusion 
of other things from its locus, cf. PSV V:34-36. 
(1) Cf. the reading at NCV 640,7: śabdāntarārthāpohaṁ svārthe kurvatī, which 
in all likelihood imitates Dignāga’s original formulation; The definition was well-
known, cf. e.g. TS 1015 and TSP 394,8ff. 
(2) According to the apoha thesis words exclude other words as well as referents 
of other words. Exclusion defines the general property in words and referents. Cf. 
e.g. Translation of PSV V:33ab. 
 
[73] tasmād <yad(1) uktaṃ prāk>(2) “ktakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena 
bhāṣate,” <tad eva(3) sthitam>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 204b6: tasmādityādinā.  
(1)Cf. gaṅ yin pa K : om. V.  
(2)Cf. sṅar brjod pa ltar V : om. K.  
(3)Cf. de ñid K : om. V. 
 
182 This paragraph marks the end of the first section of PSV V. Dignāga 
concludes that the validity of his own thesis is established because there is no other 
theoretically justifiable solution to the problem of the denotation of words. The two 
verses that follow PS V:11 introduce topics that are unrelated to those introduced in 
the previous paragraphs, cf. no. 194 below. Uddyotakara closes his exposition of 
Dignāga's view in a similar way at NV 324,20-21: anyatra pratyayābhāvapra-
saṅgāc ca, na ca anyā gatir asti, tasmād anyāpohakc chrutir iti: “And because it 
follows [absurdly] that there is no cognition otherwise, and there is no other way, 




on this paragraph, other Indian scholars did not fail to notice that Dignāga seems to 
corroborate the validity of the apoha theory merely by debunking the opponents' 
theories without corroborating in detail its epistemological framework, cf. PSṬ Ms 
B 204b6-205a2: yathoktajātyādyabhidhānapratiṣedhopasaṃhāreṇa svayam eva 
sthirīkaroti. nanu ca “parapakṣapratiṣedhena svapakṣasiddhir alabhyā” (1) yathok-
tam āvītapratiṣedhe. naiva doṣaḥ. pūrvam evātra “ktakatvādivat svārtham 
anyāpohena bhāṣata” (PS V:1cd) iti pratipāditaṃ śābdasyānumānād abhinnatvam. 
tatra kevalaṃ pramāṇāntaravādibhir vidhimukhena jātyādaya ucyante ity uktam. 
tasmin pratiṣiddhe sa evārtho vyavatiṣṭhate. vakṣyamānāṃ ca svapakṣasādhanaṃ 
hdi ktvaivaṃ uktam: “He corroborates his own theory by means of summarizing 
debunking [the views] that the word denotes the general property, etc. But is it not 
so that “establishing one's own thesis by means of debunking the opponent's thesis 
is inadmissible” as it has been formulated in the [chapter on the] rejection of the 
āvīta inference? There is no fault at all. The fact that verbal cognition is not different 
from inference has previously been explained in the [statement]: “It [i.e., a word] 
denotes its own referent through exclusion of other referents in the same way as 'the 
being produced'” (PS V:1cd). In this context it has been said by those who claim 
that [verbal cognition] is a separate means of cognition that general properties, and 
so on, are denoted in an affimative form. In that this has been debunked only this 
referent is settled. And he has formulated it in this way while keeping in mind the 
proof of his own thesis that is going to be explained.”  
After this comment Jinendrabuddhi inserts an excursus on the apoha doctrine It 
reflects Dharmakīrti's apoha theory and includes many quotations from Dharma-
kīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikasvavtti. For the Sanskrit text of the excursus, see Appendix 2. 
(1) Jinendrabuddhi appears to quote a passage from PSV III where Dignāga 
debunks the Sāṃkhyā opponents view of indirect proof (āvīta) as that of the action 
of establishing one’s own thesis through negation of the thesis of the opponent, cf. 
Ms B 122a5: parapakṣapratiṣedhena svapakṣasthāpanakriyā āvītaḥ.  
 
183de ñid = tad eva, cf. the phrase sa evārtho vyavatiṣṭhate at Ms B 205a1, which 
probably imitates the original Dignāgan formulation. 
 
[74] āha ca: bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na śabdāt sarvathā gatiḥ svasambandhā-
nurūpyāt(1) tu vyavacchedārthakāry(2) asau. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 208a1 āha ceti 
= NCV 653,15; verse qu. ŚVṬ 46,7-8, cf. PSṬ Ms B 208a2-3: bahudheti … 
abhidheyasyeti … svasambandhānurūpyād ityādi; NCV 653,15-16: bahudhāpyabhi-
dheyasyeti … svasambandhānurūpyāt tv iti. āha ca would indicate that Dignāga 
quotes from another work, possibly the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa. 
(1)°anurūpeṇa ŚVṬ.  
(2)don la rnam bcod byed K : don rnam gcod ṅag gi 'bras bu yin V, for which, 
cf. vyavacchedaphalaṃ vākyam, PV IV 192a. 
 
184 According to Jinendrabuddhi this verse settles that only exclusion of other 
(referents) is the word's referent by showing that it constitues a part of the referent 
to be indicated, cf Ms B 208a1-2: āha cety arthasya pratyāyyasyāṅga(1)saṃ-
darśanenānyāpoham eva śabdārthaṃ samarthayate.  






185 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 208a2-3: śiṃśapādibhedena puṣphitaphalitādibhedena ca 
bahuprakāratve 'pīty arthaḥ. abhidheyasyeti vkṣāder arthasya. tasyaivam aneka-
prakāratve 'pi śabdāt sarvaprakāreṇa pratītir nāsti: “The meaning is as follows: 
even though it has many modes because of particulars like śiṃśapā and particulars 
such as having flowers and fruits. The denotable object means a referent like a tree. 
Thus, although it has many modes, there is no cognition of it from the word in all its 
modes.” Siṃhasūri explains 12a with the theoretical background of PSV V:34 (q.v.), 
cf. NCV 653,15ff: bahudhāpy abhidheyasyeti śiṃśapādibhedā atrābhipretā na 
dravyādayaḥ; tathā hi vkṣavad bhedeṣu saṃśayo dṣṭo 'rthatas tu dravyādiṣu 
niścayaḥ: “In the present context a particular like śiṃśapā is intended, not 
[particulars] like substance. That is, there is observed to be doubt about the 
particulars in the same way as there is doubt about [the particulars of] tree, whereas, 
by implication, there is certainty about substance, etc.”  
 
186 This verse has a close parallel at PS II:13: <anekadharmaṇo 'rthasya na 
liṅgāt sarvathā gatiḥ>, anubaddhasya vicchedaṃ tasyānyato gamayati.(1)  
K (Kitagawa 1973 462b2-5 = P 112b 7-8): don gyi chos rnams du ma ni thams 
cad rtags las rtogs ma yin no. gaṅ źig rjes 'brel gźan la ni ldog pa rtogs par byed pa 
yin no.  
V (Kitagawa 1973 462a3-6 = P 31b 3): chos don du ma gtan tshigs kyis rnam pa 
thams cad du rtogs min no. gaṅ daṅ 'brel pa yoṅs bcad nas chos gźan daṅ bral thob 
par byed:  
“The indicator does not indicate in toto the referent with its many properties. It 
indicates, however, the exclusion from other [properties], of that [property] that is 
concomitant with it.”  
(1)For the restored pādas ab, cf. PSV V:12b and the parallel formulation at PS 
I:5ab: dharmino 'nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ, on which, v. Hattori 1968: 
27, 91 no. I.43; pādas cd are restored on the basis of pratīka and paraphrase at Ms B 
70a4: anubaddhasya vicchedam iti … tasyānyato vivakṣād vicchedaṃ vyāvttiṃ 
gamayati; PS II:13 also occurs in NM as verse 17, cf. T 1628 3c10-1113, T 1629 
8a4-5; Frauwallner 1982: 778.  
 
187 The technical term svasambandha denotes the invariable connection between 
any given word or indicator and the thing it denotes or indicates. Such connection is, 
according to Dignāgan epistemology, based upon the word's or indicator's 
application to, or presence at some similar instances of the referent and indicated, 
respectively, and their absolute non-application to or absence from all instances of 
the absence of the referent and indicated, respectively. Dignāga's concept of 
svasambandha is thus a function of the epistemological considerations underlying 
the second and third member of the trilakṣaṇa hetu. This is evident from his use of 
the expression svasambandhānurūpyāt at PSV II:13:  
 
K (Kitagawa 1973 462b6-14 = P 112b7-113a2): me'i 'bar ba daṅ rno ba'i khyad 
par ci lta ba de rnams ni du ma las rtogs pa ma yin te 'khrul ba'i phyir ro. gaṅ yaṅ 
'brel ba ni gaṅ med par me med pa' rdzas ma yin daṅ yon tan ñid la sogs pa'i rdzas 
de dag rdzas ma yin la sogs pa las ldog pa ñid rtogs pa yin te, dper na me'i me ma 
yin pa las ldog pa tsam raṅ daṅ 'brel ba'i rjes su mthun pa rtogs de bźin du 'di yin 





V (Kitagawa 1973 462a7-15 = P 31b3-5): dper na me la 'bar ba daṅ rno ba la 
sogs pa du ma yod kyaṅ dud pas bye brag de go bar mi byed de 'khrul ba'i phyir ro. 
gaṅ daṅ rjes su 'brel pa de las gźan pa ni ma yin te, rdzas ñid daṅ yon tan ñid la 
sogs pa de dag gis rdzas ma yin pa la sogs pa las log pa tsam 'ba' źig thob par byed 
pa ste, dper na mes me yin pa las log pa'i raṅ daṅ 'brel pa tsam thob par byed pa de 
bźin du 'di yaṅ me ma yin pa thams cad la mthoṅ ba ñid gźan la ni mthoṅ ba yin no: 
 
 “Smoke does not indicate the many particular features that are found in fire such 
as its flames, temperature, and so on, even though they exist in it because of 
ambiguity (*vyabhicārāt). It indicates, however, the mere exclusion of those 
(particular properties) that are concomitant [with fire] (ye tv anubaddhā), without 
which fire does not exist (yān antareṇāgnir na bhavati), such as substanceness, 
qualityness, and so on, from non-substanceness, and so on, in the same way as it 
merely [indicates] fire's preclusion of non-fires (yathāgner anagnivttimātram) in 
accordance with its own connection (svasambandhānurūpyāt), namely, that 'it is not 
observed at all non-fires, and observed elsewhere” (tathā hy asau sarvatrānagnau 
na dṣṭaḥ, anyatrāpi ca dṣtaḥ).(1)'”  
 
Jinendrabuddhi explains at Ms B 70b1-3 that Dignāga's concluding statement 
emphasizes the predominance (prādhānya) of vyatireka over anvaya for ascertaining 
the relation (sambandha). Joint absence (vyatireka) presupposes non-observation of 
the probandum at all of the vipakṣa, whereas anvaya only has a subsidiary role 
(aprādhānyam): sarvatrānagnau na dṣṭa ity anena vyatirekasya prādhānyaṃ 
vipakṣe sarvatrādarśanena khyāpayati. anyatrāpi ca dṣṭa iti. apiśabdena kvacin na 
dṣṭo 'pīti dyotayann anvayasyāprādhānyam. After these introductory remarks 
Jinendrabuddhi continues: tad evaṃ: yasmād anvayopasarjano vyatirekapradhānaḥ 
sambandhaḥ, sa ca sāmānyenaiva sambhavati, na viśeṣena, tasmāt tadānurūpyād 
vyatirekamukhenāgnir evātrānagnir na bhavatīty anagninivttimātraṃ pratipāda-
yati, na viśeṣam: “It is as follows: since the relation has joint presence as its 
subsidiary feature and joint absence as its chief feature, and this [namely the 
relation] only is possible in a general form, not in a particular form, [smoke] 
indicates, in conformity with this, by means of joint absence, the mere preclusion of 
non-fire, at the thought: “only fire is here, not non-fire,” but [it does] not [indicate] a 
particular.” 
  
These remarks merely expound what Dignāga states at PSV V:34 (q.v. below 
with no.s 421, 423, and 425), namely that it is only possible to ground the invariable 
connection on joint absence (vyatireka) of word and referent based upon non-
observation of its application to dissimilar instances, which is generalized to apply 
to all dissimilar instances as opposed to joint presence (anvyaya) which is based 
upon observation of its application to some similar instances. Thus anvyaya and 
vyatireka are not equipollent, which is essential for understanding Dignāga’s apoha 
doctrine. 
Jinendrabuddhi and Siṃhasūri explains the term svasambandhānurūpyād at PS 
V:12 accordingly:  
1. PSṬ Ms B 208a3-4: svasambandhānurūpyād ityādi. svasambandho 
'vinābhāvitvam anvayavyatirekalakṣaṇaṃ tac ca tasya sāmānyāpekṣayā, na viśeṣā-
pekṣayā. ato yādśo 'sya sambandhaḥ, gamakatvam api tādśam eva yuktam. etad 





eva yathopavarṇitam, anyasyāyogāt. tasmāt vyavacchedam eva kārī(2) 
pratyāyayatīti: “In accordance with its own connection, etc. Own connection means 
its being invariably concomitant, which is characterized by joint presence and joint 
absence; and this [viz. its being invariably concomitant] is through dependence upon 
the general feature, but not in dependence upon particular features. Consequently it 
is justified that it [viz. the word] also has exactly the kind of indicator property that 
corresponds to its relation. What is meant is as follows: its relation is through 
dependence on [its] general property, and the general property has only the form of 
exclusion such as it has been explained because another [possibility] is not justified. 
Therefore it only indicates while performing exclusion.”  
2. NCV 653,17-18: sambandhānurūpyāt tv iti. yasmād asau tajjātiye dśyamāno 
'rthāntaranivttidvāreṇaiva dṣṭo prāg evānyatrādśyamānaḥ, tasmāt sambandhā-
nurūpyāt tadviśiṣṭam evārtham āha: “'On the contrary, in accordance with its own 
connection'. Since it [namely the word] while being observed to denote the similar 
instance is observed [to denote the similar instance] by means of preclusion of other 
referents first of all by not being observed to denote other [referents], it denotes the 
referent as qualified by that [namely exclusion of other referents] in accordance with 
the connection.”  
 
The term svasambandha also occurs in a related passage at PSV III:45:  
K (Kitagawa 1973 508b11-13 = P 136a4): raṅ daṅ 'brel pa med par gźan du 
rtags can rtogs par nus pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro ||.  
V (Kitagawa 1973 508b12-14 = P 53a2): gtan tshigs la ni raṅ daṅ 'brel pa bor 
nas gźan du rtags can gyi śes pa bskyed pa'i nus pa yaṅ yod pa ma yin no ||:  
 
“For without its own connection the indicator is incapable of indicating the 
indicated elsewhere (*anyatra).”  
 
(1)Sanskrit fragments inserted on the basis of pratīkas quoted at Ms B 70a5-7: 
yān antareṇāgnir na bhavatīti. … ye tv anubaddhā iti … yathāgner anagninivtti-
mātram iti; 70b1-2: svasambandhānurūpyād ityādi … tathā hy asāv iti … sarvatrā-
nagnau na dṣṭa iti.  
(2)em. : karo Ms 
 
[75] anekadharmā śabdo 'pi yenārthaṃ nātivartate, pratyāyayati tenaiva, na 
śabdaguṇatādibhiḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 208a5-6: anekadharmā śabdo 'pītyādi 
… yenārthaṃ nātivartata iti … pratyāyayati tenaiveti … na śabdaguṇatādibhir iti; 
cf. NCV 653,18: anekadharmā śabdo 'pi.  
 
188 Cf. NCV 653,18ff: sāmānyadharmaiḥ khaguṇatvādibhir vkṣārthaṃ tasmin 
vastuni nābhidhatte, tathā hi te vināpy vkṣārthena rasādiṣu dṣṭāḥ, na tu 
vkṣaśabdo 'nyatra dṣṭaḥ, tasmād vkṣaśabdenaiva pratyāyanam upapannam: “It 
does not, for the sake of this object, denote the referent tree by means of general 
properties like being an attribute of space, etc. For they are, for instance, observed at 
taste, and so on, even in the absence of the referent tree. The word ‘tree’, however, 
is not observed to apply to other things (anyatra). Therefore it is justified that only 
the word ‘tree’ indicates.” Ms B 208a4-5: atha śabdasya ko 'ṃśo gamaka ity āha. 
anekadharmā śabdo pītyādi. svasāmānyadharmair anekadharmā; cf. the phrase at 





189 Like Bharthari Dignāga uses ativartate as a synonym of vyabhicarati; cf. VP 
III.3:51: etāṃ sattāṃ padārtho hi na kaścid ativartate. sā ca sampratisattāyāḥ 
pthag bhāṣye nirdiśitā, alluding to Mahā-bh Vol. II 391,7 (ad A V 2:94): na sattāṃ 
padārtho vyabhicarati; cf. the use of ativartate at PS II:17, q.v. no. 193. 
 
190 The property to which Dignāga alludes is the general property of the word, 
e.g., treewordness, which is defined by exclusion of other words, in the same way as 
the referent of the word. Dignāga addresses this aspect of the general apoha theory 
at PS V:22c § 35, 33ab § 47, qq.v; Cf. PSṬ Ms B 208a5-6: sāmānyadharmeṇa 
vkṣaśabdatvādinā yena na vyabhicarati pratyayāyati tenaiveti. sa evāsya dharmo 
gamaka ity arthaḥ. evaśabdena yad vyavachinnaṃ tad darśayati: “The meaning is 
this: It only indicates by means of that (property) due to which it does not deviate 
viz. the general property treewordness, etc. Only that property of it indicates. The 
word ’only’ indicates that which is excluded.” As will become clear later in the 
chapter, the general property of the word, namely exclusion of other words, is 
intrinsic to the word (śabde) in the same way as it is intrinsic to the referent (arthe). 
Consequently exclusion is an inherent property of words or referents. Cf. the crucial 
statements of PSV V 22cd above and 33ab below. 
 
191 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 208a: ādiśabdena śabdajñeyatvādīnāṃ grahaṇam. 
apratyayakatvaṃ punas teṣāṃ vyabhicāritvāt. tathā hi te vināpi vkṣārthena 
rasādiṣu dṣṭāḥ, na vkṣaśabdatvādikaṃ sāmānyaṃ: “By the expression ‘etc.’ is 
included the word's being knowable, etc. These, however, do not indicate because 
they are ambiguous. That is, even without the referent tree these are also observed to 
denote taste, and so on, but the general property treewordness is not” (cf. the similar 
explanation at NCV 653,18ff, q.v. no. 189 above).  
Dignāga's statement is similar to the view which Bharthari propounds at VPV I 
53,2-3: yathā hi ghaṭe dravyatvapthvītvaghaṭatvādīnām aviruddhaḥ samavāyaḥ, 
tathā vkṣaśabde 'pi guṇatvaśabdatvavkṣaśabdatvādīnām āktiviśeṣānām avirud-
dhaḥ samavāyaḥ: “Just as the inherence in a pot of general properties such as 
substanceness, earthness, potness, and so on, is not in conflict, so also the inherence 
in the word ‘tree’ of such particular universals as qualityness, wordness, 
treewordness, and so on, is not in conflict.”  
Dignāga's point is that the word's being a quality (guṇatā) of ether (cf. VS II 
1:5; PBh § 61) is irrelevant to its semantic properties. This is also emphasised by 
Bharthari’s commentator Vṣabhadeva at VPṬ 52,23: guṇatvaṃ tv anabhidhā-
yakaṃ pratītam eva rūpādiṣv api samavāyāt: “But qualityness is understood not to 
denote because it also inheres in colour, etc.” 
 
192 PS V:13 has a close parallel at PS II:17: tathāṅgaṃ yena rūpeṇa liṅginaṃ 
nātivartate | tenaivānekadharmāpi <gamayati netarais tu>(1). 
K (Kitagawa 1973 465b1-8 = P 113b3) de ltar yan lag gaṅ ṅo bos rtags can las 
ni mi 'da' ba de ñid kyi chos du ma yaṅ rtogs par byed kyi gźan gyi min (PS II:17) || 
du ba yaṅ du ba ñid daṅ skya ba ñid la sogs pa'i cha nas gaṅ gis me la mi 'khrul ba 
de ñid ñid kyis rtogs par byed pa yin gyis rdzas ñid la sogs pa ni ma yin te 'khrul 
ba'i phyir ro || (PSV II:17).  
V (Kitagawa 1973 465a1-8 = P 32a6): cha śas 'di lta bu'i tshul nas | rtags can la 





II:17) || dud pa ni cha śas 'ba' źig mi las mi 'khrul ba yin no || dud pa ñid daṅ skya 
bo ñid la sogs pa ni | de ñid thob par byed pa yin gyi | rdzas ñid la sogs pas ni ma 
yin te | 'khrul pa'i phyir ro || (PSV II:17):  
“Thus the indicator, although it has many properties(2), only indicates in the form 
due to which it does not deviate from the indicated, but not due to other (properties). 
(PS II:17) For smoke indicates only by means of that indicator (*aṅgena) namely 
smokeness, whitishness, and so on, (dhūmatvapāṇḍutvādinā), which does not 
deviate from fire, but not by means of substanceness, etc. (dravyatvādibhiḥ)”(3) 
(PSV:II 17).  
 
NCV 674,23ff is considerably more explicit than Jinendrabuddhi as to the 
implications of PS II:17: liṅgaṃ aṅgaṃ dhūmaktakatvādi liṅginam agnyanitya-
tvādiviśiṣṭaṃ deśaśabdādim arthaṃ nātikramya vartate yena rūpeṇa. kena ca nāti-
vartate? “dhūma ity adhūmo na bhavati, ktaka ity aktaka na bhavati” ity adhūmā-
ktakanivttyātmanā nātikrāmati, tenaiva ca rūpeṇānyato vyāvttyātmakena gama-
yati, sattvadravyādyanekadharmāpi saṃs tais tu vyabhicārān na gamayati sattvādi-
sāmānyānyadharmair iti. eṣa tāvad gamakaniyamaḥ:  
“In which form the aṅgaṃ, i.e., the indicator (liṅgaṃ) namely smoke or being 
produced does not occur by transgressing the indicated (liṅginaṃ) that is qualified 
by fire or impermanence, etc. namely the referent (artham) which is place or sound 
(deśaśabdādim) and so on. And in which [form] does it not transgress? It does not 
transgress having the nature of preclusion of non-smoke and not being produced 
(adhūmāktakanivttyātmanā) like [the statements] “it is smoke (dhūma) thus (iti) it 
is not non-smoke (adhūma),” “it is a product (ktaka) thus (iti) it is not a non-
product (aktaka).” And it only indicates in that very form whose nature is exclusion 
from other [things]. Even though it [viz. the indicator] has many properties such as 
existence or substanceness it does not, however, indicate by means of these, that is, 
general properties like existence because of ambiguity. This is the restriction with 
regard to the indicator.”  
(1)pādas abc are quoted in the original Sanskrit at NCV 674,23ff (yat tvayoktam), 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 72a5-6: tathetyādinā … nātivartata iti na vyabhicaratīty arthaḥ. PS 
II:17 also occurs in NM as verse 18, cf. T 1628 3c12-13, T 1629 8a6-7; Frauwallner 
1982: 778.  
(2)That is, general and particular properties, cf. PSṬ Ms B 72a6: sāmānyaviśeṣa-
dharmāḥ.  
(3)Sanskrit equivalents inserted according to Ms B 72a6, 72b1.  
 
193 The reading źes bya ba bsdu ba'i tshigs su bcad pa 'o V 116,3 indicating that 
PS V 12-13 are saṅgrahaślokas is dubious because these verses introduce topics that 
have not been dealt with in any of the preceding paragraphs. The purpose of a 
sagrahaśloka is to summarize the discussion of topics that have been addressed 
previously, and this is, to the best of my knowledge, how they are used by Dignāga 
in other sections of PSV. The introduction of the term in V therefore contradicts its 
use in PSV in general, and thus corroborates its omission in K, which I have decided 
to follow. In addition, Mallavādi quotes the verses immediately after citing PSV 
V:34-35 §§ 47-48 (cf. NCV 652-53), and Siṃhasūri merely restricts himself to 
explaining that Dignāga indicates the purpose of the preceding exposition in two 
ślokas (cf. NCV 653,15: āha cety etam arthaṃ ślokadvayena darśayati), thus 




ślokas. The introductory āha ca seems to indicate that Dignāga quotes them from 
another treatise (presumably the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa) to corroborate his conclu-
sion at PS V:11d because, as indicated above, they presuppose some of the funda-
mental theoretical issues of the apoha theory, which he will address at PSV V:34f. 
 
[76] yady anyāpohamātram <śabdārthaḥ>, katham <nīlotpalādiśabdānāṃ(1) 
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ syād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaś ca>. kathaṃ ca na syāt? yasmād 
bhinnam <apohyaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdānām>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 208a7: 
yady anyāpohamātram ityādi; 208b1: katham iti … kathaṃ ca na syāt.  
(1)sgra rnams la K : sgra la V. 
 
194 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 208b1-2: apohyabhedena sāhacaryād arthabhedaṃ darśayati. 
eṣa hetuḥ: ye bhinnārthā na te samānādhikaraṇā nāpi viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhūtāḥ, 
ghaṭapaṭādiśabdavat. tathā ca nīlotpalādayaḥ śabdāḥ: “He shows that difference of 
referent is due to its concomitance with difference of excluded referent. The reason 
is as follows: [Words] whose referents are different are neither co-referential nor 
related as qualifier and qualified, like words such as 'pot' or 'cloth'. And 
expressions like 'blue lotus' are the same.”  
Uddyotakara's criticism of Dignāga's view at NV 334,6-12 sheds more light on 
the assumptions that may have motivated the opponent's criticism: nīlotpalaśab-
dayoḥ ca pradhānatvād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvānupapattāv viśeṣaṇasya pūrvanipāta 
ity ubhayoḥ pradhānatvād na prāptiḥ. … samānādhikaraṇārthaś ca anyāpohavād-
inā vācyaḥ. yasya ca anyāpohaḥ śabdārthas tena anīlānutpalavyudāsau kathaṃ 
samānādhikaraṇau iti vaktavyaḥ: “And in that the qualifier-qualified relation of the 
words 'blue' and 'lotus' is not justified because they are [both] primary, it does not 
follow that the qualifier is placed first in the compound(1) because both are primary 
… And the upholder of the theory of exclusion should explain what co-referential 
means. For one who claims that the referent of a word is exclusion of other 
[referents] should explain how the two exclusions of non-blue and non-lotus are co-
referential.” And Uddyotakara continues explaining that it only makes sense to talk 
about co-reference on the assumption that the two words denote a substance as 
qualified by a general property and a quality because a general property and a 
quality are resident in it, whereas this is not the case with the two exclusions of non-
blue and non-lotus. Consequently there is no referent with regard to which the two 
exclusions are co-referential, cf. op. cit. 334,10-12: yasya punar vidhīyamānaḥ 
śabdārthas tasya jātiguṇaviśiṣṭaṃ nīlotpalaśabdābhyām dravyam abhidhīyate jāti-
guṇau ca dravye vartete na punar anīlānutpalavyudāsau. tasmāt samānādhikara-
ṇārtho nāsti. It is thus clear that Uddyotakara assumes that Dignāga considers the 
relation between nīla and utpala to be symmetrical, both terms being primary, cf. 
vārtt 1 ad A II 1:57 according to which each term is qualifier as well as qualified (on 
this view, v. below no. 203). Thus the distinction between primary and secondary 
terms in a compound is obliterated, and thus pūrvanipāta of the qualifier does not 
entail(2). A similar view is expressed by Kumārila, who objects that the qualifier-
qualified relation is impossible because the exclusion of non-lotus is not implicit in 
the negation of non-blue and vice versa, and because the two words that function as 
qualifier and qualified are without denotable object. Moreover, co-reference is 
impossible because of the difference of the exclusions, and co-reference presupposes 
identity of the referent to which the two terms refer. If it is claimed that there is co-





two exclusions because it is assumed that only sāmānyalakṣaṇa is denotable; cf. ŚV 
Apoha° 115cd-18ab: nīlotpalādiśabdeṣu śabalārthābhidhāyiṣu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatva-
sāmānādhikaraṇyayoḥ na siddhiḥ, na hy anīlatvavyudāse 'nutpalacyutiḥ. nāpi tatre-
taras tasmān na viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇe śabdayor nāpi te syātām abhidheyānapekṣayoḥ 
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca na bhinnatvād apohayoḥ. Karṇakagomin expounds Kumā-
rila's objections in a prose version at PVVṬ 188,8ff. For this criticism, cf. PV I 131-
133; TS 966-970; TS 1097.  
(1)For the technical term pūrvanipāta, cf. DSG s.v., Renou, Terminologie s.v. 
pūrva.  
(2)Karṇakagomin quotes Uddyotakara's objection at PVVṬ 261,27ff on PVSV 
65,10ff. 
 
[77] <eṣa doṣo nāsti>(1)te 'pi hi. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 208b2: te pi hītyādi.  
(1)Cf. ñes pa 'di ni med de de dag kyaṅ K : ñes pa de dag ni yod pa ma yin te V, 
conflating two separate clauses. 
 
[78] apohyabhedād bhinnārthāḥ svārthabhedagatau jaḍāḥ, ekatrābhinnakārya-
tvād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyakāḥ(1). Qu. NCV 732,21-22, TSP 397,5-6, cf. PSṬ Ms B 208b2-
3: yady apy apohyabhedād bhinnārthās tathāpi viśeṣo 'sti, yasmāt svārthabheda-
gatau jaḍāḥ … ata ekatrābhinnakāryatvāt sāmānādhikaraṇyam.  
(1)°viśeṣyakāḥ NCV :°viśeṣyatāḥ TSP. 
 
195 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 208b3: pratyekam iti śeṣaḥ. 
 
196 Cf. T 174,19-13 (om. Ms B 208b3f): “'Own referent' means the general 
property (sāmānyam). For the referent of the word 'lotus' is the mere lotus 
(utpalamātram). Its particulars are the red lotuses (*raktotpala), etc. And the 
referent of the word 'blue' is only a blue thing (*nīlamātram), and its particulars are 
bees (*bhramara), etc. 'Incapable of' (jaḍāḥ), means that they are causes of doubt 
(*saṃśayahetavaḥ).  
 
[79] <nīlotpālādiśabdā hi> saty apy apohyabhede svārthaviśeṣavyañjanārtham 
ūrdhvatākākanilayavat svam apohārtham ekatropasaṃharantaḥ <samānādhi-
karaṇā bhavanti>. tathā hi te pratyekaṃ svārthaviśeṣe saṃśayahetavaḥ, śabdān-
tarasahitavyaṅgyārthāsambhavāc ca <viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya>bhūtāḥ(2). Restored, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 209a5-209b: saty api apohyabheda ity atrāpi pūrvavad apohayabhe-
denārthabheda darśayati. svārthaviśeṣavyaṅgyārtham ... ūrdhvatākākanilayavat 
svam apohārtham iti ... ekatropasaṃharanta iti ... tathā hi ta(1) iti ... pratyekaṃ 
... svārthaviśeṣe saṃśayahetavaḥ ... śabdāntarasahitavyaṅgyārthāsambhavāc 
cetyādi. 
(1) ta em. : taṃ Ms 
(2) For bhūtāḥ, cf. no. 204 below. 
 
197 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 209a6-209b1: nīlotpalādāv arthaviśeṣe viśeṣaṇatvena 
khyāpayantaḥ nīlotpalādayo hi śabdāḥ saha prayujyamānā nīlotpalādipratibhāsaṃ 
vijñāne 'rpayanto nīlotpalādāv arthe svārthasāmānyaṃ nīlotpalādiviśeṣaṇatveno-
pasaṃharantaḥ pratipattbhiḥ pratīyante. tatas tatpratītivaśād evam uktam. 
Kumārila and Dharmakīrti use the term upasaṃhāra in similar contexts at ŚV 




44,2-5, respectively: tadabhinnam ekākāraviṣayīkaraṇe apy aniścitānyākāram 
ākārāntarasākāṅkṣabuddhigrāhyaṃ bhinnaśabdārthopasaṃhāre apy abhinnaṃ 
buddhau pratibhāti iti sāmānyaviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva sāmānādhikaraṇyāni yathā-
pratīti na virudhyante. 
Cf. the related discussion at PSṬ Ms B 208b5-209a5, which is written with the 
background of Dharmakīrti's philosophy: utpalaśabdena svārthaviśeṣasaṃśaya-
hetunā svārthasāmānye buddhāv āropite, so 'rtho paricchinnānyākāratvād ākārān-
tarasākāṅkṣayā buddhyā paricchidyate: yad etad utpalaṃ kim etad nīlam uta 
raktam iti? ata ākāṅkṣāvicchedāya nīlaśabdaḥ prayujyamānas tatra svārtham 
upasaṃharaṇa utpalārthaṃ viśinaṣṭi: yad etad utpalaṃ nīlam etat, na raktam iti 
bhavati viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ. ayam atrārthaḥ: śabdānāṃ yad abhidheyaṃ 
buddhipratibhāsātmakam apy adhyavasitabāhyārthasvabhāvam. tad bhinnaśabdār-
thopasaṃhāre 'py anekadharmānuyatam abhinnam iva pratibhāsate tataś ca nīlot-
palādayaḥ śabdās tathāvidham arthapratibimbakam buddhāv arpayanta ekam eva 
vastu nīlotpalatvādyanekadharmakaṃ prakāśayantīti bhrāntair vyavahartbhiḥ 
pratīyante. tato yathāpratīti teṣāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na virudhyate. evaṃ ca 
bauddhaḥ śabdārtho nīlādyekataraśabdaprayogād avasitaikanīlādyākāro 'py 
aniścitāparaviśeṣatvād viśeṣāntarasākāṅkṣāyā buddhyā paricchidyate: yad etan 
nīlaṃ kim idam utpalam utānyad bhramarādikam ity evamādikayā. ata ākāṅkṣāvic-
chedāya nīlaśabdena sahotpalādayaḥ śabdāḥ prayujyamānā nīlotpalādipratibhāsa-
vijñānaṃ janayanto nīlādyākāraṃ vastv anutpalāder arthāmtarād vyavacchindan-
tīty adhyavasīyante. tataḥ pratītyanurodhena viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo 'py upapadyata 
iti.  
 
198 That is, the general properties blueness and lotushood, cf. PSṬ Ms B 209a6: 
nīlasāmānyam utpalasāmānyaṃ ca.  
 
199 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 209a5-6: svārthaviśeṣo nīlotpalādiśabdānāṃ nīlotpalādiḥ. 
tadabhivyaṅgyartham anenābhinnakāryatvam āha.  
 
200 Dignāga mentions this example to explain how the two terms 'nīla' and 
'utpala' whose scope each separately differ completely, generates certainty about 
the referent, when they are combined as nīlotpala. The general property uprightness 
in itself does not generate certainty about which referent is qualified. Without 
context it is a cause of doubt because uprightness applies to different referents like 
humans or trunks. If, however, it is combined with the term ‘crow's nest’ the 
applicability of ‘uprightness’ is by implication limited to trunks; Cf. PSṬ Ms B 
209b1-3: ūrdhvatānūrdhvavyavacchedenordhvasāmānyaṃ pratipādayantī sthāṇu-
puruṣādyūrdhva<tā>bhede saṃśayahetuḥ. kākanīlayanam apy akākāspadayogya-
vastuvyavacchedena kākāvasthānayogyavastumātraṃ pratyāyayat tadviśeṣeṣu 
sthāṇusthaṇḍilādiṣu sandehahetuḥ sahitayos tu tayor apuruṣarūpa ūrdhvatāviśeṣe 
niścayahetutvāt sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ. yathā tathā nīlotpalādiśabdānām ekasminn 
arthe pūrvoktena vidhinā tad bhavati: “‘Uprightness’ which communicates knowl-
edge about the general property of being upright by excluding [things that are] not 
upright is a cause of doubt with respect to the difference of the uprightness of a 
trunk or a human being, etc. ‘Crow's nest’ which only imparts knowledge about a 
referent that is suitable as the habitat of a crow by excluding such referents that are 
not suitable as the abode of a crow is also a cause of doubt as to its particulars like a 





a cause of ascertainment with regard to the particular of uprightness that has the 
form of something non-human. It is the same in every case with regard to a single 
object of expressions like ‘blue lotus’ in accordance with the abovementioned rule.”  
Dignāga mentions the same example at PSV III 44ff: 
K (Kitagawa 1973 505,16f = P 135a6): dper na mtho yor la 'greṅ ba daṅ bya 
rog la gnas pa dag bsdoms pa ltu bu 'o.  
V (Kitagawa 1973 505,17f = P 49a7): dper na bslaṅ ba'i rnam pa daṅ bya babs 
pa gñis gcig tu 'dus pa las mtho yor du śes pa lta bu 'o?  
K (Kitagawa 1973 509,7-8 = P 136b2): de ltar yaṅ 'greṅ ba yin la bya rog gnas 
pa'i phyir mtho yor du rtogs (P gtogs) pa mthoṅ gi, 'ba' (P 'ga') źig pa la mi nus pa 
med pa'phyir ro.  
V (Kitagawa 1973 509,8-9 = P 53a5-6): 'di ltar 'greṅ ba daṅ bya ba babs pa las 
mtho yor du rtogs pa mthoṅ ba ni kha yar ba las ṅes par mi nus pa'i phyir ro.  
Cf. NCV 722,25-26: yathā ūrdhvatvaṃ sāmānyaṃ “sthāṇuḥ syāt, puruṣaḥ syāt” 
iti saṃśayahetuḥ, śakunanilayanaṃ “sthāṇur eva” iti niścayahetur viśiṣṭatvāt, 
vastrasaṃyamanaṃ vā “puruṣa eva” iti: For instance, the general property upright-
ness is a cause of doubt “maybe it is a trunk or a human being”? 'Bird's nest' is a 
cause of ascertainment “it is definitely a human being” because of being qualified, 
or 'clothing' [is a cause of ascertainment]: “It is definitely a human being”! Cf. also 
NCV 605,15; 677,29-678,7-10; PSṬ Ms B 142a7: kākanilayanaṃ hi puruṣādibhyo 
vyavacchidya sthāṇusthaṇḍilayoḥ kevalaṃ saṃśayahetuḥ. Ūrdhvatāsahitaṃ tu 
sthāṇau <so read : °o Ms> niścayahet<ur> dṣṭaṃ (so read : °udṣ° Ms). sthāṇu-
grahaṇaṃ cātrāpu<ru>ṣasyordhvatā sāmānyasyopalakṣaṇārthaṃ; ŚV Anumāna° 
94cd-95ab: kvacit saṃśayahetū yau pratyekatvena lakṣitau. saṅghāte nirṇayas 
tābhyām ūrdhvatākākavattvavat. ŚVṬ (Umveka) 328,18-19 (ad loc.): sthāṇur ayam 
ūrdhvatve sati kākanilayanāt. ŚV Vākya° 363: padārthā gamayanty etam pratyekaṃ 
saṃśaye sati. sāmastye nirṇayotpādāt sthāṇumūrddhasthakākavat.  
 
201 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 209b3: pratyekaṃ(1) svārthaviśeṣe saṃśayahetutvam 
arthāpattyā ca sahitānāṃ niścayahetutvam āha.  
(1)°aṃ em. : °a Ms  
 
202 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 209b5-7: śabdāntareṇa nīlaśabdena sahitasyotpalaśabdasya 
vyaṅgyo yo viśiṣṭo 'rthaḥ, sa kevalasyotpalaśabdasya na sambhavati. evaṃ 
nīlaśabdasyāpy utpalaśabdasahitasya yo vyaṅgyaḥ, sa kevalasya na sambhavatīti. 
śabdāntarasannidhānena viśiṣṭārthavtteḥ parasparaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ 
yathordhvatākākanīlayanayoḥ sahitayor eva viśiṣṭārthapratyāyane: “The specific 
referent of the word 'lotus' that is to be manifested when [the word 'lotus' is] 
associated with another word such as the word 'blue' is not possible for the word 
'lotus' in isolation. In the same way [the particular referent] of the word 'blue' that 
is to be manifested in association with the word 'lotus' is not possible for it in 
isolation either. Thus, since they refer to a distinct referent because of being 
juxtapposed with another word they are mutually related as qualifier and qualified in 
the same way as 'uprightness' and 'crow's nest' only indicate a distinct referent 
when they are associated.”  
Dignāga's view that each term in a compound like nīlotpala is related to the 
other as qualifier and qualified is historically related to the view Patañjali expounds 
at Mahā-bh I 399,4ff on vārtt 1 ad A II.1:57, according to which both terms in a 




ubhayaviśeṣaṇatvād ubhayoś ca viśeṣyatvād upasarjanasyāprasiddhiḥ. kṣṇatilā iti. 
kṣṇaśabdo 'yaṃ tilaśabdenābhisambadhyamāno viśeṣyavacanaḥ sampadyate. tathā 
tilaśabdaḥ kṣṇaśabdenābhisambadhyamāno viśeṣyavacanaḥ sampadyate. tad 
ubhayaṃ viśeṣaṇaṃ bhavaty ubhayaṃ ca viśeṣyam. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at 
Nyāsa Vol. 2: 76,19-22 reflects the Buddhist Dignāgan point of view: atra nīlārtho 
bhramarādibhyo vyāvartyotpalārthenotpale vyavasthāpyate. utpalārtho 'pi raktot-
palādibhyo vyāvartya nīlārthena nīle vyavasthāpyata ity asti pratyekaṃ viśeṣaṇa-
viśeṣyabhāvaḥ. sa yatra nāsti tatra tu na samāsaḥ. yathā vkṣaḥ śiṃśapeti: “In this 
case the referent of 'blue' is restricted to lotus together with the referent of ‘lotus’, 
having been excluded from bees, etc. The referent of ‘lotus’ too is restricted to blue 
together with the referent of ‘blue,' having been excluded from red lotus, etc. Thus 
each is related [to the other] as qualifier and qualified. Where this is not the case, 
there is no compound, like śiṃśapā is a tree.” Dignāga's view that each of the terms 
generates doubt as to the particular referent it denotes and that only their combined 
exclusions manifest the referent is related to a similar discussion at VP III.14:10-11 
which addresses the problems discussed at Mahā-bh loc. cit.: sāmānyānām 
asambandhāt tau viśeṣe vyavasthitau, rūpābhedād viśeṣaṃ tam abhivyaṅktuṃ na 
śaknutaḥ. tāv evaṃ sannipatitau bhedena pratipādane, avacchedam ivādhāya 
saṃśayaṃ vyapakarṣataḥ. 
 
203 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 209b7: arthānām eva parasparaṃ viśeṣyabhāvo loke pratītaḥ, 
na śabdānām. tat kathaṃ sa teṣāṃ teṣāṃ vyavasthāpyate, ity āśaṃkhyamānasya 
bhūtagrahaṇam. bhūtaśabda upamānavācī.  
 
[80] yat tarhi tad ekādhikaraṇaṃ(1). Qu. Ms B 210a2.  
(1)ekādhi° em. (cf. gźi cig pa can T; gźi gcig pa yin K : gźi gcig la [sic] V) : ekaṃ 
adhi° Ms 
 
204 The opponent addresses Dignāga's assumption that the two terms ‘blue’ and 
‘lotus’ together manifest the denoted referent blue lotus, by pointing out that this 
claim is in conflict with the well-known use of analytical strings (vigraha) in 
grammatical literature to explain the meaning of compounds like nīlotpalam as 
nīlaṃ ca tad utpalaṃ ca, which isolates the two terms as well as their denotations 
showing their syntactical agreement, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a2-3: vigrahakāle nīlaṃ ca 
tad utpalaṃ ceti kriyate. ataḥ praśnaḥ. etena yad uktaṃ “śabdāntarasahitenaiva 
śabdena viśiṣṭo 'rtho 'bhivyaṅgya” ity(1) atrābhyupetabādhām āha.  
The term adhikaraṇa is used in this context and throughout in the following 
discussion to denote a concrete object (dravya) like in Mahā-bh, cf. Renou, 
Terminologie, s.v. 
(1)'rtho 'bhivyaṅgya ity conj. : °ṭor ty Ms 
 
[81] na ca(1) tat kevalaṃ nīlaṃ na ca kevalam utpalam, samudāyābhidheyatvāt. 
Qu. TSP 379,22-23, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a3-5: na ca tat kevalaṃ nīlam iti … na ca 
kevalam utpalam iti … samudāyābhidheyatvād iti. 
(1)ca Ms (de ni T) : hi TSP. 
 
205 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a4: tathā hi nīlaśabdena kevalenotpalaśabdena ca kevalena 





(1)nīlaṃ ca kevalam conj. (cf. snoṅ po 'ba' źig pa daṅ u tpal la 'ba' źig pa T) : 
om. Ms  
 
206 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a5-6: yasmāt sahitābhyām eva nīlotpalaśabdābhyāṃ so 
'rtho 'bhidheyo na kevalābhyām. anyathaikasya tadarthābhidhāyitve paryāyaśabda-
vat dvayoḥ sahaprayogo nopapadyeta. tad etena vigrahakāle 'pi sahitābhyām eva 
nīlotpalaśabdābhyāṃ tadvācyam ity abhyupagamān nābhyupetabādheti darśayati.  
 
[82] nīlotpalaśabdābhyāṃ <hi> sahitābhyāṃ sa <pratīyate>(1), na 
kevalābhyām.(2) Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a5, q.v. above no 207. 
(1)Cf. de … rtogs pa yin gyi K : sbyar bar bya ba'i V.  
(2)K and V are syntacticaly confused, cf. bsdus pa dag K : mtha' dag la V. In 
any case, it is clear from the paraphrase at Ms B 210a5 that either expression 
qualifies snoṅ po daṅ u tpala la'i sgra dag las V : u tpala daṅ snoṅ po'i sgra dag las 
K. 
 
207 Cf. de K : om. V (PN so; DC conjecture de, presumably on the basis of K). 
 
[83] <kevalau hi> varṇavat tau nirarthakau. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a7: 
varṇavat tau(1) nirarthakau.  
(1)varṇavat tau conj. (cf. yi ge bźin du TK, kha dog bźin du V) : varṇṇāvarṇṇau 
Ms 
 
208 Cf. kha yar ba ni V : 'ba' źig pa dag la K. 
 
209 Cf. the discussion at Mahā-bh I 31,11-12 on vārtt 14 ad Śivasūtra 5: 
anarthakās tu prativarṇam arthānupalabdheḥ. anarthakās tu varṇāḥ. kutaḥ? 
prativarṇam arthānupalabdheḥ. na hi prativarṇam arthā upalabhyante. kim idaṃ 
prativarṇam? varṇam varṇaṃ prati prativarṇam. 
 
[84] yathaiva hi. Qu. Ms B 210a7. 
 
210 Cf. ni la brjod pa la V : sṅon pa brjod (so read with P; ed. yod) pa K. 
 
211 Cf. de bźin du 'di la yaṅ ṅo V : de bźin du 'dir yin no K. 
 
[85] viṣama upanyāsaḥ(1). na hi …. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a7: viṣama 
upanyāsa iti. Ms B 210b1: na hītyādi.  
(1)Cf. mi mtshuṅs pa bkod pa yin te K : om. V. 
 
212 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a7-210b1: dṣṭāntavaiṣamyam āha. kathaṃ viṣama iti? 
āha: na hītyādi. etenābhyupetahānim āha. nīlaśabdasya kevalasyāpy 
arthavattvenābhyupagamāt.  
 
[86] varṇe na kaścid arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye, tadvācya iti tatrāpi 
kevalaṃ sa pratīyate. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b1-2: varṇe na kaścid arthaś ced 






213Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b2: tatrāpi nīlaśabde yo 'rtho gamyate sa nīlaśabdavācya 
iti kevalaṃ pratīyate, na tu samudāyārtho nīlaśabdavācyatvena pratīyata ity arthaḥ:  
 
[87] yathaiva hi. Qu. Ms B 210b3. 
 
214 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b2-3: ata eva samudāyārthaśūnyatāṃ kevalayor darśayann 
āha: yathaiva hītyādi. 
 
[88] yat tūktaṃ … tatrāpi. Qu. Ms B 210b3: yat tūktam ityādinā … tatrāpītyādinā. 
 
215 Since Jinendrabuddhi explains that the sentence beginning with yat tūktam 
repeats the pūrvapakṣa, it is obvious that the readings ji skad du ni daṅ la'i sgra cuṅ 
zad kyaṅ don gyi rtogs (so read) pa mi bskyed do źes pa bźin no źe na V are 
preferable to sṅon po'i sgras don 'ga źig rtogs pa yin no K; cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b3-5: 
yat tūktam ityādinā pūrvapakṣaṃ pratyuccārya tatrāpītyādinā tadvācya ityāder 
uttarārdhasyārtham ācaṣṭe.  
 
216 Cf. de la yaṅ rigs sṅon po'i (so read : V po ni) sgra'i brjod bya'o źes yaṅ gar 
ba rtogs par bya ste V : de la yaṅ rigs 'ba' źig sṅon po'i sgras brjod pa'i phyir 'ba' 
źig rtogs pa yin no K.  
 
217 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b3-4: jātir nīlaguṇasamavāyinī nīlatvam. kevalagrahaṇena 
samudāyārthaśūnyatām āha: “The general property inherent in the blue quality is 
blueness. By using the [word] 'alone' he explains that it is empty of the referent of 
the aggregate.” 
 
218 The Tibetan translations of this clause in KV are syntactically ambiguous, cf. 
de'i yon tan daṅ ldan pa daṅ rdzas daṅ ldan par brjod par bya ba yin par rigs pa'i 
phyir K : yon tan de'i brjod bya daṅ ldan pa yin na ni rdzas ldan pa'i ldan pa yaṅ 
yin pas V. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation, however, leaves no doubt about the nature 
of the argument, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b4-5: nīlaśabdavācyayā jātyā yukto guṇo vā 
yatra sā samavetā, jātiyuktena guṇena yuktaṃ dravyaṃ vā yatra nīlaguṇaḥ 
samavetaḥ: sarvaṃ cedaṃ na samudāyasyārthaḥ: “The quality as connected to the 
general property [blueness] that is denotable by the word 'blue' or [the quality] in 
which [the general property blueness] is inherent, the substance as connected to the 
quality as connected to the general property [blueness] or [the substance] in which 
the blue quality is inherent: all of this is not the referent of the aggregate.”  
Dignāga evidently wants to point out that the denotation of the word 'nīla' is 
neither the blue quality as connected to the general property blueness nor the 
substance as connected to the blue quality. On this interpretation it seems reasonable 
to assume that a negation is missing in KV. The suggested translation is based on 
the conj. mi rigs pa'i phyir : rigs pa'i phyir K. 
 
[89] arthaśūnyaiḥ samudayair. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b6: arthaśūnyair iti … 
samudayair iti. 
 
[90] bhinnaśabdavācyenārthena(1) bhinnārthā ity ucyante. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms 
B 210b6-7: kathaṃ tarhy “apohyabhedāt bhinnārthā” (14a) ity ucyanta ity āha: 





kevalanīlādiśabdarthavācyenārthena bhinnārthā ity ucyante. na tu 
samudāyārtheneti.  
(1)V misinterprets arthena as don gyi śugs kyis, i.e., “by implication.” 
 
219 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b6-7: bhinnaḥ pthagbhūtaḥ kevala iti yāvat.  
 
220 Jinendrabuddhi closes his comment on this paragraph with a brief discussion 
of the implications of Dignāga's view of co-reference and the qualifier-qualified 
relation, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b7-211a2: yadi tarhi samudāyavācya eva viśiṣṭo 'rthaḥ, 
tat kathaṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ viśeṣa<ṇa>viśeṣyabhāvo vā yavatā bhedādhi-
ṣṭhānam. ubhayam apīdaṃ(1) bhinnāśrayaṃ(2) samudāyaś caikaḥ? Parikalpasamā-
ropitāvayavasadbhāvād ubhayaṃ vyavasthāpyate. vakṣyate caitad “apoddhāre 
padasyāyam artho vikalpita”(2) (= PS V 46ab) iti. pratipattrabhiprāyavaśena vā. 
pratipattāro hy ubhayaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭasyaikasyaivārthasya dvāv imau śabdau pra-
tyekaṃ vācakāv iti manyante. tatas tadabhiprāyavaśāt tathā vyavasthāpyate(2).  
(1)Ms so, but ’di gñis ka ni T would suggest reading hīdaṃ as Tib. ni generally 
translates Sanskrit hi. 
(2) bhinnāśrayaṃ conj (cf. tha dad pa’i rten can T) : om. Ms 
(2)em. (cf. PS V 46ab) : apodvāre yad anyāṣ?aṃ vākṣād arthe vikalpita Ms. T is 
based upon a similarly corrupted text and the translation is consequently 
incomprehensible. One wonders if the translator himself could make sense of it, cf. 
177,36-37: 'di ni sel ba'i sgo la gaṅ 'di'i 'di dag las don du brtags pa 'o źes 'chad 
par 'gyur ro. 
(2)em. : °sthā kriyam Ms 
 
[91] arthāntaro hi(1) <śabdārtho nopapadyate. kathaṃ ktvā?>. Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 211a3: arthantaretyādi.  
(1)°aro hi conj., cf. don gźan ni K : don gźan la ni V, which suggests the reading 
arthāntare.  
 
221 That is, something different from 'exclusion of other (referents)' like a 
general property, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a3: yad anyāpohād anyaj jātyādikam 
abhidheyam iṣyate.  
 
[92] <tayor hy> avayavārthayor(1) adhikaraṇaṃ tato bhinnaṃ syād abhinnaṃ vā. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a3-4: avayavārhayor iti … tayor adhikaraṇaṃ … tata iti 
… bhinnaṃ syād abhinnaṃ veti.  
(1)Cf. de'i yan lag gi don dag K : de la ni yan lag daṅ yan lag can gyi don dag V. 
 
222 Namely the aggregate as object, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a3: samudāyābhidheyo yo 
'rthas.  
 
223That is, the denotable objects of the separate terms 'nīla', and so on, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 211a3: kevalanīlādiśabdavācyayoḥ.  
 
224 That is, because there is no third option with regard to a substantially existent 





225 Namely, from the two component referents consisting of the two general 
properties, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a4: jātyām avayavārthābhyām. According to the 
translations of KV—both equally confused—it is the general properties as referents 
that may or may not be different from the referent (adhikaraṇa). 
 
[93] <tatra tāvad na bhinnam, yasmāt> samudāyaikatā(1) nāsti mitho 'bheda-
prasaṅgataḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a4: tatrābhedapakṣe doṣāpadarśanāyāha 
samudāyaikatā(1) nāstīti. kuta ity āha: mitho bhedaprasaṅgata iti.  
(1)°aikatā em. (cf. gcig ñid V Ms T: gcig ni K) : °aika Ms  
 
226 Cf. gaṅ gi phyir K : 'di ltar V. 
 
227 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a5: samudāyinoḥ parasparam abhedaprasaṅga ity arthaḥ.  
 
[94] yadi hi. Qu. Ms B 211a5. 
 
228 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b1: yad anekasamudāyo na sa vastutaḥ, kalpita eva tu 
ṣaṇṇagarīvat(1).  
(1)Cf. A II 1:51. 
 
229 Cf. thal bar 'gyur ro K : om. V. 
 
230 Cf. gcig las K : don gcig las V. 
 
[95] samūhānekatāsakteḥ(1). Qu. Ms B 211a7.  
(1)Cf. 'gyur (sic.; read thal) phyir K : thal bar 'gyur V. 
 
[96] samūhasya <cā>(1)nekasmād abhedād anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ. <tataś ca nāsti>. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a7-211b1: samūhasya jātiguṇasamudāyasyānekasmād 
avayavād abhedād anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ.  
(1)Cf. yaṅ K : om. V. 
 
[97] nīlotpalārthayoḥ. Qu. Ms B 211a7. 
 
231 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b1: nīlotpalārthayor iti bahuvrīhiḥ. nīlotpalābhidhāyinoḥ 
śabdayor ity arthaḥ. 
 
[98] ekatrāpi vartamānau <śabdau svārthaṃ na tyajataḥ>(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 211b1: ekatrāpi vartamānāv iti.  
(1)or: hāyakau. 
 
232That is, in the compound ‘nīlotpala,’ cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b1-2: ekaminn api 
śabdasamudāye 'vayavabhāvena vartamānāv ity arthaḥ. 
 
[99] samuditayor api. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b2: nīlotpalaśabdayoḥ 
samuditayor apīti. 
 






233 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b2: bhinnārthatvāt. yathā ghaṭapaṭaśabdayoḥ sāmānā-
dhikaraṇyaṃ nāsti, tathā nīlotpalaśabdayoḥ samuditayor apīti.  
 
[101] <eṣa doṣo nāsti>. dvāv api <viśeṣārthau> sāmānye viśeṣāntarbhāvāt. 
tulyarūpau <sāmānyārthena>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b3: sāmānye 
viśeṣāntarbhāvād iti; 211b4: dvāv api nīlotpalaśabdau; Ms B 211b5: tulyarūpāv 
(1)ityādi.  
(1)em. : tulyarūpetvityādi Ms 
 
234 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b3-5: nīlam iti sāmāṇyaṃ; tadviśeṣā utpalādayaḥ; te 
tatrāntarbhūtāḥ(1). nīlotpalaśabdau hi sāmānyābhidhānau viśeṣam antarbhāvya 
vartete, tasmāt sāmānye viśeṣā antarbhūtā iti. te 'pi nīlotpalaśabdayor arthāḥ. tad 
evaṃ dvāv api nīlotpalaśabdau nīlotpalārthavantau(3). tataś ca svārthāparityāge 'pi 
na kaścid doṣaḥ: “Blue is a general property; its particulars are lotus, etc.; they are 
included in that. For the words 'blue' and 'lotus' that denote two general properties 
apply by including the particular. Therefore the particulars are included in the 
general; for they too are the referents of the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’. In those 
circumstances both of them viz. the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ have as their referent 
the blue lotus. And therefore there is no problem even if they give up their own 
referent.”  
(1)°āntar° em. : °āṃr° Ms  
(2)°ānyābhi° em. : °am abhi°.  
(3)°palārthavantau em. (cf.u tpal la sṅon po don daṅ ldan pa dag go T) : 
palenāvyavṃtau Ms 
 
 [102] viśeṣārthavattvajñāpanārthaṃ(1) dvitīyaśabdaprayogaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 211b6, q.v. no. 236.  
(1)Cf. don gyi bye brag daṅ ldan pa śes par bya ba' i phyir V : khyad par gyi don 
śes par bya ba'i don du K. 
 
235 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b5-6: yadi tarhi sāmānyaśabdo 'pi viśeṣārthas tata eva 
viśeṣāvagamāt dvitīyaśabdaprayogaḥ kimartham? ity āha: tulyarūpāv ityādi. 
yenaiva rūpeṇa nīlaśabdo nīlatvam āha, tenaiva nīlotpalam ity api. atas tasya 
<tulya>rūpatvān(1) na jñāyate: kim ayaṃ sāmānyārtha eva atha(2) viśeṣārtho 
'pīti(3); viśeṣārthavattvajñāpanārthaṃ dvitīyaśabdaprayogaḥ: “In that case, if it has 
a particular as its referent even though it is a general term, what is the reason why 
the second word is applied since the particular is understood from this? To this 
[question] he answers: “They have a form that is identical with,” etc. The word 
‘blue’ also denotes the blue lotus in the same form in which it denotes blueness. 
Therefore one does not know whether it only has the general property as its referent 
or whether it also has a particular as its referent because its form is the same. Thus 
the application of the second word is for the purpose of making known the fact that 
they have a particular as their referent.”  
(1)tulya° conj. (cf. ṅo bo mtshuṅs pa T) : om. Ms  
(2)atha em. : hata Ms  
(3)°īti em. : °īhi Ms  
 
[103] atra tāvad nīlaśabden<ābheden>ābhidhīyate, na jātiḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms 





236 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b7-212a1: nīlaśabdena hi nīlajātir abhidhīyate tadyukto vā 
guṇaḥ, na tūtpalādidravyajātiḥ. tasyāś(1) ca viśeṣā raktotpalādayaḥ, na nīlaguṇasya 
tatsamavāyino vā nīlatvasya, tataḥ kathaṃ nīlaśabdārthe nīlotpalādīnām antar-
bhāvaḥ syāt: “For the word 'blue' denotes the general property blueness or the 
quality connected to it, but not the general property substanceness of a lotus and so 
on; and the red lotus, and so on, are its [viz. the general property substanceness], 
[they are] not [particulars] of the blue quality or the blueness inherent in it. 
Therefore, how could the blue lotus, and so on, be included in the referent of the 
word 'blue'?”  
(1)T reproduces tasyās as de las sic. 
 
 [104] <na hi nīlaśabdo dravyajātiṃ> sāmānyenāha, <kuto viśeṣasya dravyajātāv 
antarbhūtaḥ kalpyeta(1)>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a1: sāmānyenāhety; 211b7-
212a1, q.v. no. 237 above. 
(1)brtag V : brtags pa K. 
 
237 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a1: abhinnaśabdasyārtham ācaṣṭe. tad etena ye nīla-
śabdārthasya bhedā na bhavanti, na te tatrāntarbhavanti, tadyathā balākādayaḥ. 
tathā ca nīlotpalādayo dravyajātiviśeṣā iti.  
 
[105] nanu ca nīlavad dravyaṃ sāmānyen<āha>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a2, 
q.v. no. 241 below. 
 
238 The reading balāka is supported by Ms, cf. no. 238 above. K and V are utterly 
confused, cf. ha li daṅ lā ba la sogs pa K : lā ba daṅ u tpa la dag kyaṅ V. 
 
239 Cf. u tpa la dag kyaṅ V : om. K. 
 
240 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a2: naiva hi nīlaśabdena nīlo guṇas tajjātir vābhidhīyate, 
kiṃ tarhi nīlaguṇavat sāmānyena dravyaṃ; tadbhedāś ca nīlotpalādaya ity 
anavadyam: “For the word ‘blue’ does not denote the blue quality or its general 
property, but rather [it denotes] in a general way the substance that possesses the 
blue quality; and the blue lotus, and so on, are its particulars. Thus it is 
unobjectionable.” 
 
[106] ayuktam evaṃ bhavitum. Qu. Ms B 212a3. 
 
[107] <kasmāt?> pūrvam uktatvāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a3-4: pūrvam 
uktatvād ityādi. 
 
241 Cf. ci'i phyir V : gaṅ gi phyir K. 
 
242 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a3-4: tadvatpakṣadarśanaṃ hīdam upanyastam. tac ca 







[108] <tadvadabhidhānaṃ hi(1) “tadvato nāsvatantratvād” (PS V:4a) 
ityevamādinā> pūrvam eva niṣiddham(2). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a3-4, q.v. 
above no. 243.  
(1)K and V are syntactically confused, cf. de daṅ ldan par brjod pa la (sic) ni V : 
de daṅ ldan pa ni K, and, subsequently de daṅ ldan par brjod pa ni. 
 (2)Cf. sṅar ñid du bkag pa yin no K : sṅar ñid du … ma grub par brjod do V. 
 
[109] tad ayuktam. Qu. Ms B 212a4. 
 
243 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a4: abhidheyatvena hy antarbhāva iṣṭaḥ, na ca viśeṣāṇāṃ 
sāmānyaśabdābhidheyatvaṃ sambhavati: “For it is claimed that [the particulars'] 
are included [in the general property] as denotable objects. And it is not possible that 
the particulars are the denotable objects of the general term.” 
 
[110] <kasmāt?> saṃśayāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a4: atra hetum āha: 
saṃśayād iti. 
 
[111] saṃśayo hi <sāmānyaśabdād viśeṣeṣu(1) dṣtaḥ>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
212a4: saṃśayo hītyādikam asyaiva vivaraṇam.  
(1)Cf. khyad par rnams la K : bye brag gi sgra rnams la (*viśeṣaśabdeṣu sic)V. 
 
[112] na ca yataḥ saṃśayas <tenābhidhānaṃ yuktam>(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
212a5: na ca yataḥ saṃśaya ityādy anvayasyopadarśanam.  
 (1)Cf. de yis brjod par rigs pa ma yin no V : de ni brjod par mi rigs so K. 
 
[113] syāt tv arthato <viśeṣaśabdāt sāmānyapratītiḥ, avyabhicārāt(1)>. Restored, 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a5: syāt tv arthata ityādi vyatirekasya.  
(1)Cf. mi 'khrul pa'i phyir V : 'khrul pa med par 'gyur ro K. V construes 
sāmānyapratītiḥ with avyabhicārāt, cf. spyi rtogs pa la mi 'khrul pa'i phyir V. 
 
244 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a6: arthata iti grahaṇaṃ sākṣād abhidhānasyābhimatatvāt: 
“The use of the expression ‘by implication’ is due to the fact that it is believed that it 
denotes directly.”  
  
245 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a5: śiṃśapāśabdārtho hi vkṣasāmānyāvyabhicārīti 
śiṃśapāśabdād arthato(1) vkṣasāmānyapratītir bhavati: “Since the referent of the 
word ‘śiṃśapā’ does not deviate from the general property tree, there is a cognition 
of the general property tree, which is caused by the word ‘śiṃśapā’ by implication.” 
(1) śabdād arthato em. (cf. sgra las don gyis T) : śabdārthato Ms 
 
[114] yat tarhīdam <uktam “antarbhūtaviśeṣaṃ sāmānyam” iti>, naitad <uktam 
abhidheyatvāt, kiṃ tarhi>(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b1: yat tarhīdam ityādi. 
yadi nāntarbhūtaviśeṣaṃ sāmānyaṃ, tat katham ayam āgamo na virudhyata ity 
abhiprāyaḥ. naitad ityādināgamaṃ gamayati.  
(1)etad is the correlative of yat. KV translate as if the relative clause represents a 
statement made by the opponent. 
 





246 Cf. til la sogs pa K : sṅon po la sogs pa la V. 
 
[116] paryāye gatir ekasmāt. Qu Ms B 212b1. 
 
247 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b1-2: paryāyaśabdeṣu hi ekasmād eva paryāyaśabdād 
vivakṣitārthapratītir bhavati. tataś ca dvitīyasya prayogābhāva eveti kathaṃ sāmā-
nādhikaraṇyaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo veti manyate: “For in the case of synonyms a 
single synonym causes the cognition of the intended referent. And therefore the 
application of a second [synonym] is not met with. So how could there be co-
reference or a qualifier-qualified relation. This is how he is thinking.” 
 
[117] paryāyaśabde hy anirjñātānekārthe(1) paryāyāntarasya(2) prayogas 
tat<pūrvā>rthapratītaye. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b3: paryāyaśabde hītyādi; B 
213b3-4, q.v. below no. 249.  
(1)Cf. don du ma ma rtogs pa la K : ma rtogs pa daṅ don du ma la ma (sic; ma 
om. DC) yin gyi V.  
(2)Cf. rnam graṅs gźan gyi (so read; ed. gyis) sbyor ba K : rnam graṅs gźan 
sbyor ba V.  
 
248 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b3-4: tatrānirjñātārthe(1) paryāyāntarasya prayogo(2) 
bhavati: yathā kasyacit pikaśabde 'nirjñātārthe tadarthapratītaye kokilaśabdasya, 
anekārthe vā arthāntaravyavacchedena viśiṣṭārthapratītaye: yathākṣaśabde vibhīta-
kaśabdasya. na cātrāyaṃ prakāro 'sti. tasmād ayukto dvitīyasya prayoga ity abhi-
prāyaḥ: “In this context there is an addition of another synonym to [a synonym] 
whose referent is not understood, like, for instance, someone's addition of the word 
kokila to the word pika whose referent is not understood, so that its referent may be 
understood, or to one that has many referents so that a specific referent may be 
known by excluding other referents, like, for instance, the word vibhītaka to the 
word akṣa. And this kind [of addition] is not found in the present case. Therefore the 
addition of a second [synonym] is not justified. Such is the opinion.”  
Thus the use of a second term in addition to the one already mentioned is only 
justified if the meaning is not clearly understood. Otherwise it is not. And in the 
present case it must be assumed that if nīla and utpala denote the same referent they 
are synonyms, and thus the addition of one to the other is meaningless because one 
does not apply a second term in addition to one whose meaning is understood. 
Dignāga apparently alludes in this paragraph to the principle that 'one does not use 
words whose referents have already been denoted,' which Patañjali explains at 
Mahā-bh I 105,2-3: arthagatyarthas śabdaprayogaḥ. arthaṃ sampratyāyayiṣyāmīti 
śabdaḥ prayujyate. tatraikenoktatvāt tasyārthasya dvitīyasya prayogeṇa na bhavi-
tavyam uktārthānām aprayoga iti: “The use of words is for the purpose of 
comprehending their referents. A word is used at the thought “I shall make [its] 
referent understood.” In that case one should not use a second word because the 
referent has already been denoted by a single one, for 'one does not use [words] 
whose referents have already been denoted';” cf. Mahā-bh I 240,24-25. 
(1)°ānirjñātā° em. : °ātā° Ms  






[118] etad eva hi <paryāyaśabdānām> paryāyatvam(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
212b4-5: kasmāt punar ekasya paryāyasya prayoge dvitīyasya tatrāprayoga ity āha: 
etad eva hītyādi. 212b6: paryāyatvam iti.  
(1)rnam graṅs pa'i sgra ñid K : sgra ñid V. 
 
249 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b5: paryāyeṇārtham abhidadhatīti paryāyaḥ. na so 'sti(2) 
yugapatprayoge svanimittābhāvāt.  
(1)°aḥ. em. : °yā Ms  
(2) na so 'sti conj. (cf. de cig car sbyor ba la med de T) : na sā Ms 
 
250 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b5: anvarthasaṃjñā hīyam. 
 
[119] paryāyeṇārtham abhidadhati, <na yugapat>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b5: 
paryāyeṇārtham abhidadhatīti. 
 
251 Cf. Bharthari's VP II:251: yaugapadyam atikramya paryāye vyavatiṣṭhate. 
 
[120] tathā ca utpalārthasya nīlaśabdenaivāvagater viśesaṇaviśesyatvābhāvaḥ. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b6: tathā cetyādi … utpalaśabdasahitavyaṅgyasyārthas-
ya nīlaśabdenaiva kevalenāvagater … viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ. 
 
252 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b6-7: yataḥ paryāyaśabda eka evābhidhānāyālam, ata 
utpalaśabdasahitavyaṅgyasyārthasya nīlaśabdenaiva kevalenāvagater vyavacched-
yatvam eva nāstīti viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ: “Since only a single synonym is 
sufficient for denoting, the referent that is manifested together with the word ‘lotus’ 
does not have an excluded referent because it is understood from the word ‘blue’ 
alone. Thus there is no qualifier-qualified relation.” 
 
[121] <yathābhede> tathā bhede 'pi: <samudāyibhyaḥ> samudāyasyānyatvaṃ 
sādhyam. na hi tasya teṣu teṣāṃ vā tatra kārtsnyenaikadeśena vā vttiḥ sambhavati. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b7-213a2: tathā bhede 'pīti doṣa iti vartate. kathaṃ 
punar doṣa ity āha: samudāyasyānyatvaṃ sādhyam iti. na siddham ity arthaḥ. 
kathaṃ sādhyam ity āha: na hītyādi. na hi tasyāvayavinas teṣv avayaveṣu teṣāṃ 
vāvayavānāṃ tatra samudāye(1) kārtsnyena sarvātmanā ekadeśena vā bhāgena vā 
vttiḥ sambhavati; cf. no. 254 below. 
(1)°e em. : °o Ms 
 
253 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s lenghthy elaboration of Dignāga’s argument at PSṬ Ms 
B 213a2-213b1: yadi hy avayavy avayaveṣv ekadeśena vartetāvayavānavasthā syāt. 
tathā hi yair avayavair avayavī samavāyikāraṇe avayaveṣu vartate, teṣv api 
tenāvayavabhedenaiva vārtitavyam. punas teṣv apy evam ity anavasthā. na ca 
tadvttāv avayavino vttir asti teṣām anavayavitvāt. atha kārtsnyena vartate tadā-
vayavino bahutvaprasaṅgo 'vayavānāṃ bahutvāt teṣu ca pratyekaṃ sarvātmanā 
parisamāptatvāt. abhinnadeśatvāc cāvayavinā sarve 'vayavāḥ saṃyogideśenābhin-
nadeśāḥ syuḥ. atha nābhinnadeśā iṣyante, evaṃ tarhy ekadravyo 'vayavī syād ity 
evamādayaḥ kārtsnyena vttau doṣās teṣām api tatra yadi sarvātmani vttir 
avayavinaṃ vyāpya tatas tasya niravayavatvāt sarveṣām ekadeśatā. tataś ca yatra 
pāṇiḥ, tatra pādādayo 'pīti. mecakekṣaṇaprasaṃgo vibhāgena grahaṇāsambhavāt. 




tair apy apareṣu vartitavyam, tair apy evam ity anavasthā. yac ca nīlaṃ tan 
notpalaṃ syāt, yad apy utpalaṃ tan na nīlam ityādi. yad evaṃ kārtsnyenaikadeśena 
vā vttir na saṃbhavati, tasmān nāvayavyatiriktaḥ samudāyaḥ sidhyati. 
 
[122] tad dhy arthayor vā bhavec <chabdayor vā>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b1: 
tad dhy arthayor vā bhaved iti.  
 
254 Namely co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
213b1: tad ity ubhayaṃ sambadhyate.  
 
255 I assume that the syntax of this clause has to be interpreted in the light of the 
previous sentence.  
 
[123] yady apy ekārthavttitā <jātiguṇayoś cārthayor> na sāmānyaviśeṣatvam. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b1-2: yady apy ekārthavttitety etat … na 
sāmānyaviśeṣatvam iti. 
 
256 That is, there is no qualifier-qualified relation between them. In this context 
the term is equivalent to viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ. 
 
[124] yady api hi <nīlaguṇotpalajātyor ekatra dravye vtteḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ 
bhavet, na viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b1: yady api 
hītyādinā vyācaṣṭe; Ms B 213b1-2 q.v. below no. 258.  
 
257 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b1-2: ekatra dravye dvayor api samavāyād upapadyate 
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ, jātiguṇayor na viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ: “Even if co-reference 
is justified because they both inhere in the same substance, a general property and an 
quality are not related as qualifier and qualified.”  
 
[125] na hi. Qu. Ms B 213b2.  
 
258 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b2: etena parasparaṃ sambandhābhāvam āha. etac ca “na 
sāmānyaviśeṣatvam” (PS V:19b) ity asya vivaraṇam. yeṣāṃ parasparaṃ 
sambandho nāsti na teṣāṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ, ghaṭapaṭādivat. nāsti ca jāti-
guṇayoḥ parasparaṃ sambandhaḥ: “Thereby he explains the absence of a mutual 
relation; and this is the explication of the statement “there is no general-particular 
property relation between them” (PS V:19b). [General and particular properties] that 
have no mutual relation are not related as qualifier and qualified like a pot and cloth 
[are not related as qualifier and qualified]; and a general property and a quality do 
not have a mutual relation.” 
 
[126] tadvatoḥ. Qu. Ms B 213b5.  
 
259 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b4-5: kathaṃ punas tadvator ity ucyate. yāvataikam eva 
tad dravyam ubhayaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭam. ekasyāpi guṇabhedād bhedam āśrityaivam 
uktam ity adoṣaḥ: “However, why is the expression “of the two property possessors” 
used, in so far as this substance is one only, being qualified by both qualifiers? It is 
used in this way with reference to the difference [of the qualifiers] because although 






260 Cf. 'jug pa V (DC conj. ldan pa sic) : om. K. 
 
261 The translation of the prodosis is conjectural as K and V are confused, 
diverging in terms of syntax and vocabulary, cf. de(1) daṅ ldan pa'i don K (cf. 
tadvatoḥ 19d) : spyi'i (sic) don la V.  
(1)de conj. : om. K. 
 
[127] dravyayor anyatrāvtteḥ(1). Qu. Ms B 213b3.  
(1)Cf. gźan la 'jug pa'i rdzas dag la V : rdzas daṅ yon tan dag gźan du mi 'jug 
pa'i phyir K. 
  
262 That is, they do not have any other locus than the one in which they are 
already resident, cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b3-4: yasmāj jātiguṇaviśiṣṭayor dravyayor 
nāparam adhikaraṇam asti yatra bhedena(1) varteyātām. ata ekatra vttyabhāvād 
digākāśayor iva nāsti sāmānādhikaraṇyam iti: “Because two substances that are 
qualified by a general property and a quality do not have another locus, in which 
they might reside separately.” Therefore, since they do not reside in one and the 
same [thing] they are not co-referential in the same way as a quarter of the sky and 
the sky.”  
(1)°ena conj. : bhede Ms : om. T. 
 
[128] dvayor ekasya vā sāmānyaviśeṣavattvāyogāt. Qu. Ms B 213b5-6.  
 
263 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b6: na hi nīladravyasya bhramarāder utpaladravyasya ca 
sāmānyaviśeṣavattvam asti. ato nānayor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā, jātidvayavat. ekasya 
yatra jātiguṇau saha vartete, na hi tad eva tasya sāmānyaṃ viśeṣo vā bhavati. ato 
'trāpi nāsti viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo yathaikasya ghaṭasya: “For an indigo-blue 
substance like a bee and the substance lotus do not possess the general property 
[lotusness] and the particular property [blueness]. Therefore the two are not related 
as qualifier and qualified, like a couple of general properties. The same [substance] 
in which the general property and the quality reside together is not the general 
property or the quality of one of them. Therefore there is no qualifier-qualified 
relation in this case either, like [there is no qualifier-qualified relation] of one pot.” 
 
264 Cf. de ltar na re źig don la gñis srid pa ma yin no V : de ltar re źig sic K (text 
corresponding to don la gñis srid pa ma yin no V is missing). 
 
[129] atyantabhinnau(1) hi <śabdau jātiguṇābhidhāyakau, tasmāt tayoḥ 
sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b7: atyantabhinnau hīti.  
(1)Cf. śin tu tha da pa ni V : gźan la (sic) tha dad pa K.  
 
265 The syntactic function of the particle hi is in this case equivalent to yasmāt.  
 
266 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b7-214a1: sāmānyaviśeṣayor bhedo 'sti tadatadviṣayatayā, 
nātyantam. atas tadvyavacchedāyātyantagrahaṇam.  
 
267 Cf. de'i phyir(1) gźi mthun pa yod pa ma yin no K : de yaṅ yod pa ma yin no. 




(1)Read de'i phyir de dag gi. 
 
268 Cf. de'i sgra dag la yaṅ V : de'i sgra dag kyaṅ K.  
 
269 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a1-2: viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo 'pi jātiguṇavācinoḥ śabdayor 
nopapadyate. arthadvārako hi tayor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ. tadarthayoś ca jāti-
guṇayor na kaścanābhisambandhaḥ: “A qualifier-qualified relation between two 
words that denote a general property and a quality is not justified. For the qualifier-
qualified relation of the two [words] is caused by [their] referents. And there is no 
relation between their two referents viz. the general property and the quality.” 
 
270 Cf. de dag med do K : om. V. 
 
271 Cf. rigs V : rdzas K. 
 
272 Cf. rigs (em. : K rdzas) daṅ yon tan tsam rjod par byed pa ñid la K : rigs daṅ 
yon tan tsam brjod pa ñid yin no V. 
 
[130] tulyātulyaṃ prasajyate. Qu. Ms B 214a2.  
 
273 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a 2-3: tulyaśabdo 'traikaparyāyaḥ.(1) ekam anekaṃ vādhi-
karaṇaṃ prasajyata ity arthaḥ. tataś ca sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ samānam 
evādhikaraṇaṃ na bhavatīti ktvā: “The word ‘similar’ is in this context a synonym 
of one. The meaning is this: The [absurd] consequence is that the substance is 
[either] one or many. And therefore there is no co-reference on the grounds that the 
substance is not the same.”  
(1)°aḥ em. : °a Ms 
 
274 Cf. gaṅ gi phyir K : gal te V. 
 
275 Cf. sgra dag gis (em. : gi K) yon tan daṅ rigs (em. : rdzas K) kyis (em. : kyi 
K) khyad par can rdzas gcig brjod par bya ba K : rigs daṅ yon tan gyi sgra dag 
rdzas kyi khyad pa gcig la brjod pa V. 
 
[131] atulyatvāvivakṣā cet. Qu. Ms B 214a3. 
 
[132] <yadi manyate: sambandhiktabhedāvivakṣāyāṃ> tulyatvaṃ tāvad upādāya 
sāmānādhikaraṇyam bhaviṣyati. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms 214a4-5: tulyatvaṃ tāvad 
upādāya sāmānādhikaraṇyam bhaviṣyati.  
 
276 The opponent objects that what defines the similarity (tulyatvam) of the 
substance to which the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ refer is the fact that the speaker does 
not intend to refer to the difference that is caused by the relata viz. the general 
properties blueness and lotusness, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a3-5: samānāsamānādhikaraṇa-
sambhave samānam adhikaraṇam āśritya sāmānādhikaraṇyam ucyate vidhinā 
sāmānādhikāraṇyavacanāt. na hi bhinnam adhikaraṇaṃ pratiṣidhyate, kiṃ tarhy 
abhinnaṃ vidhīyate. tena tāvanmātravivakṣayā tulyatvaṃ tāvad(1)upādāya sāmā-
nādhikaraṇyam bhaviṣyati. yas tu vastunaḥ sambandhikto bhedaḥ, sa vivakṣayā-





karoti: “If there is the possibility that the substance is either the same or not the 
same one speaks about co-reference with reference to the same substance because 
co-reference is expressed in an affirmative form. For it is not denied that the 
substance is different, but rather is is prescribed that it is not different. Therefore 
since only that much is intended to be expressed, there will be co-reference based 
upon such similarity. But the difference of referent that is caused by the relatum 
[i.e., the general property] does not effect that the substance is different because it is 
not presented according to the intention [of the speaker]. In this way he shows the 
opponent's opinion.”  
(1)Notice the wrong punctuation 'dra ba ñid de, de srid la brten nas T. 
 
[133] yatrāpi hi. Qu. Ms B 214a6. 
 
277 The opponent continues arguing that the same principle holds even on the 
apoha theory, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a6: apohapakṣe 'py eṣa nyāya āśrayaṇīya iti 
darśayati.  
 
278 Cf. T 182,26ff: “The meaning is 'because they are the causes of a cognition 
that appear as having the same reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇābhāsabuddhihetutvāt)'. 
There is a minor gap in Ms corresponding to T 182,26-28, after which Ms continues 
at B 214a6-7: … śabdopajanitā darśayati. tanmātram āśritya tvayāpi sāmānādhi-
karaṇyavyavasthā kriyata iti.  
 
[134] tulyākārabuddhihetutvāt. Qu. Ms B 214a6: tulyākārabuddhihetutvāt(1). 
(1)°tvāt conj. (cf. blo mtshuṅs pa'i rgyu yin pa'i <phyir>(2) K : blo mtshuṅs pa'i 
rgyu yod pa ñid [sic] V) : tulyākārabuddhi Ms (some lines are missing, cf. blo rnam 
pa mtshuṅs pa'i rgyu ñid kyi phyir źes pa T). For the reading tulyākārabuddhihetu° 
which is not corroborated by K and V, cf. expressions like bhinnākārā buddhi and 
abhinnākārā buddhiḥ in Dharmakīrti's PVV: 65,25f: tad ekam anaṃśaṃ vastu 
kathaṃ bhinnākārābhir buddhibhir viṣayīkriyate; 39,15: kevalam abhinnākārā 
buddhir utpadyate; 55,7: kathaṃ tāsv abhinnākārā buddhir iti. One cannot therefore 
exclude the possibility that ākāra has been interpolated in the light of Dharmakīrti's 
usage.  
(2)phyir conj. (cf. rgyu ñid kyi phyir T) : om. KV. 
 
279 Cf. yod du zin kyaṅ V : med pa ñid ma yin gyi K. 
 
280 Cf. mi tshuṅs pa bkod pa ste K : 'di ni mi zad par brgal ba ste V. 
 
[135] tatra śabdavyāparaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b1-2: tatraiva 
nīlotpalaśabdavyāparo. 
 
[136] ubhayavyudāsānughīte. tanmātrasya vivakṣā prayujyate. Restored, cf. Ms 
214a7: ubhayavyudāsānughīta iti; Ms B 214b1: tanmātrasyaiva vivakṣā 
prayujyate. 
 
281 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a7-214b1: ubhayavyudāso 'nīlānutpalavyāvttiḥ. sā ca 
vyāvttimataḥ paramārthato nānyeti. tad evānīlānutpalavyāvṭttaṃ nīlotpalākhyaṃ 




thasyopajana eva; cf. Manorathanandin's explanation at PVV 298,22: nīlotpalam ity 
ubhayavyāvttiviśiṣṭaikavastuvyavasāyikāyā buddher anurodhataḥ, ad PV I 131-
32ab: vicchedaṃ sūcayan ekam apratikṣipya vartate yadānyaṃ tena sa vyāpta 
ekatvena ca bhāsate sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ syāt, tadā buddhyanurodhataḥ. TS 1097: 
nīlotpālaśabdebhyo ekam evāvasīyate anīlānutpālādibhyo vyāvttaṃ pratibim-
bakam. 
(1)T punctuates wrongly: des rjes su bzuṅ źiṅ phan btags pa ni. 
(2)anu° em. : jānu° Ms 
 
282 That is to the exclusion of particular distinctive properties like mukulatva, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 214b1-2: nānyeṣām mukulatvādīnām. 
 
283 The apprehension of the meaning of the expression ‘blue lotus’ only 
presupposes the combined exclusions of the neganda of ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ viz. ‘non-
blue’, and ‘non-lotus’, it is not assisted by other exclusions like the exclusion of the 
neganda of 'lotus bud', and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b1: tatraiva nīlotpalaśabda-
vyāparo, na mukulādivyudāsānughīta iti.  
 
[137] sambandhikte tv <viśeṣe 'vivakṣite >, tad vastu kathaṃ vācyam. Restored, 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b2: sambandhikte tv iti; Ms B 214b2-3, q.v. below no. 285.  
 
284 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b2-3: nīlotpalaśabdau hi nīlaguṇotpalajātibhyāṃ vyavac-
chinna eva vastuni tannibandhanau pravttau. tatra yadi viśeṣaṇakto viśeṣo na 
vivakṣyate, <anarth?>arūpaṃ(1) tad vastu kathaṃ vācyam. na hi vastunaḥ svato 
nīlotpalādisvabhāvatā bhavatīty asaṃvyavahāryam eva syāt: “For the words ‘blue’ 
and ‘lotus’ are applied to an object as defined by the quality blue and the general 
property lotus, having these as their cause. If in this case the difference that is 
caused by the qualifiers is not intended to be expressed, how could this thing be 
denotable, having a form which is not the referent? For the thing does not per se 
have the nature of a blue lotus, etc. Thus it could not be made subject of verbal 
designation.”  
(1)don med pa'i ṅo bo'i T. 
 
[138] gavāśvasamānatā. Qu. Ms B 214b3. 
 
285 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b3-4: yadi śabdaviṣayīktasyāpi viśeṣasyāvivakṣā gaur 
aśva ity atrāpi samānatā syāt: “If the difference is not intended to be expressed 
although it is made the object of the word, there would be similarity even in the case 
of [the entities called] ‘cow’ and ‘horse’.” 
 
286 yod pa V : rta ñid K would indicate that the translators of V read astitva for 
aśvatva. 
 
[139] <tasya vastuno> 'nabhidheyatvena <samānateti gavāśva iti> nīlotpalādivat 
sāmānādhikaraṇyaprasaṅgaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b4-5: anabhidheya-
tveneti(1) … nīlotpalādivat sāmānādhikaraṇyaprasaṅga iti.  






287 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b4-5: yat tat sāmānyaviśeṣarahitaṃ vastumātraṃ tad 
aviṣayam eva śabdānāṃ saṃsargipadārthopapāditavastuviśeṣaviṣayatvāt. tataś ca 
gavāśvasya samānatā bhedābhāvaḥ syāt: “The mere thing without a particular 
general property is not the referent of words because their object is a particular thing 
effected by an inherent object of reference [i.e., a general property]. And therefore 
there will be similarity of cow and horse, i.e., absence of difference [between 
them].”  
 
288 Cf Ms B 214b5-7: evaṃ manyate: nīlotpalam ity atrāpi naiva kiṃcid ekam 
abhidheyam asti nīlaguṇotpalajātisamparkaprāptarūpabhedavyatirekeṇa nīlotpa-
lasya rūpāntarābhāvāt. <a>tas tadāpy anabhidheyatvena vastusamānataiva sāmā-
nādhikaraṇyahetuḥ. tad gavāśve 'py anabhidheyatvam aviśiṣṭam iti sāmānādhi-
karaṇyāpattiḥ: “The idea is as follows: Also in the case of [the word] ‘blue lotus’ 
there is not a single denotable object because a blue lotus does not have another 
form apart from the particular form that obtains from a conjunction of the quality 
blue and the general property lotus. Therefore, even then the similarity of things as 
such is the cause of co-reference because of not being denotable. Therefore the not 
being denotable is not distinct even with respect to ‘cow’ and ‘horse.’ Thus their co-
reference obtains [absurdly].” 
 
[140] tatrāktiviśeṣaś(1) cet.(2) Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b7: tatrāktiviśeṣaś ceti. 
(1) Cf. khyad rnam pas (sic) yin K : bye brag tu ma (sic) byas V. Both versions 
are impossible to construe.  
(2) cet em. (cf. gal te … śe V : źe na K : der rnam pa'i khyad par yin na T 
183,22) : ceti Ms 
 
289 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b7-215a1: 
gotvāśvatvādisambandhibhedāhitaviśeṣāsam(1)bhavenāpi svata eva gavāśvasya 
viśeṣo 'sti, yadabhivyaktasya sāmānyasya gotvādeḥ śabdenopādānam. tato yuk-
tam(2) etad yad gavāśve gotvāśvatvayor vivakṣitatvaṃ śabdena viṣayīktatvāt. 
anyathā tadabhidhānam eva na syāt: “Even because of the impossibility of a 
difference effected by the difference of the relata cowhood and horsehood, and so 
on, the difference between a horse and a cow exists per se, manifested by which the 
general property cowhood, and so on, is appropriated by the word. Therefore it is 
correct that cowhood and horsehood in a cow and a horse are intended to be denoted 
because the word takes them as its objects. Otherwise they could not be denoted at 
all.”  
(1)°āsam° em. (cf. med par yaṅ T) : °asaṃ° Ms 
(2)mi rigs (= *ayuktam sic) T. 
 
290 Cf. gal te 'di snam du V : om. K. 
 
291The view that the manifestation of a given general property is due to the 
particular material shape of the object that manifests it, and to which its occurrence 
is restricted, is briefly mentioned by Helarāja Prakīrṇaprakāśa Vol I 94: 8-11 (on VP 
III.1:93-94); he attributes it to the Vaiśeṣikas (loc.cit. line one): nanu ca sāpi (scil. 
jāti) katham anavayavena vyaktiṃ nānuyāyāt. tathā ca gavāśvādau sāṅkarya-




cet? viśiṣtasaṃsthānayogitvaṃ vyaktīnām. anyo hy avayavasanniveśo gavām, anyas 
tv aśvānām iti gotvāśvatvayor ādhāraniyamasiddhiḥ. 
 
292 Cf. dbyibs kyi khyad par (= saṃsthānaviśeṣa) rnam par (= ākti) brjod pas K 
: dbyibs kyi bye brag tu byas te V, which is difficult to construe and must be based 
upon a flawed reading, cf. 21c der bye brag tu ma (sic) byas te V. 
 
293 Cf. 'di yod pa yin te K : yod par ma brjod do V; for brjod V, cf. K, q.v. no. 
291. 
 
[141] svasāmānyābhivyaktihetur <viśeṣas>. tatkte hi tayos tathābhidhāne katham 
avivakṣā. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 215a1: svasāmānyābhivyaktihetur iti; Ms B 
215a3: tatkte hi tayos tathābhidhāne katham avivakṣeti; cf. quotation no. 296 
below. 
 
294 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215a1-2: anena tadastitvāvagater(1) nibandhanam āha. 
kāryaviśeṣāt saṃsthānam avayavasanniveśātmakam anumīyata ity arthaḥ. nanu 
cāśritadharmabheda evāyam. yathaiva hi gotvāśvatvādayaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣā vastva-
vacchedahetutvād(2) anātmabhūtā vastunaḥ,(2) tathā saṃsthānam api. tathā ca 
tadupamarde vastvātmaivāvaśiṣyate. satyam etat. doṣāntarābhidhitsayā tv etad 
avyapekṣitam(4): “Hereby he formulates the cause for ascertaining its existence. The 
meaning is that due to a particular effect the [difference of material] shape whose 
nature consists in a collocation of parts is inferred. But surely this is only a 
difference of dependent properties. For in the exact same way as particular general 
properties such as cowhood and horsehood do not have status as essential natures of 
material objects (vastu) because they are causes of delimiting objects, so also the 
material shape; and thus, when it is destroyed nothing but the nature of a material 
object is left. This is true. However, this is not taken into consideration with a wish 
to present other problems.” 
(1) °āva<ga>ter em. : °ā{y}vater Ms 
(2) T translates in accordance with Ms sāmānyaviśeṣāvastvavacchedahetutvāt as 
spyi daṅ khyad par gyi dṅos po ma yin pa gcod pa'i rgyu ñid kyi phyir which is 
meaningless in the context. T reflects a common translation error caused by 
scriptura continua.  
(3) T 183,33 interprets gen. sg. vastunaḥ as nom. pl., cf. loc.cit. dṅos po rnams. 
(4) ‘di la bltos par byas pa T 183,35 for etad avyapekṣitam. 
 
295 Cf. Ms 215a3-4: saṃsthānaviśeṣakte gaur aśva ity evam abhidhāne sati 
katham bhedasyāvivakṣā. athavā tatkte hi tayos tathābhidhāne(1) iti dvivacanam 
evaitat. abhidhānaṃ śabdo 'bhidīyate 'neneti ktvā: “When there is a denotation 
like ‘cow’ or ‘horse’ which is caused by difference of material shape, why would 
there be no intention to express the difference [of material shape]? Or rather, [in the 
phrase] “since the two denotations of these two in this way [viz. as ‘cow’ and 
‘horse’, respectively] is caused by this [difference of material shape] [the expression 
abhidhāne] is definitely a dual form. A word is a ’denotation’ (abhidhānam) on the 
grounds that it denotes.” 






[142] na tu nīlotpalatvavato(1)'rthasy<eti>(2) na tadvat sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ iti. 
Restored, cf. Ms 215a4-5: na tu nīlotpalatvavato 'rthasyetyādi. 
(1)u tpa la daṅ sṅon po bźin no V would indicate that the translators read °vat 
and interpreted it accordingly instead of vato. u tpa la sṅon po la sogs pa'i don la K 
shows no trace of the possessive suffix vat. Neither version reproduces the affix tva, 
although it is crucial for understanding the argument. 
(2)Cf. phyir K and the syntactically analogous use of tato in the paraphrase of the 
argument at Ms B 215a5 below no. 297. 
 
296 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215a5: nīlaguṇotpalajātiviśeṣamato(1) 'rthasya na gavāśvavat 
saṃsthānabhedas tato na tadvad nīlotpalādiśabdavat sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ gavāśvā-
diśabdānām: “The referent that is possessed of the quality blueness and the 
particular general property lotusness has no difference of material shape like a cow 
and a horse. Therefore words like ‘cow’ and ‘horse’ are not co-referential in the 
same way as these viz. words like ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’.” 
(1) °viśeṣamato em. : °viśemato Ms 
 
[143] anekāktisaṅkaraḥ. Qu. Ms B 215a5-6. 
 
[144] ekasmin vastuni <anekasāmānyā>bhivyakter anekasaṃsthānasamāveśaḥ 
<syāt>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 215a6: yadi saṃsthānabhedād bhinnasāmānyā-
bhivyaktir ekasmin vastuni ghaṭatvasattvadravyatvādyabhivyakter anekasamsthāna-
samāveśaḥ prasajyate: “If different general properties are manifested because of 
difference of material shape, it follows [absurdly] that many material shapes would 
co-occur in one entity because it manifests such general properties as potness, 
existence, and substanceness.”  
 
[145] na ca dṣṭam. Qu. Ms B 215a6. 
 
297 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215a7-215b1: na hi dīrghaparimaṇḍalādīny ekatra samā-
viṣṭāni. etena tadabhāvavyavahārasiddhyai svabhāvānupalambham āha. caśabdo 
na ceṣṭam bhavato 'pīty arthadyotanāya(1), ghaṭādyaikākārābhidhānapratyayā-
bhāvaprasaṅgāt. na hy anekasaṃsthāne vastuni tadāyattayor abhidhānapratyayayor 
ekākāratvam upapadyate, tadvaśena vastunas tadrūpāvasāyābhāvaprasaṅgāt. Tas-
mān na saṃsthānabhedād bhinnasāmānyābhivyaktir abhyupeyā: “For being oblong 
and circular and so on are not collocated in one and the same thing. Therefore he 
mentions non-perception of their essential nature in order to prove its being treated 
as non-existent. The word 'and' is to clarify the meaning viz. that you too do not 
claim it because of the [absurd] consequence that the denotation and idea of a pot 
and so on that has a single form would be non-existent. For when an entity has a 
multitude of material shapes it is not justified that the denotation and the idea that 
are based upon this [entity] have a single form because the [absurd] consequence 
would be that the form of the entity could not be ascertained. Therefore one is not to 
assume that the manifestation of different general properties is due to difference of 
material shape.” 
(1) arthadyotanāya em. : arthaḥ | dyotanāya Ms 
 





[147] <gavaśvādīnāṃ punaḥ> tulyātulyam adhikaraṇaṃ <syād> anabhidheyatvāt 
sattādivyañjakatvāc ca gotvādivyañjakatvāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b2-3: 
idānīṃ tv anabhidheyatvāt sattādravyatvādivyañjakatvāc ca tulyaṃ gotvāśvatva-
vyañjakatvāc cātulyam iti tulyātulyam adhikaraṇam.  
 
298 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b1-3: pūrvaṃ gotvāśvatvābhyāṃ(1) viśeṣo 'nabhidheyatvāc 
cāviśeṣa iti tulyātulyam adhikaraṇam uktam. idānīṃ tv anabhidheyatvāt sattā-
dravyatvādivyañjakatvāc ca tulyaṃ gotvāśvatvavyañjakatvāc cātulyam iti tulyātul-
yam adhikaraṇam: “Previously the substance was said to be similar and dissimilar 
on the assumption that the difference is due to cowhood and horsehood, and the non-
difference is due to not being the denotable object. Now, on the other hand, the 
substance is similar and dissimilar on the assumption (iti) that it is similar because 
of not being denotable, and because of manifesting existence and substanceness, and 
so on, and dissimilar because of manifesting cowhood and horsehood.”  
(1)gotvāśvatvā° em. (cf. rta ñid T) : gotvā° Ms 
 
[148] tatrāpy atulyatvāvivakṣāyāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaprasaṅgaḥ. Restored, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 215b3: tatrāpy atulyatvāvivakṣāyāṃ nīlotpalādivat sāmānādhikaraṇya-
prasaṅga iti.  
 
[149] iṣṭe 'pi cābhāvaḥ. Qu. Ms B 215b3. 
 
[150] yatrāpi. Qu. Ms B 215b3.  
 
[151] yadi. Qu. Ms B 215b3. 
 
[152] sāmānyabhedābhivyañjakatvāt(1). Qu. Ms B 217b2.  
(1)°bhedābhi° em. (cf. tha dad pa'i spyi mṅon par gsal bar byed pa'i phyir K : 
spyi tha dad par gsal bar byed pa yin pa'i phyir V) : °ā[bh]i° Ms (cf. spyi tha dad 
pa mṅon par gsal bar byed pa ñid kyi phyir T). 
 
[153] tathā hi. Qu. Ms B 215b3. 
 
[154] na vyaktir guṇakarmaṇoḥ. Qu. Ms 215b4. 
 
299 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b5: yadi saṃsthānam eva sāmānyasyābhivyañjakam 
abhyupeyate, guṇatvakarmatvādīnām anabhivyaktiprasaṅgaḥ, teṣām asaṃsthāna-
vattvāt: “If it is assumed that the material shape alone manifests the general 
property, it has the [absurd] consequence that there is no manifestation of 
qualityness and actionness because they do not possess material shape.”  
 
[155] <guṇakarmaṇor hy> asaṃsthānavattvāt <tadgatasāmānyā>nabhivyakti-
prasaṅgaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b5: anabhivyaktiprasaṅgaḥ, teṣām 
asaṃsthānavattvāt. 
 
[156] bhedena svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvād dravyādiṣu bheda iti. Qu. Ms B 






300 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b6-7: saṃsthānapakṣasya duṣṭatvāt tam utsjya 
pakṣāntaram avalambate: dravyaguṇakarmasu dravyatvādivyaktihetuḥ śaktiviśeṣo 
'sti. tato na guṇakarmagatasāmānyānām abhivyaktidoṣaḥ: “Since the theory of 
material is faulty he gives it up and clings to another theory, namely that there is a 
particular power in substances, qualities, and actions, which is the cause of 
manifestation of substanceness, etc. Therefore there is no problem concerning the 
manifestation of general properties included in quality and action.” For the 
Vaiśeṣika concept of śaktibheda, cf. PBh § 381: yathā kuṇḍadadhnoḥ saṃyogai-
katve bhavaty āśrayāśrayibhāvaniyamaḥ, tathā dravyatvādīnām api samavāyaikatve 
'pi vyaṅgyavyañjakaśaktibhedād ādhārādheyaniyamaḥ. Mallavādi discusses this 
view at NC, cf. NCV 533,9ff. For the concept of śakti, cf. Halbfass 1992: 72f, and 
passim. 
 
301 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b7-216a1: naitad evam anekāntāt. tathā hi 
ghaṭasyānekasāmānyavattvāt tadvyaktau śaktibhedo 'bhyupagantavyaḥ. tataś 
caikasyāpi śaktibhedadarśanāt, nālaṃ śaktibhedo bhedapratipādanāya: “This is not 
the case because of uncertainty. That is, since a pot possesses many general 
properties difference of power is to be assumed with respect to their manifestation. 
And therefore difference of power is not sufficient for explaining difference [of 
substance and the rest] because even a single [substance] is observed to have 
different powers.” 
 
[157] <gotvāśvatvayoḥ> kiṃkto viśeṣa iti <vaktavyam>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
216a1: kiṃkto viśeṣa iti. 
 
302 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216a1-2: bhinnaṃ hi viśeṣaṇaṃ viśeṣyasya bhedaprati-
pādanāyālam iti tayor eva bhedaṃ paryanuyuṅkte: “For a distinct qualifier is 
sufficient for explaining the difference of the qualified. With this in mind he 
enquires about the difference between the two.” 
 
[158] śābdānām tāvad abhidhāyakaśabdaktaḥ. teṣāṃ hi yadcchāśabdeṣu viśe-
ṣaḥ,(1) tadabhidheyatvāt(2). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b3: yathoktaṃ: śābdānāṃ 
tāvad abhidhāyakaśabdakta iti; 216a2: teṣāṃ hi yadcchāśabdeṣv iti.  
(1)Cf. brjod par bya ba ñid las (cf. the syntactical parallel gavādiśabda-
vācyatayaiva, q.v. below no. 304) K : raṅ raṅ gi sgras (sic) brjod par bya ba de dag 
V.  
(2)Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216a2-3, q.v. no. 304 below. 
 
303 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216a2-3: svarūpamātranimittapravttayo yadcchāśabdā 
ḍitthaśabdādayaḥ. gavādiśabdāś ca gotvādiṣu bāhyapravttinimittābhāvād yadc-
chāśabdāḥ. tadabhidheyatvam eva(1) teṣāṃ viśeṣaḥ. gotvādayo hi yadcchāśabda-
viṣayā gavādiśabdavācyatayaiva vastvantarād viśiṣyanta iti śābdā manyante: 
“Words like ‘ḍittha’ are arbitrary terms whose cause of application is their mere 
own form. And words like ‘cow’ are arbitrary terms with regard to cowhood, etc. 
because they are without external cause of application. Their difference is the mere 
fact that they are their denotable objects. For [general properties] like cowhood that 
are the objects of arbitrary terms are differentiated from other [general] entities 
(vastvantarāt) merely by being the denotable objects of words like ‘cow’. This is 




The only property that characterizes general properties is that they are entities 
(vastutva) devoid of any other distinguishing property. Since general properties as 
entities per definition are devoid of other general properties (niḥsāmānyāni 
sāmānyāni), their denotation is without cause of application. Consequently the 
semantic condition for their denotation is similar to that of arbitrary terms whose 
cause of application is their own form (svarūpa).  
It has not been possible to trace an explicit statement of the view which 
Dignāga's opponent mentions, to Sanskrit grammatical literature, although related 
views of the function of svarūpa as cause of application, when denoting a general 
property, are taken for granted by Bharthari, cf., e.g., VP III.1:6f; Kaiyaṭa at Mahā-
bh-Pr IV p. 341,11-13: gavādayo yadā jātimātravācinas tadā tebhyaḥ śabdasvarūpe 
pratyayaḥ. tathā hi arthe jātau(2) śabdasvarūpam adhyaste, yo gośabdaḥ sa evārtha 
iti, tataḥ śabdasvarūpam eva tatra pravttinimittam, nānyat: “When [words] like 
“cow” denote the mere general property, the (bhāva) affix [cf. A V.1:119] serves to 
denote the own form of the words when introduced after these. That is, the own 
form of the word is superimposed upon the general property in the referent at the 
thought “the word ‘cow’ is the same as the referent.” Therefore only the own form 
of the word is the cause of application to it, nothing else.” 
For Dignāga's treatment of the semantic conditions of arbitrary terms, cf. § 64 
and no. 597. 
After explaining the view of the grammarians, Jinendrabuddhi addresses the 
objection that the difference between ‘ḍittha,' etc. exists per se, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
216a3-5: nanu ca ḍitthādīnāṃ svato 'py asti viśeṣaḥ. śabdamātrāhite hi viśeṣe 
'nāhitasaṃjñayos tadaharajātayor viśeṣo nopapadyeta. naiṣa doṣaḥ. śabdavyāpāre 
bhedo 'yaṃ cintyate, na tu darśane(3). na ca śabdavyāpāre ḍitthāder viśeṣaṇam 
aparam asti: “Certainly the difference between ‘ḍittha,’ etc. also exists per se. For if 
the difference were merely effected by the word, it would not be justified that there 
is difference between two [persons] born at the same day, who have not yet been 
given a name. This is not a problem. The difference is conceived with regard to the 
function of the word, not with regard to observation. And with regard to the function 
of the word its qualification is not other than that of [proper names like] ‘ḍittha,’ 
etc.” 
(1)°tvam eva em. : °(tvaṃ e?)va Ms  
(2)Cf. the use of the term arthajāti in Bharthari's VP I 15a, III.1:6c, 8c, 11a 
which denotes the “general property inherent in a referent upon which the general 
property inherent in a word is superimposed as its cause of application;” cf. Helarāja 
VPPr Vol. I p. 8,1-3 ad VP III.1: 8cd): niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyānīty arthajātīnāṃ 
svato jātirahitatve tatkāryaṃ śabdapratyayānuvttilakṣaṇaṃ śabdārthayoḥ so 'yam 
ity abhedena sambandhāc chabdasamavāyinī jātir arthenādhyāropitābhedā sampā-
dayantī tadātmanā sampadyata ity upacaryate. 
(3)na tu darśane conj. (ma mthoṅ ba la ni ma yin no (?) T) : na utpaladarśane° 
Ms T would seem to presuppose the reading adarśane which makes no sense in the 
present context. 
 
[159] bhedo vācakabhedāc cet(1). Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216a5: cetyādi.  
(1)cet conj (cf. źe na K : śes na V) : ca Ms (ces T). 
 






[160] aviśiṣṭe hi vastuni abhidhāyakena śabdenābhedopacārād na vaktavyaṃ 
viśiṣṭasāmānyābhivyaktihetutvād gavādayo viśiṣṭāḥ. abhidhānabhedād api dṣṭo 
bhedaś caitrādivad <iti cet>. na, tasyaiva parīkṣyatvād, ekasyāpi <cā>(1)nekaparyā-
yaśabdhābhidheyatvāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 216a5-6: aviśiṣṭe hi vastuni 
abhidhāyakena śabdenābhedopacārāt(2) tataś ca na vaktavyaṃ viśiṣṭasāmānyā-
bhivyaktihetutvād gavādayo viśiṣṭā iti; 217b3-4: abhidhānabhedād api dṣṭo bhedaś 
caitrādivad iti; 216a6: na tasyaiva parīkṣyatvād iti; 216a7: ekasyāpītyādi; 216b3: 
ekasyāpi anekaparyāyaśabdābhidheyatvād iti.  
(1)ca conj.  
(2)°ābhed° em. (cf. tha mi dad pa ñe bar btags pa'i phyir T) : °ena bhed° Ms 
 
305 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216b6-7: tasyaivābhidhānaktasya bhedasya caitrādiṣv api 
gotvādisv iva parīkṣyatvāt: kiṃ caitramaitrayoḥ svato bhedaḥ, āhosvid abhidhāna-
bhedād iti: “Because the difference that is made by the denotation is subject to 
criticism also in the case of Caitra, like in the case of cowhood, etc.: Is the 
difference between Caitra and Maitra per se or is it due to difference of denotation?” 
 
306 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216b7: paryāyaśabdair anekāntād na tato bhedaḥ pratīyate ity 
arthaḥ.  
 
[161] tatrārtha iva vicāraḥ(1). Qu. Ms B 216a7-216b1.  
(1)Cf. de la ni de bźin du rnam par brtag go V : de kho na la rnam par (sic) K. 
 
307 Cf. 'on kyaṅ spyi las bye brag tu byas par zad na V : spyi daṅ khyad par gyis 
byas pas yin no K.  
The general property of any given referent (artha) or speech unit (śabda), its 
sāmānyalakṣaṇa, is constituted by exclusion of other referents or speech units, the 
referent or speech unit being the substrate of exclusion of other referents or speech 
units, cf. PSV V 36d with note 460. 
 
308 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216b1-4: gośabdāśvaśabdayoḥ kiṃkto viśeṣa ity ukte 
'vaśyaṃ(1) vaktavyaṃ svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvena viśeṣa iti. tathā hi gośabdo 
gośabdatvasya vyañjako 'śvaśabdas tv aśvaśabda<tva>syeti. evaṃ yadi bhinna-
sāmānyābhivyañjakatvād gavādiśabdabheda iṣyate, svato 'bhedaprasaṅgaḥ. tathā 
hi sāmānyaviśeṣeṇa gośabdatvādinā sahābhedopacārāt, upacārato bhedo, na tu 
vāstavaḥ. ekasyāpi ca gośabdasya śabdatvagośabdatvaguṇatvādīnāṃ vyañjakatvād 
anekaprasaṅgaḥ. athābhidhānakto viśeṣaḥ, tad ayuktam “ekasyāpy anekaparyā-
yaśabdābhidheyatvād” ity eṣo 'rtha(2) iva vicāraḥ; athavā tatrārtha iva vicāra iti 
śabdasāmānye: kiṃkto 'sya bheda iti pūrvavad vicāraḥ kartavyaḥ: “When it is 
asked how the difference between the word ‘cow’ and the word ‘horse’ is caused, it 
is necessarily to be answered that the difference is due to their manifesting their own 
general properties. That is, the word ‘cow’ manifests [the general property] cow-
wordness, the word ‘horse’, on the other hand, manifests [the general property] 
horse-wordness. Thus, if it is claimed that words like ‘cow’ are different because 
they manifest different general properties it follows [absurdly] that the difference is 
not per se. That is, on account of transfer [of the word ‘cow’ to cow-wordness] in 
the form of identity with the particular general property cow-wordness, the 
difference is due to transfer, but it is not a substantial one. And because a single 




and so on, it follows [absurdly] that it is many. If, on the other hand, the difference 
is caused by the denotation, this is not justified because one [referent] is denotable 
by many synonyms. Thus the analysis is like that of the referent. Or [alternatively], 
in this case the statement “the analysis is like that of the referent” means like that of 
the general property of the word: the analysis is to be performed like before [asking] 
'whereby is the difference caused'”?  
(1) 'vaśyaṃ em. : 'vaśya° Ms  
(2)em. : arthaḥ | iva Ms 
 
[162] sa tu nābhidhāyakaḥ. Qu. Ms B 216b4.  
 
309 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216b4-5: svalakṣaṇaṃ pratyakṣyasya viṣayaḥ. tac cāsādha-
raṇatvād nārthena saha prāg dṣṭam. na ca pūrvam aghītasambandhasya vācaka-
tvaṃ samasti: “The object of immediate sensation is the individual [word]. And this 
has not been observed previously together with its referent because it is not 
common. And a word whose connection with [its referent] has not been appre-
hended does not denote.” For the implications of this discussion, cf. no. 401 below. 
 
[163] śākaṭikā<der> <bāla>prayuktasya ca <ekārthābhidhāyakatvāt>. Restored, 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 216b5: śākaṭikādiprayuktasya (?) ceti = śiṅ rta la sogs pas rab tu 
sbyar ba yaṅ T. This quotation appears to be defective, cf. blun po la sogs pa rnams 
kyi sbyor ba ni don cig brjod par byed pa'i phyir ro K : śiṅ rta la sogs pa rmoṅs pa 
rnams kyi tha sñad kyaṅ don rjod par byed pa ma yin pa'i phyir te V. KV make it 
possible to identify the following items: śiṅ rta la sogs pa V corresponding to 
śākaṭikādi : om. K; blun po la sogs pa rnams kyi sbyor ba K : rmoṅs pa rnams kyi 
tha sñad V corresponding to *bālaprayuktasya(1). This would suggest the following 
restoration of the phrase: śākaṭikāder bālaprayuktasya ca ekārthābhidhāyakatvāt.  
(1)This term is used by Bharthari in a similar context at VPV I 232,5, q.v.  
 
310 For this word, cf. pw, MW s.v. 
 
311 Dignāga points out that even the perceptible difference between the usage of 
educated people and that of children and uneducated ones does not involve any 
difference of referent. His argument no doubt reflects similar discussions in 
Bharthari's VP; cf., e.g., VPV I 228,7ff where Bharthari addresses the question of 
the denotation of so-called corrupted speech forms (apabhraṃśa), among which he 
mentions gāvī and goṇī that are used to denote the object to which educated (śiṣṭa) 
people refer as 'gauḥ'. Since Dignāga claims that only the general speech form 
(sāmānya), i.e., the word type, denotes, the question arises as to how he understands 
the difference between forms like goṇī and gauḥ in terms of the alleged denotative 
function of the general property. Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignāga's statement at Ms 
B 216b5-7: yam evārthaṃ śiṣṭaprayuktaḥ śabda āha, tam evāśiṣṭaprayukto 'pi. yadi 
ca svalakṣaṇabhedena bhidyamānāḥ śabdās tasya tasyārthasya vācakāḥ syuḥ, tato 
goṇyādiśābdaiḥ sa evārtho na gamyeta, gamyate ca. tasmād viśeṣo na vācakaḥ, 
sāmānyam eva vācakam. evam aśiṣṭaprayuktād api śabdāt tasyaivārthasyāvagatir 
bhavati sāmānyasyābhinnatvād, nānyathā: “The word that is used by an uneducated 
person denotes the same referent even when it is used by an educated one. If the 
words that differ because of difference of the individual [words] were to denote this 





etc. Yet it is understood. Therefore the particular does not denote, only the general 
property denotes. Thus a word, even when it is used by an uneducated person, 
causes understanding of the same referent because the general property [of the 
word] is the same, but not otherwise.”  
As it appears Jinendrabuddhi's commentary is not particularly clear on the 
question of how the sāmānya is involved in the denotation of the word goṇī, but 
since forms like goṇī are described as particulars (svalakṣaṇa), it seems natural to 
conclude that he assumes that the denotation of the so-called apabhraṃśa forms is 
mediated through the general property of the alleged correct form viz. gauḥ. This 
view apparently presupposes that apabhraṃśa forms are ultimately based upon so-
called correct (sādhu) forms (cf. VPV I 229,1f), incorrect forms denotingby means 
of inference of the correct underlying form, cf. VP I:141ab: te (scil. apabhraṃśāḥ) 
sādhuṣv anumānena pratyayotpattihetavaḥ; VP III.3:30: asādhur anumānena 
vācakaḥ kaiścid iṣyate, vācakatvāviśeṣe vā niyamaḥ puṇyapāpāyoḥ. Cf. Helarāja ad 
loc. VPP Vol. I 143,12ff (quoting on p. 144,5 the relevant passage from Mahā-bh 
Vol I 8,21: evam ihāpi samānāyām arthagatau śabdena cāpaśabdena dharmani-
yamaḥ kriyate, śabdenaivārtho 'bhidheyo nāpaśabdenety evaṃ kriyamāṇam 
abhyudayakāri bhavatīti); cf. the important passage at VPV I 72,2-3: viśiṣṭapratya-
yotpattau ca pratyakṣeṇa vyavasthāṃ prakalpayati. anumānapakṣeṇa tu sambandhi-
sambandhād akṣinikocādivad apabhraṃśāḥ pratyayaviśeṣv aṅgabhāvam upagac-
chanti; cf. Paddhati ad loc.: sādhuśabdā arthasya sambandhād viśiṣṭaṃ jñānaṃ 
janayantīti aviśeṣam āha pratyakṣapakṣeṇa iti: yathā pratyakṣam avyavahitaṃ jñā-
nāntareṇa svaviṣayam bodhayati tathā sādhuśabdasambandhaḥ śabdāntarāvya-
vahitaḥ. anumānapakṣeṇa dvitīyaḥ: yathā liṅgaṃ svajñānavyavadhānena liṅginam 
anumāpayati. yathā vā anumeyajñānaṃ sāmānyākāravyavadhānena svalakṣaṇam. 
apabhraṃśā iti: tathā goṇyādayaḥ śabdā gośabdavyavadhānena. yatra śrotur evaṃ 
buddhir bhavati gośabdo 'syābhidhitsataḥ pramādād aśakter vā goṇīśabdam uccā-
rayati; VPV I 233,1-4; VP III.3:55: rūpaṇavyapadeśābhyāṃ laukike vartmani 
sthitau, jñānam praty abhilāpaṃ ca sadśau bālapaṇḍitau. This verse is the third in 
Dignāga's Traikālyaparīkṣā; cf. Helarāja VPP Vol. I: 163: 9-10: yathā bālo vikal-
payaty artham abhidhatte ca, evam paramārthadarśanā vidvāṃso 'pi. The problem 
of the relation between correct and incorrect forms is addressed by Dharmakīrti at 
VN I 44,12ff, cf. VN II 82ff. 
 
312 Children's usage involves morpho-phonetic distortion, cf. ambāmbā iti 
prayoktavye bāla ambaketi prabhāṣate, Paddhati 232,13 ad VP I:179. 
 
313 Cf. bye brag de dag las V : om. K. 
 
314 Dignāga quotes VS X.11: śiraḥ pṣṭham udaram pāṇir iti tadviśeṣebhyaḥ, for 
which, cf. Candrānanda ad loc.: svasāmānyaviśeṣebhyaḥ śirastvādibhyo yeṣu jñā-
naṃ jāyate (te) śiraādayo 'vayavā ity arthaḥ; Ms B 216b7- 217a1: śira iti jñānaṃ 
yāvat pāṇir iti yaj jñānaṃ tad avayavasaṃsthānaviśeṣebhya ity arthaḥ. tathā hi 
yadā śirastvaṃ svāśrayasaṃsthānenābhivyajyate, tadā tataḥ śira iti jñānam 
bhavati: “The meaning is this: The cognition 'head' up to the cognition 'hand' is 
due to the differences of of the parts. That is, when the property headhood is 






315 Cf. de dag gi ltar na yaṅ V : de yi khyad par de dag kyaṅ K. 
 
[164] vyañjakavyaktito bhede <prāptam anyonyasaṃśrayaṃ>(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 217a1: vyañjakavyaktito bheda ityādi.  
(1)For 23b, cf. ŚV Ākti° 50b: prāptam anyonyasaṃśrayam, no. 317 below. 
 
316 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 217a1-2: vyañjakadravyaktā vyaktiḥ svasāmānyasvarūpapra-
kāśanam. tato bhede(1) sāmānyasyeṣyamāna itaretarāśrayaṃ vyākhyānam prāpnoti, 
anyatarasyāpy apratītatvāt. tataś ca na parasparabhedapratipādanāyālaṃ(2): “The 
manifestation that is effected by the manifesting substance means the act of bringing 
to light the own form of its own general property. If the difference of the general 
property is claimed to be due to that, the explanation becomes necessarily circular 
because [the difference] of the other is not cognized. And therefore it is not capable 
of explaining their mutual difference.”  
Dignāga's argument is reproduced in similar terms by Kumārila in ŚV Ākti° 
49b-50b, although with a different intention: vyañjakasya tu kiṃktaḥ | bhedo 
hastyādipiṇḍebhyaḥ? svataś cet, iha tatsamam || vyaṅgyajātiviśeṣāc cet, prāptam 
anyonyasaṃśrayam|.  
(1)°e em. : °a Ms  
(2) na ... °āyālaṃ em. (for alam ‘capable of’, ‘able to’ constructed with the 
dative, cf. A II.3 [13+]: 16, cf. nus pa ma yin T) : °āyāṃ Ms 
 
[165] dravyasvabhāvaḥ ka iti? svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvam. sāmānyasvabhāvaḥ 
ka iti? svadravyābhivyaṅgyatvam. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217a2-3: 
dravyasvabhāvaḥ ka ityādinā tad itaretarāśrayatvaṃ darśayati. dravyasvabhāvaḥ 
ka ity uktiḥ svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvaṃ goḥ svabhāva ity ākhyāyate. Sāmānya-
svabhāvaḥ ka ity uktiḥ svadravyābhivyaṅgyatvam. 
 
[166] svabhāvānaikataikasya bahuvyakteḥ parasparam. Qu. Ms B 217a4.  
 
317 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 217a4: dravyasya sattādeś cānekasvabhāvatvaṃ syāt: “The 
substance and [the property] existence, and so on, would have many intrinsic 
natures.” 
 
318 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 217a5 on 23cd: bahūnāṃ vyakter bahubhiś ca vyakter iti.  
 
319 Cf. maṅ po gsal bar byed pa'i phyir daṅ maṅ po rnams kyis gsal ba'i phyir 
maṅ po gsal ba yin no K : gsal ba maṅ po źes bya ba ni maṅ po rnams kyi gsal ba 
daṅ maṅ po rnams kyi gsal ba ste V. 
 
[167] dravyād dhi <bahusāmānyasya> sattāder <vyaktiḥ>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
217a5: dravyād dhīti … sattāder iti.  
 
320 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 217a5-6: ādiśabdena ghaṭatvapārthivatvādīni ghyante. 
 
321 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 217a5: ghaṭādikāt. 
 






[168] sarvathā ca guṇasambandhabhedāc ca śaktibhedāc cābhidhānabhedāc ca 
bhedābhyupagame <ekasyāpy> anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b1-
3: sarvathā cetyādinā … guṇasambandhabhedād iti … bhedābhyupagame drav-
yasyānekatvaprasaṅgaḥ. śaktibhedāt … abhidhānabhedāt. 
 
323 The term guṇa is here as elsewhere used of the general properties that are 
supposed to inhere in substances, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b2: guṇaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣa 
ihābhipretaḥ. tena sambandhaḥ. tadbhedāt. Jinendrabuddhi refers to PS V:22a2 at 
Ms 217b2: yathoktaṃ: sāmānyabhedābhivyañjakatvāt.  
 
324 Jinendrabuddhi refers to PSV V:22b, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b3: yathoktaṃ: 
śaktibhedena svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvād dravyādiṣu bheda iti.  
 
325 Jinendrabuddhi refers to PSV V:22cd, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b3: yathoktaṃ: 
śābdānāṃ tāvad abhidhāyakaśabdakta iti. yathoktam: abhidhānabhedād api dṣṭo 
bhedaś caitrādivad iti. 
 
326 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase of Dignāga's argument Ms B 217a6-217b1: 
tad evam ekaṃ ghaṭādidravyam anekeṣām pārthivatvādīnāṃ vyañjakam iti tasyāne-
kasvabhāvatvaprasaṅgaḥ. yadi vyaṅgyasāmānyabhedād dravyabhedaḥ, tathā sattā-
disāmānyam anekena pārthivādīnāṃ dravyeṇa vyajyata iti tasyāpy anekasvabhāvatā 
prasajyate. yadi vyañjakadravyabhedāt sāmānyabhedo 'bhyupeyate. tasmān na 
vyañjakadravyabhedāt sāmānyabhedo nāpi vyaṅgyasāmānyabhedād dravyabhedo 
'nekāntād iti.  
 
327 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b4: evaṃ tadvadabhidhānapakṣe 
sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ. 
 
[169] viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvam asvātantryāt puroditam. Qu. PSṬ Ms B 217b4.  
 
328 Cf. PS V:4a above with PSV ad loc.; PSṬ Ms B 217b4-5: “tadvato nāsvata-
ntratvād” (4a) ity atra hy etadbhedatvam uktam. atadbhedatve ca yathā sāmānādhi-
karaṇyaṃ na sambhavati, tathā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo 'pi. bhedena hi sāmānyaṃ 
viśeṣyate, nābhedena. 
 
[170] anyatve 'pi na sāmānyabhedaparyāyavācyanut. Qu. NCV 638,2, cf. PSṬ Ms 
B 217b6: anyatve 'pi.  
 
329 According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga is now introducing an exception to the 
general rule of exclusion formulated at the beginning of the apoha chapter, so as to 
avoid the conclusion that the general rule also applies to the referents of general 
terms, particular terms, and synonyms, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b6-7: śabdasya 
pravttinivttyarthatvād anvayavyatirekacodanāyā vyahārāṅgatā, na(1) tv anyathā 
iti darśayitum pūrvaṃ ktakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena śabdo bhāṣata (cf. PS 
V:1cd above) ity uktam. tasyedānīm anyatve 'pītyādināpavādam āha. yad utsṣṭam 
“anyāpohena bhāṣata” (PS V:1d above) iti tat sāmānyaviśeṣaparyāyaśabdārtha-
parihāreṇeti.  





[171] tulye 'pi hy anyatve. Qu. PSṬ Ms B 217b7. 
 
[172] avirodhāt. paryāyaśabdasya <tāvat>(1) tulyaṃ apohyaṃ yugapad aprayogāt, 
na ca svārthapratikṣepo yuktaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a1-2, 4: avirodhād iti … 
paryāyaśabdasyetyādi. tulyam apohyam iti … yugapad aprayogād iti … na ca 
svārthapratikṣepo yukta iti.  
(1)Cf. re źig KV.  
 
330 Since the property of being other is the cause of exclusion, not being in 
conflict, i.e., not being other, explains why the referents of general terms, particular 
terms, and synonyms are not excluded, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b7-218a1: anyatvaṃ 
cāpohe nimittam. avirodhād iti anapohyatāyāṃ hetuḥ. yā(1) hy aviruddhā na te 
parasparebhyo druhyanti nāpohanti, yathā rūpādayo dravye. NCV 637,15-16: 
anyatve sāmānyabhedaparyāyaśabdānām arthaṃ vkṣaśrutir nāpohate pthivīśiṃ-
śapātarvādiśabdānām avirodhāt, virodhāc ca paṭādīn apohata iti: “The word ‘tree’ 
does not exclude the referent of a general terms, a particular terms, and a synonym 
although they are different because terms like ‘earth,’ ‘śiṃśapā,’ and ‘taru (tree)’ 
are not in conflict; and it excludes cloth, etc. because of conflict.”  
ŚVṬ 69,27-70,1 on ŚV Apoha° 148: atra bhikṣuṇā vkṣaḥ śiṃśapeti sāmānādhi-
karaṇyaṃ darśayatoktam: vkṣas tarur iti paryāyānāṃ ca parasparam anapohya-
tvam. anyatve 'pi na sāmānyabhedaparyāyavācinām avirodhāt – iti: “While illu-
strating co-reference such as “śiṃśapā is a tree” the monk explains: Synonyms like 
‘vkṣa’ and‘taru’ do not have excluded referents one another because general terms, 
particular terms, and synonyms are not in conflict, although they are different.  
Cf. NR 429,32: yad api sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdānāṃ śiṃśapāvkṣādīnām paryāyā-
ṇāṃ ca taruvkṣādīnām avirodhenānapohakatvam uktam: anyatve 'pi na sāmānya-
bhedaparyāyavācinā <m avirodhād>(1)iti.  
(1) yā em. : yo Ms 
(1)So probably read: om. NR. 
 
331 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a2-3: ekena tasyārthasya ktakatvān na dvitīyaḥ 
prasajyate. sati ca sāmarthye yatra dvitīyasyāprayogaḥ, tayor ekārthatā yathā 
<taruvkṣa>yoḥ(1): “Since the referent is dealt with by a single [synonym] a second 
one is not required; and when a second one is not applied as they have the same 
capability, the two of them have the same reference, like [the synonyms] ‘taru’ and 
‘vkṣa’.” 
(1) yathā taruvkṣa° conj. : yasthā [prasth?]ayoḥ Ms (dper na bye brag dag bźin 
no T, which is incomprehensible in the context; the the translator may have had 
difficulties interpreting the Sanskrit Ms; the proposed conj. is based on the examples 
mentioned at NR 429,32 q.v. no. 331 above).  
 
332 Another reason for non-exclusion according to Jinendrabuddhi, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
218a4: anapohyatāyāṃ hetvantaram āha. 
 
[173] sāmānyaśabdenāpi svabhedeṣu arthāntaraṃ vyudastam bhedaśabdo 
'numodate,(1) arthitvāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a5-6: sāmānyaśabdenāpītyādi 
… svabhedāḥ śiṃśapādayaḥ teṣu arthāntaraṃ ghaṭādi vyudastaṃ vkṣaśabdena 





(1)The readings of V ched cher mi 'dzin pa yaṅ ma yin te V (“does not not admit 
to”) are preferable in the present context to bzod pa ma yin te K (“does not tolerate” 
= Sanskrit na kṣamate, cf. below no. [183]), although it is rather a paraphrase than a 
translation of Sanskrit anumodate.  
 
333 For instance the word 'śiṃśapā'. 
 
334 That is, the term ‘tree’ (vkṣa). 
 
335 Such as pot, etc. (ghaṭādi). 
 
336 That is śiṃśapā and the rest, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a5-6: sāmānyaśabdasya 
vkṣaśabdasya yat svavkṣatvasāmānyaṃ tasya bhedāḥ svabhedāḥ śiṃśapādayaḥ.  
 
337 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a6: arthī hi śiṃśapāśabdo ghaṭādivyudāsena: “For the 
word ‘śiṃśapā' is in need of the exclusion of pot, etc.” 
 
[174] yathā hi śiṃśapā na palāś<ādi>, evaṃ na <ghaṭādy api(1)>. Restored, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 218a6: yathā hītyādi.  
(1) palāś<ādi> ... <ghaṭādy api> conj. (cf. ‘di ltar śiṅ śa pa ni pa la śa la sogs pa 
ma yin pa de bźin du bum pa la sogs pa yaṅ ma yin no V : dper na śiṅ śa pa ni pa la 
sogs pa de bźin du bum pa la sogs pa yaṅ ma yin no K) : yathā hi śiṃśapā na 
palāśaś cevaṃ nāpārthivādy api PSṬ Ms B 218b2.  
 
338 Cf. śiṅ śa pa ni pa la śa la sogs pa V : śiṅ śa pa ni pa la sogs pa K. 
 
339 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a6-218b1: etena ghaṭādyapohenārthitvād ekārthakāritām 
udbhāvayan bhedaśabdaḥ sāmānyaśabdena na virudhyata iti darśayati. tathā hi 
pālāśādirūpaḥ śiṃśapāśabdasyārtho na bhavatīti. tasya palāśādayo 'pohyāḥ. tathā 
ghaṭādirūpo 'pi na bhavatīti. ghaṭādayo 'py apohyāḥ. te ca vkṣyaśabdenāpohyante: 
“Thereby, arguing that they have the same purpose because they are in need of the 
exclusion of pot, and so on, he shows that a particular term is not in conflict with a 
general term. That is, the referent of the word ‘śiṃśapā' does not have the form of 
palāśa, etc. Thus its excluded referents are palāśa, etc. In the same way it does not 
have the form of pot, etc. Thus its excluded referents are also pot, etc. And these are 
excluded by the word ‘tree’.” 
 
[175] etena <sāmānyasāmānyaśabdārthāpratikṣepo 'py uktaḥ>. Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 218b1: etenetyādi. 
 
340 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b1-3: svasya sāmānyasya vkṣatvasya yat sāmānyam 
pārthivatvaṃ tacchabdaḥ pārthivaśabdaḥ sāmānyasāmānyaśabdaḥ. tena yat vyu-
dasyam apārthivādi tac chiṃśapāśabdo 'numanyate 'rthitvāt. yathā hi śiṃśapā na 
palāśaḥ, evaṃ(2) nāpārthivādy(3) api. evam āvttyā adravyasyāsataś ca dravya-
sacchabdābhyāṃ nirākriyamānasyārthitvād abhyanumodanaṃ yojyaṃ: “The word 
‘earthen’ denoting the general property earthenness that is the general property of its 
own general property, is a general term's general term. The word ‘śiṃśapā’ 
approves that non-earthern things, and so on, are to be excluded by it because it is in 




[something] earthen, and so on, either. Thus the approval is to be applied by 
recursion because it needs that non-substances and non-existent things are excluded 
by the words ‘substance’ and ‘existent’.”  
(2)°palāśaḥ, ev° conj. : °palāśaś cev° Ms 
(3)nāpārthivādy conj. : nāpādivādy Ms (cf. chu las ma gyur pa ñid la sogs T = 
āpāditvādi; the translator of T evidently read āpāditvādi as translated. However, it 
makes no sense in the context). 
 
[176] tathā sāmānyaśabdaḥ svārtham abhiprete viṣaye vyavasthāpyamānam 
viśeṣaśabdena viśeṣaviśeṣaśabdena vā kathaṃ nopekṣate. <evaṃ avirodhāt 
sāmānyādiśabdārthāpoho na yujyate>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b3-5: tathā 
sāmānyaśabda ityādi … svārthaṃ(1) sattādikaṃ abhiprete viṣaye vyavasthāpya-
mānam iti … viśeṣaśabdena … viśeṣaviśeṣaśabdena vā … kathaṃ nopekṣate.  
(1)°aṃ sat° em. : °asat° Ms 
 
341 That is, for instance, the word ‘existent’ and its own referent existence, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 218b3: sāmānyaśabdo 'pi sadādiḥ. svārthaṃ sattādikam. 
 
342 That is, e.g., a substance as defined by a property, and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
218b4: guṇādivyavacchinne(1) dravyādau.  
(1)°vyavacchinne em. (cf. rnam par bcad pa'i T) : vyavasthinne Ms 
 
343 A particular term is a term like ‘substance’, and a particular term's particular 
term comprises in descending order terms like ‘earthen,’ ‘tree,’ ‘śiṃśapā’, and so 
on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b5: viśeṣaśabdena dravyādinā, viśeṣaviśeṣaśabdena vā 
pārthivavkṣaśiṃśapāśabdādinā. 
 
344 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b5-6: arthī hi svaviṣayāvasthānena(1) nirviṣayasya svār-
thasyānupapatteḥ. anenābhiṣṭārthasampādanād viśeṣaśabdaḥ sāmānyaśabdasyopa-
kārī, tataś ca sāmānyaśabdas tena na virudhyata iti darśayati: “For [the general 
term] is in need of being confined to its proper domain since it is not justified if its 
proper referent is without domain. Since the intended referent is realised by means 
of it [viz. the general term], the particular term is assisting the general term; and 
therefore he points out that the general term is not in conflict with it.”  
(1) svaviṣayāva° em. (cf. raṅ gi yul la gnas pas T) : sasvaviṣayāva° Ms 
 
[177] samūhaś ca tathārthāntaravācakaḥ. Qu. NCV 647,14-15.  
 
345 Although Dignāga does not explain the linguistic implications of the term 
samūha, it is clear from Jinendrabuddhi and Siṃhasūri’s explanations in PSṬ and 
NCV, respectively, that samūha in the present context denotes any given string 
consisting of 1. two speech units such as stem (prakti) and affix (pratyaya), 2. two 
speech units constituting a compound (samāsa), 3. two speech units (i.e., syntactical 
words) constituting a sentence (vākya); and 4. a sentence consisting of more than 
two syntactical words. According to Dignāgan theory, the sentence is the principal 






346 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b6-7: avirodhād apratikṣepe guṇotkarṣaṃ darśayati. atha-
vā parasparārthāpratikṣepe hetvantaram āha. parasparārthāpratikṣepe hi svārtha-
viśiṣṭasyārthasya vācakatvam upapadyate, nānyathā. 
 
[178] evaṃ ca sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor svārthe sāmānye <vartamānayor> dvayor 
bahūnāṃ vā <tad>viśiṣṭārthāntarasya vācakatvam <upapadyate> yathoktam prāk. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 219a1-2: evaṃ ceti … dvayor iti … svārthe vkṣasāmānye 
vārtamānam; 219a6-7: bahūnam vā … sarveṣāṃ svārthasāmānye vartamānānām … 
vācakatvam … arthāntarasya cābhidhānam; parallel at NCV 647,14-15: evaṃ ca … 
sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor ityādi yāvad vākyārthavācakatvam; Ms B 218b6-7, q.v. no. 
347 above; 219b1: yathoktam prāg iti. 
 
347 Jinendrabuddhi quotes PS V:15ac explaining that while it shows that the 
words ‘nīla' and ‘utpala' each separately are without referent in terms of the refer-
ent of their aggregate, it also explains that the aggregate denotes a separate referent 
(arthāntara), cf. PSṬ Ms B 219b1: samudāyārthena pratyekam ānarthakyaṃ 
nīlotpalaśabdayor darśayatā samudāyasyārthāntarābhidhāyitvam uktam.  
 
348 Jinendrabuddhi quotes as an example of a string consisting of stem and affix 
the syntactical word vkṣam (PSṬ Ms B 219a1: dvayor iti yathā vkṣam iti 
praktipratyayoḥ), which he analyses at PSṬ Ms B 219a1-3 as a combination of the 
denotation of the nominal stem vkṣa and the affix am denoting the direct object 
(karma): atra hi prātipadikaṃ svārthe vkṣasāmānye vartamānaṃ karmādivibhak-
tyarthān na pratikṣipati. am ity api pratyayaḥ karmasāmānye 'vasthito vkṣādīn 
prātipadikārthān nāpohate. evaṃ parasparārthāpratikṣepe tayor yaḥ samūho 
vkṣam iti so 'vayavārthaviśiṣṭasyārthasya(1) vācaka upapannaḥ: “For in this case 
the nominal stem(a) does not reject the referent of the direct object case affix, and so 
on, while being applied to the general property treeness. And the affix am which is 
restricted to the general property of being a direct object does not exclude the 
referents of nominal stems like ‘tree’, etc.; thus, in that there is no mutual rejection 
of their referents, it is justified that the aggregate of the two viz. vkṣa + am denotes 
a referent that is qualified by the referents of the [two] constituents.”  
Jinendrabuddhi continues extending the analysis to the compound nīlotpala at 
219a3-6: tathā nīlotpalam(2) iti nīlotpalaśabdayoḥ samāsapadayoḥ samāsārtha-
vācakatvam anyonyārthāvyudāse sati yujyata iti yojyam. tathā hi nīlaśabdasya nīla-
viśeṣān anutpalādīn(3) apratikṣipata(4) utpalānutpalavttir arthaḥ. utpalaśabdas-
yāpy utpalaviśeṣān anīlādīn(5) apratikṣipato(6) nīlānīlavttiḥ. samudāyas(7) tv 
avayavārthābhyāṃ viśiṣṭaḥ: “It is to be construed thus: In the same way as it is 
justified that the words ‘blue' and ‘lotus' viz. the two compounded words of the 
expression ‘blue lotus' express a compounded referent in that they do not exclude 
one another's referent. That is, although the word ‘blue' is not rejecting particulars 
of blue such as non-lotuses, and so on, it has a referent that occurs among lotuses as 
well as non-lotuses. And although the word ‘lotus' too is not rejecting particulars of 
lotus such as [those that are] non-blue, it [has a referent that] occurs among blue as 
well as non-blue things. The compound, however, is qualified by the referents of the 
two constitutive parts.”  
(a)For the definition of prātipadikam, cf. A I 2:45: arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ 
prātipadikam. The first triplet (prathamā) serves the purpose of denoting the 




(1) 'vayavā° em. (cf. yan lag gi T) : pacā° Ms 
(2) nīlot° em. : lot° Ms 
(3) anutpalā° em. : utpalā° Ms 
(4) apratikṣipata em. : pratikṣipataḥ Ms 
(5) anīlādīn em. : na nīlādīn Ms 
(6) apratikṣipato em. : pratikṣipate Ms 
(7) samudāyas em. : samudāyasya Ms 
 
349 The commentator mentions as an example of the combination of more than 
two terms the example rājapuruṣa abhirūpamān āgaccheti:(1) “let the handsome 
prince come.” (PSṬ Ms B 219a7), cf. NCV 647,18-20 which develops more fully 
the implications of Dignāga's concise statement: devadatta tiṣṭhati, devadatto gehe 
tiṣṭhati, devadatta gām abhyāja śuklām ityādidvitricatuḥpañcādipadasamūhānāṃ 
vākyārthavācakatvam. 
(1) āgaccheti conj (< āgaccha + iti, cf. śog ces pa T) : apeti Ms 
 
[179] <āha ca>(1) tanmātrākaṅkṣaṇād bhedaḥ svasāmānyena nojjhitaḥ, nopāttaḥ 
saṃśayotpatteḥ, sāmye caikārthatā tayoḥ. Qu. TSP 379,7-8; Ms B 219b2–6: 
tanmātrākāṅkṣaṇād iti … nopātta ityādi … sāmye caikārthatā tayor iti; NCV 648,18 
(PS V:27cd). 
(1) Cf. yaṅ brjod pa V : om. K. 
 
350 Jinendrabuddhi explains that since general and particular terms are not in 
conflict, Dignāga formulates this verse with reference to the fact that a general term 
does not exclude (atyāga) the particulars nor does it include them (anupādāna), cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 219b1-2: sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor avirodhe sāmānyaśabdena bhedānām 
atyāgam anupādānāṃ cādhiktya ślokam āha.  
  
351 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 219b3: svabhedamātrākāṅkṣaṇād ity arthaḥ. ākāṅkṣā punas 
teṣu saṃśayānasya vyavacchedaprārthanā. mātraśabdo viśeṣāntarākāṅkṣānirāsāya. 
tathā hi vkṣaśabdāt palāśādiviṣayaivākāṅkṣā jāyate, na(1) ghaṭādiviṣayā. yadi ca 
ghaṭādivat palāśādayo 'pi tyaktāḥ syuḥ, tatrāpi ghaṭādivad ākāṅkṣā na syāt. bhavati 
ca. tato na tyaktāḥ: “The meaning is 'because only its own particulars are expected 
as a complement.' The expectation of a complement, moreover, is the request for 
exclusion made by somebody, who is in doubt about these [particulars]. The word 
‘only’ is for the sake of excluding the expectation of other particulars as 
complements. That is, due to the word ‘tree’ the expectation of a complement that 
only concerns palāśa, and so on, arises, but not one that concerns pot, etc. And if 
palāśa, and so on, were rejected in the same way as pot, and so on, there would be 
no expectation of a complement with regard to these in the same way as [there 
would be no expectation of a complement with regard to] pot, etc. And this is the 
case. Therefore they are not excluded.” 
(1) na conj : om. Ms 
 
352 The identity to which Dignāga refers is the identity of the referent of the 
general term ‘tree’ and any of its particulars, e.g., the term, ‘palāśa,’ which is the 
presupposition of their being co-referential. Mallavādi substitutes the term tattva for 
sāmya in his edited version of PS V:27, cf. NCV 648,15. Jinendrabuddhi does not 





the co-reference of the general and particular term consists in their not excluding 
and not including, cf. PSṬ Ms B 219b6: yatraitayoḥ sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor atyāgo 
'nupādānaṃ ca, tatraikārthatā sāmānādhikaraṇyam ity arthaḥ: “The meaning is 
this: When the general and the particular term neither exclude nor include, they have 
the same reference, i.e., they are co-referential.” 
 
[180] anekam api sāmānyam bhedenāvyabhicāriṇā, upāttaṃ na tayos tulyā(1) 
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā. (2) Restored, Ms 219b7-220a2: anekam apītyādi … avyabhicā-
riṇeti(3) … na tayor iṣṭā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyateti; cf. parallel at NCV 648,24-25: anekaṃ 
ca sāmānyaṃ … upāttam avyabhicāriṇā bhedena; NCV 649,11: yathocyate tvayā: 
na tayos tulyā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā.  
(1) tulyā (cf. mtshuṅs KV) : iṣṭā Ms 220a2. 
(2) In V this verse is followed by the phrase źes bya ba bsdu ba’i tshigs su bcad 
pa dag go : om. K. However, the subject matter of the verses as well as PSṬ do not 
corroborate that formally they are saṃgrahaślokas; for a similar example of a non-
standard use of the term, cf. the verses at PS V 12-13 that V also identifies as 
saṃgrahaślokas in contrast to K. 
(3) °eti em. (cf. NCV 648,24: avyabhicāriṇā) : °o hi Ms 
 
353 The preceding verse addresses the relationship between a general term and its 
particulars, which is defined by the general term's neither excluding nor including 
the particulars. In the immediately following one Dignāga answers the question of 
whether the relation between a particular general term and its general property is the 
same as that between a general terms and its particulars; cf. the introduction to the 
verse at Ms B 219b7: yathā sāmānyaśabdena(1) svabhedānāṃ na tyāgo nopādānaṃ, 
kiṃ tathā viśeṣaśabdenāpi sāmānyasyeti? praśnaprasargam(2) āha.  
(1)sāmānya° em. : sāmānyādhikara° Ms  
(2)praśnaprasargaṃ conj (cf. dri ba spoṅ bar byed pa T) : prannaprasaṃgā Ms 
 
354 Cf. the paraphrase at PSṬ Ms B 219b7-220a1: yady apy anekaṃ sāmānyaṃ 
tathāpi tad bhedaśabdenopāttam pratyāyitam ity arthaḥ; pratyāpanavyatirekeṇopā-
dānāsambhavāt. yathā śiṃśapāśabdenārthato(1) vkṣapārthivadravyasatsāmānyam 
upāttaṃ, na kevalam atyaktam eva. “Even though there are several general proper-
ties, nevertheless they are included by the particular [general] term, that is, they are 
indicated by it because inclusion is impossible without the action of indicating, like 
the inclusion by implication through the word 'śiṃśapā' of the general property of a 
tree, an earthen thing, a substance, and something existent, not merely of [the 
general property] as not excluded.  
(1) °to em. : °aḥ Ms 
 
355 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 220a1-2: kasmāt punaḥ sāmānyānām upādānam bhedaśabde-
netyādi? “avyabhicāriṇeti.” yasmād bhedaḥ sāmānyāvyabhicārī sāmānyābhāve 
bhedābhāvāt, tasmāt tena tadupādānaṃ: “Why is it, moreover, that general proper-
ties are included by a particular [general] term, etc.? [The answer is:] “Because it 
does not deviate.” Since the particular [general property] does not deviate from the 
general property in that the particular [general property] would not exist if the 






356 The point is that the relation between the terms ‘vkṣa’ and ‘śiṃśapā’ is not 
symmetrical as neither one is related to the other as qualifier and qualified because 
every śiṃśapā is a tree, whereas every tree is not necessarily a śiṃśapā. Thus the 
term ‘śiṃśapā’ may qualify the term ‘tree’ but not vice versa as ‘śiṃśapā’ does not 
deviate from the general property treeness and the hierarchy of other general 
properties that together define the entity ‘tree;’ cf. the succinct explanation at PSṬ 
Ms B 220a2-5: vkṣo hi śiṃśapādīn vyabhicaran vyavacchedam apekṣata ity asti 
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ. śiṃśapā tu vkṣasāmānyam avyabhicarantī nāpekṣata ity 
nāsti. vyabhicarinos tu bhedayor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ tulyaḥ. tadyathā nīlotpala-
yoḥ: “For ‘tree’, not being restricted to ‘śiṃśapā’, and so on, depends upon 
exclusion. Thus there is a qualifier-qualified relation. ‘śiṃśapā’, on the other hand, 
being restricted to the general property treeness, does not depend upon it. Thus there 
is none. Two particulars, however, that are not restricted have a symmetrical 
qualifier-qualified relation, like, for instance, ‘blue’ and ‘lotus.’”  
The problem Dignāga discusses is ultimately derived from a discussion at Mahā-
bh in which Patañjali addresses the question of how two words that each denote a 
substance (dravya) and therefore are principal (pradhāna) relate to one another, cf. 
Mahā-bh I 399,25-26 (ad A II 1:57 vārt 2): kathaṃ tarhīmau dvau pradhānaśabdāv 
ekasminn arthe yugapad avarundhyete: vkṣaḥ śiṃśapeti. naitayor avaśyakaḥ 
samāveśaḥ, na hy avkṣaḥ śiṃśapāsti: vkṣaḥ śiṃśapā: “How then are these two 
principal words simultaneously confined to the same referent like [in the statement]: 
“The śiṃśapā is a tree.” The conjunction of these two is not necessary because the 
śiṃśapā is not a non-tree.” This statement is explained as follows by Jinendrabuddhi 
in Nyāsa ad A II.1:57: vkṣo hi śiṃśapātvaṃ vyabhicarati, śiṃśapā tu na vkṣatvam. 
atas tatprakārāntarebhyaḥ palāśādibhyaḥ taṃ vyavacchinattīti śiṃśapā tasya 
viśeṣaṇam bhavati, na tu viśeṣyam. vkṣas tu viśeṣyaḥ. śiṃśapārthas tu vkṣatvaṃ 
na vyabhicaratīti na tasyāsau viśeṣaṇam bhavati: “For ‘tree’ deviates from 
śiṃśapāness, whereas ‘śiṃśapā’ does not deviate from treeness. Therefore, as it 
excludes this from palāśa (trees), and so on, whose attributes differ from those of 
the former, ‘śiṃśapā’ is its qualifier, but not the qualified. ‘Tree,’ (vkṣa) on the 
other hand, is the qualified. The referent of ‘śiṃśapā,’ however, does not deviate 
from treeness. Thus the latter is not its qualifier.” 
 
[181] kim punar atra <kāraṇaṃ yena bhedaśabdo bhedāntaraśabdārtham 
apohate>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 220a5: kim punar atretyādi. 
 
357 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's introductory remark at PSṬ Ms B 220a4-5: 
sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayoḥ parasparārthapratikṣepapratiṣedhe(1) dvayoḥ sāmānyaśab-
dayoḥ dvayoś ca bhedaśabdayoḥ parasparārthapratikṣepaḥ siddha iti etad aprati-
pādyam eva, kāraṇam eva tu pratipādyam iti. atas tad eva pcchati “kim punar 
atre”tyādi. sāmānyayos tu svasāmānyāpekṣayā bhedatvān na pthag upādānam. 
(1) Cf. the use of the term parasparārthāpratikṣepa no. 347 above. 
 
[182] bhedo bhedāntarārthaṃ tu virodhitvād apohate. Qu. NCV 649,14; ŚVṬ 69,5 
and 71,4; NR 429,14; cf. PSṬ Ms B 220a6-7: bhedo bhedāntarārtham iti … 
virodhitvād iti; NCV 613,26: bhedo bhedāntaretyādi.  
 
358 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 220a6-7: vkṣatvasya śiṃśapādir bhedaḥ parasparato bhidyata 





viṣayiṇo nirdeśāc chabdo bhedo bhedāntaraṃ ceti vijñeyam. bhedaśabdo bhedān-
taraśabdārtham ity arthaḥ. virodhitvād (PS V:28b1) iti hetuḥ: “śiṃśapā, and so on, 
is a particular of treeness in that [śiṃśapā, etc.] differ mutually. ‘Different 
particular’ means that the same thing is different with regard to khadira, and so on, 
as well as [being] a particular. In this case, however, one has to understand that the 
word is the particular as well as a different particular since that which has reference 
to a given thing is specified as the thing [in question]. The meaning is: A particular 
term [excludes] the referent of different particular terms. The reason is 'because they 
are in conflict [with one another]';” Cf. ŚVṬ 69,3 introducing 28ab: atra bhikṣuṇā 
palāśaḥ śiṃśapeti sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na bhavatīti darśayatoktam. Kumārila 
addresses the content of 28ab at Apoha° 147: virodhitvena bhedānām apoho yadi 
kalpyate, virodho ’pohatas tatra, virodhāc cāpy apohanam. Pārthasārathimiśra ad 
loc. explains apoha as mutual non-existence (itaretarābhāvaś cāpohaḥ, NR 429,16), 
which is an undeniable aspect of Dignāga’s apoha thesis, cf. PSV V: 45 below. 
(1)°yesya em. : yeśa Ms  
 
[183] bhedārthā hi śabdāḥ sāmānyārthāpaharitvād rājaputravat parasparaviro-
dhinaḥ. tataś ca na parasparārthaṃ kṣamante(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 223a7: 
bhedārthā hi śabdāḥ sāmānyārthāpaharitvād rājaputravat parasparavirodhina iti 
etad eva tāvad ayuktam; 220a7: sāmānyārthāpahāritvād iti … rājaputravad iti; 
220b1: tataś ca na parasparārthaṃ kṣamante; cf. the paraphrase at ŚVṬ 69,3ff: 
bhedaśabdā hi palāśaśiṃśapādaya ekaṃ vkṣatvasāmānyam anyonyam apahtya 
rājyam iva rājaputrāḥ svaviṣaye sthāpayantaḥ parasparavirodhino vartante.  
(1)bzod (so read, ed. brjod) pa ma yin te K : bzod par mi nus te V. 
 
359 Cf. Kumārila's use of the same expression at ŚV Apoha° 148: na sāmānyāpa-
hāritvaṃ vidhirūpeṇa tatra te, palāśādīn apohyāto vkṣaṃ harati śiṃśapā. 
 
360 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 220a7-220b1: rājaputrāṇāṃ hi pitary uparate sāmānyārtho 
rājyam. tasya te sarve yathābalam apahāritvād virodhinaḥ: “For when their father 
is deceased, the kingdom is the common property of the king's sons. They are all of 
them in conflict [with each other] because they are appropriating it with all their 
might.” Cf. Buddhist Logic Vol. I: 492 no. 3; 493 no. 4. 
 
[184] tadyathā <'ayaṃ vkṣaḥ śiṃśape'ti(1) śiṃśapāśabdo vkṣaśabdena saha pra-
yujyamānaḥ khadirādibhyo vyavacchidya(2) vkṣatvaṃ svaviṣaye vyavasthāpayati. 
tathetaratrāpi(3). evaṃ tāvad bhedaśabdasyai>kadravyāpahāritvād(4) <bhedāntara-
śabdārthāpoho yuktaḥ(5)>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 220b2: tadyatheteti … 
ekadravyāpahāritvād iti. 
 (1)śiṅ 'di śiṅ śa pa yin no źes em. : śiṅ 'dis (NP so; 'di śiṅ ed.) śa pa yin no V : 
śiṅ śa pa zes bya ba la K.  
(2)Cf. rnam par bcad nas V : bśad nas K.  
(3)Cf. cig śos la V : gźan la K.  
(4)rdzas gcig btaṅ sñoms su byed pa'i phyir ro V : rdzas gcig la 'jug pa'i phyir 
K.  
(5)Cf. rigs pa yin no V : rigs pa ma yin no K. 
 





362 According to Jinendrabuddhi the reason ekadravyāpahāritvāt is just a 
repetition of the reason sāmānyarthāpahāritvāt, cf. Ms 220b2: ekadravyāpahāritvād 
iti sāmānyāpahāritvasyaivānuvādaḥ.  
 
[185] atha <sāmānyāntarabhedārthaṃ(1) ghaṭādim asambaddhaṃ> kasmād 
apohata <iti. yasmāt>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 220b5: athetyādi; 220b5-6, q.v. no. 
364 below.  
(1)Cf. spyi gźan V : phyir (sic) gźan K.  
 
363 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi sets forth the assumptions underlying the opponents 
objection at PSṬ Ms B 220b3-6: nanu caitad virodhitvasya hetuḥ, na 
bhedāntarārthāpohasya. tat kimiti tataḥ sa prayukta ucyate. tad api tasya pāram-
paryeṇa hetur ity adoṣaḥ. virodhaḥ pratikṣepahetur uktaḥ. sa ca sāmānyārthāpa-
hāritvāt. na ca sāmānyāntarasya pārthivatvāder ye bhedā ghaṭādayas tadvācibhiḥ 
saha śiṃśapāśabdasyaikārthāpahāritvaṃ, kiṃ tarhi vkṣaśabdena. ataḥ(1) prati-
kṣepakāraṇābhāvād nāpoha iti manyamāna āha: athetyādi. śiṃśapāyāḥ sāmānyaṃ 
vkṣatvam. tato 'nyatvāt pārthivatvaṃ sāmānyāntaram. tadbhedo ghaṭādiḥ. so 
'sambandhaḥ śiṃśapāśabdena virodhābhāvāt, na hi tacchabdena śiṃśapāśab-
dasyaikadravyāpahāritvam. atas taṃ kasmād apohate virodhābhāvāt. naivāsāv 
apohyata ity arthaḥ: “Certainly this [viz. appropriating the common property] is the 
reason for being in conflict, but not for the exclusion of the referent of other 
particular [terms]. So how is it justified thereby? This too is indirectly the reason for 
it. Thus there is no problem. Being in conflict is said to be the reason for negation. 
And this [viz. being in conflict] is due to appropriating the common property. And 
the word 'śiṃśapā' does not appropriate the one property together with words 
denoting particulars like pots that are particulars of other general properties like 
earthenness, but rather [it does so] together with the word ‘tree’. Therefore there is 
no exclusion since the reason for the negation does not exist. With this in mind he 
says: 'But', etc. Treeness is the general property of śiṃśapā. Earthenness is a 
different general property because it is different from that [viz. treeness]. Its 
particular such as a pot is without connection with the word 'śiṃśapā' because there 
is no conflict. For the word denoting it does not appropriate the same property as 
that of the word 'śiṃśapā'. So why does it exclude this since there is no conflict? 
The meaning is: It does not exclude at all.”  
(1)°a. ataḥ em. : °ātaḥ Ms 
 
[186] sāmānyāntarabhedārthāḥ svasāmānyavirodhinaḥ. Qu. NCV 613,27, 649,15; 
cf. PSṬ Ms B B 220b6-7: sāmānyāntarabhedārthā iti.  
 
364 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 220b7: tad evaṃ virodham apohanibandhanaṃ darśayati. 
virodhasāmānyam apohahetuḥ. iha ca yady api sākṣād virodho nāsti pāraṃparyeṇa 
tv asty eva: “In this way he shows that hostility is the cause of exclusion. The cause 
of exclusion is the general property hostility. And even though the hostility does not 
exist directly, it exists, however, indirectly.” 
 
[187] vkṣaśabdena hi <ghaṭādīnām pārthivādyapahāritvād virodhaḥ>. tena hi 
nirākriyamāṇaṃ abhyanumodate(1) mitraśatruvat. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 220b7: 
vkṣaśabdena hītyādi; Ms B 221a1: tena hītyādi; 221a1-2, q.v., no. 366 below.  






365 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 221a1-2: śiṃśapāśabdasya mitraṃ vkṣaśabdaḥ tadartha-
sāmānyavācitvāt. tacchatravo ghaṭādiśabdāḥ pārthivatvāpahāritvāt(1). tatas tena 
vkṣaśabdena nirākriyamāṇaṃ(2) ghaṭādikaṃ śiṃśapāśabdo 'bhyanumodate mitra-
śatrum iva: “The word ‘tree’ is the friend of the word 'śiṃśapā' because it denotes 
the general property of its referent. Its enemies are words like 'pot' because they are 
appropriating earthenness. Therefore the word 'śiṃśapā' approves that pot, and so 
on, is being excluded by the word ‘tree’ in the same way as [one approves that] the 
enemy of a friend [is being excluded].”  
(1)°vatvāpa° conj. : °vāpa° Ms  
(2)nirā° conj. : °enāvākri° Ms 
 
[188] arthāc ca tena sa nirasta iti pratīyate. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221a2-3: 
arthāt(1)… tena śiṃśapāśabdena ghaṭādir nirasta iti pratīyate. 
(1)Cf. don las (so read : don la V) yaṅ de des spaṅs so źes śes par bya 'o V : des 
kyaṅ de bsal lo źes bya bar rtogs pa yin no K.  
 
366 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 221a2-3: śiṃśapāśabdasya siṃśapāsāmānyam arthaḥ. tasya 
cāghaṭādirūpatvād ghaṭādivyāvttis tata evārthāt pratīyate. na punaḥ śiṃśapāśab-
dasya tatra vyāpāraḥ, tathāpi tena śiṃśapāśabdena ghaṭādir nirasta iti pratīyate 
tatpratyāyitenārthena tasya nirastatvāt: “The referent of the word 'śiṃśapā' is the 
general property of a śiṃśapā. And since this has the form of non-pot, and so on, the 
exclusion of pot, and so on, from the same (tata eva) is understood by implication. 
Although the word 'śiṃśapā' is not concerned with this [exclusion], nevertheless it 
is understood that pot, and so on, is excluded by the word 'śiṃśapā because it is 
excluded by the referent that is indicated by it.” 
 
[189] etena <sāmānyāntarabhedānāṃ guṇādīnāṃ tadbhedānāṃ ca rūpādīnāṃ> 
nirākaraṇaṃ upekṣaṇaṃ ca(1) sambandhasambandhataḥ(2) ktaṃ(3) veditavyaṃ(4) 
mitramitraśatruvat, mitraśatrumitravat. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221a3-7 q.v. no. 
368 below.  
(1)Cf. sel bar byed pa daṅ btaṅ snoms su byed V : sel bar byed par bltos par (sic) 
K.  
(2)Cf. 'brel pa las 'brel pa K : 'brel pa can daṅ 'brel pa can ma yin pa yaṅ V.  
(3) ktaṃ is only translated in K; cf. byas par next. 
(4)Cf. byas par rigs par bya 'o K : rigs par bya 'o V. 
 
367 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 221a3-7: anena nyāyena pārthivasāmānyād anyat sāmānyaṃ 
dravyatvam. tasya sāmānyaṃ sattvam. tasya bhedā guṇāḥ karmāṇi ca teṣām api 
bhedā rūpādaya utkṣepaṇādayaś ca yathākramam. nirākaraṇaṃ ca svavirodhinā 
śabdena upekṣaṇaṃ(1) ca viśeṣaśabdena sambandhasambandhataḥ(2) ktaṃ(3) 
veditavyam. katham ity āha: mitramitraśatruvad ityādi. atra mitramitreti dviruktiḥ 
pāramparyeṇa mitrapratipādanaparā veditavyā. anyathaikamitravyavahitam eva 
mitram pratīyeta. tatra guṇaṃ karma ca śiṃśapāśabdo dravyaśabdena nirākriya-
māṇam mitramitraśatruvad abhyanumodate. guṇaviśeṣān(4) rūpādīn karmaviśeṣān 
cotkṣepaṇādīn śiṃśapāśabdo mitraśatrumitravat dravyaśabdena rūpādyutkṣepaṇā-
diśabdānāṃ cānyatareṇa nirākriyamāṇān upekṣate: “In accordance with this 
principle substanceness is another general property than the general property 




particulars of this [viz. existence] are qualities and actions, and their particulars, 
moreover, are colour, and so on, and the action of throwing upward, and so on, 
respectively. And the exclusion by a term with which itself is hostile and the 
toleration by a particular term should be understood as caused by a connection 
series. In what way? Like the enemy of a friend's friend, etc. In this case the 
repetition 'friend's friend' is to be understood as having the objective of indicating a 
friend in a series, otherwise the friend would be understood as completely separated 
from one friend. In this context the word 'śiṃśapā' approves that quality and action 
is being excluded by the word 'substance' like the enemy of a friend's friend. And 
the word 'śiṃśapā' tolerates like the friend of the enemy's friend that particular 
qualities like colour and particular actions such as throwing upward, and so on, is 
being excluded by the word 'substance' as well as by one or other among the words 
'colour', and so on, and 'throwing upward', etc.”  
(1) upekṣaṇaṃ em. : utkṣepanañ Ms 
(2)sambandhasam° em. : sambandhaḥ ktaṃ sam° Ms  
(3)ktaṃ is not translated in T.  
(4)°ān em. : °ād Ms 
 
[190] tatra tu(1) na sākṣāt tasya te 'pohyāḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b1: tatra 
tu na sākṣāt tasya ta ityādi; 223b6: yad apy uktam: “na sākṣāt tasya te 'pohyāḥ”(2). 
(1)de la yaṅ V : de la yaṅ de ni K.  
(2)°āḥ em. : °ā(rth) Ms  
 
368 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 221a7-221b1: nanu ca śiṃśapāśabdenaiva ghaṭādīnāṃ 
nirākaraṇam. tathā śiṃśapāśabdād evoccaritāt tadapohaḥ pratīyate: “Is it not so 
that pot, and so on, is only excluded by the word 'śiṃśapā'? Thus its exclusion is 
understood from the word 'śiṃśapā' alone as soon as it is articulated.” 
 
[191] <na hi śiṃśapāśabdo ghaṭādīn sākṣād apohate. kasmāt?> mā bhūt 
sāmānyatulyatā. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b1: mā bhūd ityādi; 223b6: <m>ā bhūt 
sāmānyatulyatā. 
 
[192] yadi hi(1) sākṣād apoheta, vkṣaśabdena tulyārthaḥ(2) syāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 221b1-2: yadi hi sākṣād apoheta rūpaśabdavat,(3) vkṣaśabdena tulyārthaḥ 
syāt; 223b6-7: yadi hi sākṣād apoheta(4) vkṣaśabdenāviśiṣṭaḥ syād ityādi.  
(1)Cf. ni V : om. K.  
(2)Cf. śiṅ gi sgra daṅ mtshuṅs pa'i don can du 'gyur K : śiṅ gi sgra daṅ don 
mthuṅs pa 'gyur V. Thus KV do not corroborate the reading vkṣaśabdenāviśiṣṭaḥ at 
223b6-7.  
(3)rūpa° em. : rūpo ś° Ms : sṅon po'i sgra T.  
(4)°eta em. : °e tu Ms  
 
[193] tathā bhedāntarāṇām <tu teneva>(1) na syād apohaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms 
B 221b2: tathā bhedāntarāṇām ityādi.  
(1)The particle iva, which is crucial for understanding the argument, is found in 
the paraphrase of the argument at Ms 221b2, q.v. below no. 370. It is not reproduced 






369 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b2: tathā sati palāśādīnāṃ vkṣaśabdeneva śiṃśapā-
śabdena na syād apohaḥ: “In those circumstances palāśa, and so on, would not be 
excluded by the word 'śiṃśapā' just as it is not excluded by the word ‘tree’.” 
 
[194] yathaiva hi vkṣaśabdaḥ palāśādīn(1) nāpoheta, tathā śiṃśapāśabdo 'pi 
nāpoheta <tena tulyatvāt>(2). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b2-3: yathaiva hi 
vkṣaśabdaḥ palāśādīn nāpoheta(3) … tathā śiṃśapāśabdo 'pi nāpoheta.  
(1)Cf. pa la śa la sogs pa V : śiṅ śa pa la sogs pa rnams K. 
(2)Cf. de daṅ mtshuṅs pa'i phyir K : des mtshuṅs par bya ba'i phyir V. 
(3) apoheta em. : apohate Ms 
 
370 That is, because 'palāśa', and so on, include ‘tree’ because the latter negates 
pot, and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b3: ghaṭādipratikṣepeṇa vkṣopādānāt. 
 
[195] <yadi nāsti sa doṣo>'lpabahvarthāpohatvena bhinnatvād <ity evam>, 
ayuktam. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b4: alpabahvarthāpohyatvena bhinnatvād iti; 
Ms B 221b7: ayuktam iti.  
  
371 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's exposition of the opponent's view at PSṬ Ms B 221b4-
7: śiṃśapāśabdasya bahutaram apohyam palāśādipratikṣepād alpataraṃ vkṣaśab-
dasya palāśādyanapohāt. ataś cātulyāpohyatvān na vkṣaśabdena tulyārthaḥ 
śiṃśapāśabdaḥ. tathā hi vkṣaśabdasya vkṣatvam arthaḥ. śiṃśapāśabdasya tu tac 
ca śiṃśapātvam. ato 'lpabahutvāpohyatvena(1) bhinnatvān naiva doṣaḥ. etad uktam 
bhavati: yady api śiṃśapāśabdasya vkṣaśabdasya ca vkṣatvam arthaḥ, tathāpi 
śiṃśapāśabdasya śiṃśapārthavatvalakṣaṇo 'sti viśeṣaḥ. tena saty api vkṣārtho-
pādāne na bhavati palāśādyanapohaprasaṅga iti: “The word ‘śiṃśapā’ has more 
excluded referents because it excludes palāśa, and so on, the word ‘tree’ has fewer 
because it does not exclude palāśa, etc. And therefore the word 'śiṃśapā' does not 
have a referent in common with the word ‘tree’ as its excluded referents are not the 
same. That is, the referent of the word ‘tree’ is the property treeness. That of the 
word ‘śiṃśapā’, however, is the same as well as śiṃśapāness. Therefore, since they 
are different as their excluded referents are few and many there is no problem. What 
is meant is this: even though the referent of the word 'śiṃśapā' and the word ‘tree’ 
is the property treeness, nevertheless the difference of the word 'śiṃśapā' is that it is 
characterized by the fact of having the śiṃśapā as its referent. Therefore, even 
though it includes the referent tree the [absurd] consequence of not excluding the 
palāśa, and so on, does not exist.” 
(1) ato 'lpabahutvā° conj (cf. de’i phyir bsal bar bya ba ñuṅ ṅu daṅ maṅ po ñid 
kyis ni T) : cātolyabahutvā° Ms (cf. ataś cātulyāpohyatvāt above, de’i phyir yaṅ etc. 
T). 
 
[196] yathaiva hi vkṣaśiṃśapāśabdau(1) <vkṣatvaśiṃśapātvaviśiṣṭaṃ vastu 
bruvāṇāv atyantabhinnārthaṃ> brūtaḥ, tathehāpy <asaṅkīrṇenārthena> bhavitav-
yam. arthāt tu syād alpabahutarāpohaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b7-222a1: 
yathaiva hi parasya vkṣaśiṃśapāśabdāv asaṅkīrṇam(2) artham brūtaḥ, tathehāpi 
bhavitavyam iti samānārthaḥ; 222a2-3: arthāt tu syād ityādi, cf. 224a1: yad apīdam 
“arthāt tu syād(3) alpabahutarāpoha” ity etad apy anyāyam eva.  
(1)Cf. śiṅ daṅ śiṅ śa pa'i sgra dag ni V : śiṅ daṅ śiṅ śa pa'i sgra dag gis K.  




(3)tu syād em. : tasmāt Ms 
 
372 Dignāga points out that he basically follows the same principle as the 
opponent who, while accepting conventional usage, differentiates between the 
referents of the words ‘śiṃśapā’ and ‘tree’ as the referents of general terms and 
particular general terms are not confused in common usage, cf. PSṬ Ms B 222a1-2: 
<kutaḥ>(1) punar ayaṃ niyamo yat parasyaiva bhavitavyam iti? na(2) kutaścit. 
yathaiva tu pareṇa laukikīm(3) pratītim anurakṣatā loke sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor 
asaṅkīrṇārthatvāc chiṃśapāvkṣaśabdayor arthabhedo vyavasthāpyate, tathāsmā-
bhir apīty etāvad ucyate.  
(1)kutaḥ conj. (cf. ci las T) : om. Ms  
(2)na kha(lu?) Ms 
(3)lau° em. : lo° Ms 
 
373 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 222a2-4: kathaṃ tarhi śiṃśapāśabdād bahutarāpohaḥ 
pratīyate yadi sa tena na kriyata ity āha: arthāt tu syād ityādi. śiṃśapāśabdena hi 
śiṃśapārthe pratyāyite śiṃśapāyā(1) vkṣatvenāvinābhāvitvāt sāmarthyāt vkṣa-
tvāvagatiḥ. atas tenārthena nirākriyamāṇaṃ(2) ghaṭādikam mūḍhaḥ śabdaktam 
manyate: “How then is the exclusion of more understood from the word ‘śiṃśapā' if 
it is not effected by this? With this in mind he says: “Yet, by implication there will 
be,” etc. For when the word ‘śiṃśapā’ has indicated the referent śiṃśapā, treeness is 
understood by implication because a śiṃśapā is invariably connected with treeness. 
Therefore a fool believes that when a pot, and so on, is implicitly excluded by it 
[viz. the word ‘śiṃśapā’], it is done explicitly.”  
In the immediately following excursus Jinendrabuddhi addresses the question of 
why the word 'śiṃsapā' only indicates śiṃśapāness directly, whereas it indicates by 
implication all the other properties that define the śiṃśapā. For Dignāga has claimed 
in a saṅgrahaśloka at PS II:18ab that the logical indicator indicates the concomitant 
properties (the so-called anubandhinaḥ) of the indicated. And the logical property of 
the word ‘śiṃśapā’ would constitute a parallel instance, cf. PSṬ Ms B 222a4-222b2: 
katham punas tulye liṅgatve dhūmādi sākṣād evānalādau dravyatvādy avagamayati. 
yad āha: “gamyante liṅgatas te 'pi liṅgino ye 'nubandhinaḥ” (PS II:18ab) iti. 
śiṃśapāśabdaḥ punaḥ sākṣāc chiṃśapātvam eva pratyāyayati, sāmānyantarāṇi tu 
sāmarthyāt. api cānvayavyatirekalakṣaṇasambandhāpekṣayā śabdaḥ svārthāvagati-
hetur iṣyate. tat kathaṃ na dravyasattvādīni gamayeta? na hi tadabhāve śabda 
upalabhyate. naiṣa doṣaḥ. tatra na hy arthasya puruṣaktaḥ sambandho, 'pi tu 
svabhāvataḥ. sa yena yenāvinābhūtaḥ svabhāvataḥ, taṃ tam eva pratyāyayati. 
śabdasya tu puruṣaktasaṅketopanītaḥ sambandhaḥ, na ca dravyatvādau vkṣa-
śabdaḥ saṅketitaḥ. tat kutas tadapekṣayānvayavyatirekau. tato na dravy<atv>ādī-
nāṃ(3)sa gamakaḥ. nanu ca, śabdasyāpy apauruṣeya eva sambandho vivakṣāyām. 
tatra tajjanyaviśeṣagrahaṇe(4) sāmānyāntarāvagatihetutvaṃ tasyeṣṭam eva, aviśeṣa-
grahaṇe(5) vyabhicārān neṣyate. dhūmādāv api liṅga etad tulyam eva. na hi tad api 
dīptatvādisāmānyaviśeṣam analādau gamayitum alam. tatra ko 'yaṃ śabda eva 
codyānurāgaḥ: “How then, as its being an indicator is similar, does smoke, and so 
on, directly indicate substanceness, and so on, in the case of fire, etc. For as 
(Dignāga) says: “The concomitants of the indicated are also indicated by the 
indicator.” (PS II:18ab). The word 'śiṃśapā', however, indicates śiṃśapāness 
directly, but [indicates] the other general properties by implication. In addition, it is 





dependence upon its connection, which is characterized by joint presence and joint 
absence (cf. PSV V:34). Therefore, why would it not indicate substanceness, etc.? 
For the word is not apprehended in the absence of these. This is not a problem. For 
in this case the connection of the referent is not manmade, but rather, it is due to the 
essential nature [of the referent]. Whatever [referent] with which it is invariably 
connected, that alone it indicates. The word's connection, however, is brought about 
by a convention that is manmade. And the word ‘tree’ is not agreed to denote 
substanceness. Therefore, how could there be joint presence and joint absence with 
respect to this [viz. the word ‘tree’ as denoting substanceness]? Consequently, it 
does not indicate substanceness, etc.  
Certainly, even the word's connection for the sake of denoting the intension [of 
the speaker] (vivakṣā) is by no means due to human agents. In the present context it 
is claimed that it [viz. the word ‘tree’] is a cause of the cognition of other general 
properties, when the particular [general properties] that are occasioned by it are 
apprehended, but it is not claimed, when the particular [general properties] are not 
apprehended because of uncertainty. (6) 
The case is the exact same with regard to the logical indicator smoke, etc. For 
this too is not capable of indicating particular general properties like the radiance in 
fire, etc. In those circumstances, why this passion for raising questions about the 
word only?”  
The technical term anubandhin also occurs in PS II:18-19. It is possible to 
restore both verses on the basis of quotations and paraphrases at NCV 675,11-16, 
YD 86,20 (PS II:19cd), and PSṬ Ms B 72b1-3: gamyante liṅgatas te 'pi liṅgino ye 
'nubandhinaḥ, viśeṣā na <tu> gamyante tasyaiva, vyabhicāriṇaḥ. (PS II:18) liṅ-
gānubandhinas tv arthā gamayanti na <liṅginam> vyabhicārād, viśeṣās tu pratītāḥ 
pratipādakāḥ. (PS II:19): “The concomitants of the indicated are also indicated by 
the indicator, but its particulars are not indicated at all as they are deviating. (18) 
The referents that are the concomitants of the indicator, however, do not indicate the 
indicated on account of deviation. The particulars, however, are indicating insofar as 
they are cognized” (19).  
The commentary on these verses at NCV loc. cit. is far more explicit than Ms B 
ad loc., and is therefore worthwhile quoting in full: viśeṣās tauṣakārīṣādayo na 
gamyante tasyaiva, vyabhicāritvād liṅgasya viśeṣaiḥ sahādṣṭatvāt. evaṃ liṅ-
gasyānyavyāvttaṃ sāmānyaṃ gamakam, nāvyāvtam anyataḥ sattvādi. liṅginaḥ 
sāmānyaṃ gamyaṃ nivttam anagnyādibhyo 'gnitvaṃ sattvādi cāgnitvānubaddham 
avyabhicāritvād iti. liṅge tv ayaṃ punar viśeṣaḥ: liṅgānubandhinas tv arthā ityā-
diślokaḥ. pūrvodāhtāḥ sāmānyadharmāḥ sattvādayo liṅgasya dhūmasya na gama-
yanti, uktakāraṇatvāt. viśeṣās tu kecid liṅgyavinābhāvinaḥ pratītāḥ pratipādakāḥ 
pāṇḍutvabahulatvādaya iti. For the pratīkas at Ms B loc.cit., cf.: gamyante liṅgatas 
te 'pīti … vyabhicariṇa iti … liṅgānubandhinas tv arthā iti … viśiṣtās (sic) tv iti.  
(1)T translates erroneously śiṅ śa pa'i don rtogs par byas pa na śiṅ śa pa ñid 
kyaṅ ṅo.  
(2)°ena nirākri° conj. : °enākri° Ms  
(3)°yatvā° conj. : °yā° Ms 
(4)°aṇe sām° em. : °aṇasām° Ms  
(5)eva, avi° em. : evāvi° Ms 
(6) The opponent appears to object that even in the case of vivakṣā, which is 
claimed to be indicated by any given word [see note 9 above and Appendix I 




transcends human agency (apauruṣeya). The rest of the argument appears to take for 
granted that general properties are real things that presuppose observation. Even 
though the word ‘tree’ denotes an object which is a substance, the inference of 
substanceness is only valid if backed by observation of the particular general 
properties that the object includes.  
 
[197] yadi bhedo bhedāntarārtham <apoheta, madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto 
guruś(1) ceti yad etad guṇasya guṇāntaraiḥ sāmānādhikaranyam,> tat katham? 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 222b2-3: yadi bhedo bhedāntarārtham it … tat katham iti.  
(1)The same example is quoted at TSP 312,25: tadyathā: madhuro rasaḥ 
snigdhaḥ śīto guruś ceti, cf. ro mṅar po snum pa graṅ ba lci ba źes bya ba'i yon tan 
'di yon tan gźan daṅ gźi mthun pa źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa der ci ltar 'gyur źe na K : 
gaṅ 'di yon tan daṅ yon tan gźan gyis gźi mthun pa ste, ro mṅar pa la snum pa daṅ 
bsil ba daṅ lci ba ñid do źes pa de ji ltar źe na V. 
 
374 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 222b2-3: guṇabhedā hi madhurasnigdhatvādayaḥ. tatraiṣāṃ 
parasparāpohe sāmānādhikaraṇyena na bhavitavyam. asti ca tat(1). tathā hi madhu-
rarasasya(1) guṇāntaraiḥ snigdhatvādibhiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam upalabhyate: “For 
sweetness and stickiness, and so on, are different qualities. Under these circum-
stances there is no co-reference as they exclude one another. And [co-reference] 
does exist. For instance one observes the co-reference of the sweet taste with other 
qualitites such as stickiness.” And Jinendrabuddhi continues commenting upon the 
phrase tat katham at Ms B 222b3-4: na kathañcid yujyata iti manyate. anena 
sāmānādhikaraṇyād madhurādīnāṃ kṣṇatilakavad anapoham anumāya virodhasya 
hetor anekāntikatvam udbhāvayati, apohābhāve 'pi bhāvāt. Madhurasnigdha-
śaityādāv(2) akāraṇatvaṃ vāpoham prati virodhasya, saty api tasminn avikalpye(3) 
tadabhāvād iti.  
(1) tat em. : tataḥ Ms 
(2)madhurarasasya conj. : carakerasasya Ms 
(3)mtshaṅ na (sic) T. 
 
[198] sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ tu. Qu. Ms B 222b5. 
 
375 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 222b5–223a1: yad etat sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ guṇabhedānāṃ 
tadāśrayeṇāvirodhāt. madhurādīnāṃ yad āśrayabhūtaṃ dravyaṃ tena teṣām avi-
rodhaḥ, na hi guṇāḥ svāśrayeṇa virudhyante(1). dravyam eva ca madhuraguṇaṃ, 
tasyaiva ca śītasnigdhādayo guṇāḥ, na rasasya guṇasya. atas tatra dravye vttā 
rasa upacaryante. upacāranibandhanam punar ekārthasāmāvāyaḥ. upacāraphalaṃ 
tu mādhuryasya snehādibhiḥ sāhacaryakhyāpanam. tataś ca yathā teṣāṃ mukhya 
āśrayo dravyaṃ madhurādiguṇayogād “madhuraṃ dravyaṃ śītaṃ guru” cety 
ucyate, tathopacarito 'py āśrayo madhurākhyo rasaḥ snigdhatvādiguṇayogād 
“madhuro rasaḥ snigdho guruś” cety ucyate. tad evaṃ gauṇam atra sāmānādhika-
raṇyaṃ kalpitam ity uktam bhavati. na ca kalpitārthavaśād vastunaḥ tādātmyaṃ 
sidhyatīti. nāsti yathoktadoṣaḥ: “The co-reference of the various qualities is due to 
their not being in contradiciton with their substrate. That is, the [quality] sweet 
[taste] and the rest, are not in contradiction with the substance that is their substrate. 
For qualitites are not in contradiction with their own substrate. And only the 
substance has the quality sweet [taste], and only this [viz. the substance] has such 





transferred to [the sweet] taste as resident in the substance. The cause of transfer, 
moreover, is [their] inherence in one and the same referent. The effect of transfer, 
however, is the enunciation of the concomitance of sweetness with stickiness and 
the rest. And therefore, just as their primary substrate viz. the substance is said to be 
a substance that is sweet, cool, and heavy because it is connected with the quality 
sweet, and so on, in the same way the taste called sweet, although it is substrate in a 
transferred sense, is said to be a sweet sticky and heavy taste because of the 
connection with the quality stickiness, etc. Thus the co-reference which in this case 
is secondary is said to be imaginary;” cf. TSP (ad TS 781) 312,26ff: yatraiva hi 
dravye mādhuryaṃ samavetaṃ tatraiva śītatvādayo 'pīty ekārthasamavāyabalād 
atra bhavati sāmānādhikaraṇyam.  
(1)vi° em. : ni° Ms 
 
376 I assume that rdzas yod la ni V : rdzas K translates Sanskrit *dravye sati. 
 
377 Cf. źes pa'i V : phyir K. 
 
[199] adṣṭatvād vyudāso vā. Qu. Ms B 223a1; ŚVṬ 71,6, NR 431,1. 
 
378 In PSV V:25cd Dignāga introduces conflict (virodha) as the cause of 
exclusion and makes use of this term throughout the following paragraphs to 
describe the action of exclusion of other referents. However, Dignāga's use of the 
disjunction vā at this juncture serves the purpose of introducing an epistemologically 
valid alternative to virodhitva as the cause of exclusion. Dignāga’s statement at PS 
V:31a invalidates the previous discussion, and makes it look problematic, if not 
entirely superfluous.  
Bhaṭṭaputra Jayamiśra correctly interpreted the introduction of non-observation 
(adṣṭatva, adarśana) as another cause of exclusion than conflict (virodha) or being 
in conflict (virodhitva), which Dignāga introduces at PS V:25a above. Cf. his 
introduction to the quotation of PS V:31a at ŚVṬ 71,5: bhikṣuṇāparaṃ kāraṇam 
uktam, and the explanation at NR 431,1-2: adṣṭatvād vyudāso vā bhedānām 
itaretaram iti śiṃśapāśabdaḥ palāśādāv adṣṭaḥ tasyāpohaṃ karotīti. 
Jinendrabuddhi interprets vā in the sense of eva, which excludes virodha and 
virodhitva as the cause of apoha, cf. Ms B 223a2: vāśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ. 
adṣṭatvād eva vyudāsaḥ, na virodhitvād ity arthaḥ. yathā ktakatvaṃ nityeṣv 
adarśanāt(1) tadapohaṃ karoti, tathā bhedaśabdo bhedāntareṣv adarśanāt tadapo-
haṃ karoti: “The word vā has a restrictive meaning. The meaning is this: exclusion 
is only due to not being observed, not due to being hostile. Just as the general 
property being produced excludes permanent [things] because of not being observed 
in these, a particular term excludes other particulars because of not being observed 
to denote these.” Although the interpretation of vā as avadhāraṇa is supported by 
the indigenous Sanskrit lexicographers, cf., e.g., Amarakośa IV.16cd: vai vety 
avadhāraṇavācakaḥ, Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation is formally correct in the 
context of Dignāga's exposition at PSV V:34 below. However, vā which is repeated 
in the vtti where evidently it has no restrictive function merely serves the purpose 
of introducing the only valid reason of exclusion. It marks the introduction of the 
siddhānta as is generally the case in Indian śāstra literature, and leaves the 




terms of virodha, and now introduces non-observation as the real cause of exclusion 
of other referents, which ultimately reflects his own epistemology and logic. 
(1) °eṣv adarśa° em. : °eṣu darśa° Ms 
 
[200] <atha vā>(1)yasmād bhedaśabdo bhedāntarārthe(2) na dṣṭaḥ, tasmād 
apohate. kasmāt tu na dṣṭa iti(3)? Restored, cf. ŚVṬ 71,6-7: yasmād bhedaśabdo 
bhedāntarārthe na dṣṭaḥ, tasmād apohate; PSṬ Ms B 223a2-3: kasmāt tu na dṣṭa 
iti.  
(1) yaṅ na K : om. V. 
(2) °arthe conj. : °artho ŚVṬ.  
(1) For iti, cf. źe na K : ci ste ... źes bya V. 
 
379 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 223a3: śiṃśapāśabdasya palāśādāv adarśanasya kāraṇam 
pcchati: “He asks for the reason why the word ‘śiṃśapā’ is not observed to denote 
a palaśa, etc.” 
 
380 Cf. kha cig gis 'gal ba'i phyir K : kho bo cag gis … bkag pa'i phyir ro V. 
 
[201] svābhāvike 'py arthe … āhopuruṣikā pratipannā; cf. PSṬ Ms B 223a3: 
svābhāvike 'py artha iti. 223a7: āhopuruṣikā pratipanneti. Cf. 224a4: kiṃ punaḥ 
kāraṇam ācāryenāhopuruṣikā pratipannā.  
 
381 The extant Sanskrit fragments of this sentence do not, unfortunately, clarify 
the divergent translations of K and V. Although Jinendrabuddhi comments on 
Dignāga's statement with the background of Dharmakīrtian and post-Dharmakīrtian 
philosophy, the introductory part of his explanation presumably reflects Dignāga's 
own view. I have therefore adopted the readings of K that seem to fit 
Jinendrabuddhi's explanation. According to Jinendrabuddhi Dignāga introduces 
non-observation (adarśana) as the cause of exclusion because being in conflict 
(virodhitva) is merely an implied feature (upalakṣaṇamātram), cf. PSṬ Ms B 223a3-
6: hetupratyayasvabhāvapratibaddhatayā svābhāvikaḥ śabdalakṣaṇo 'rtha itīhābhi-
pretaḥ. śiṃśapādiśabdo hi śiṃśapādivivakṣayaiva prayujyate, na palāśādivivakṣayā. 
ataḥ śiṃśapāvivakṣāsvabhāve pratibaddhatvāt palāśādiṣu śiṃśapāśabdasya prayo-
go na bhavati. tataś ca tatrādarśanam. tad etasmiṃ svābhāvike(1) 'rthe tasyādar-
śanam bhedāntarāpohasamartham utsjya yad virodhitvaṃ pratikṣepakāraṇam 
uktam, tad nyāyamuktasyāhopuruṣike(2)ty arthaḥ. virodhitvam upalakṣaṇamātram. 
anyad api yat tadadhikakāraṇam uktaṃ tad api veditavyam. “aho aham” iti yo(3) 
manyate, so 'hopuruṣaḥ. tadbhāva āhopuruṣikā. sā punar abhimānaḥ, sa hy 
ahopuruṣaśabdasya prayojakaḥ: “What is intended here is that the referent as 
characterized by the word is natural on account of its being dependent upon the 
inherent nature of its causes and conditions. For the word 'śiṃśapā', and so on, is 
only applied with the intention to denote the śiṃśapā, but not with the intention to 
denote the 'palāśa', etc. Therefore, since it is dependent upon the inherent nature of 
the intention to denote the śiṃśapā, the word 'śiṃśapā' is not applied to the palāśa 
tree, etc.; and therefore it is not observed to denote these. Consequently, when some 
reject that the fact that it is not observed to denote this natural referent is incapable 
of excluding other particulars, and claims that being in conflict is the cause of 
exclusion, [this claim] is [an expression of] the conceit of some who has abandoned 





should also know the other cause transcending this, which has been set forth. The 
person who thinks, ‘Ah! What a person I am,' is a conceited person (ahopuruṣa); as 
an essential state (tadbhāva) [cf. A V 1:119] āhopuruṣikā is ‘personal 
conceitedness.' Moreover, it is haughtiness (abhimāna), for this prompts the 
application of the word ahopuruṣa.” 
The following excursus at Ms 223a7-224a5 contains an explicit criticism of 
Dignāga's position. It is indebted to Dharmakīrtian philosophy: kim punar 
atrāyuktaṃ yenaivam āha: “āhopuruṣikā pratipanne”ti. “bhedārthā hi śabdāḥ 
sāmānyārthāpahāritvāt rājaputravat parasparavirodhina” (= PSV V:28ab) iti. etad 
eva tāvad ayuktam. tathā hi sāmānyārthāpahāritvaṃ virodhasya hetutvenopāttaṃ, 
tac ca śabdānāṃ viśiṣṭe viṣaye sāmānyārthapratyāyanalakṣaṇaṃ rājaputrāṇāṃ 
tadvijātīyaṃ rājyasvīkaraṇalakṣaṇaṃ, yasmin sati svasmin vijite dānādikriyāsu 
svatantro bhavati. tatra yadi śabdagataṃ sāmānyārthāpahāritvaṃ hetutvenopā-
dīyate(4), dṣṭānto(5) hetuvikalaḥ syāt. atha rājaputragataṃ hetor asiddhatā. 
śabdamātraṃ hi tatrābhinnam, nārthaḥ kaścit. na ca tato 'rthasiddhiḥ. na hy 
anapekṣitavastukaṃ śabdamātram icchāmātrabhāvi vidyata iti. vastugamyaṃ vastu 
sidhyati. yathoktaṃ: “vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdasāmyād abhedinaḥ, na 
yuktānumitiḥ pāṇḍudravyādivad dhutāśane (= PV II:12). jātyantare prasiddhasya 
śabdasāmyadarśanāt, na yuktaṃ sādhanaṃ gotvād vāgavādīnāṃ viṣāṇivad” (= PV 
II:15) iti. na ca bhedaśabdena kevalena sāmānyārtho viśiṣṭe viṣaye pratyāpyate, kiṃ 
tarhi sāmānyaśabdasahitena. tataś cobhābhyāṃ saṃhatya(6) sāmānyārthāpahārād 
bhedaśabdasya yadi tato bhedāntaraśabdena virodhaḥ sāmānyaśabdasyāpi syāt. na 
cāsti. tasmād ayuktam etat. yad apy uktaṃ “na sākṣāt tasya te 'pohyā. mā bhūt 
sāmānyatulyatā” (PSV V:29ab). “yadi hi sākṣād apoheta(7) vkṣaśabdenāviśiṣṭaḥ 
syād ityādi (PSV V:29cd). tad apy asad eva. yatra hi śabdaḥ saṅketyate, tam evāha. 
śiṃśapāśabdaś ca śiṃśapāyām eva saṅketyate na vkṣasāmānye. tato yady api tena 
sakṣād ghaṭādayo 'pohyante, tathāpi naiva vkṣatvam upādīyate. yad apīdam 
“arthāt tu syāt(8) alpabahutarāpoha” (PSV V:29cd) ity etad apy anyāyam eva, 
bhedasyobhayagatatvāt, svārthasya ca bhedarūpatvāt. anyatarabhedacodane 'py 
ubhayagato bhedo (cf. PVSV 63,3f) 'numīyate(9). yathā devadatto yajñadattasya 
bhrātety ukte yajñadattasyāpi bhrāttvam. na hy ayam asti sambhavo yat devadatto 
yajñadattasya bhrātā syāt, na tu yajñadattas tasyety. uktam etat: yathā ca śiṃśa-
pāyāḥ palāśādibhyo bhedas tathā ghaṭādibhyo 'pi, tataś ca śiṃśapācodane yathā 
palāśādyapohaḥ pratīyata evaṃ ghaṭādyapoho 'pi. tat kuto 'yaṃ vibhāgo labhyate: 
palāśādayas tasya sākṣād apohyā ghaṭādayas tv arthata iti. kim punaḥ kāraṇam 
ācāryeṇ“āhopuruṣikā pratipannā,” punaś ca tāṃ vihāya nyāya(11) evāvalambitaḥ? 
yuktyapetam bahv api ghoṣayadbhir na śakyate vastutatvaṃ vyavasthāpayitum. 
tasmān nyāyam abhisandhāya(12) vastunas tattvam āhopuruṣikayā ye pratipāda-
yitum icchanti tais tān(13) tyaktvā yuktir evānusartavyeti sūcanārtham.  
(1) etasmiṃ svā° em. : tasmin asvā° Ms  
(2) °e em. : °am Ms 
(3) yo em. : yo na Ms  
(4) hetutve° em. : hetve° Ms 
(5) °ānto em. : °ānte Ms  
(7) saṃha° conj. (cf. 'dus nas T) : ha° Ms  
(8) °eta em. : °e tu Ms  
(9) tu syāt em. : tasmād Ms  
(10) 'nu° em. : vamīyate Ms  




(12) abhisandhāya conj. (cf. dgoṅs nas T) : (unn?)aṃ( gh?)ya Ms 
 
[202] evaṃ tarhi sāmānyaṃ syāt svabhedanut. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 224a5: 
evaṃ tarhītyādinā; ŚVṬ 71,15: sāmānyaṃ syāt svabhedanut, cf. NR 431,5-6: tatra 
bhikṣuṇā coditam: sāmānyaṃ syād viśeṣāpohāt. 
 
382 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 224a5-6: evaṃ tarhītyādinā sāmānyaśabdasya viśeṣeṣv 
adarśane saty apy apohasyābhāvād(1) apohasyātaddhetukatvam.  
(1)apy apo° em. : avy ahopuruṣik{ā}? apo° Ms 
 
[203] yady adarśanenāpohate, <sāmānyaśabdasyāpi svabhedeṣv adarśanād(1) 
apohaprasaṅgaḥ(2) syāt>. Restored, cf. ŚVṬ 71,12f: yady adarśanena bhedaśabdo 
bhedāntarārtham apohate.  
(1)phyir K. : źes V.  
(2)sel bar K : gźan sel bar V. 
 
383 Cf. the parallel objection reproduced as pūrvapakṣa at ŚVṬ 71,12-14: yady 
adarśanena bhedaśabdo bhedāntarārtham apohate. atha kasmāt sāmānyaśabdo 'pi 
bhedārthaṃ nāpohate, so 'pi hi na tatra dṣṭa eveti: “If a particular term excludes 
the referent of other particular terms, then why does a general term not exclude the 
referent of a particular term too? For this [viz. the general term] too is not observed 
to denote these.” 
 
[204] nānyayuktasya dṣṭatvāt. Qu. Ms B 224a6; ŚVṬ 71,22; NR 431,11. 
 
384 That is, contextual factors like motive and context. One cannot exclude the 
possibility that anya = anyaśabda, cf. the parallel at VP II:264: arthapraka-
raṇāpekṣo yo vā śabdāntaraiḥ saha yuktaḥ, pratyāyaty arthaṃ taṃ gauṇam apare 
viduḥ; VP II:251cd, q.v. below no. 386. 
 
[205] dṣṭo hy arthaprakaraṇādibhiḥ sāmānyaśabdo viśeṣam pratipādayati. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 224a6-7: dṣṭo hy arthaprakaraṇādibhir(1) iti … sāmān-
yaśabdo viśeṣam pratipādayati; cf. ŚVṬ 71,19-20: yaḥ punar asyām paricodanāyām 
bhikṣuṇā parihāro dattaḥ: arthaprakaraṇādibhiḥ sāmānyaśabdo viśeṣeṣu dśyate. 
ato nāsty adarśanam iti.  
(1)°ādibh° em. : °ābh° Ms 
 
385 Cf. VP II:251cd: arthaprakaraṇābhyāṃ vā yogāc chabdāntareṇa vā; VPV II 
255,9-12 ad loc.: arthaprakaraṇaśabdāntarasambandhādīni pravibhāge nimittāni. 
arthena añjalinā juhoti … prakaraṇena tu bhojanādinā saindhavādīnāṃ śabdānām 
arthaviśeṣāvacchedāḥ kriyante. śabdāntareṇābhisambandhenāgnir māṇavako gaur 
vāhika iti; see also VP II:314-316 with VPV ad loc. Ms B 224a6-224b1: ādiśabdena 
saṃsargādayo ghyante. tatra sāmārthyena sāmānyaśabdo viśeṣam pratipādayati. 
tadyathābhirūpāya kanyā deyeti. antareṇāpi vacanam abhirūpāyaiva kanyādānaṃ 
siddham eva. vacanasāmarthyād abhirūpatamāyeti(1) gamyate(2). prakaraṇena bho-
janaṃ gopasaṃhāraprakaraṇe saindhavam ānayety ukte lavaṇa eva pratyayo 
bhavati(3). saṃsargeṇa savatsā dhenur ānīyatām ity ukte godhenur eva pratīyate(4). 






(1) °rūpat° em. : °rūta° Ms 
(2)Cf. Mahā-bh I 331,17-18 (ad A I.4:42): tadyathā loke … abhirūpāya kanyā 
deye ti na cānabhirūpe pravttir asti tatrābhirūpātamāyeti gamyate. VPV II 275,23f 
(ad 315-16): abhirūpāya kanyā dīyatām … na cānabhirūpe pravttir asti. Tatrābhi-
rūpatarāyeti vijñāyate. 
 (3)Cf. VPV II 274,13f (ad loc. cit.): arthāt prakaraṇād vā loke viśeṣagatir iti … 
saindhavam ānaya mgayāṃ ca kariṣyāmīti … tadyathāntareṇa śabdam bhujyaṅge 
saṃhriyamāṇe saindhavam ānāyeti nāśve sampratyayo bhavati.  
(4)Cf. VPV II 273,18f (ad loc. cit.): saṃsargād dhenur ānīyatām … vyavasthi-
tasya viśeṣasyāsampratyayaḥ … savatseti. 
 
386 Cf. Mahā-bh I 220,5-6 : sāmānyaśabdāś ca nāntareṇa viśeṣam prakaraṇaṃ 
vā viśeṣeṣv avatiṣṭhante. VP II:214; VNṬ 7,24-25: yad āha: na hi viśeṣa-
śabdasannidhir eva śabdānāṃ viśeṣāvāsthitihetuḥ, api tu prakaraṇasām-
arthyādikam api. 
 
[206] ta<dābhaḥ>(1) saṃśayas tathā. Qu. Ms B 224b1-2.  
(1)°dābhaḥ conj. (cf. der snaṅ K : de snaṅ V) : tan nitaḥ Ms 
 
387 Cf. spyi'i sgra <las>(1) V : spyi'i las K.  
(1)las conj, cf. K above : om. V. 
 
388 T snaṅ ba translates in this case Sanskrit ābhāsaḥ. For a similar use of ābhāsa 
qualifying saṃśaya, cf. PSV V:34 below. 
 
389 Cf. de rnams la yaṅ V : de yod pa rnams kyaṅ K. 
 
390 That is, even though the general term previously has been observed to denote 
its particulars, the use of it without the necessary restriction of its scope is similar to 
the use of the term uprightness whose scope is restricted to denote the uprightness of 
a tree by the addition of the term ‘crows nest’, cf. PSV V:14 above.  
 
391 Cf. the absurd translation re źig 'greṅ ba la V (= ūrdhve [?] tāvat sic). 
 
392 Although KV are syntactically confused and the readings diverge, the 
svabhāvahetu formulated by Jinendrabuddhi gives a sufficiently clear indication of 
its context, so that it is possible to eliminate the errors, cf. PSṬ Ms B 224b2-3: 
sāmānyaśabdasya viśeṣeṣu darśane hetvantaram āha. na hi caitraśabdasya madhu-
rādiṣv adṣṭapūrvasya tadākārasaṃśayahetutvam. etena yaḥ svabhedākārasaṃśaya-
hetuḥ sa svabhedeṣu dṣṭapūrvaḥ, ūrdhvatāvat. tathā ca sāmānyaśabda iti svabhā-
vam āha: “He formulates another reason for the observation of a general term at the 
particulars. For the word caitra(1) is not a cause of doubt about its mental picture 
when it has not previously been observed to denote sweet things (madhura), etc. 
Therefore, that which is a cause of doubt about the mental picture of its own 
particulars has been observed previously to denote its own particulars, in the same 
way as 'uprightness'. And a general term is like that.” After this explanation 
Jinendrabuddhi adds a brief discussion with reference to the general term 
śrāvaṇatva, cf. 224b3-5: nanu ca śrāvaṇatvenānekāntaḥ. tad dhi na kvacit dśyate 




tatra ca tat dṣṭam eva, na tu punar nityādayaḥ padārthāḥ. tasya bhedā yeṣu tan na 
dṣṭam ity acodyam etat. sāmānyatve vā satīti viśeṣaṇam atra draṣṭavyam. tac ca 
sāmānyaśabdādhikārād labhyate.  
(1)Cf. Amarakośa III.15. 
 
[207] saṃśayo 'yukta iti cet. <idaṃ> manyate: yady arthaprakaraṇādisahita 
<ev(1)opalabdhaḥ> syāt, tataḥ <kathaṃ saṃśaya> iti. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
224b5: saṃśayo 'yukta iti ced iti; B 224b5-6: yady arthaprakaraṇādisahitaḥ(2) syāt, 
saṃśayahetur na syāt, kākanilayanasahitordhvatāvat. asti ca saṃśayaḥ. tato yathā 
svabhedeṣūpalabdhapūrvatā tathārthādisahitatvābhāvo 'pīti viruddho hetur iti 
manyate.  
(1)Cf. kho na K : om. V.  
(2) °śayo em. : °śaye Ms  
 
[208] niścite kevalāt tu saḥ. naiva arthādisahitāc chaṃśaya ity ucyate(1), kiṃ tarhy 
arthādisahitāt. niścita uttarakālaṃ kevalāt saṃśayaḥ. Restored, cf. Ms 224b6: 
niścite kevalāt tu sa ityādi; B 224b6-7: naiva viśeṣasahitāt saṃśaya ucyate, kiṃ 
tarhy arthaprakaraṇādisahitāt sāmānyaśabdāc chiṃśapādau viśeṣe niścita uttara-
kālaṃ kevalād viśeṣeṣu saṃśayaḥ. 
(1)brjod par mi bya ste V : brjod pa K. 
 
393 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 224b7-225a1: etenārthādisahitopalabdhikāle saṃśayahetu-
tvāsiddheḥ, yadā ca saṃśayahetutvaṃ tadārthādisahitatvāpratijñānād nāsti virud-
dhateti darśayati.  
 
[209] bhede <na kevalo 'sti> cet. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225a1: bhede ced iti(1).  
(1)Ms so, but T reproduces 32c in toto. 
 
394 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225a1: kevalasya bhedeṣu prayoga eva nāsti tadanabhi-
dhāyitvāc(1) chabdāntaravat. na vāprayuktasya saṃśayahetutvam upapadyate iti. 
evam apy asiddhaṃ svabhedākārasaṃśayahetutvam.  
(1)°anabhi° em. : °abhi°. 
 
395 Cf. 'dir K : om. V. 
 
396 Cf. spyi'i sgra V : ci'i sgra K. 
 
[210] dṣtaḥ śrotvyapekṣayā. Qu Ms B 225a2. 
 
[211] yadā hi śrotānyasāmānyavyudāsenārthībhavati, <tadyathā> kiṃ vkṣaḥ 
pārthiva uta pañcamahābhautika ity <ukte>, tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya prayogaḥ 
sambhavati. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225a2: yadā hītyādi(1). yadā hi śrotrā … 
tadanyasāmānyavyudāsenārthībhavati, tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya pārthivaśab-
dasya prayogaḥ sambhavati. Ms B 225a4: kiṃ vkṣaḥ pārthiva uta pañcamahā-
bhautika iti.  
The translations of this clause in KV deviate considerably in terms of syntax and 
meaning from the paraphrase at Ms B 225a2-3 and appear to have been based upon 
a corrupt text. K and V state: For when (yadā hi) the listener, after having excluded 





'earthen,' when he asks “is a tree earthen (pārthiva) or does it consist of the five 
principal elements (pañcamahābhautika)?” Cf. Ms loc. cit.: yadā hi śrotrā 
vkṣasvabhāvam prati saṃśayitaḥ, pārthivatvadīnāṃ sāmānyānāṃ anyatamasva-
bhāvapratipattyarthaṃ tadanyasāmānyavyudāsenārthībhavati, tadā pārthiva iti 
kevalasya pārthivaśabdasya prayogaḥ sambhavati: “For when (yadā) the listener 
who is in doubt about the essential nature of a tree in order to get to know either 
nature of [its] general properties such as earthenness, and so on, asks for the 
exclusion of its other general, (tadā) it is possible to apply 'earthen' alone saying 
’earthen’ (pārthiva iti).”  
When juxtaposing the two Tibetan translations and Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase 
it is obvious that neither K nor V reproduce the expected apodosis, which is 
introduced by tadā in the paraphrase. K, on the one hand, reproduces Sanskrit yadā 
by gaṅ gi tshe : om. V, but neither K nor V translate tadā. In addition, they both 
seem to have misundertood the syntax of Sanskrit arthībhavati = don du gñer bar 
'gyur te K : don du gñer ba yin te V, which is constructed with instr. of the thing 
requested/asked for. It is highly likely that Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase: tadā 
pārthiva iti kevalasya pārthivaśabdasya prayogaḥ sambhavati incorporates the 
original apodosis because it contains a gloss pārthivaśabdasya on pārthiva iti 
kevalasya that otherwise would seem unnecessary. KV may have preserved part of 
the apodosis in the clause sa las gyur pa 'o źes smras pa lta bu 'o K : sa la byuṅ ba' 
o źes brjod pa bźin no V, which, however, was interpreted as part of the sentence 
illustrating the use of the word pārthiva alone. A trace of the word kevala is 
probably found in yaṅ gar ba don du gñer ba V : 'ba' źig kho na don du gñer bar 
'gyur te K. 
(1) hī° em. : pī° Ms 
 
397 Cf. Bharthari's use of the term arthitvam at VPV II 323,16-17: yathaiva 
prayoktur abhidhānam arthāvacchedanimittaṃ tathaiva pratipattur apy arthitvam 
… tathā “kiṃvarṇaḥ,” “kutaḥ krānta” iti praśne “śveto dhāvati, atikrānta” itye-
vamādy api sambhavati: “Just as the intention of the speaker is a cause of 
determining the meaning, so also the request of the listener … For instance, at the 
question “of what colour,” “from where did he run away” [answers like 'the white 
horse is galopping away (śveto dhāvati)/the dog ran away from here'(1) (< śvā + itaḥ 
+ dhāvati) are also possible.”  
(1)This example is recorded at Mahā-bh I 14,14. 
 
[212] niścite tarhi <tasya> vkṣe(1)kutaḥ pārthivaśabdaprayogāt(2) saṃśaya iti 
<cet>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225a3-4: niścite tarhītyādinā saṃśayānupapattiṃ 
darśayati … niścite praṣṭur vkṣe kutaḥ kevalāt sāmānyaśabdāt saṃśayaḥ.  
(1)Cf. gal te de'i śiṅ ṅes pa la K : de ṅes pa'i ltar na ni de'i śiṅ la V.  
(2)Cf. sa las gyur pa'i sgra sbyor ba'i phyir K : sa las byuṅ ba'i sgra sbyor ro 
źes pa'i V. 
 
[213] tasya niścite 'nyasya <kevalāt saṃśayaḥ>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225a4: 
tasya niścite 'nyasyeti.  
 
[214] yathā cā<rthāntarāpoho ’rthe(1) sāmānyaṃ, tathā>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 




(1)Cf. ci ltar don la don gźan gsal ba spyi yin pa de bźin du K : ji ltar don gźan 
sel ba de bźin du spyi yaṅ V. K would seem to translate a text like *arthāntarāpoho 
'rthe sāmānyam: “The general property in the referent is exclusion of other 
referents.” This translation reflects the content of § 46 which is to show that the 
sāmānya in śabda is similar to that in artha namely exclusion of other speech units 
and other referents. The locative evidently imitates contemporary usage, which is 
based upon the assumption that that general properties are inherent in the objects 
they qualify. 
 
398 In this paragraph Dignāga introduces the concept of general word property 
śabdasāmānya, which he defines as exclusion of other words, analogous to the 
definition of the general property of the referent viz. arthasāmānya, which is ex-
clusion of other referents cf. PSṬ Ms B 225a5-6: evam arthasāmānyaṃ vyutpādya 
śabdasāmānyaṃ vyutpādayitum āha: yathā cetyādi; cf. Pind 1991. 
The subsequent exposition at Ms B 225a6-225b1 is strongly influenced by 
Dharmakīrtian philosophy (cf., e.g., the discussion at PVSV 38,17ff), although the 
concept of śabdasāmānya never occurs in Dharmakīrti's works: yathārtheṣv 
ekārthakriyākārivyaktibhedānubhavadvārāyāto buddhau viparivartamāmaḥ sāmān-
yākāro vyavahārānuyātibhir bāhyarūpatayā vyavasīyamāno 'rthāntaravyudāsākh-
yaṃ(1) sāmānyaṃ gamakaṃ, tathā śabdeṣv atatkāryavyāvttaśabdasvalakṣaṇānu-
bhavāhitavibhramavāsanopanītajanmā(2) bauddhaḥ sāmānyākāro vyavahārānuyāti-
bhir bahiḥ śabdamātrām upāyitvenāvyavasitaḥ śabdāntaravyavacchedākhyaṃ(1) 
sāmānyaṃ vyavasthāpyate. 
(1) em. : °aḥ Ms 
(2) °vibhrama° em. : °vidrama° Ms 
 
399 This paragraph is important for understanding the rationale of the apoha 
theory. Dignāga’s use of the locative imitates contemporary philosophical usage. 
The schools of thought, whose views Dignāga analyses and rejects as untenable, 
considered general properties as a real entities resident in any given referent (arthe) 
or word (śabde). They were considered as constituting the semantic justification for 
the application of words. Dignāga, however, rejects that there are general properties 
in things or words, and he maintains that exclusion of other referents or other words 
is equivalent to the function of real general properties as maintained e.g. by Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika philosophers. Exclusion of other is like the opponents’ real general 
properties assumed to be an inherent property of things and words, which means that 
Dignāga regarded exclusion as an inherent natural property of things and words: 
they exclude other things by their very nature. Exclusion thus defines in a general 
way their difference from other things and words, in spite of the fact that the 
individual differences of things and words (their svalakṣaṇa) is beyond linguistic 
representation. This explains why Dignāga introduces the concept of substrate 
(āśraya) of exclusion in § 51 below. This term only makes sense if one interprets it 
as referring to an actual substrate. As will become clear in the crucial paragraphs 
starting with PSV V:34, exclusion is equivalent to the non-existence (abhāva) or 
absence of other things from the locus of the referent of any given word, exclusion 
being an inherent property of the excluding word and thing. This explains why 
Dignāga claims that a word denotes its referent as qualified by preclusion or 
negation of other (referents). In other words, any given word excludes other words 





excludes other things. The referent is supposed to be a real entity (vastu) qualified 
by preclusion as appears from the important fragment from Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa 
quoted no. 182 above, which states that the referent is an object (vastu) qualified by 
preclusion (nivttiviśiṣṭaṃ vastu śabdārthaḥ) i.e. non-existence of other things in the 
locus of the referent. 
 
[215] <śabdāntaravyavacchedaḥ> śabde sāmānyam ucyate(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 225b1-3, q.v. below no. [216].  
(1)Cf. sgra gźan rnam par gcod pa ni sgra la spyir ni brjod pa yin K : sgra gźan 
rnam par bcad nas ni sgra’i spyi rjod par byed pa yin V. K presupposes the reading 
*śabdāntaravyavacchedaḥ. V is impossible to construe. 
 
[216] yathaiva aktakavyudāsena(1) yat ktakatvaṃ(2) tat sāmānyam anityatvādi-
gamakam, tathā śabdāntaravyavacchedena śabde sāmānyam ucyate. tenaiva cārtha-
pratyāyakaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b1-3: yathaivetyādinā kārikārtham ācaṣṭe 
… aktakavyudāsena hetunā yat ktakatvaṃ(2) buddhipratibhāsaviśeṣaḥ. yathaiva 
tat sāmānyaṃ ktakavyaktisādhāraṇatvād anityatvādigamakaṃ tathā śabdāntara-
vyavacchedena(3) hetunā vijñānākāraviśeṣarūpaṃ śabde svasāmānyam(4) ucyate. 
tenaiva cārthapratyāyakaḥ śabdaḥ.  
(1)Cf. ma byas pa rnam par bsal ba'i spyi yis mi rtag pa la sogs pa go bar byed 
pa (sic) V : ma byas pa bsal ba'i phyir mi rtag pa ñid la sogs pa go bar byed pa K.  
(2) °katvam em. (cf. byas pa ñid T, byas pa ñid K : byas pas V) : °kaṃ Ms 
(3)Cf. sgra gźan rnam par gcod pa’i sgra la spyir brjod pa K : sgra gźan rnam 
par bcad pa’i sgra’i spyis brod par byed do V. KV do not corroborate 
°vyavacchedena Ms. 
(4) śabde sāmānyam conj (cf. sgra la raṅ gi spyi T) : śabdeṣu sāmānyam Ms. In 
contrast to T, Ms and KV do not corroborate svasāmānyam. 
 
400 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b1-2: hetau ttīyā. aktakatvavyudāsaḥ ktakaṃ vastūcyate, 
na hi vyāvtti vyāvttimato (cf. PVSV 32,15ff) 'nyety uktam. vyāvtti vyudāso 
vyavaccheda iti hi paryāyāḥ: the thrid triplet is to denote the cause. The exclusion of 
not-produced [things] is explained to be an object (vastu] that is produced; cf. 
Dignāga's exposition of what constitutes the indicative function of ktakatva at PSV 
II:22, v. above no.s 13 and 400. Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase of the argument at Ms 
B 225b1-3 (cf. no. [216] above) explains that the general property in a word is its 
exclusion of other words, the general property itself having the appearence of a 
particular form in consciousness. It is remarkable, though, that it is impossible to 
trace a single passage in PSV V, in which Dignāga makes clear that general 
properties are mental constructs located in consciousness. 
 
401 That is, only the word type, which is qualified by exclusion of other words 
denotes, in contrast to its individual instantiations, the svalakṣaṇas because they 
have not been observed before; cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 225b4, 
quoting a ślokapāda: na tu svalakṣaṇena “tasya pūrvam adṣṭatvād” iti that stems 
from a well-known verse in which Dignāga explains that the relation between 
signifier and signified can only be established in terms of their types, the underlying 
supposition being that these two types are each defined by exclusion of other: 
nārthaśabdaviśeṣasya vācyavācakateṣyate | tasya pūrvam adṣṭatvāt; sāmānyaṃ 




between an individual referent and an individual word (arthaśabdaviśeṣa) because 
they have not previously been observed (together); their general property, however, 
will be taught.” Cf. Kumārila's statement at ŚV Apoha° 102: bhavadbhiḥ śabda-
bhedo 'pi tannimitto na labhyate, na hy asādhāraṇaḥ śabdo vācakaḥ prāg 
adṣṭitaḥ:: “Nor do you assume that the difference between words is caused by the 
(vāsanās), for [according to your theory] an individual (asādhāraṇaḥ) word does not 
denote because of not being previously observed [together with its referent].” ŚV 
Apoha° 104 equating śabdāntarāpoha with śabdasāmānya corroborates the assump-
tion that the verse is from one of Dignāga’s works. Kamalaśīla quotes it explaining 
at TSP 377,18 that the general property of the word that denotes (śabdasāmānyaṃ 
vācakaṃ) is exclusion of other words (śabdāntarāpohaḥ), which he compares to the 
general property of the referent (arthasāmānyam), defined as exclusion of other 
referents (arthāntarāpohaḥ). The verse is inter alia quoted at NCV p. 615,12–13 
with the introductory remark: arthaviśeṣaś ca tavāvācya eva; Siṃhasūri quotes at 
NCV 616,10-11 a short prose passage from the same work (presumably the 
Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa) stating that the word denotes the general feature (sāmānya): 
yad apy uktaṃ: pūrvadṣtasāmānyena dhūmenāgnyanumānavad abhidhānaṃ 
sāmānyasya śabdena na viśeṣasya pūrvam adṣṭatvād iti: “Just as fire is inferred by 
means of smoke whose general property [viz. exclusion of other] has been observed 
previously, the general property is denoted by the word, but not the individual 
because it has not previously been observed. Jinendrabuddhi also quotes the 
ślokapāda at Ms B 62b5-6 in the context of discussing how the relation between the 
word and its referent is established with reference to a perceptible particular 
(svalakṣaṇa) at the time of saṅketa (i.e., the time when the relation between the 
word and the thing it denotes is taught) when the word by definition does not denote 
individuals, but only their general property: saṅketakāle śabdārthasambandhābhijño 
hi saṅketakālānubhūtārthasāmānyam eva pratipādyate śabdān, na svalakṣaṇaṃ, 
“tasya pūrvam adṣṭatvāt.” prayogakāle viśeṣaviṣayatvāśaṅkā na bhavaty eva. 
saṅketakāle tu pratyakṣaṃ svalakṣaṇam iti.  
Vṣabhadeva's statement at Paddhati 52,13-15 is closely related to Dignāga's 
view: śabdasvalakṣaṇāni paricchidyamānodayavyayāni kathaṃ nityāni syuḥ. 
svalakṣanāni ca na vācakāni. sāmānyam eva vacakam iti jātiḥ śabdaḥ: “How could 
the individual words that originate and vanish in the process of being delimited be 
eternal. The individuals do not denote. Only the general property denotes. Thus (iti) 
the word [as conveyor of meaning] is the general property.” Cf. Pind 1991. 
Interestingly, Dignāga’s reason for denying word-particulars’ capability of 
denotation re-surfaces unexpectedly in Vinītadeva’s Santānāntarasiddhiṭīkā 3,13-
16: ‘di ltar saṅs rgyas pa thams cad ni brjod par byed pa’i sgra’i rnam pa can gyi 
śes pa yin par ‘dod kyi, sgra’i khyad par ni yod kyaṅ ma yin te, de ni sṅon ma mthoṅ 
ba’i phyir źes bya ba la sogs pa’i gtan tshigs kyi khyad par brjod par byed pa yin pa 
bkag pa’i phyir ro: That is, all Buddhas maintain that a cognition (*jñāna) has the 
form of the word that denotes (*vācaka), but it does not have that of a word-
particular (*viśeṣaśabda) because it has been refuted that a [word] particular 
denotes, the reason being “because it has not been observed previously (*pūrvam 
adṣṭatvāt),” and so on.  
 







403 In this paragraph Dignāga discusses, although very briefly, a problem to 
which the Sanskrit grammarians usually refer as ekaśabdadarśana and anekaśab-
dadarśana, cf. Puṇyarāja's VPṬ 103,21 (ad VP II:250): atraikaśabdadarśanam 
anekaśabdadarśanaṃ ceti dvau pakṣau; Ms B 225b3-4: ekānekatvaṃ śabdasya 
vyutpādayitum āha: tatrāpītyādi. According to the first theory the same speech unit 
has various meanings depending on whether the usage is primary or secondary. The 
second theory stresses the fact that some speech units are identical in terms of the 
string of phonemes that constitute them, but different in terms of their derivation, the 
ambiguity of denotation being resolved by contextual factors. Thus the first theory 
focuses primarily on ambiguities of reference (artha), whereas the second is 
concerned with ambiguities of single speech units like words or sentences. Both of 
them are mentioned by Bharthari, cf. e.g. VPV I 139,8-9: śrutyabhedād anekār-
thatve 'py ekaśabdatvam, arthabhedād ekaśrutitve' py anekaśabdatvam. tatra caike-
ṣām aupacāriko bhedo mukhyam ekatvam. anyeṣāṃ tu pthaktvaṃ mukhyaṃ vyāva-
harikam ekatvam iti; VP II:257; VP II:314-17; 405, 407; VPV I 206,2-5: vākyānāṃ 
hi tulyarūpatve 'pi sati nimittāntarāc chaktir bhidyate. tatra yo rūpād eva kevalād 
vākyārthaṃ pratipadyate prakaraṇasāmarthyādi nāpekṣate sa vivakṣitāvivakṣitayoḥ 
saṃmoham āpādyate. 
 
[217] tatrāpi. Qu. Ms 225b4. 
 
[218] yatrākṣādiśabdād(1) arthe śakaṭāṅgādau(2) saṃśaya <utpadyate>, tatra śab-
dasyaikyam. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b4-5: yatrākṣādiśabdaśravaṇād abhidheye 
śakaṭāṅgādau … saṃśayo bhavati, tatra śabdasyaikyam.  
(1)For yatra, cf. gaṅ du V : om. K.  
(2)Cf. don śiṅ rta'i gśol mda' la sogs pa la V : śiṅ rta'i yan lag la sogs pa'i don 
K. 
 
404 The word akṣa is a well-known example of a homonym in Sanskrit gram-
matical literature, cf. Mahā-bh I 220,2: bahavo śabdā ekārthā bhavanti, tadyathā 
indraḥ śakraḥ + … ekaś ca śabdo bahvarthas tadyathā akṣāḥ pādāḥ māṣāḥ iti. VPV 
II 255,2-3 (ad VP II:250): yathaiva śabdabhede 'pi hastaḥ karaḥ pāṇir ity 
arthasyaikatvaṃ na nivartate, tathaivārthabhede 'py akṣāḥ pādā māṣā ity ekatvaṃ 
(so read; ed. tva°) śabdasya na nivartate: “Just as hasta, kara, pāṇi do not abandon 
their identity of reference although the words are different, so akṣā pādā māṣā do 
not abandon their [phonic] identity of word although their [individual] referents are 
different.” 
 
405 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b4-5: ādigrahaṇād vibhītakādau. 
 
406 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b5: ekasya hy anekārthasambandhiṣu saṃśayakāraṇatvam 
prasiddham ataḥ prameyatvavad anekasambandhisaṃśayahetutvād eka iti pratī-
yate: “For it is acknowledged that a single [word] is a cause of doubt about relata 
that are different referents. Therefore it is understood that it is one because it is a 
cause of doubt about different relata in the same way as 'being an object of 
cognition'.”  
 





[220] <yatra> bhavatiśabdādau <śatrantādau> (1) saṃśayaḥ(2), <tatra> śruti-
sāmye(3) 'pi śabdabhedo draṣṭavyaḥ, tadyathā ka iheti. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
225b6-7: śrutisāmye 'pi śabdabhedo draṣṭavyaḥ … tadyathā(4) ka iheti.  
(1)śatrantādau conj. (Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b6: kim idaṃ śatrantasya saptamyeka-
vacane sati). The two Tibetan transations of this paragraph are utterly confused. 
bhavatiśabdādau is translated (partly in translitterated form) in K as bhabate’i sgra 
la sogs par, but V contains no trace of this term. yod pa la sogs par K : sogs par V 
are incomprehensible. Perhaps Kanakavarman read the first term of the compound 
as sattā°; the crucial lexeme anta, however, is not reproduced. Vasudharakṣita may 
not even have been able to identify in his exemplar the first two terms of this 
compound. DC add absurdly sgra la before sogs par V. 
(2)Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b5f: bhavatiśabdādau sādśyāt saṃśayaḥ.  
(3)Cf. sgra spyi K : ñan pa pos (sic) spyi la V.  
(4) °yathā em. °yatha Ms 
 
407 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b6: yathā bhavatiśabdādau sādśyāt saṃśayaḥ: kim idaṃ 
śatrantasya saptamyekavacane sati rūpam āhosvit tiṅantam utāmantraṇam. evam 
asyety ukte sandehaḥ: kim idaṃ ṣaṣṭhyantam padam uta loṭmadhyamapuruṣaika-
vacanāntam? “Like the doubt about the word 'bhavati', etc. because of similarity: 
“Is this the form of [a word] ending in the affix śat [i.e., the affix of the present 
participle] ending in the seventh triplet in the singular, or is it [a word] ending in a 
tiṅ affix [i.e., pr. 3 sg. < √bhū], or is it a vocative [< bhavatī]? In the same way, 
when one says asya, there is doubt about whether it is a syntactical word ending in 
the sixth triplet [i.e., gen. mn. < idaṃ] or whether it is ending in second person 
singular of the affix loṭ [i.e., imp. < √as “throw”].”  
Kumārila mentions the same example at ŚV Pratyakṣa° 191: bhavatyādau ca 
bhinne 'pi nāmākhyātatvasaṃjñayā, rūpaikatvena cādhyāse tulyārthatvaṃ prasaj-
yate. 
 
408 The technical term śrutisāmya is well known from the Kāśikā, cf. Kāś on A 
IV.1:103; VIII.2:18; 2:42; 4:1. V. Cf. Renou, Terminologie s.v. śravaṇa; cf. 
Bharthari's use of the term tulyaśruti at VPV II 273,14 (ad VP II:315-16). 
 
409 The clause ka iha is ambiguous: due to sandhi it may be interpreted either as 
a combination of the syntactical words kaḥ + iha > ka iha: “Who is here” or ke 
[locative of kam (m. or n.)] + iha > ka iha: “Here at Ka [i.e., Prajāpati], or “Here in 
ka [i.e., water],” Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b7-226a1: atra hi saṃhitāyāṃ śabdarūpagataḥ 
saṃśayaḥ. kim ayam prathamānta uta saptamyanta ity anekatvaṃ ca prasiddham. 
evaṃ lokasyārthe śabde ca sandehād abhedo bhedaś ca veditavyaḥ: “For in this 
case the doubt relates to the form of the word in connected speech: Does it end in 
the first triplet or does it end in the seventh triplet? And thus its manifoldness is 
acknowledged. In this way identity and difference are to be viewed since people are 
in doubt about the referent and the word, respectively.” Examples of such 
ambiguities are mentioned at VPV I 135,6-7: vākyeṣu vā praviveki nirjñātārtha-
bhedaṃ vā yāvat tulyarūpam padaṃ gaur akṣa iti sarvaṃ tad ekam. nāmākhyāta-
bhede 'pi caikam evākṣyaśva ityevamprakāraṃ padam. VPV II 259,16-17 (ad VP 
II:268): tathā vāyur vāyuḥ, aśvo 'śvaḥ, tena tena, iti nāmākhyātānāṃ tulyarūpatve 
viṣayāntarasyāsaṃsparśān na gauṇamukhyavyavahāro 'sti; cf. VPV II 304,12 (ad 






[221] katham punaḥ śabdasyārthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne pūrvadoṣāpra-
saṅgaḥ. Restored, cf. NCV 650,9: katham punaḥ śabdasyārthāntaretyādi; Ms B 
226a1: katham punar ityādi; NCV 658,15: arthāntarāpohena svārthabhidhāne; 
NCV 651,3: pūrvadoṣāprasaṅgaś ca kathaṃ arthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne; 
NCV 658,10: pūrvadoṣāprasaṅga iti.  
 
410 Dignāga’s opponent asks why the consequences–anabhidhāna and vyabhi-
cāra–that follow from the first theory, the so-called bhedapakṣa introduced and 
explained at PSV V:2ab do not apply to the apoha theory; cf. NCV 728,20: 
bhedapakṣe param praty uktayor ānantyā(d) anuktivyabhicāradoṣayor “adṣṭer 
anyaśabdārthe” PSV V:34a ityādināpyaparihtatvāt; Ms B 226a1: śabdārthānta-
ravyavacchedena yathoktasya svārthasyābhidhāyaka ity asmim pakṣe caturṣu 
pakṣeṣu pūrvaṃ ya uktā doṣās teṣāṃ katham abhāvaḥ. Cf. NCV 650,10-651,1: 
bhedajātitatsambandhatadvatpakṣagatā doṣās tavāpi ānantyavyabhicārādayaḥ 
kathaṃ na syuḥ? 
 
411 Cf. gaṅ gi phyir K : 'di ltar V. 
 
[222] adṣṭer anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāṃśe 'pi darśanāt, śruteḥ sambandha-
saukaryaṃ na cāsti vyabhicāritā. Qu. TSP 378,17-18; Ms B 226a2: 34ab, 226a4-5: 
34cd; NCV 652,8: 34ab: 660,25: 34cd; 661,10: 34abc; 728,20: 34a. 
 
412 The feasibility of the connection (sambandhasaukaryam) depends on the 
word’s being observed to apply to an instance of its referent and its not being 
observed to apply to the referents of other words. It is clear from the writings of 
non-buddhist philosophers who address the implications of sambandhasaukaryam 
that Dignāga presupposes that the person who is taught the connection of word and 
referent (vyutpatti) is standing in some place (ekadeśastha) next to the referent 
(artha). A knowledgeable person points to a prototypical instance of the referent, 
i.e., a member (aṃśa) of the domain of similar referents, explaining that “this (thing) 
x is y” (cf. §§ 65-66 below). As the referent thus defined occurs in a particular locus 
and no special conditions apply to it and its locus, the ekadeśastha may reify the 
application of y to any given x through the means of their joint presence (anvaya) 
and absence (vyatireka), their joint absence being ascertained merely through not 
observing (adarśanamātra) the application of y to any other thing but the referent x, 
inferring that y denotes all instances of similar things to the exclusion of all things 
occurring in other loci than that of the referent. As non-observation of the absence of 
other things in the locus of the prototypical aṃśa is easily ascertained, the object of 
non-obervation being the non-existence (abhāva) of some other referent in the locus 
of the prototypical example (cf. no. 428 below), Dignāga assumes that reification of 
the connection between y and x is feasible on the basis of mere non-observation, 
emphasizing the predominance of vyatireka over joint presence as the means of 
establishing the invariable concomitance of y and x, the foundation of any valid 
connection. 
Dignāga’s view was well known to Kumārila, who addresses it at ŚV Anumāna˚ 
131cd–132:    
aśeṣāpekṣitatvāc ca saukaryāc cāpy adarśanāt [131cd] 




tāvatā na hy anaṅgatvaṃ yuktiṃ śābde hi vakṣyate [132] 
“Although joint absence (vyatireka) is claimed to establish [universal 
concomitance] because it is dependent upon [joint absence of] all [of the dissimilar 
instances] and because [the connection] is easy [to establish] since [the indicator or 
the word] is not observed [to apply to dissimilar instances], it is by no means the 
case that joint presence (yukti) on that account is not a factor when it comes to 
inference, as will be explained in the chapter on verbal knowledge (śābda).” 
Uṃveka introduces Kumārila’s succinct statement of the rationale of Dignāga’s 
theory of the feasibility of the connection as follows: 
sādhyena vyāptisiddhyai ca vyatireko ‘tra kathyate [ŚV Anumāna˚ 128c-d] ity 
uktam, tad anupapannam ity āśaṅkyate: aśeṣavipakṣāpekṣitvenādarśanamātrāvase-
yetvena ca sukhagrāhyatvād anvayanirapekṣasya vyatirekasyaivāṅgatvāt; anvayas 
tu darśanād avaseyaḥ; na ca tat sarvatra sapakṣe saṃbhavati sakalasapakṣagraha-
ṇābhāvena: 
“It is said: “In order to establish the universal concomitance with the probandum 
joint absence (vyatireka) is stated for that purpose” [ŚV Anumāna˚ 128c-d]. This is 
unjustified he thinks and argues: Because only joint absence without dependence 
upon joint presence is a factor because it is easy to apprehend as dependent on the 
vipakṣa as a whole and as ascertainable through mere non-observation; joint 
presence on the other hand, is ascertainable through observation; and that is not 
possible for all of the sapakṣa because there is no apprehension of all of the 
sapakṣa.” 
Sucaritamiśra’s Kāśikā ad ŚV loc. cit. supports Uṃveka’s interpretation: 
atra bauddhā vadanti kim idaṃ “vyāptyā sādharmya ukte ca na vaidharmyam 
apekṣyate” [ŚV anumāna˚ 118ab] ity ucyate ? na hi śatāṃśenāpi hetor vipakṣãd 
vyatireke śaṅkhyamāne gamakatvam astīty aśeṣavipakṣo ’numātur vyatirekaṃ 
grahītum apekṣitaḥ, na cāsau duradhigamaṃ, ekadeśasthasyāpi sarvādarśanasau-
kāryāt. darśanaṃ hi sarvavipakṣāṇāṃ duṣkaram, tadabhāvas tu saukāryaprāpta 
eva: 
“In this context the Buddhists argue: what is meant by saying that “when the 
positive example has been formulated in connection with the [formulation of the] 
universal concomitance (vyāpti) there is no need for the negative example” [ŚV 
anumāna˚ 118ab]? For the reason is not probative if there is even the least bit of 
doubt about its difference from the dissimilar instances (vipakṣa). Consequently the 
person who is inferring has to depend on all of the dissimilar instances for 
discerning the joint absence [of the hetu from the dissimilar instances]. This, 
however, is not difficult to realise because it is feasible even for someone who is 
standing in one place (ekastha) to not observe [the application of the hetu] to all [of 
the dissimilar instances]. For the observation of all the things that are dissimilar is 
not feasible, whereas their absense is easily obtained (saukāryaprāpta).” 
Pārthasārathimiśra corroborates the analysis in Nyāyaratnāka ad loc.: 
śākyās tu vaidharmyavacanasya pākṣikatvam asahamānā vaidharmyam eva 
sarvadā vaktavyaṃ na sādharmyam ity āhuḥ … te kila manyate: yasyāpi sādhyā-
nvayo liṅgasyānumānāṅgaṃ yasya vā vipakṣavyatirekaṃ tayor ubhayor api tāvad 
aśeṣāpekṣitatvam avivādam. tatra yady anvayo ’ṅgam iṣyate, tato ’vaśyaṃ sarveṣām 
atītānāgātānām api dhūmānām agnibhiḥ sarvaiḥ samanvayo ghītavyaḥ. na cāsāv 
īśvareṇāpi grahituṃ śakyate; na ca keṣāñcid anvaye ghīte ’nyair aghītānvayair 
anumānaṃ sambhavati. vahnimattvasāmānyena dhūmattvasāmānyasyānvayo ghīta 





sāmānyam, tathāpi tadīyāśeṣadeśakālānvayo ’gner durgraha eva. vipakṣavyatirekas 
tu sujñānaḥ, sa hy adarśanamātragamyaḥ, sukaraṃ ca sarvadhūmānām apy eka-
deśasthenaivānagniṣv adarśanam. tasmāt anagnibhyo vyaticecyamāno dhūmo 
’nagnivyāvttimukhenāgniṃ gamayati. ata evātadvyāvttiviṣayatvaṃ liṅgaśabdayoḥ. 
tasmād vipakṣavyāvttipradarśanārthaṃ vaidharmyam eva vaktavyam, na sādharm-
yam iti: 
“The Buddhists, however, being unable to accept that the formulation of the 
negative example [only] has status as a corollary [to the positive example] claim that 
only the negative example should always be formulated, not the positive one; they 
are reported (kila) to argue as follows: whoever is of the opinion that the indicator’s 
agreement with the probandum is a factor in inference or whoever is of the opinion 
that [its] difference from the heterologous [is a factor in inference] they necessarily 
have to agree on its being dependent on the exhaustion [of all of the homologous 
and the heterologous]. If, in the present case, agreement is taken to be a factor, it 
will be necessary to perceive the agreement of all past and future [instances of] 
smoke with all [past and future instances of] fire, but not even the Lord is capable of 
doing that ! And inference is not possible when joint presence of some has been 
apprehended because of other joint presences that have not been perceived. Suppose 
it is objected that what is perceived is the agreement of the property of being smoky 
with the property of being firy. Such objection, however, is impossible because the 
universal cannot stand [the criticism] of the alternatives of its being [identical or] 
different from the particular [in which it inheres]. On the other hand, let us assume 
that the universal exists. But even so fire’s agreement with such a thing [as a 
universal] at all places and modes of time is certainly difficult to perceive. However, 
its difference from the dissimilar [instances] is easy to know, for this can be known 
merely through [the reason] not being observed [at the dissimilar (instances)]. 
Indeed, it is feasible even for someone who is standing in a some place 
(ekadeśastha) not to observe all [instances of] smoke at non-fires. Therefore when 
smoke is differentiated from non-fires it makes fire known by means of excluding it 
from non-fires. Consequently the scope of the indicator or the word is to exclude 
what is other (atad). Therefore only the dissimilar example is to be formulated for 
the sake of exemplifying the exclusion [of the hetu] from dissimilar [instances], but 
not from the similar ones.” 
 
413 Cf. the related formulation of Kumārila's solution to the problems of infinity 
and ambiguity at Tantravārtikam ad III 1:12 where he rejects Dignāga's two 
arguments against the possibility of denoting the particulars by claiming that 
although entities are infinite, the relation of the word to the thing it denotes is 
feasible and that there will be no ambiguity if one takes a single among them as 
indicative [of the residence in it of the general property],(1) cf. loc.cit. p. 39,16ff: 
nanu vyaktīnām ānantyavyabhicārābhyām anabhidhānam uktam. naiṣa doṣaḥ: 
ānantye 'pi hi bhāvānām ekaṃ ktvopalakṣaṇam. śabdaḥ sukarasambandhaḥ na ca 
vyabhicariṣyati. 
(1)Kumārila assumes by implication that the universal resides identically in each 
particular and therefore justifies the application of a general term to each instance. 
 
414 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 226a2: śabdārthagrahaṇaṃ vipakṣopalakṣaṇam. vipakṣe 




the vipakṣa. The meaning is this: because of not being observed to apply to the 
vipakṣa;” cf. no.s [224] and 420 below. 
 
415 The locative is used to introduce the reference of any given term as in 
Sanskrit grammatical literature in which x(loc.) generally means “to denote x” or 
“applies to x,” cf. no. 419 below on the use of vtti.  
 
416 Cf. NCV 652,8-9: atrocyate tvayā: adṣṭer anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāṃśe 'pi 
darśanāt, anyāpohenārthābhidhānasiddhir iti vākyaśeṣaḥ; op.cit. 728,20-21: 
“adṣṭer anyaśabdārthe” ityādināpy aparihtatvāt.  
Jinendrabuddhi deviates completely from the theoretical framework of 
Dignāga's apoha theory by claiming that the svārtha is the aggregate of persons as 
possessed of intention vivakṣāvatpuruṣasamūha, the term ‘part’ (aṃśa) denoting a 
single such person, cf. PSṬ Ms B 226a2-4: svo 'rtho 'sminn iti svārthaḥ. kaḥ punar 
asau? vivakṣāvatpuruṣasamūhaḥ. tasyāṃśo 'vayavaḥ vivakṣāvān puruṣaḥ. aṃśe 
'pīti ca vivakṣavata iyaṃ saṅkhyā. This interpretation is indebted to Dharmakīrtian 
and post-Dharmakīrtian philosophy according to which one infers a speaker's 
vivakṣā from the words he is using, cf. no. 9 above. In spite of this deviation from 
Dignāgan doctrine the subsequent presentation reproduces fairly accurately the 
underlying rationale of Dignāga's theory of induction: Jinendrabuddhi states that 
although the members of the own referent of the word as explained above are 
infinite, nevertheless the word indicates its referent because it is observed to denote 
a single instance; to which Jinendrabuddhi adds that the use of api indicates that it is 
observed to denote several instances as well(1); and he concludes his exposition by 
explaining that Dignāga uses the word 'member' because the pervasion of the 
sapakṣa [i.e., everything similar to the indicated referent] is without [all] the 
members in the case of the act of indicating; for the word indicates even though it 
does not pervade (the sapakṣa), cf. PSṬ Ms B 226a3-4 : etad uktam bhavati: yady 
api yathoktasya svārthasyāṅgānām ānantyam, tathāpi tatraikatrāpi darśanād iti. 
apiśabdo 'nekatrāpīti dyotayati. sapakṣavyāpteḥ pratyāyanāyām anaṃśatvād aṃśa-
grahaṇam. avyāpake 'pi hi gamakaḥ.  
(1)Jinendrabuddhi alludes to the well-known use of api after numerals to indicate 
the notion of totality, cf. Renou, Grammaire Sanscrite § 382 p. 517. 
 
[223] anvayavyatirekau hi śabdasyārthābhidhāne(1) dvāram, tau ca tulyātulyayor 
vttyavttī. Qu. NCV 660,21, cf. PSṬ Ms B 226a5-6: anvayavyatirekau hi … dvāram 
… tau ca.  
(1)śabdasyārtha° em. : śabdārthasya NCV; cf. NCV loc. cit. no. 8; NCV 652,10-
11: śabdasyānvayavyatirekau arthābhidhāne dvāram. tau ca tulyatulyayor 
vttyavttī; NCV 664,10-11: śabdasyānvayavyatirekau arthābhidhāne dvāram. 
 
417 Joint presence and joint absence are a means (dvāram) in the sense that the 
word has the property of an indicator and as such it indicates by virtue of its 
connection, which is established through joint presence and joint absence, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 226a5-6: dvāram upāyaḥ. śabdasya liṅgatvāt tasya cānvayavyatirekalakṣaṇa-
sambandhabalena gamakatvāt. Dignāga's view of joint presence and absence differs 
from the traditional view of the Sanskrit grammarians by its emphasis on the 
impossibility of anvaya for every single item to which a term refers as opposed to 





For an analysis of the procedure of induction through anvaya and vyatireka in 
the context of the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, cf. Cardona 1980. 
 
418 For the implications of the use of (a)dṣṭi/(a)darśana and vtti in the context 
of Sanskrit grammatical literature, cf. the references in Renou, Terminologie s.vv. 
dś- and vt-. Dignāga's use of these terms is ambiguous because it is open to a 
localistic interpretation as in the case of the canon of the trairūpya, which is 
concerned with the occurrence of the indicator at the indicated and the sapakṣa and 
its absolute non-occurrence at the vipakṣa. Although Dignāga undoubtedly assumes 
that the logical indicator and the verbal indicator are homologous in the sense that 
they are subject to identical constraints, it is hard to believe that he would have 
described verbal usage in terms of the occurrence of the verbal sign at the referent(s) 
it denotes and its absolute non-occurrence at dissimilar referents. The use of vtti 
with the locative like that of (a)dṣṭi/(a)darśana rather reflects the common usage in 
traditional Indian semantics of introducing the locative in order to indicate the 
denotation of any given term, and this is in perfect agreement with Dignāga's 
description in §66 below of teaching the denotation by pointing at the referent. 
However, Dignāga's critics evidently interpreted his formulation in a localistic sense 
as appears from Kumārila's criticism at ŚV Śabda˚ 86, where he addresses the 
second member of the trairūpya, namely the sapakṣānvaya: yatra dhūmo 'sti 
tatrāgner astitvenānvayaḥ sphuṭaḥ. na tv evaṃ yatra śabdo 'sti tatrārtho 'stīti niśca-
yaḥ: "It is obvious that wherever there is smoke, there it is continually accompanied 
by the existence of fire. However, an ascertainment like "the referent is wherever the 
word is" is not in the same way obvious. Some buddhists apparently attempted to 
reinterpret joint presence in terms of joint presence of verbal cognition (śabdajñāna) 
and cognition of the referent (arthajñāna), cf. Uṃveka’s introductory remarks to ŚV 
Śabda° 89 p. 368,21-22: kaścid āha: vināpy śabdasvarūpasyārthasvarūpeṇānvayaṃ 
śabdajñānasyārthajñānenānvyayo bhaviṣyati. yatra yatra gośabdajñānaṃ tatra 
tatra gojñānam iti. 
  
419 Cf. Siṃhasūri's exegesis at NCV 652,9-11 explaining the homology between 
the logical and verbal indicator: anumānānumeyasambandho hy abhidhānābhidhe-
yasambandhaḥ. tatra yathā dhūmasya ekadeśe darśanād agneḥ anagnau cādarśa-
nād anagnivyudāsenāgnipratītis tathā anvayavyatirekāv arthābhidhāne dvāram: 
“For the connection between signifier and signified is an inference-inferendum 
connection. Just as fire in this case is cognized through exclusion of non-fire 
because smoke is observed at some place where there is fire and because it is not 
observed at non-fire, joint presence and joint absence are a means to denoting the 
referent.”  
Jinendrabuddhi also connects induction by means of joint presence and joint 
absence to Dignāga’s view of the purpose of the second and third member of the 
canon of trairūpya, cf. PSṬ Ms B 226a6: anvayavyatirekarūpopavarṇanaṃ: tattulya 
eva vttis tadatulye 'vttir eva liṅgasyeti. etat svarūpam anvayavyatirekayoḥ: “The 
description of the form of joint presence and joint absence is [as follows]: the 
indicator's occurrence at what is similar exclusively, and its absolute non-
occurrence at what is dissimilar. This is the essential nature of joint presence and 
joint absence;” cf. Dignāga's definition at PSV II:5cd (q.v. no. 9 above) of the three 




YD alludes to Dignāga's description of induction by means of joint presence and 
joint absence at 100,13-16: na, anvyavyatirekābhyām adhigamahetutvāt. yathā 
ktakatvādir dharmo 'nityādau (1) viṣaye dṣṭaḥ tadabhāve cādṣṭa ity anitye 'rthe 
niścayam ādadhāty evaṃ śabdo 'pi svārthe dṣṭo 'nyatra cātajjātīye(2) na dṣṭaḥ 
pratipattihetur bhavati. tasmād anumānād abhinna evāyam iti: “No, [āgama, i.e., 
verbal communication, is not something different] because it is a cause of cognition 
through joint presence and joint absence. Just as a general property like being 
produced is observed at an object that is impermanent, but not observed at its 
absence, and thus instills certainty about the referent as impermanent, the word too 
becomes a cause of cognition, when it has been observed to apply to its own referent 
and not observed to apply to something else that is not of the same kind. Therefore it 
is not at all distinct from inference.”  
 (1)'anityādau conj. : ed. anityatvādau; however, according to Dignāgan 
epistemology general properties do not occur at other general properties as in 
Vaiśeṣika ontology, but only as mediated through the objects/referents in which they 
occur.  
(2)so read with A; ed. anyatra tajjātiye.  
 
[224] tatra tu(1) tulye(2) nāvaśyaṃ sarvatra vttir ākhyeyā kva cid, ānantye 
'rthasyākhyānāsambhavāt. atulye tu saty apy ānantye śakyam adarśanamātreṇā-
vtter(3) ākhyānam. ata eva ca svasambandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanāt tadvyavacchedā-
numānaṃ svārthābhidhānam(4) ity ucyate. Restored, cf. NCV 652,11-21: tatra tulye 
nāvaśyaṃ sarvatra vttir ākhyeyā kva cid, ānantye 'rthasyākhyānāsambhavāt … 
atulye tu saty apy ānantye śakyam adarśanamātreṇādarśane 'pravtter ākhyānam … 
ata eva ceti … sambandhibhya iti … anyatrādarśanād iti … tadvyavacchedānu-
mānam; NCV 718,14: ata eva cedam ityādi etatpakṣasaṃśrayadarśanārtham 
bhāṣyagrantham āha: svasambandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanād ityādi; Ms B 226a6-7: 
tatra tu tattulye nāvaśyam iti. nāyaṃ niyamo yat sarvasmin sajātīye vttir ākhyeyā 
… kvacid ityādi; 226b1-5: atulye tu saty apy ānantya iti … ata eveti … svasam-
bandhibhyaḥ sajātīyebhyo 'nyatra vipakṣe adarśanāt tadvyavacchedānumānam(5) 
iti. yatrādarśanaṃ svārthābhāve tadvyavacchedānām anumānam anumitiḥ svārthe 
'bhidhānam ity ucyate(6). 
(1)tu Ms (cf. de la '… ni V : de la '… ni K : om. NCV.  
(2)tulye (cf. dra ba la V : dra ba K) NCV : tattulye Ms  
(3)°mātreṇāvtter conj. : °mātreṇā …'pravtter NCV.  
(4)°ābhi° em. (cf. raṅ gi don rjod par byed pa V : °e 'bhi° (cf. raṅ gi don la … 
brjod pa KT = svārthe 'bhidhānam).  
(5)tad° em. (cf. de T) : tatra vya° Ms  
(6)Cf. źes brjod par bya 'o V : bśad pa yin no K. 
 
420 The adverbial complement kvacit is here syntactically equivalent to kasmiṃś-
cit. There is no doubt that kvacit is to be construed with the preceding negation na. 
Jinendrabuddhi, however, interprets kvacit as if it constitute a separate clause, 
syntactically independent of the preceding clause, cf. PSṬ Ms B 226a7f: yadcchā-
śabdānāṃ sambhavati sarvatra darśanaṃ tadviṣayasyaikatvād iti. ataḥ “kvacid” ity 
āha: “It is possible to observe arbitrary terms [denoting] every [referent] because 
their referent is singular. Therefore he says 'to any [referent] whatever.”  
This interpretation is evidently motivated by the view that arbitrary terms (= 





infinite therefore does not apply to the referents of proper nouns. It may have been 
motivated by the exposition of an (old?) ṭīkā on PS which both Mallavādi and 
Siṃhasūri quote, cf. below no.s 422-23.  
Elsewhere Siṃhasūri cites a passage (from the ṭīkā) in which it is argued that it is 
impossible to state the joint presence (anvaya) of parts like being one-eyed and 
dwarfish, and so on, with respect to the aggregate of attributes that constitute the 
object denoted by the proper name ḍittha, consequently one might draw the 
conclusion that joint absence (vyatireka) like joint presence is impossible too, cf. 
NCV 706,13-15: tvayā anvayavyatirekāv arthānumāne dvāram ity uktvā guṇa-
samudāye ḍitthākhye 'rthe kāṇakuṇṭādyavayānvayānabhidhānād anvayāsambhavaṃ 
niruktīktya anvayāsambhavād vyatirekāsambhavam āśaṅkyoktaṃ syād etad vyati-
rekasyāsambhava iti. NCV 652,12-15, q.v. below no. 422. 
For Dignāga's analysis of proper nouns with the background of the apoha 
theory, cf. PS V 50a. 
 
421 Cf. NCV 652,12-15: na hi sambhavo 'sti vkṣaśabdasya sarvavkṣeṣu dar-
śane, nāpi sarvatra liṅgini sarvaliṅgasya sambhavo 'gnidhūmādivat. yady api 
kvacid asti ḍitthādiṣu sambhavas tathāpi na taddvāreṇānumānam, sarvātmanāpratī-
teḥ. guṇasamudāyo hi ḍitthākhyo 'rthaḥ, na ca sarve kāṇakuṇṭādayo ḍitthaśabdād 
gamyate. evam anvayadvāreṇānumānāsambhavaḥ: “For it is not possible to observe 
that the word ‘tree’ denotes all trees, nor is it possible to observe every indicator at 
every indicated, in the same way as it is not possible to observe every smoke at 
every fire. Even though it is possible at some such as ḍittha, nevertheless there is no 
inference by means of that because it is not cognized in toto. For the referent that is 
termed ḍittha is an aggregate of attributes, and they, e.g., his being one-eyed, 
dwarfish, and so on, are not all of them understood from the word ‘ḍittha’. Thus 
inference by means of joint presence is impossible;” NCV 675,20-21: yat svār-
thasyāṃśe 'pi darśanād gamakatvaṃ samarthayatoktaṃ: na sarvatra liṅgini liṅgaṃ 
sambhavati; cf. NCV 678,13-14: bhrāntavacanam etad: “sarvatra liṅginy adar-
śanān na dṣṭavat pratipattiḥ;” for the epistemological implications of the term 
dṣṭavat, cf. PS II:15 with PSV ad loc. no. 13 above.  
Siṃhasūri's explanation at NCV 652,12-15 appears to be an almost verbatim 
reproduction of the passage of the (old?) ṭīkā on PSV, cf. NCV 662,11,14: vkṣaśab-
dasyāvkṣetyādi yāvad darśane nāsti sambhavaḥ, nāpi sarvatra liṅginītyādi … yady 
api kvacid ityādi sa eva ṭīkāgrantho yāvad anumānāsambhava iti; cf. NCV 716,18-
19: guṇasamudāyamātrasya kāṇakuṇṭāder darśanāsambhavaḥ, saty api darśane 
sarvathānumānāsambhavaḥ sarvaprakāreṇādṣṭatvāt: “It is impossible to observe 
the mere aggregate of attributes such as being one-eyed, dwarfish, etc.; even though 
they are observed, it is impossible to infer them in toto because [the aggregate] has 
not been observed in every possible way.” 
 
422 Since Siṃhasūri introduces his exegesis of this phrase at NCV 652,16 by 
stating syād etad vyatirekasyāpy asambhavaḥ, it is highly likely that this sentence 
and the following exegesis is indebted to the ṭīkā he was using because the 
remaining part of his explanation is identified by Siṃhasūri at NCV 662,10,14 as 
quoted by Mallavādi from the ṭīkā. Siṃhasūri repeats the sentence at NCV 706,15 
immediately after addressing the impossibility of anvaya as applied to any referent 




same source because his introductory remark is similar, cf. PSṬ Ms B 226b1: syād 
etad atulyānām ānantyād vyatirekākhyānasyāpi sarvatrāsambhava iti. 
 
423 Cf. Siṃhasūri's lucid exposition of Dignāga's standpoint at NCV 707,8-10: 
anvayagatadoṣabhāvaṃ(1) vyatirekagataṃ guṇaṃ ca darśayati granthaḥ: “atulye 
saty apy ānantye”(2) ityādi. tato anyasyābhāvamātraṃ sāmānyato vyatirecanīyaṃ 
tadbhedarūpāṇi asaṃspśatā śabdena liṅgena vā. tasmād adoṣa iti parihāraḥ: “The 
text (granthaḥ) shows the that joint presence is problematic and joint absence 
preferable, namely ‘non-occurrence at what is dissimilar, even though it is infinite’, 
and so forth. Therefore the mere non-existence of other [referents] is to be excluded 
in a general way (sāmānyato) by the word or the logical indicator without [its] being 
in contact(3) with the forms of its particulars [i.e., the particulars constituting the 
excluded other referents](4). Therefore there is no problem. Such is [Dignāga's] 
rebuttal.”  
(1) So read : ed. °ābhāvam. 
(2) For this citation, cf. no. [224].  
(3) No speech unit is in direct touch with its referent beyond the fact that it 
denotes it as excluded from its non-referents, irrespective of the individual features 
of the non-referents; the idea that speech is not in direct touch with reality but 
transcends it due of its generalising representation of things, is also expressed in a 
well-known verse ascribed to Dignāga viz. vikalpayonayaḥ śabdaḥ, etc, for which 
cf. no. 531 below.  
(4)For this, cf. the exposition of the theoretically crucial § 60. 
 
424 Dignāga’s introduction of adarśanamātra to justify vyatireka−anyāpoha is 
equivalent to mere joint absence (vyatirekamātra, cf. no. 13) − reflects the 
treatment of lopa in Sanskrit grammatical litterature, cf. Patañjali’s explanation of 
vārtt 2 (on A I.1:60: adarśanaṁ lopaḥ) at Mahā-bh I 158:10f: sarvasyādarśanasya 
lopasaṁjñā prāpnoti. kiṁ kāraṇam? sarvasyānyatrādṣṭatvāt. sarvo hi śabdo yo 
yasya prayogaviṣayaḥ sa tato ’nyatra na dṣyate. Cf. no. 419 above and the related 
statement at PSV V:1. 
Jinendrabuddhi explains vyatireka as characterized by non-existence, cf. PSṬ Ms 
B 226b2-4: teṣām ānantye saty api svārthābhāve śruter abhāvalakṣaṇo vyatirekaḥ 
śakyate darśayituṃ adarśanasyābhāvamātratvāt. śabdārthayor hi kāryakāraṇabhā-
ve siddhe kāraṇasyārthasyābhāve tatkāryaṃ śabdo na bhavatīti. etāvatā adarśaṇam 
pratyāyitam bhavati. tatrāśrayādarśanam(1) aprayojanam, vināpi tena vyatireka-
niścayāt. na hi kāraṇābhāve kāryasaṃbhava iti. ato vyatirekasyāpi sukaram ākhyā-
naṃ: “Even though there is an infinity of these [referents] it is possible to show joint 
absence, which is characterized by non-existence when the word's own referent 
does not exist because non-observation is nothing but non-existence. For in that it is 
recognized that word and referent are related as cause and effect, the effect of the 
referent namely the word does not exist when its cause viz. the referent does not 
exist. That much explains non-observation. In this context non-observation of the 
substrate has no purpose because joint absence is ascertained even without it. For 
there is no possibility of an effect when there is no cause. Therefore it is also 
feasible to tell the joint absense [of the word and its referent].”  
On the subject of adarśanamātra, Siṃhasūri limits himself to explaining that 
non-observation is nothing but absense of observation, cf. NCV 652,17: adarśanaṃ 





Dignāga's view that it is feasible to establish the connection through non-observa-
tion as it relates to the dissimilar without exeption and connects non-observation and 
joint absence vyatireka: aśeṣāpekṣitatvāc ca saukaryāc cāpy adarśanāt, sādhane 
yady apīṣṭo 'tra vyatireko 'numāṃ prati; cf. the criticism of adarśanamātra Apoha° 
75: na cādarśanamātreṇa tābhyāṃ pratyāyanaṃ bhavet | sarvatraiva hy adṣṭatvāt 
pratyāyyaṃ nāvaśiṣyate ||. 
Dignāga’s view that mere non-observation of the word’s application to dissimilar 
instances establishes the connection between the word and its referent is reflected in 
his alleged pupil Īśvarasena’s theory of upalambhābhāvamātram, cf. E. Steinkell-
ner: “Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund,” WZKS 10 pp. 73-85; cf. HB 
II p. 154 foll.. Dharmakīrti’s theory of anupalabdhi breaks with the Dignāgan 
tradition.  
Cf. Dharmakīrti’s implicit criticism of Dignāga’s view of adarśanamātra as the 
principal means of establishing apoha at PV III Pratyakṣapariccheda 172a-c: 
anyatrādṣṭyapekṣatvāt kvacit taddṣṭyapekṣaṇāt śrutau sambadhyate ’poho. This 
criticism, which treats observation and non-observation as equipollent, is implicit in 
the clause anyatrādṣṭyapekṣatvāt, for which Dignāga would have sarvatra for 
anyatra, i.e., in the atulya in toto; v. PVBh p. 264,30 foll. ad loc. cit.: śabdasya hy 
anyatra vijātīye ’dṣṭatvāt(2), kvacit tu tajjātīye darśanād apoha eva saṅketa iti 
jñāyate; note especially the following reference to Dignāga’s view loc. op. cit. p. 
265,23: anye tu punaḥ sarvato vijātīyād vyāvttim, kvacid vidheye vttim apekṣata iti 
vyatireke tātparyam(3) anvaye tu neti, vyatireka eva prādhānyena pratyāyate: 
“Others, on the other hand, claim that [a word] depends on exclusion from all 
dissimilar instances, and on its application to some thing to be shown. Thus the 
reference is to joint absence, but not to joint presence. Therefore (iti) joint absence is 
understood as the primary thing.” A similar statement is quoted in Jñānaśrīmitra’s 
Apohaprakaraṇa 207,10-11: tathā hi vijātīye sarvatrādṣṭyapekṣatvāt, kvacit tu 
apekṣaṇātmajātīye śrutau saṃbadhyate ’poha iti śāstram. The śāstra to which 
Jñānaśrīmitra refers is as one can see the above-mentioned passage from 
Dharmakīrti’s PV III 172. However—and this is remarkable—it breaks completely 
with Dharmakīrti’s view by substituting sarvatra for anyatra, thus apparently 
returning to Dignāga’s original justification of apoha by stating that apoha depends 
on non-observation of the referent in all (sarvatra) of the domain of the dissimilar 
and dependence on some instance (kvacit) of the referent in the domain of the 
referent. Cf. Dignāga’s use of sarvatra at PSV II:13 quoted no. 188 above, q.v. 
For a discussion of the theoretical implications of Dignāga's view of adarśana-
mātra, cf. Pind 1999.  
(1)°ādarśanaṃ conj. : °adarśanaṃ Ms (cf. mthoṅ ba T). The conj. is required by 
the context as the argument otherwise would seem incomprehensible. 
(2) ’dṣṭatvāt em. : dṣṭatvāt PvBh 
(3) vyatireke tātparyam conj. : vyatirekitātparyam PvBh 
 
425 Cf. NCV 652,17-18: yasmād darśanasya sarvatrāsambhavaḥ. saty api 
darśane sarvathānumānāsambhavaḥ: “Because observation to denote all [that is 
similar to it] is impossible. Even if it were observed [to denote all that is similar to 
it], inference in toto is impossible.” Jinendrabuddhi must have used the same source 
as Siṃhasūri, as appears from the parallel explanation at Ms B 226b4: yasmād 
darśanasya tattulye sarvatrāsambhavo 'tattulye tu sambhavo 'darśanasya: “because 




to denote all that is dissimilar to it is possible.” Dignāga also mentions at PSV III:45 
the impossibility of observing the indicated at all that is similar. Both versions 
deviate from each other, cf. K (Kitagawa 1973 508b7-11): 'di rigs pa yaṅ yin te | 
gaṅ rigs mi mthun pa thams cad las ldog pa'i phyir daṅ | de'i sgo nas bsgrub bya 
thams cad la rtogs par byed pa'i phyir ro || 'di ni bsgrub bya daṅ rigs mthun pa | 
thams cad la gdon mi za bar yod pa ma yin la | thams cad la 'dzin pa srid pa ma yin 
źiṅ. — V (Kitagawa 1973 508a7-12): gaṅ rigs mi mthun mtha' dag las log pa de'i 
sgo nas bsgrub bya la śes pa 'jug par byed pa de dag ni rigs kyi | 'dir gor ma chags 
par mthun phyogs mtha' dag la yod pa'o źes pa ni ma yin źiṅ | thams cad la yod par 
'dzin pa yaṅ mi srid do ||: “And this is justified because [the indicator] is excluded 
from all that is dissimilar and because it indicates every probandum by means of that 
(*taddvāreṇa). For it is necessarily not the case that it is found at all that is similar 
to the probandum, it being impossible to apprehend its existence at all [that is 
similar to the probandum].” 
 
426 The compound tadvyavacchedānumāna is syntactically equivalent to tato 
vyavacchedānumāna, cf. NCV paraphrasing the (old?) ṭīkā (cf. no.s 421-23 above) 
752,21-22: yatraivādarśanam uktaṃ vkṣābhāve 'vkṣe, tato vyavacchedānumānam 
'avkṣo na bhavati' iti. evaṃ ca ktvā vkṣaśabdād dravyatvādyanumānam upapan-
nam bhavati: “Only with regard to which non-observation is stated i.e. with regard 
to the absence of a tree which is a non-tree, the inference from its exclusion from 
this [non-tree] is 'it is not a non-tree'; and on such grounds the inference of 
substanceness, and so on, from the word ‘tree’ is justified.” Thus, the inferential 
component of Dignāga’s apoha theory presupposes that it is possible to draw valid 
inferences from negative evidence based upon non-observation.  
Jinendrabuddhi's gloss at Ms B 226b1-5 is syntactically ambiguous: yatrādarśa-
naṃ svārthābhāve tadvyavacchedānām anumānam: “The inference is of exclusions 
of/from that to which it is not observed to apply when its own referent is absent.” 
It is evident that the inference to which Dignāga refers amounts to the judgement 
that e.g. the referent of the word “tree” is not a non-tree, which means that no entity 
that is not a tree occurs in the locus of the referent tree. From this follows that the 
relation between the referents of the words “tree” and “non-tree” is one of privative 
opposition between any given tree and any given non-tree, the latter qualifying the 
former by its absence from its locus. This constitutes Dignāga’s solution to the 
problem of the universal: the reference of a word does not depend upon the presence 
of a universal inhering in the referent as its cause of application, but rather upon the 
fact that any given tree is not primarily qualified by its individual characteristics, but 
rather, it is universally qualified by the non-existence in its locus of things that are 
not trees, the relation between the referents being one of privative opposition 
between two types of objects, namely trees and non-trees. This is the reason why 
Dignāga emphasises the predominant role of joint absence (vyatireka) i the process 
of exclusion. For Dignāga’s view of terms like ‘non-tree,’ whose purpose is to 
denote as non-existing the single (eka) general property (sāmānyadharma) that 
distinguishes non-trees from trees, cf. the important paragraph PSV V:43b below.  
For the qualifying role of negation or exclusion as equivalent to the non-
existence or absence (abhāva) of other things from the locus of the referent, cf. no. 
466 below, and Jinendrabuddhi’s remarks on the predominance (prādhānya) of 
vyatireka (cf. no.s 13, 188, and 426 above, no. 428 below) over anvaya at Ms B 





tathāpi vyatirekasya prādhānyāt tadvāreṇaiva gamakatvam iti darśayati: “Thereby 
he shows that even though both joint presence as well as joint absence are factors 
with regard to inference, nevertheless, since joint absence is predominant, it is only 
by means of that [the word] indicates.”  
 
427 The technical term svasambandhin denotes any of the general properties that 
together define an entity. Thus the referent tree is defined by the general properties 
treeness, substanceness, earthenness, etc. Not all of these properties are connected to 
the word ‘tree’ in terms of being invariably connected with it. The word ‘tree’ is 
only invariably connected to the general property treeness. The other relata, 
however, are inferable from the word ‘tree’ because they form a hierarchy of 
properties, whose logical characteristics are determined by their position in the 
hierarchy, which is defined in terms of the extension of the terms that constitute it; 
cf. the explanation at NCV 652,18-20: svasambandhibhya iti. yatra dṣṭaḥ so 'tra 
sambandhī abhipretaḥ, na tu avinābhāvitvasambandhena. anyatrādarśanād iti abhi-
dheyābhāve 'darśanāt, anyathā hi vkṣaśabdasya tasmin vastuni pthivīdravyādya-
bhāve 'pi darśanaṃ vaktavyaṃ syāt: “Than its own relata: The thing to which it is 
observed to apply is in this context considered a relatum, but not due to a connection 
in terms of being invariably concomitant. Because of not being observed to apply to 
other [referents]: Because of not being observed to apply when the denoted is not 
present. For otherwise observation of the word ‘tree’ to apply to this object (vastu) 
would have to be stated even in the absence of earth and substance, etc.”  
In his exegesis Siṃhasūri appears to reproduce more or less verbatim an old ṭīkā 
on PSV on the concept of svasambandhin, which Mallavādi evidently combined 
with extracts from Dignāga's PSV, cf. NCV 718,15-16: “ata eva cedam” ityādi 
etatpakṣasaṃśrayadarśanārtham bhāṣyagrantham āha “svasambandhibhyo 'nya-
trādarśanād” ityādi. asya vyākhyā ṭīkāgrantho “yatra dṣṭa ”ityādi yāvad “avkṣo 
'nagnir vā na bhavatī”ti gatārthaḥ. evaṃ ca ktvetyādi yāvad upapannam bhavati; 
the explanation at NCV 718,16-22 is probably a paraphrase, if not a verbatim 
reproduction, of the corresponding exposition of the ṭīkā: anekāvinābhāvinām 
pthivīdravyatvādīnāṃ vkṣaśabdād dhūmāc cānubandhinām anumānam yujyate 
taddarśasparśanena, vkṣatvāt pthivī dravyaṃ sac ca dhūmatvāc ca vkṣavad 
agnivac ceti. itarathā tv ityādi. atyantavyatireke sambandhitvābhāve 'nubandhināṃ 
dravyādīnām apy anyatvād atulye vipakṣa eva vtter apakṣadharmatvānai-
kāntikatvaviruddhatvānumānābhāvadoṣāḥ syuḥ. Anubandhināṃ dravyādīnāṃ tyāge 
tadavinābhāvino vkṣasya svārthasyāsambhava eveti ca doṣaḥ. tataḥ pratyāyya-
pratyāyanayor anupapattiḥ. tasmāt svasambandhyābhāvetyādy uktopasaṃhāraḥ, 
sambandhino 'rthāntarasya bhāve darśanāt sambandhina eva bhāvābhāve 'darśa-
nāc cānumānasyābhipretasya siddhir iti: “The inference of the invariable concomi-
tants such as earthenness, substanceness, and so on, from the word ‘tree’ and the 
concomitants(1) from smoke is justified due to their observation or touch: from 
treeness, earth, substance, and 'existent', and from smokeness in the same way as 
tree and fire. Otherwise, however, etc.: if they were completely disconnected, i.e., if 
they did not have the property of being a relatum, then, because of the occurrence of 
the adjuncts viz. substance, and so on, in what is dissimilar viz. the vipakṣa, as also 
they are different, there would be the faults of not being inference viz. not being a 
property of the probandum, being ambiguous, and being contradictory; and if the 
concomitants viz. substance, and so on, are taken away, there would be the problem 




Therefore indicated and indication are not justified. This is recapitulated in the 
words beginning: therefore, if the relata do not exist: because of observing a relatum 
viz. another thing at an entity and because of not observing the same relatum when 
the entity does not exist the meant inference is realised.”  
(1)For the term anubandhin, cf. PS II:18-19, q.v. no. 374 above. 
 
[225] anvayadvāreṇa cānumāne vkṣaśabdād ekasmin vastuni śiṃśapādyābhāsaḥ 
saṃśayo na syāt. tatsaṃśayavat(1) pārthivatvadravyatvādyābhāso 'pi(2) saṃśayaḥ 
syāt. yatas tu(3) <vkṣaśabdo 'pārthivādiṣu na dṣṭaḥ>, ato vyatirekamukhenaivā-
numānam. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 226b6-227a2: anvayadvāreṇa cetyādi … yady 
anvayadvāreṇaivābhidhānam iṣyate, evaṃ sati vkṣaśabdasyārthādisahitasya śiṃ-
śapādiṣv anvayo 'stīti kevalāt vkṣaśabdād ekasmin vastuni śiṃśapādyābhāsaḥ saṃ-
śayo na syāt, api tu niścaya eva syāt. athānekatra darśanāt saṃśayaḥ. evaṃ tarhi 
tatsaṃśayavat pārthivatvadravyatvādyābhāso 'pi saṃśayaḥ syāt pārthivatvādyan-
ekadarśanāt. niścayas tu dṣṭo. yato 'nekatrāpi vartamāno yasyābhāve na bhavati 
tad gamayati, netaram(4), ato vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam. etad eva darśayann 
āha: yatas tv ityādi.  
(1)Cf. the tshom de bźin du V : the tshom za ba bźin du K.  
(2)Cf. snaṅ ba V : snaṅ ba la yaṅ K.  
(3) Cf. gaṅ gi phyir K : gaṅ du V (Sanskrit tu is not translated). 
(4) netaram em. (cf. cig śos T) : netarata Ms 
 
428 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 226b6-227a2: caśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ. Siṃhasūri's 
explanation of the passage beginning anvayadvāreṇa cānumāne is related to the 
corresponding passage of Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 226b6-227a1-2 
quoted above no. [225], cf. NCV 652,23–653,12 anvayadvāreṇa cānumāne 'yaṃ 
doṣaḥ: yasmād anugamo 'sti vkṣaśabdasyārthādisahitasya śiṃśapādiṣu, tasmāt ke-
valenāpy anumānam prāpnoti. atha bahuṣu palāśādiṣv api dṣṭa iti saṃśayo bha-
vati. evaṃ sati vkṣārthe pārthivatvadravyārthasattārthāḥ(1) santi teṣu vkṣaśab-
dasya samānatvāt saṃśayaḥ syāt, niścayas tu dṣṭaḥ śabdāt: “If, however, the 
inference were by means of joint presence the problem is as follows: since there is 
joint presence of the word ‘tree’ accompanied by the referent, and so on, with 
śiṃśapā, and so on, it follows [absurdly] that the inference is through that alone. But 
it is also observed to denote the palāśa, etc. Thus there is doubt. In those 
circumstances there would be doubt about the referent of earthenness, substance[-
ness?], and existence that are found in the referent tree because the word ‘tree’ is the 
same with regards to these. However, it is observed that the word causes 
ascertainment explicitly.”  
(1)One would expect the reading dravyatvārtha instead of dravyārtha. 
 
[226] <āha ca> vkṣatvapārthivadravyasajjñeyāḥ prātilomyataḥ catustridvyeka-
sandehe nimittam, niścaye(1) 'nyathā. Qu. ŚVṬ 72,1-2; Ms B 227a3 (pāda d); NR 
432,8-9. Cf. ŚV Apoha° 158. 
(1)niścaye NR Ms : niścayo ŚVṬ. 
 
429 This verse is related to PS II 14, which Siṃhasūri quotes at NCV 724,22-24 
to illustrate the predominance of joint absence (vyāvttiprādhānya) over joint 
presence: guṇatvagandhasaurabhyatadviśeṣair anukramāt, adravyādivyavaccheda 





guṇatvenādravyād gandhatvenāpārthivād adravyāc ca saurabhyeṇāsurabhi-
sādhāraṇāt surabhiviśeṣeṇa cotpalādiṣu vyavaccheda ekaikavddhyā kriyate (PSV 
II:14): (1) 
“Like with respect to a lotus, and so on, the possessing a quality, aroma, sweet 
fragrance, and its particular [i.e., a particular sweet fragrance], excludes [it] in due 
order from being a non-substance, and so on, by augmentation [of the exclusions] 
one by one. (PS II:14) 
The possessing a quality effects with respect to a lotus, and so on, its exclusion 
from being a non-substance, the possessing aroma from its being non-earthen as 
well as being a non-substance, sweet fragrance from what does not possess the 
common property of sweet fragrance [namely aroma (gandhatva)], as well as a 
particular sweet fragrance, and so on, by augment-ing [the exclusions] one by one.” 
(PSV II:14). 
(1)It is possible to restore PSV II:14 from the pratīkas and Jinendrabuddhi's 
paraphrase at PSṬ Ms B 70b6-71a3: guṇatvenādravyatvād ity uktam. ata eva 
guṇatvasyāpy ekavddhyā vyavacchedakaraṇam praty aṃśabhāvo 'sti. yadi hi 
tenādravyavyavacchedo vidhīyata evaṃ gandhe 'naikavddhyā vyavacchedaḥ kri-
yate … gandhatvenāpārthivād adravyāc ceti pārthivam idaṃ dravyaṃ ca 
gandhavatvād ity apārthivād adravyāc ca vyavacchedaḥ kriyate. saurabhyeṇā-
surabhisādhāraṇād iti gandhavad etat saurabhyeṇa pūrvakābhyām asurabhisādhā-
raṇāc ca vyavacchedaḥ kriyate surabher gandhaviśeṣasya sādhāraṇaṃ sāmānyaṃ 
surabhisādhāraṇaḥ gandhatvamātram iha vivakṣitam. Avidyamānaḥ surabhisādhā-
raṇaḥ yasya tat tathoktaṃ nisṣṭam ity arthaḥ. 
 
Jinendrabuddhi's concluding remark at PṬS Ms B 71a4, addressing the 
opponents question why the logical reason indicates through joint absence only, is a 
precise characterization of the rationale of the Dignāgan argument: surabhiviśeṣa 
utpalādigandhaviśeṣaḥ. tad evam adravyādivyavaccheda ekaikavddhyotpalādiṣu 
guṇatvādibhiḥ kriyamāno dṣṭaḥ, sa kathaṃ yujyate yadi vipakṣavyāvttimukhena 
hetuḥ pratyāpayati, nānyathā? dṣtavad vidhimukhena hi sarveṣu sarveṣāṃ darśa-
nasyāviśiṣṭatvāt tulyā pratītiḥ syāt. tasmād vyāvttidvāreṇaiva hetur gamayatīty 
abhyupeyam: “A particular sweet fragrance is a particular aroma of a lotus. 
Therefore, when in this way the property of being a quality etc. is observed to effect 
the exclusion from non-substances etc. with regard to a lotus etc. by augmentation 
[of the exclusions] one by one, how could that be justified if the logical indicator 
indicates through exclusion from what is dissimilar, but not otherwise? Because (hi) 
through affirmation in the way it has been observed [previously] the cognition of all 
[properties] would be the same since the observation of all [properties] is not 
differentiated. Therefore it is to be accepted that the logical reason indicates 
exclusively by means of exclusion.” 
  
Siṃhasūri quotes PS III:44 at NCV 727,9-10 as yet another example of the pre-
dominance of exclusion over joint presence, which presupposes affirmation of the 
presence of the indicator at some indicated or observation of the word’s application 
to its referent: anyathā hi dṣṭavad yadi siddhiḥ syāc chauklyarūpaguṇāśritāt, 
kramavat prātilomye 'pi dvitryekārthagatir bhavet(1). 
(1) Cf. PSṬ Ms B 139b4-140a1: yasmād vyacchedadvāreṇa hetur gamakaḥ. 
tasmād ekasmāt saurabhyād dhetor utpalasya gandhādīni siddhyanti. saurabhyasya 




gandhatvādiṣu darśanād darśanadvāreṇaiva gandhatvādisiddhir iti. āha: anyathā 
hītyādi. yadi yathādṣṭaṃ tathā pratyāyayet, na vyacacchedadvāreṇa, yathākrameṇa 
śauklyāt trayāṇāṃ rūpatvaguṇatvāśritatvānām avagatiḥ. rūpatvād dvayor guṇāśri-
tatvayor guṇatvād ekasyāśritatvasya, evaṃ prātilomyenāpy āśritatvāt trayāṇāṃ 
guṇatvarūpatvaśuklatvānāṃ syāt, guṇatvād rūpatvaśukratvayor dvayo rūpatvād 
ekasya śuklatvasyaiva. na hy āśritatvādīni guṇatvādiṣu na dṣṭāni. atha yathā-
śritatvaṃ guṇatvādiṣu dṣṭaṃ tathā kṣṇādiṣv(a) apīti saṃśayo bhavati. śauklyam api 
rūpaguṇāśritatveṣu dṣṭam iti. tatas teṣu sāmānyāt saṃśayaḥ syāt. vyāvttidvāreṇa 
tu pratyāyane na doṣaḥ. yathā rūpatvābhāve ‘bhāvāt śaulyaṃ rūpatvahetuḥ. tathā 
guṇatvāśritatvayor api tadabhāve ‘bhāvād iti. āśritatvaṃ tu guṇatvādyabhāve ‘pi 
dṣṭam iti nāsti. tasmād guṇatvādiniścayaḥ. 
(a) kṣṇādiṣu conj. : tasmādiṣu Ms 
 
430 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of the antaraśloka at PSṬ Ms B 227a2-6: 
vyatirekamukhenaiva pratyāyanam ity etat sambandhayitum antaraślokam āha. 
jñeyaśabdaḥ satdravyapārthivavkṣatveṣu caturṣu saṃśayahetur, yataḥ sa tadabhā-
ve 'pi dṣṭaḥ. evam(1) uttaratrāpi vācyaṃ: sacchabdo dravyapārthivavkṣatveṣu 
triṣu, dravyaśabdaḥ pārthivavkṣatvayor dvayoḥ, pārthivaśabdaḥ ekasmin vkṣatve. 
niścaye 'nyatheti nimittam iti vartate. anyathety ānulomyena vkṣaśabdaḥ pārthiva-
dravyasajjñeyatveṣu caturṣu niścayahetuḥ. tathā hi sa tatra ca dṣṭaḥ, tadabhāve ca 
na dṣṭaḥ(2). evam uttaratrāpi vākyaṃ: pārthivaśabdādayo 'py evam ekaikahānyā(3) 
dravyatvādiṣu niścayahetavo jñeyāḥ. yadi ca dṣṭavad vidhinā pratyāyanaṃ syād 
yathākrameṇa catustridvyekārthaniścayaḥ. tathā prātilomyenāpi ta<t?> syāj jñeya-
śabdādīnāṃ sattvādiṣu darśanāt. yatas tadabhāve 'pi dṣṭatvāt saṃśayaḥ, tasmād 
vyatirekadvāreṇaiva gamakatvam iti: “In order to bring it into connection with the 
idea that the indication is only through joint absence he formulates an inserted śloka. 
The word 'knowable' is a cause of doubt about four viz. existence, substanceness, 
earthenness, and treeness since it is also observed where they are absent. The same 
is to be formulated with regard those that follow: the word 'existent' [is a cause of 
doubt] about three viz. substanceness, earthenness, and treeness, the word 
'substance' about two viz. earthenness and treeness, and the word 'earthen' about 
one viz. treeness. In the statement otherwise [they are a cause] of the word 'cause' is 
to be supplied from what precedes. Otherwise, i.e., the word 'substance' is a cause 
of about four viz. earthenness, substanceness, existence, and knowability. That is, it 
is, on the one hand, observed when they are present, and, on the other hand, not 
observed when they are absent. The same is to be formulated with regard to those 
that follow: also the words 'earthen', and so on, are in the same way to be 
considered causes of about substanceness, and so on, by deducting one after 
another(4). But if the indication were in an affirmative form in the way [the referent] 
has been observed [previously] there would be about four, three, two, and one 
referent in direct order. This would also be the case in reverse order because the 
words 'knowable', and so on, are observed to apply when existence, etc. is present. 
Since there is doubt because they are also observed where these are absent, the 
property of indicating is only through joint absence.”  
Cf. also NCV 653,12-14: vkṣaśabdo 'vkṣanivttyaikārthako 'pārthivavyāvt-
tyāpi svārthe vartate, tathā hi vkṣapārthivadravyasacchabdā ānulomyena tridvye-
kārthaniścayahetavaḥ. evam arthāntaravyudāsenārthāntarābhidhānam upapannam: 
“The word ‘tree' which has a single referent by means of preclusion of non-trees 





words ‘tree,’ ‘earthen,’ ‘substance,’ and ‘existent,’ are in direct order causes of 
ascertainment of three, two and one referent, [respectively]. Thus, the denotation of 
some referents (arthāntara) is by means of exclusion of other referents (arthān-
tara).”  
Similarly ŚVṬ 72,20-25 who interprets the verse in the light of Dignāga’s rejec-
tion of vidhi as it necessarily is a cause of doubt: yat punaḥ parapakṣe vidhimukhena 
śabde pravartamāne sarvātmakārthagrahaṇaṃ prāpnoti, tataś ca yathānulomyena 
vkṣapārthivadravyasajjñeyaśabdebhyaś catustridvyekaniścayo bhavati, tathā prāti-
lomyenāpi niścayena bhavitavyam. na ca tathā dśyate. jñeyaśabdāc caturṣu sattā-
diṣu sandehāt, sacchabdāt triṣu dravyādiṣu, dravyaśabdāt dvayoḥ pārthivavkṣa-
tvayoḥ, pārthivaśabdād ekatra vkṣatve. tasmān na vidhimukhena pravttāḥ śabdāḥ.  
(1)evam em. (cf. de bźin du T) : etam Ms  
(2) dṣṭaḥ em. : dṣṭa Ms 
(3) ekaika° em. : ekekai° Ms 
4)As opposed to adding them, cf. PSV II:14, q.v. no. 430 above. 
 
[227] na ca sambandhadvāraṃ muktvā śabdasya liṅgasya vā(1) svārthakhyā-
panaśaktir asti. Qu. NCV 663,9-10 (iti tvayaivokto 'yaṃ nyāya iti darśayati); cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 227a6: na ca sambandhadvāram muktvetyādi. sambandho 'vinābhāvaḥ 
sa eva dvāraṃ nimittam anumiteḥ. tatra parityajya śabdasya liṅgasyeva (sic) nāsti 
svārthapratyāyanaśaktiḥ; cf. Ms 227a7-227b1, q.v. no. 432 below.  
(1) Cf. PSṬ Ms B 227a7: vāśabda aupamye, which explains the reading 
liṅgasyeva of the paraphrase. 
 
431 The necessary means of connection is vyatireka whose predominance over 
anvyaya for establishing the avinābhāvasambandha was explained at PSV V:34, cf. 
Ms B 227a7-227b1: yathārthātmakaṃ liṅgam avinābhāvasambandhadvāreṇa pra-
tyāyayat svārthaṃ vyatirekadvāreṇa pratyāyayati, tathā śabdo 'pīti pratipādanāya 
“liṅgasya ve”ti vacanam: “Just as a logical indicator indicates its proper object that 
has the nature of a referent through joint absence by indicating it through the 
relation which is constituted by the invariable relation [between indicator and 
indicated], so also a word. Therefore, in order to make that clear he uses the 
expression “or the inferential indicator.”  
Dignāga's view that the invariable relation of the word (śabda) or the logical 
indicator (liṅga) to the referent or the indicated is grounded on exclusion underlies 
Kumārila's statement at ŚV Apoha° 92: yady apy apohanirmukte na vttiḥ śabda-
liṅgayoḥ yuktā, tathāpi buddhis tu jñātur vastv avalambhate; cf. also ŚV Apoha° 73 
qu. TS 933, commenting on which Kamalaśīla quotes a Sanskrit fragment at TSP 
367,11: apohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām eva pratipādyate, which probably stems from one 
of Dignāga's lost works; cf. Manorathanandin at PVV 299,14-15 ad PV I 134cd-
135ab: sāmānyagocārāś śabdā buddhayaḥ kalpikā anyāpohaviṣayā ācāryeṇa 
proktāḥ: apohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām pratipādyate; Dharmakīrti would seem to 
incorporate more of this fragment in the following statement: at PVSV 25,27-28: 
katham punar etad gamyate: “vyavacchedaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām pratipādyate vidhinā 
na vasturūpam eve”ti. Hemacandra on Syādvādamañjarī 14 p. 94:248 quotes the 
following two ślokapādas: apohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyāṃ na vastu vidhinocyate; cf. also 
PV I 47: apohaviṣayam iti liṅgam prakīrtitam, ascribed to ācārya, i.e., Dignāga by 





432 Jinendrabuddhi interprets vā in the sense of iva(1), cf. Ms 227a7: vāśabda 
aupamye.  
(1)Cf. Amarakośa III.4:9: va vā … sāmye. However, vā in the sense of iva is only 
recorded in verse. Dignāga evidently does not distinguish between the function of 
the logical indicator and the word in terms of their connection and indicative 
funktion. 
 
[228] tasyānekadharmatve sarvathā pratyāyanāsambhavāt, <svārthāvyabhicāraś 
ca>(1) bhedānabhidhānāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 227b1-3: tasyānekadharmatva iti 
śiṃśapādibhedena puṣpitaphalitatvādibhedena ca vkṣāder arthasyānekadharmatve 
sarvathā pratyāyanāsambhavād iti … bhedānabhidhānād iti; cf. the quotation at 
NCV 663,11-12: yad uktaṃ tvayā. “na cāsti vyabhicāritādoṣaḥ, bhedānabhidhā-
nād" iti, which may stem from a different source, presumably the Sāmānyaparīkṣā-
vyāsa. 
(1)Cf. the use of svārthāvyabhicāraḥ at § 49, cf. no. [234] below. 
 
433 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 227b1-3: yadi sarveṇa prakāreṇa puṣpitaphalitatvādinā 
pratyāyanaṃ syāt, tadā yathoktaṃ sambandham antareṇa syāt. vidhinaiva pratyā-
yanaṃ, tac ca na sambhavati, puṣpitatvādibhedeṣu vyabhicārāt. yathādarśanaṃ ca 
pratyāyanaṃ vidhiḥ. tasmān na vidhinā pratyāyanatvam api tv arthāntaravyāvtti-
dvāreṇa: “If the indication were in every form such as [the tree's] being in flower or 
having fruits, it would be without the previously explained connection: the 
indication would only be through affirmation, and this is not possible because of 
ambiguity with regard to its particular features like its being in flower, etc. And 
affirmation is an indication reflecting observation. Therefore the fact of indicating is 
not through affirmation, but rather through exclusion of other referents.” Cf. 
Dharmakīrti's analogous statement with reference to Dignāga at PVSV 65,19-22 ad 
PV I 134, q.v. above no. 432: yadi hi vidhirūpeṇa vastv eva śabdair vikalpair vāpi 
viṣayīkriyeta, so 'yaṃ sarvārthasarvākārapratītiprasaṅgo 'sāmānādhikaraṇyādayaś 
ceti manyamānaḥ praṇetā nyāyaśastrayānyapohaviṣayāv etau prāha. For the impli-
cations of the expression sarvathā, cf. PSV II:15, q.v. no. 13 above. 
 
434 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 227b3: teṣām parasparābhāve 'pi bhāvād vyabhicāraḥ syāt, na 
sāmānye 'bhidheye, tasyābhedāt. tadabhāve cābhāvāc chabdasya: “Because the 
[particulars] exist although they are mutually non-existent, there will be ambiguity, 
but not if the general property is the denotable object because it is without division, 
and because the word would not exist if [the general property] did not exist.”  
 
[229] evaṃ tāvat <pūrvoktadoṣābhāvaḥ>(1). Restored, cf. NCV 728,20: evaṃ 
tāvad ityādi; cf. NCV 653,22: evaṃ tāvad bhedābhidhāne ye doṣā uktāḥ. NCV 
728,20: evaṃ tāvad ityādi.  
(1)Cf. sṅar bśad pa'i skyon K : ñes pa sṅa ma V.  
 
435 That is, the problem of not denoting as explained at PSV V:2ab. Siṃhasūri 
quotes a similar argument interspersed with his own glosses at NCV 653,20-22 
pūrvadoṣābhāvaś ca yasmāc chruteḥ sambandhasaukaryam bahutve 'pi tulyātulya-
yor vttyavttī, sambandhasaukaryād na cāpi vyabhicāritā bhedānabhidhānāt. evaṃ 
tāvat bhedābhidhāne ye doṣā uktās te parihtā iti anyāpohavādipakṣaḥ: “And the 





occurrence and non-occurrence at the similar and dissimilar, [respectively], although 
[the particulars] are many. Because of the feasibility [of the connection] there is no 
ambiguity either since the particulars are not denoted. Thus in the first place the 
faults that have been mentioned with regard to the denotation of the particulars are 
avoided. This is the thesis of the upholder of the apoha theory.”  
 
[230] anantarasyāpy abhāvaḥ. <katham? yasmāt(1)>. Restored, cf. NCV 728,22-
730,11: yad apy uktam: anantarasyāpi … (a)bhāva iti.  
(1)Cf. gaṅ gi phyir K : 'di ltar V. 
 
436 That is, the absurd consequence that co-reference becomes impossible if the 
word ‘existent’ is supposed to denote the general property or the connection as 
Dignāga explains at PSV V:2cd, cf. NCV loc. cit.: jātisambandhābhidhānapakṣayor 
uktasya sāmānādhikaraṇābhāvaprasaṅgadoṣajātasya (abhāvaḥ). 
 
[231] vyāpter anyaniṣedhasya tadbhedārthair abhinnatā. Qu. NCV 730,11-13, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 277b3-5: vyāpter anyaniṣedhasyeti … tadbhedārthair abhinnateti.  
 
437 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 227b5: anyāpohavācibhir dravyādiśabdaiḥ sadādeḥ śabdasya 
sāmānādhikaraṇyam ity arthaḥ: “The meaning is that a word like ‘existent’ is co-
referential with words like ‘substance’ that denote exclusion of other [referents].” 
 
438 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 277b4-5: vyāptiḥ svabhedāpratikṣepaḥ. anyaniṣedho yathok-
taṃ sāmānyam. tasya vyāpteḥ: svabhedānāṃ vyāpakatvād ity arthaḥ. anyaniṣedhas-
yeti hi ktyogalakṣaṇakartarīyaṃ ṣaṣṭhī: “Pervasion means not rejecting its own 
particulars. Negation of other [referents] means the general property such as it has 
been explained. 'Since [it viz. the general property negation of other referents] 
pervades' means 'since it pervades its own particulars.' For in the expression 
“anyaniṣedhasya” the sixth triplet is introduced to indicate the agent who is 
characterized by construction with [a verbal stem] ending in a kt affix(1).”  
The explanation of the verse at NCV 730,12-13 is more explicit: ‘sad ity asad na 
bhavati’ ity asato nivttiḥ sarvadravyaguṇakarmaghaṭarūpotkṣepaṇādibhedavyāpi-
nī. tasyā asannivtteḥ sarvabhedavyāpitvāt tair abhinnārthatvāt sāmānādhikaraṇ-
yam upapannam: “The preclusion of the non-existent as expressed in the statement 
“‘it is existent because (iti) it is not non-existent’ pervades all particulars such as 
substances, qualities, actions, pots, colours, and upward movements, etc. Since the 
preclusion of non-existent things pervades all the particulars, co-reference is 
justified as its referents are not distinct from these.”  
(1)Jinendrabuddhi analyses vyāpti as vi +√āp + kt affix ti, and construes the 
phrase vyāpter anyaniṣedhasya with reference to A II.3:65: kartkarmaṇoḥ kti: 
“(The sixth triplet is introduced) to denote the agent or the direct object (in 
construction with a verbal stem) ending in a kt affix;” v. Kāś ad loc. 
 
[232] sāmānyaśabdasya hi yat ktyam(1) arthāntaravyudāsaḥ sa svabhedāprati-
kṣepeṇeti bhedaśrutyā saha(2) sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapannam. Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 227b5–228a1: sāmānyaśabdasya hītyādiḥ. sāmānyaśabdasya yat ktyam 
pratyāyyam. tat punaḥ kīdśam? arthāntaravyudāsaḥ sa svabhedāpratikṣepeṇa; 
NCV 730,14-15: sāmānyaśabdasya hi sadāder yo 'rthāntaravyudāso “asan na 




NCV 730,20: tataś ca bhedaśrutyā dravyaguṇādikayā ghaṭapaṭādikayā saha 
sāmānādhikaraṇyam anupapannam.  
(1)The Tibetan translations are syntactically confused and, moreover, reproduce 
ktyam as byas pa, cf. spyi'i sgras gaṅ don gźan rnam par gsal bar byas pa V : don 
gźan bsal ba byas pa'i spyi'i sgra K.  
(2)Cf. khyad par gyi sgra daṅ lhan cig K : tha dad pa'i sgra daṅ gźi mthun pa 
daṅ lhan cig par (sic) V. 
 
439 Cf. PV IV 178: sa ca bhedo 'pratikṣepāt sāmānyānāṃ na vidyate, vkṣo na 
śiṃśapaiveti yathā prakaraṇe kvacit; see Manorathanandin’s commentary PVV 
422,10-15 ad loc. 
 
440 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 227b6-228a1: anena vyāpakatvam āha. na hi yathā 
jātyabhidhāne jātyantarāṇām parityāgas tathārthāntarāpohābhidhāne dravyatvādī-
nām bhedānām, abhinnasya vastunaḥ sacchabdād apratikṣiptadravyatvādyākārasya 
buddhau pratibhāsanāt. hiśabdo yasmādarthaḥ. itiśabdas tasmādarthaḥ. yata evaṃ, 
tasmāt bhedārthair dravyādiśabdaiḥ sacchruteḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapannaṃ: 
“Hereby he explains that [the negation of other referents] pervades [the particulars]. 
For particular [general properties] like substanceness, and so on, are not omitted, 
when the exclusion of other referents is denoted, in the same way as the other 
general properties are omitted when the general property is denoted because due to 
the word ‘existent’ a non-different entity, from whose form substanceness, and so 
on, is not omitted, is reflected in the mind. The word ‘for’ has the meaning of 
‘since’. The word ‘thus’ has the meaning of ‘therefore’. Since this is the case, it is 
justified that the word ‘existent’ is co-referential with words like ‘substance’ whose 
referents are particulars.”  
Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is influenced by Dharmakīrtian philosophy and the 
subsequent discourse at Ms B 228a1-4 is an adaptation of Dharmakīrti's PVSV 
42,13ff applied to the question of the co-reference of the two terms ‘sad’ and 
‘dravya’: kathaṃ ktvā? yad etaj jñānaṃ vastusvabhāvagrāhiṇānubhāvenāhitāṃ 
vāsanām āśrityotpadyate abāhyārthaviṣayam api tadviṣayam ivābhinnakārya-
padārthaprasūtatvād abhinnārthagrāhīva vikalpakam. tatra yo 'rthākāraḥ pratibhā-
sate vyavahartbhir bāhyavastutvenādhyavasitas(1) tatra sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ 
vyavasthāpyate, na svalakṣaṇe, buddhāv apratibhāsanāt. sa hy asadvyāvttena rūpe-
ṇa pratibhāsamāno 'bhinnasadākārānugataḥ pratibhāsate. sa evāsato vyāvttaḥ, 
punar adravyatvāder api vyāvtto dvitīyena dravyatvādyākāreṇānugato 'bhinnaś ca 
pratibhāti. ata ekaṃ vastusatvena dravyatvena ca prakāśamānaṃ saddravyam iti 
saddravyaśabdābhyām abhidhīyata iti sāmānādhikaraṇyavyavasthā kriyate. 
(1)em. (cf. phyi rol gyi don ñid du lhag par źen pa T) : bāhyavākṣavastu-
tvenāvyavasitas Ms 
 
[233] <tasmāt svabhedārthair(1) pthakśrutidoṣo(2) nāsti>. Restored, cf. the 
parallel at NCV 730,24: tasmād apthakśrutidoṣo 'sty eva, which undoubtedly 
reflects Dignāga's own formulation. The Tibetan translations of this clause are 
problematic.  
(1)Cf. raṅ gi khyad par gyi don K : 'di'i tha dad pa'i don V (= tadbhedārthair).  






441 Dignāga refers to the problem mentioned at PS V 2d: bhedarthair 
apthakśruteḥ; cf. Siṃhasūri's explanation at NCV 731,11-732,10: sattāsamban-
dhābhidhānapakṣayor apthakśrutidoṣo 'sti, nāpohapakṣe viśeṣahetusadbhāvād iti. 
tasya viśeṣahetoḥ pratipādanārtham uktam – tatra hītyādi. sattāsambandhābhi-
dhānapakṣayor guṇau sattāsambandhau viśeṣaṇatvāt, tadvastu guṇīty ataḥ sāmānā-
dhikaraṇyābhāvo yukto: “The problem of not being “heard apart” [from words 
whose referents are particular general properties] [that attaches] to the theses of the 
denotation of existence or its connection, does not [attach] to the theory of exclusion 
because there is a special reason [for it]. In order to explain this special reason it is 
said: For on these two, etc. On the two theses of the denotation of existence or its 
connection existence and the connection are properties because they are qualifiers. 
Their object is the property bearer. Therefore it is justified that there is no co-
reference.”  
For the implications of this explanation, cf. the exposition at PSV V:2cd-3 above 
§ 4.  
 
442 The translation of this clause is tentative, as the Tibetan translations differ 
considerably from one another, cf. don gaṅ gñi ga'i sgras brjod par byed pa yaṅ don 
gźan la gźi mthun pa yin no K : de ni mthun pa'i sgra daṅ don gźan sel ba'i don gñis 
ka sgra'i brjod bya 'o V. Only the phrases don gaṅ gñi ga'i sgras brjod par byed pa 
K : don gñis ka sgra'i brjod bya 'o V are comparable to one another. It is clear, 
however, that the content of the clause must be related to the explanation at PSṬ Ms 
228a4-5 and NCV 732,14ff (for which, cf. no. 445 below), which is concerned with 
explaining that the [absurd] consequence that general and particular terms are not 
co-referential does not arise on the apoha theory. When the two terms ‘existent’ and 
‘substance’ are combined in the phrase ‘existent substance’ they form an aggregate 
that is syntactically similar to a compound and thus subject to the same inter-
pretation. As it appears from Siṃhasūri's exposition, Dignāga's statement is parallel 
to the apoha theory of compound formation, for which, cf. PSV V:15 § 25 above. 
 
[234] tathā hi svārthāvyabhicāraḥ <kevalasyānyatrāvtteḥ>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms 
B 228a4: tathā hi svārthāvyabhicāra iti; NCV 732,16: tathā hi svārthāvyabhicāro 
viśeṣasahitasyeti. 
 
443 That is, there is no ambiguity as regards the denotation of the general term 
‘sat’ when it is accompanied by the particular term ‘dravya’; cf. the exposition at 
NCV 732,14ff, q.v. no. 445 below. 
 
444 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 228a4-5: samudāyārtho hi viśiṣṭas. tasya yadi padaṃ vācakaṃ 
syāt, tadā tadabhāve 'pi padasya vtter na tad gamayet. yatas tu samudāyaḥ 
śabdāntaram eva tasya vācakam, ato na vyabhicāraḥ: “For the referent of an 
aggregate is distinct [from the referents of the individual components]. If the 
syntactical word were to denote it, it would not indicate because the syntactical 
word applies even in its [viz. the referent of the aggregate's] absence. But since the 
aggregate, i.e., a different expression, denotes it, there is no ambiguity.”  
The exposition of the pūrvapakṣa at NCV 732,14ff is far more explicit as to the 
question Dignāga addresses: kasmād anabhidhānam iti cet, saṃśayotpatteḥ, 
<an>upāttatve(1) sati anabhihite saṃśayaḥ syāt. tasmāt sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ viśe-




darśayati – sad dravyaṃ san guṇa ityādi. tathā hi svārthāvyabhicāro viśeṣasahitas-
yeti viśeṣaśabdaprayogaḥ. ko 'sau vākyārtha ity ata āha – yasmād avayavaśab-
dārthābhyām anyaḥ samudāyārthaḥ, saddravyaśabdārthāv avayavāv asadadravya-
nivttyupalakṣitau, tābhyām anya ubhayaśabdavyudāsānughītaḥ samudāyārthaḥ, 
tasya ca vācakau tau samuditau na viparītārthau, tad darśayati – na tu sacchabdo 
dravyārtham āha, na dravyaśabdaḥ sadartham: “If it is asked: “Why is there no 
denotation [of its own particulars by the general term]”? [Answer:] Because doubt 
arises. There will be doubt in that it is not included [by the general term](3), i.e., in 
that it is not denoted. Therefore it is correct that the word 'existent' is co-referential 
with words like 'substance,' whose referents are particulars, with regard to the 
referent of a sentence, but not with regard to the referent of the syntactical word. He 
shows that in the examples: 'existent substance', ' existent quality', etc. That is, 
there is no ambiguity as regards the denotation of the general term, when it is 
accompanied by a particular. Thus a particular term is applied. What is this referent 
of the sentence? Therefore he says: Because the referent of the aggregate is other 
than the referents of the two words that constitute the parts; the two parts viz. the 
referents of the words 'existent' and 'substance' are characterized by negation of 
what is non-existent and what is a non-substance; the aggregate referent that is 
assisted by the exclusions [effected by] both words is other than these two; and the 
two that denote this [referent] do not have opposite referents when combined; this he 
shows [in the statement] 'but the word 'existent' does not denote the referent that is 
a substance, nor does the word 'substance' denote the referent that is existent.” 
At this point Siṃhasūri quotes PS V:15, after which he continues: atra codyam – 
kathaṃ tarhīti ‘yat sat tad dravyam, yad dravyaṃ tat sat’ iti bhinnārthatve na(2) 
yuktam? iti. atra tenaivocyate – ubhayaśabdavyudāsānughītasya asadadravyanivt-
tyanughītasya saṃhataśabdadvayābhidheyasya samudāyārthasyaikatvāt tathocya-
te, na tu sadarthasya dravyaśabdenābhidhānād iti pūrvapakṣaḥ: “Here the follow-
ing question is to be raised: In this case, how is not correct to say ‘whatever is 
existent is a substance’ and ‘whatever is a substance is existent’ as the referents are 
different? Here he says: since the referent of the aggregate that is denotable by the 
two words together assisted by negation of non-existent things and non-substances is 
a unity, it is said to be so, but not because the referent that is existent is denoted by 
the word ‘substance.’ Thus the pūrvapakṣa.”  
(1)em., cf. NCV 732 no.8.  
(2)°tve na conj. : °tvena NCV, cf. op.cit. 732 no. 10.  
(3)Cf. PS V 26 § 40. 
 
[235] paścimasyāpi doṣasyā<bhāvaḥ. kasmāt?>. Restored, cf. NCV 733,12: 
paścimasyāpi doṣasya bhāva eva; Ms B 228a5: paścimasyāpi. 
 
445 That is, the problem explained at PSV V 4a, cf. PSṬ Ms B 228a5-6: tadvato 
nāsvatantratvād ity asya. Siṃhasūri quotes a similar verse, presumably from the 
Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, as an introduction to his exposition of Dignāga's argument, 
cf. NCV 733,13: yad uktaṃ jātimatpakṣe “tadvato nāsvatantratvād bhedāj jāter 
ajātitaḥ” ityādi doṣajātam. The phrase sākṣād vtteḥ of PS V 36c is related to 
Dignāga’s observation at PSV V 4a: sacchabdo jātisvarūpamātropasarjanaṃ 






[236] sākṣād vtter abhedāc ca. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 228a6: sākṣād vtter iti; 
NCV 733,14: sākṣād vtteḥ; Ms B 228b3: anenābhedāc cety etad vivtam. 
 
446 The word applies directly to its referent through exclusion of other referents 
without its denotation being mediated by the word's dependence upon a real general 
property, cf. PSṬ Ms B 228a6: na hi tadvatpakṣa iva(1) guṇarūpopaktaṃ vastu 
śabdenābhidhīyate. tatra hi guṇāntaropakārasya virodhāt tyāgaḥ. iha tu sattvādi-
kaṃ guṇāntaram anapekṣyāsadvyudaste vastuni śabdo vartate: “For it is not, like in 
the case of the thesis of the general property possessor, a referent under the 
imfluence of the form of a general property (guṇa) that is denoted by the word. For 
on this [theory viz. the apoha theory] there is omission of the influence of other 
general properties because it is in conflict(2). However, on this [theory viz. the 
apoha theory] the word applies to an object (vastu) from which what is non-existent 
is excluded without being dependent upon a different general property like 
existence.”  
For Siṃhasūri's explanation of the statement sākṣād vtteḥ, cf. no.s 450, 456 
below.  
(1)iva conj. (cf. de daṅ ldan pa'i phyogs bźin du T) : tadvatpakṣabhāvaguṇa° Ms  
(2)Cf PSV V:6c-7a § 12. 
 
447 For the implications of this argument, cf. no.s 452, 462 below. 
 
[237] na hy arthāntaram upādāya <śabdaḥ svabhedeṣu vartate>. tasmāt pāratan-
tryeṇa <svabhed>ānākṣepadoṣo nāsti(1). bhāktadoṣo 'pi nāsti(2), nāpi bhedāna-
vasthānād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ(3), avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsty arthānta-
rāpohamātrasyābhinnatvād adravyatvāc ca. ata eva <sāmānyaviśeṣāntarayogānu-
saraṇaṃ na kartavyaṃ> sākṣād arthāntarapratiṣedhāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
228a7, na hy arthāntaram upādāyetyādi. tasmāt pāratantryeṇeti; 228b1-7 ata eva 
bhāktadoṣo 'pi nāsti … nāpītyādi. bhedānavasthānam ānantyam. na tasmād 
anabhidhānadoṣaḥ … avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsti … arthāntarāpoha-
mātrasyābhinnatvād iti … adravyatvād ceti …ata eveti; 229a2: sākṣād 
arthāntarapratiṣedhād iti.  
(1)Cf. NCV 733,16: anākṣepadoṣo nāsti.  
(2)Cf. NCV 733,16: bhāktadoṣo 'py ata eva nāsti.  
(3)Cf. NCV 733,17: nāpi bhedānavasthānād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ. 
 
448 Mallavādi applies the term bhāvāntara in a similar context, cf. NCV 734,16 
and 735,7,16-17. Dharmakīrti alludes to Dignāga's formulation at PVSV 34,21-23: 
tatra hy arthāntaram upādāya anyatra vartamāno dhvanir asvātantryādidoṣair 
upadrūyate. na ca arthātaram anyasmād vyāvttir vyāvttād dvayor ekābhidhānād 
ity uktam: “For in this case (viz. in case exclusion of other is considered a property 
like a general property) the word, while being applied to one thing in dependence 
upon another referent, is afflicted with such problems as not being independent. And 
it has already been explained (at PVSV 34,15-20) that the exclusion from other is 
not a referent that is different from the excluded because both (viz. the term 
denoting the property exclusion of other and the term denoting the property 
possessor as qualified by exclusion of other) denote the same thing.”  





449 Cf. Siṃhasūri's lucid exposition at NCV 733,14: tasyābhāvo 'nyāpohapakṣe 
sākṣād vtteḥ. tatra hi sacchabdaḥ sattām upādāya dravye vartamānas tadbhedān 
ghaṭādīn ākṣeptum asamarthaḥ. atra punar asatpratiṣedhena sākṣād vartata iti 
tasya ye viśeṣās tān na pratikṣepati. tasmād ihānākṣepadoṣo nāsti: “This (kind of 
problem, cf. the verse quoted at NCV 733,13, q.v. no. 30 above) does not exist on 
the apoha theory. For on this (theory) the word 'existent,' while applying to a 
substance in dependence upon (the general property) existence, is incapable of 
implicitly referring to its particulars such as pots. But here (viz. on the apoha 
theory), on the other hand, it applies directly by negation of the non-existent. Thus it 
does not negate its particulars. Therefore the problem of not implicitly referring (to 
the particulars) does not exist here (viz. on the apoha theory).”  
Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignāga's argument in similar terms at PSṬ Ms B 
228a7-B 228b1: na hy apoho nāma jātyādivat kiñcid arthāntaraṃ yad upādāya 
śabdo dravye varteta. tato vyavadhānābhāvāt kutaḥ pāratantryam. tad eva tu vastv 
asadvyāvttaṃ sākṣād abhidhīyate. tatas tasya ye viśeṣās te tadavyatirekād na 
pratikṣipyante: “For the so-called exclusion is not some different sort of referent 
like a general property, and so on, in dependence on which the word applies to a 
substance. Therefore, since no intermediary entity exists how could there be 
dependence? This very object, however, is denoted directly as excluded from the 
non-existent. Therefore its particulars are not rejected because they are not distinct 
from it.” 
 
450 Cf. NCV 733,16-17: bhāktadoṣo 'py ata eva nāsti. na hy anyatra mukhyā 
vttir dravyādiṣūpacaryate: “Precisely therefore the problem of transfer of 
denotation does not exist either. For (the word's) primary application to something 
else is not transferred to substances, etc.” Cf. the almost identical explanation at PSṬ 
Ms B 228b1-2: ata eva bhāktadoṣo 'pi nāsti. na hy anyatra(1) mukhyavttiḥ śabdo 
dravyādiṣūpacaryate: “Precisely therefore the problem of transfer of denotation 
does not exist either. For a word that primarily applies to something else is not 
transferred to substances, etc.”  
(1)na hy an° conj. : na nyatra Ms 
 
451 Siṃhasūri’s explanation at NCV 733,17-18 sheds more light on the issue than 
Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis (on which see below): nāpi bhedānavasthānād 
anabhidhānadoṣaḥ. kasmāt? abhedāt. na hy arthāntarāpoho bhedeṣu bhidyate, 
abhāvāt. tanmātraṃ ca śabdenocyate, na bhedāḥ: “Nor does the problem of not 
denoting exist, which is due to the particulars being infinite. Why? Because 
[exclusion] is not a particular (abheda). For exclusion of other referents 
(arthāntarāpoha) is not divided among the particulars because it is non-existence 
(abhāva);(1) and this alone is denoted by the word, not the particulars.”  
Jinendrabuddhi identifies this problem with the argument at PS V:8cd, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 228b2: bhedānavasthānam ānantyam. na tasmād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ. 
“tadvāṃś ca bheda evoktaḥ, sa ca pūrvaṃ nirākta” (PS V:8cd) ity anena yad 
uktaṃ(2).  
(1) Exclusion of other referents is equivalent to non-existence of other referents 
in the locus of the referent of any given word. Non-existence is eo ipso indivisible 
and therefore not subject to the absurd consequences that the theory of real 
universals entails. Cf. Translation § 51. 






452 Jinendrabuddhi identifies this problem with the discussion at PS V:9c, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 228b2-3: avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsti. yad uktam “tadvān 
artho ghaṭādiś ce” (PS V:9c) tyādinā. This is indirectly confirmed by Siṃhasūri 
who deals with Mallavādi's criticism of Dignāga's argument at NCV 733,19, 
quoting a similar verse, presumably from the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa. According to 
Siṃhasūri Dignāga's claim that a problem similar to the one of assuming that 
general properties are real entities does not exist on the apoha theory, presupposes 
that it denotes the exclusion of other referents directly, cf. NCV 733,20: sākṣād 
ghaṭapaṭādiṣv asatpratikṣepād iti: “Because it negates directly non-existent [things] 
with respect to pot or cloth, etc.;” NCV 735,15 (yad apy uktam): arthāntarāpoho 
'sadaghaṭanivttiḥ san ghaṭa iti, tasmāt sāmānyadoṣo 'pohapakṣe nāstīti: “Exclu-
sion of other referents is the preclusion of non-existent things and non-pots such as 
'existent pot'. Therefore the problem of the general property does not exist on the 
apoha theory.”  
Cf. Dharmakīrti's reference, in a similar context, to asāmānyadoṣa at PVSV 
66,13-14 (cf. PV I 136): yathā hy ekas tasmād bhinnas tathānyo 'pi iti bhedasyā-
sāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsti.  
 
453 As Jinendrabuddhi notices at PSṬ Ms B 228b3, this explains 36c2 
anenābhedāc ce (36c2) ty etad vivtam, and he continues explaining the argument at 
228b3-4: bhede hi saty ānantyadoṣo bhavaty asāmānyadoṣaś ca, anyasyānyatrā-
vtteḥ.(1) arthāntarāpohamātraṃ tv abhinnam. tatra kuto 'sya doṣasyāvakāśaḥ: “If 
[exclusion of other] were a particular there would be the problem of infinity and the 
problem of not being a general property because one thing does not reside in the 
other [as mentioned at PS V 9c-10a]. The mere exclusion of other referents, 
however, is not divided [among the referents]. So how could there be an opportunity 
for [introducing] this problem;” cf. Dharmakīrti's statement at PVSV 48,14, q.v. no. 
459 below. 
(1)em. : anyasyānyatre vtter Ms 
 
454 The argument that the sāmānyadoṣa does not exist because exclusion of other 
is not a substance (adravyatvāt) elaborates the point that it is not a different sort of 
referent (arthāntara) like the general property existence, and that it is without 
division. The reason is that exclusion of other things anyāpoha is equivalent to non-
existence of other things in the locus of the referent, and non-existence which is the 
mere absense of something from something else, does not have status as a thing, 
which by implication excludes that it is qualified by the kind of properties that 
define things. Dharmakīrti formulates a similar view at PV I 169ab and PVSV 
85,21-23 ad loc.: nivtter niḥsvabhāvatvān na sthānāsthānakalpanā. na hy 
anyāpoho nāma kiṃcit tasya ca svabhāvānuṣaṅgiṇyaḥ svabhāvasthitipracyutikal-
panā na kalpante: “Since negation is without essential nature the idea of 
permanence or non-permanence does not (fit). For negation of other is nothing 
whatsoever, so the notions of the duration and disappearence of the essential nature 
that are the concomitants of an essential nature do not fit it.”  
As indicated by Siṃhasūri's exegesis at NCV 734,13-16 Mallavādi quotes two 
ślokapādas to the same effect, presumably from the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa. 
Unfortunately NCV does not quote Mallavādi's exposition of Dignāga's view in 




bhā)ṣye likhitam. tadvyākhyā: nāpy arthāntarāpoho nāmetyādi yāvan nāsti sāmān-
yadoṣa ityapohapakṣe jātimatpakṣagatadoṣābhāvapratipādanaṃ viśeṣapradarśanād 
iti tvadabhiprāyam pradarśya.  
Cf. the parallel at Madhyamakahdayakārikā V 64 [for which, cf. no. 458 below] 
where Bhavya explains, in his criticism of Dignāga's apoha theory, that the reason 
why a general property is resident in many things is that is not a substance, cf. 
Tarkajvālā ad loc.: rdzas thams cad kyi khoṅs su gtogs pas rdzas su med pa'i phyir 
du mar 'jug pa yin no: “Since [the general property] does not exist as a substance 
(dravya) in that it is inherent in all substances (*sarvadravyāntargata) it is resident 
in many (*anekavtti). Jinendrabuddhi explains the argument at Ms B 228b4-7 with 
reference to Dharmakīrti's view, as it is expounded at PV I 70-72 and PVSV ad loc., 
that the general property is a mental category, not a thing: nanu ca jñānasya yaḥ 
sāmānyākāraḥ sāmānyavyavasthāpitaṃ, sa ca jñānād avyatiriktatvād (cf. PV I 71c) 
anyatrāvartamānaḥ kathaṃ sāmānyam ity āha. adravyatvāc cetyādi. vijñānākā-
rasyāpi sāmānyarūpeṇāpariniṣpannatvāt sāmānyam adravyasad eva naiva aniṣṭam. 
etad uktam bhavati “mithyāvikalpa evāyam artheṣv ekātmatāgrahaḥ(1)” (PV I 
72ab). vastutaḥ sāmānyan nāma nāsty eva. bhrāntajanābhiprāyavaśāt(2) kevalam 
iyaṃ sāmānyavyavasthā kriyate. bhrāntā hi vyavahartāraḥ svajñānapratibhāsa-
viśeṣam eva bahir vyaktibhedānuyātam iva sāmānyam manyanta iti ktveti(3).  
(1)°tāgrahaḥ em. : °nāgraho Ms  
(2)bhrāntajanā° em. : bhrāṃjanā° Ms  
(3)Jinendrabuddhi's exposition is an epitome of Dharmakīrti's discourse on the 
problem at PVSV 38,17ff. 
 
455 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 228b7–229a2: sākṣād vtteḥ (PS V 36c). tatra hi sattāviśeṣaṇa-
rūpeṇābhidhānād vastunaḥ svarūpaṃ vyavadhīyate. tatsambandhinaś ca ghaṭatvā-
dayo na sattāsambandhino “jāter ajātitaḥ” (PS V 11b2). tato na tadmukhe-
nānekārthākāṅkṣāhetuḥ. iha tu sākṣād asatpratiṣedhena śabdaḥ svārthe pravartate. 
tatas tadbhedākāṅkṣāhetutvam upapadyate vināpi jātyantarayogena: “That is, 
“because it applies directly.” For in this context (i.e., the context of the existence of 
general properties) the own form of an entity is defined by a word denoting it in the 
form of the qualifier “existence.” And its relata viz. potness, and so on, are not the 
relata of existence “because a general property is without (other) general properties” 
(PS V 11b2). Therefore it is not on that account a cause of the expectation of many 
referents. Whereas here [viz. on the apoha theory], on the other hand, the word 
[‘existent’] applies directly to its own referent through negation of what is non-
existent. Therefore it is justified that it is a cause of expectation of its particulars 
even without the connection to other general properties.” 
 
456 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 229a2-4: arthāntarapratiṣedhopāyalabhyaṃ svārthābhidhā-
nam evam uktam. sākṣāt svārthābhidhānād ity arthaḥ. etenāta evety asyārtho 
darśitaḥ. atra ca vastusajjātyantarayogapratiṣedho vivakṣito, na tu kalpitajātyanta-
rayogo 'pi. tathā hi yat sad ity ucyate, tad eva tatas tato vyāvttam ākārāntareṇa 
pratibhāsamānaṃ kalpitasāmānyāntarayogena tathā tathā vibhajyate: “The 
(word's) denoting its own referent is is to be understood by means of negation of 
other referents, as it has been explained. The meaning is: Because it denotes its own 
referent directly. Thereby the meaning of “precisely therefore” is shown. And in this 
context the negation of connection to other real general properties is intended, but 





that is said to be ‘existent’, being reflected in the mind in a different form as 
excluded from this or that is differentiated in this or that way by being connected to 
other imagined general properties.”  
This exegesis is strongly influenced by Dharmakīrtian philosophy, cf., e.g., 
PVSV 54,18ff.  
 
[238] <evam pūrvadoṣābhāvād> arthāntarāpoha eva śabdārthaḥ sādhuḥ. Restor-
ed, cf. TSP 389,11-12: tasmād guṇotkarṣād apy arthāntarāpoha eva śabdārthaḥ 
sādhuḥ; cf. no. [241] below. 
 
[239] <atra ca>(1) jātidharmavyavasthiteḥ. Qu. ŚVṬ 74,8; NR 433,4; TSP 728,16, 
776,8. °teḥ NR, TSP : °tiḥ ŚVṬ.  
(1)'di las (read 'di la = Sanskrit atra) kyaṅ K (cf. the PSV ad loc. atraiva 
vyavatiṣṭhante) : gaṅ las śe na V (this translation is incomprehensible in the context 
and presupposes a different reading). 
 
457 It is interesting that Bhavya, in his criticism of the apoha theory at 
Madhyamakahdayakārikā V:64 describes the general property, which he defines at 
V:62 as a property that is absent from dissimilar things (vijātīyena śūnyatvam … 
sāmānyam iti niścitam) in terms that are related to Dignāga's exposition at PSV 
V:36cd, cf. loc. cit.: abhedādravyasattvābhyām ekam anekavtty api, tadvināśe 
'vināśāc ca nānyasmin tanmatir na ca: “Since by nature it is not a particular and not 
a substance, it is one as well as resident in many; and in that it is not annihilated 
when its [substrate] is annihilated, it is not the case that the cognition of it does not 
[apply] to another [instantiation of it].” 
 
[240] jātidharmāś caiketvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā atraiva 
vyavatiṣṭhante, abhedāt, āśrayāvicchedāt, ktsnārthapratīteḥ. Restored, cf. ŚVṬ 
74,9: jātidharmāś caikatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā atraiva tiṣṭhanti; 
TSP 389,9-11 qu. STP I 201,13-14: sarvatrābhedād āśrayasyānucchedāt ktsnārtha-
parisamāpteś ca yathākramaṃ jātidharmā ekatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāpti-
lakṣaṇā(1) apoha evāvatiṣṭhante; cf. PSṬ Ms B 229a4-7: atraiva vyavatiṣṭhanta iti 
… abhedād ekatvam … āśrayāvicchedān nityatvaṃ … pratyekaparisamāptiḥ 
ktsnārthapratīteḥ. Kumārila mentions the properties that Dignāga attributes to 
apoha at ŚV Apoha° 163ab: api caikatvanityatvapratyekasamavāyitāḥ. 
(1)°nityatva° STP so : om. TSP. 
 
458 Exclusion of other referents that is equivalent to non-existence (abhāva) of 
other referents in the locus of the referent, is not a particular (abheda) and is 
therefore characterized by property of being one (ekatva) like real general properties 
postulated by other schools of thought. For Dharmakīrti’s interpretation at PVSV 
48,14-16: cf. no. 462 below. 
 
459 Dharmakīrti rejects these properties commonly attributed to real general 
properties (jāti) at PVSV 39,13-15: vyaktivyatiriktāvyatiriktaikanityavyāpitādyā-
kārair api naiva pratipattiḥ. kevalam abhinnākārā buddhir(1) utpadyate. According 
to Karṇakagomin the argument at PVSV 48,18: yathākalpanam asyāyogāt: “because 




pervasiveness] the way they are imagined,” alludes to Dignāga's exposition in this 
paragraph(2).  
(1) Cf. no. 463 below on the notion of substrate (āśraya) of buddhi. 
(2) Cf. PVSVṬ 202,25-26: yathākalpanam nityavyāpitādyākārair asya sāmānyas-
yāyogād ity anyavyāvttyabhidhāne 'yam abhiprāya ācāryadignāgasya. 
 
460 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 229a4: yujyanta ity arthaḥ(1). Jayamiśra quotes Dignāga’s 
enumeration of properties with the following observation on Kumarila’s ŚV Apoha 
163 at ŚVṬ 74:7-9: atra bhikṣuṇāpohapakṣe jātipakṣatulyatvam atidiṣṭam (quoting 
first paragraph of PSV:36d) … te ime vastudharmā avastuny atidiśyamānā asūtra-
paṭakāritvam sūcayantīty arthaḥ. In short, transferring properties of real things to an 
unreal thing like exclusion is like making yarnless cloth. 
(1) Cf. rigs śiṅ (sic) ldan no źes pa’i don to T; rigs śiṅ translates yujyante, 
although not in the sense of “being connected to” as required by the context; ldan no 
= yuktāḥ (?) has no equivalent in Ms. One cannot, however, exclude the possibility 
that the translator attempted to convey the idea of the properties of exclusion being 
logically justified (yujyante) as well as connected to exclusion.  
  
461 Exclusion’s property of being one (ekatva) follows from its not being a 
particular (bheda), cf. PSV V: 36c with no. 452 above. The scope of the term bheda 
appears from its use in Dignāga’s analysis of the view current among contemporary 
non-Buddhist philosophers that general properties are real single entities that inhere 
in their substrates. See PSV II:16 q.v. no. 504 below.  
Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation reflects Dharmakīrti’s view on the issue, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 229a4-5: abhedād ekatvam. arthāntaravyudāso hi buddhāv abhinnarūpatayā 
pratibhāsamāno vyavahārānuyātibhir ekatvena vyavasīyate ity ekatvaṃ tasya 
vyavasthāpyate: “Its being one follows from its not being a particular(1). For the 
exclusion of other referents, when appearing in the mind in identical form, is 
determined as being one and the same by those who are engaged in verbal 
exchange(2). Thus its being one is defined.”  
(1)For the implications of this argument, cf. PS V 36c no. [236] above with no. 
448.  
(2)This explanation is evidently dependent upon Dharmakīrtian philosophy; cf. 
Dharmakīrti's reference to the unity of exclusion at PVSV 48,14-16: tasmād 
avaśyaṃ śabdena vyavacchedaś codanīyaḥ. sa ca abhinnas tadanyeṣv iti jātidharmo 
apy asti: “Therefore exclusion is necessarily to be enjoined by the word. And this 
[exclusion of other referents] is identical with respect to those (effects) that are 
different from those (that are the same;” cf. PVSVṬ 202,17-19 explaining that being 
identical (abhinna) relates to things that have the same effct and those that differ 
from them in terms of effect. Thus the jātidharma is the property of excluding many 
referents (anekārthavyāvttitva): sa cety anyavyavacchedaḥ. tadanyeṣv iti tasmād 
atatkāryād anyeṣv ekakāryeṣv abhinnaḥ. Sarveṣāṃ vyāvttatvāt. iti ktvānekārtha-
vyāvttitvaṃ jātidharmo 'py asti).  
 
462 Dignāga's introduction of the concept of āśraya as denoting the substrate of 
anyāpoha as opposed to the view of its being the bearer of real general properties is 
related to similar views on the permanence of the general property formulated by 





“Since [its] substrate is not discontinued the general property remains, although [its] 
substrate is impermanent.” 
Cf. Candrānanda's remarks ad VS I.2:8 on the notion (buddhi) ‘existent' (sat) as 
not being annihilated because the general property existence is separate from 
substances, and so on, whose destruction does not affect its being permanent: 
āśrayavināśād asyā (scil. buddher) vināśa iti cet, na yataḥ “dravyaguṇakarmabhyo 
'rthāntaraṃ sattā (= VS I.2:8).” yasmād dravyādibhyo vyatiriktā sattā tasmān na 
dravyādivināśe sattā vinaśyatīti. 
Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation of this term is indebted to Dharmakīrti’s 
philosophy, cf. PSṬ Ms B 229a5-7: āśrayāvicchedān nityatvam. āśrayās tadartha-
kriyākāritayātatkāribhyo vyāvttā bhedāḥ, te hi svānubhavadvāreṇa śabdārthasya 
nimittam bhavanti yathoktam prāk; teṣāṃ cānantyāt ucchedo nāsti. ato yāvat te 
tāvat sa iti nityatvam api kalpitam upapadyate: “The property of being eternal 
follows from the substratas’ not being discontinued. The substrata are the particulars 
that are excluded due to their effecting a [specific] purposeful action, from those that 
do not effect it, for (hi) they are the cause of the word’s reference based upon one's 
own experience, as explained previously(1); and since they are infinite there is no 
discontinuation. Therefore, as long as they exist, this exists. Thus, (iti) also an 
imagined (kalpitam) infinity (nityatvam) is justified.”  
Interestingly, Jinendrabuddhi does not explain the introduction of the concept of 
substrate (āśraya) in the light of its use at the crucial passage PVSV 39,13ff; cf. e.g. 
the statement concerning the substrate of buddhi loc.cit. lines 15-17 in which 
Dharmakīrti explains that the substrate of buddhi is exclusion of other referents 
(anyāpoha) because it exists in the entities (sic) (vastuṣu bhāvāt): tasyāḥ ka āśraya 
ity anyāpoha ucyate. tasya vastuṣu bhāvāt, avirodhāt(2) vyavahārasya, ca śabdāśra-
yasya tathādarśanāt. na punar vastubhūtaṃ kiṃcit sāmānyaṁ nāmāsti yatheyaṃ 
buddhiḥ pratibhāti. 
 (1)Jinendrabuddhi is referring to his excursus at PSṬ Ms B 206b2, for which, cf. 
Appendix II. The introduction of the notion of arthakriyākāritā is, of course, an 
anachronism that is indebted to Dharmakīrtian philosophy. 
 (2) Cf. Karṇakagomin’s exegesis at PVSVṬ 171,22ff, which clarifies in what 
way anyāpoha is resident in things (vastuṣu) thereby causing a mental representation 
that has the same appearence (ekākārā buddhiḥ): tasya vijātīyavirahalakṣaṇasyān-
yāpohasya bhinneṣv apy sarvatra vastuṣu bhāvāt tathābhūtasya cānyapohasya 
sāmānyabuddhihetutvam praty avirodhāt. tathā hi yathaikam vkṣam avkṣād vyā-
vttaṃ paśyaty evam anyam apy atas tatraikākārā buddhir utpadyate. Dharmakīrti’s 
statements as explained by Karṇakagomin evidently presupposes Dignāga’s view 
that the general property (sāmānya) in any given referent [arthe, cf. PSV V §34, §46 
above] or speech unit [śabde, cf. PSV V §34, §46 above] is defined by exclusion of 
other referents or speech units. Dignāga, on the other hand, does not address the 
question of the mental representation of anyāpoha, but restricts himself to 
explaining that exclusion of other referents or speech units is a function of the 
referents or speech units belonging to the same class, which qualifies them as tokens 
of the same type.  
 (3) Cf. Helarāja's commentary ad loc. VPP Vol. I 48,13: anucchinnāśrayāt = 
āśrayād ucchedo 'syā nāyāti, āśrayo 'syā nocchedahetur ity arthaḥ. āśrayaś ca 





463 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 229a7-229b1: pratyekaparisamāptiḥ ktsnārthapratīteḥ. 
arthāntaravyudāso hi palāśādau pratyekam buddhiparivartini(1) vyavahārāvasāri-
bhiḥ pratipattbhiḥ sarvātmanā pratīyata iti tatpratītyanurodhena vyavasthāpyamā-
nā ktsnārthaparisamāptir na(2) virudhyate: “Extension to each single follows from 
cognizing the referent completely. For the exclusion of other referents is cognized 
completely by the listeners who are engaged in discourse with regard to each single 
[tree] such as a palāśa, and so on, that revolve in the mind. Thus, when it is defined 
in accordance with this cognition the extension to the complete referent is not in 
conflict.”  
(1)Dharmakīrti uses this term in a related passage of PVSV, cf. op. cit. 38,24ff: 
tad eṣām buddhipratibhāsam anurundhānair buddhiparivartinām eva bhāvānām 
ākāraviśeṣaparigrahād bahir iva parisphuratāṃ sāmānyam ity ucyate.  
(2)na conj (cf. mi 'gal T) : om. Ms 
 
[241] <evam pūrvoktadoṣābhāvād> guṇotkarṣāc ca śabdo 'rthāntaranivttiviśiṣṭān 
eva bhāvān āha. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 229b1: guṇotkarṣāc ceti; TSP 389,11: 
tasmād guṇotkarṣād api; PVSV 62,27-63,1: śabdo 'rthāntaranivttiviśiṣṭān eva 
bhāvān āha. 
  
464 It appears from Jinendrabuddhi's concluding remark that Dignāga must have 
contrasted, in the SPVy, his own view of the general properties that attach to the 
exclusion of other with those of the upholders of real general properties, cf. PSṬ Ms 
B 229b1-2: jātidharmavyavasthāyā atraiva yuktatvāt. vastusajjātipakṣe tu yathā sā 
nopapadyate, tathā Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāse(1) veditavyam: “That is, because the 
definition of the attributes of a general property is only connected to this [viz. 
exclusion of other referents]. However, the way in which it [namely the definition of 
the properties of a general property] is not justified on the theory of objectively real 
general properties, should be known from the SPVy.” 
(1)Translated erroneously as spyi brtag pa’i skabs su T; elsewhere SPVy is 
correctly translated as spyi brtags pa rgyas par. 
 
465 Jinendrabuddhi seems consciously to avoid commenting upon the idea of 
referents being qualified by exclusion of other referents because of the controversies 
attached to it. Elsewhere, however, he interprets the term arthāntarāpohaviśiṣṭe as 
vivakṣāvati puruṣe (cf. no. 505 below), which is a complete departure from the 
rationale of Dignāga's use of the term, being based upon Dharmakīrtian and post-
Dharmakīrtian philosophy (cf. no. 9 above).  
Mallavādi and Siṃhasūri allude to Dignāga's claim that the word denotes things 
(vastu) as qualified by exclusion of other referents at NCV 732,10-13: arthāntarā-
pohaḥ sad ity asan na bhavatīti nāsadbhāvamātram evocyate, kiṃ tarhi, arthāntarā-
pohena viśiṣṭaṃ vastv eva sad ity ucyate, yasmin vastuni so 'pohaḥ kriyate, tac ca 
dravyaṃ śabdārthaḥ, nāpohamātram. sa cāpohaviśiṣṭo 'rtho dravyādiḥ sacchab-
dena vyāpto 'parityāgāt, na tu sākṣād uktaḥ: “Exclusion of other referents as in the 
statement ‘existent means it is not non-existent' does not merely express its being 
non-existent, but rather, that the entity for the sake of which the exclusion is 
effected, is indeed an entity which, being qualified by exclusion of other referents, is 
said to be ‘existent.’ And this substance is the referent of the word, not mere 
exclusion. And the referent that is qualified by exclusion viz. a substance, and so on, 





denoted directly.” Cf. the related Sanskrit fragment, possibly from Dignāga’s SPVy, 
quoted no. 182 above.  
Siṃhasūri's remark at NCV 734,20 exposes the difficulties of the notion of 
exclusion of other referents as qualification of things: atha svamatena brūṣe na 
sāmānyaṃ na vyāvttimad iti kutas tadviśiṣṭavastvabhidhānam. khapuṣpaśekhara-
viśiṣṭavandhyāputrābhidhānavat: “Now, if you say in accordance with your own 
theory that [exclusion of other] is neither a general property, nor is [the referent] 
exclusion possessing, then how could the [word] denote a thing as qualified by it 
[viz. exclusion]. It is like denoting the son of a barren woman as qualified by a 
wreath of sky flowers”!  
Siṃhasūri also attributes to Dignāga the view that in spite of his use of the 
phrase “qualified by exclusion of other referents,” exclusion of other referents is not 
to be understood as another kind of qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) like the general properties 
posited by Nyāyavāiśeṣika philosophy, cf. NCV 735,17-18: abhāvāntaratvād 
arthāntarāpohasyāpohavān arthaḥ śabdavācyo na bhavati. ato nāpoho viśeṣaṇaṃ 
nāpohavān so 'rtha iti yadi tvayeṣṭam: “If you claim that since the exclusion of 
other referents is not a different [kind of] entity, the denotable object of the word is 
not a referent that is exclusion possessing. Hence exclusion is not a qualifier and the 
referent is not exclusion possessing.”  
The thought underlying Dignāga's claim that a word denotes things as qualified 
by negation of other referents becomes clear, I believe, in the light of the debate 
with the Sāṅkhyavaināśika Mādhava recorded at PSV V:39ff. This interesting 
discussion shows that the idea of exclusion or negation presupposes the notion of 
mutual absence (itaretarābhāva). Things as denotable objects are defined by the 
absence in their loci of the nature of other things (ātmāntarābhāva). As Dignāga 
states at PSV V:45: “The nature of one thing is the non-existence of the nature of 
other things” (ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti). He appears to interpret this mutual 
absence as a qualifier-qualified relation: the absence of all non-x from any given 
locus of x qualifies x as denotable, the absence of non-x from the locus of x being 
the qualifier and x the qualified.  
The idea that absences are related to the loci from which they are absent as 
qualifier to qualified can be traced to a short fragment from an unknown work by 
Uddyotakara which Kamalaśīla quotes in TSP ad TS 782ab; and there is no reason 
to assume that Uddyotakara does not rely on earlier views about absences as 
qualifiers of the loci from which they are absent. In the above-mentioned fragment 
Uddyotakara states that the relation of general properties like potness to things like 
pots is characterized by inherence, whereas (the relation to them) of negations (i.e., 
absences) is characterized by a qualifier-qualified relation, cf. TSP 313,15-16: 
ghaṭatādīnāṃ sāmānyānāṃ ghaṭādibhiḥ samavāyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ, abhāvā-
nāṃ tu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ.  
Since Dignāga rejects the assumption that pravttinimitta is real general 
properties inherent in things as not tenable, he must have realised that a possible 
way of accounting for the identity and difference of things as referents i.e. as 
denotable objects would be to start from the principle of the mutual absence of any x 
from the loci of all non-x. This could be formalised through joint presence and 
absence (anvayavyatireka) as a qualifier-qualified relation in which the predominant 
joint absence of all non-x from any given locus of x qualifies the latter as x. 
Induction by means of joint absence and presence of any word and referent 




denotes. This implies identifying the referent by pointing at a prototypical instance 
of it accompanied by the demonstrative pronoun “this,” as Dignāga explains at PSV 
V 50b-c; cf. no. 413 above.  
 
[242] apohaniyamaḥ(1) kasmāt. Qu. Ms B 229b2.  
(1)apoha° em. (cf. gźan sel T) : apohyaniyaḥ Ms 
 
466 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 229b2: na kutaścid api hetor ity arthaḥ.  
 
[243] rūpaśabdena rasādayo apohyante, na punar anyatamavarṇābhidhāne śeṣā 
varṇā <atyantabhinnā api. sa kiṃktaḥ>? yasya tu rūpatvam abhinnaṃ nīlādiṣv 
evāsti(1), na rasādiṣv <ity evam eṣa doṣo nāstīti cet>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
229b3-5: tatra tulye bhede rūpaśabdena rasādayo apohyante(2) na(3) punar anyata-
mavarṇābhidhāne śeṣāvarṇā … yasya tv ityādi. yasya tu rūpatvam abhinnaṃ(4) 
dravyasatsāmānyaṃ tasya tatkto niyamo … tac ca nīlādiṣv evāsti na rasādiṣu.  
(1)eva is reproduced by ñid in V, cf. sṅon po la sogs pa ñid V : sṅon po la sogs 
pa rnams K.  
(2) apohyante em. : hyante Ms 
(3) na em. : na na Ms 
(4) abhinnaṃ em. : ā{nna}bhinnaṃ Ms 
 
467 This paragraph introduces a discussion of how the scope of exclusion is 
restricted. Dignāga's opponent points out that since a quality (guṇa) like the blue 
color differs from other colors as well as from the quality taste (rasa) and the 
remaining qualities, it is necessary to explain the cause of restriction. As he asserts, 
this restriction can only be accounted for by assuming that a real general property 
colourness is found in each particular colour as opposed to taste, and so on, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 229b2-3: nīlādīnāṃ paraspararūpasamanvayābhāvāt(1) rasādivat te 'pi bhid-
yante. tatra tulye bhede rūpaśabdena rasādayo apohyante, na punar anyatama-
varṇābhidhāne śeṣāvarṇā ity atra na kaścin niyamahetuḥ. anenābhyupagama-
virodham āha.  
(1)°samanvayā° em. : °samarthayā°. 
 
[244] <eṣa doṣo nāsti, yasmād(1)> lokarūḍho(2) na mśyate(3). Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 229b5-6: lokarūḍho na mśyata iti.  
(1)Cf. gaṅ gi phyir K : 'di ltar V. 
(2)This adjective qualifies an implicit vyavahāra. 
(3)Cf. Buddhist Sanskrit parāmśyati; cf. Pāli Tathāgato voharati aparāmasan ti 
no. 472 below. 
 
468 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 229b6: anekārthatvād dhātūnāṃ nābhiviśyata ity arthaḥ. 
 
[245] uktaṃ hi Bhagavatā: “janapadaniruktiṃ nābhiniviśeta saṃjñāṃ ca lokasya 
nābhidhāvet(1).” tasmād asmābhir api <lokavyavahārā naimittikā vā> pāribhāṣikā 
<vā> bhūtārthatvena na mśyante, lokavad evānugamyante. siddhaś ca rūpaśabdo 
loke nīlādiṣv eva, na rasādiṣu. Restored, cf. Ms B 229b-230a4: uktaṃ hītyādi. 
janapadaniruktir lokavyavahāraḥ … pāribhāṣikāḥ … saṃjñāṃ cetyādi … tasmād iti 





iti … tathāsmābhir apy anugamyante … ata āha siddhaś cetyādi … rūpaśabdo loke 
nīlādiṣv eva siddho na rasādiṣu.  
(1)The Sanskrit version of this Madhyama-āgama quotation is found at 
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 31,14-15, cf. Taishō 1,701c6. For the original Pāli version, 
cf. no. 471 below. 
 
469 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 229b6: janapadaniruktir lokavyavahāraḥ. 
 
470 In the Buddhist tradition this passage is quoted to show that one should not 
become attached to conventional usage, cf., e.g., Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 31,15: 
cakṣuḥ paśyati vijñānaṃ vijānātīti nātrābhiniveṣṭavyam. Buddhist Sanskrit nirukti 
translates Pāli nirutti and is not related to Sanskrit nirukti “etymology.” The original 
Pāli version of the quotation is found at Majjhimanikāya III 230,20-21: janapada-
niruttiṃ nābhiniveseyya, samaññaṃ nātidhāveyyā ti (Papañcasūdanī V 30,23f: 
nābhiniveseyyā ti na adhiṭṭhahitvā ādāya vohareyya. samaññaṃ ti lokasamaññaṃ 
lokapaṇṇattiṃ nātidhāveyyā ti nātikkameyya). The use in the Pāli canon of 
atidhāvati (= Buddhist Sanskrit abhidhāvati) is highly restricted; cf. Saṃyuttanikāya 
IV 230,23-25: yaṃ ca sāmaṃ ñātaṃ taṃ ca atidhāvanti. yaṃ ca loke saccasam-
mataṃ taṃ ca atidhāvanti; in postcanonical Pāli literature it is used in descriptions 
of how the teaching of the ultimate truth should not disregard conventional usage, 
cf., e.g., Visuddhimagga 522,15: janapadaniruttiyā anabhiniveso samaññāya anati-
dhāvanan ti ayaṃ ñāyo paridīpito hoti, and Mohavicchedanī 267,7-9: paññattiṃ 
anatikamma paramattho pakāsito vināyakena so yasmā. tasmā añño pi paṇḍito 
paramattham pakāsento samaññaṃ nātidhāvaye.  
 
471 Cf. the canonical formulation at Dīghanikāya I 202,7-9: itimā kho Citta loka-
samaññā lokaniruttiyo lokavohārā lokapaññattiyo yāhi Tathāgato voharati 
aparāmasan ti.  
 
472 The underlying assumption is that terms denoting things in which any given 
general property is resident have this general property as their cause of application 
(naimittika), whereas terms like 'existence' (sattā) do not have a cause of 
application because any given general property is by definition a not repeatable 
singularity. They are therefore similar to such items that are denoted by proper 
nouns or by technical terms like those of Pāṇinian grammar; cf. PSṬ Ms B B 229b6-
230a1: samudāyaśabdāḥ sattādikaṃ vastusatsāmānyam pravttinimittam upādāya 
tadvati vartante. sattādau tu dravyasati sāmānye nimittāntarābhāvāt pāribhāṣikāḥ 
yādcchikā ity evaṃ nābhiniveśaṃ kuryāt vastusataḥ sāmānyasyāyogāt: “Words 
that denote a collection [of things] in dependence upon a real general property like 
existence as their cause of application viz., apply to the general property possessor. 
However, since there is no other cause of application with regard to a general 
property such as existence as a real object, they are technical designations, i.e., 
proper nouns. Thus one should not become attached since it is untenable that a 
general property is a real object.”  
For the term pāribhāṣika, v. Renou, Terminologie, DSG s.v. 
 
473 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a1-2: bhūto 'rtho vastusatsāmānyam pravttinimittaṃ 





(1)Cf. A V I 1:119. 
(2)Cf. A II 3:21. 
 
474 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a2: yathā loko 'nabhiniviśyānugacchati. The idea of 
observing the constraints of conventional usage on the level of saṃvti is also 
emphasized by Dignāga in Hastavālaprakaraṇa, cf. verse 6ab: 'jig rten pa yi don 
rtogs pas | 'jig rten bźin du śes par bya |. The vtti explains this statement as follows: 
ji ltar 'jig rten pa dag bum pa la sogs pa'i don la yod pa'i ṇo bor rtogs pas | 'di ni 
bum pa 'o || snam bu 'o || śiṅ rta 'o źes tha sñad 'dogs pa de bźin du jig rten bźin du 
sṅon gyi sgrub pas tha sñad du bya 'o ||. 
 
475 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a: syād etad: vastusatā sāmānyena vinā loke 'pi naiva 
sidhyati, rūpaśabdo nīlādiṣu rasādiṣv iveti. ata āha: siddhaś cetyādi. vastusat-
sāmānyam antareṇāpi saṃvtisata eva sāmānyād rūpaśabdo loke nīlādiṣv(1) eva 
siddhaḥ, na rasādiṣu. tad dhi nīlādiṣv eva vartate, na rasādiṣu. tathā hi nīlādaya eva 
praktyā svānubhavadvāreṇa tathāvidhaṃ vikalpabuddhau sāmānyākāram arpa-
yati.(2) yena lokas tatraiva rūpavyavahāraṃ karoti, netaratra.  
(1)em. : loke'pi naiva Ms  
(2)The vocabulary is strongly influenced by Dharmakīrti's PVSV, cf., e.g., the 
use of arpayati at PVSV 37,26; 54,19. 
 
[246] rūpatve tulyam etac ca. Qu. Ms B 230a6. 
 
476 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a7: tathāpi tulyo paryanuyoga ity arthaḥ. 
 
[247] <yasya ca atyantabhinnanīlādiṣu rūpatvavttiḥ(1), tasya kena 
rasādyavttiḥ?> rasādyavttivad vā pītādyavttiḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a6: 
rasādyavttivad vā pītādyavttir iti.  
(1)Cf. 'jug pa'i gzugs ñid V : gzugs 'jug pa K. 
 
477 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a5-6: tatraitat syāt: bhaved rūpaśabdasya nīlādāv eva 
siddhir yadi tatpravttinimittasya saṃvtisataḥ samānyasya nīlādāv eva vttiḥ syāt. 
sā ca nāsti. tulye hy atyantabhede nīlādāv eva tad vartate, na rasādāv iti kuta etat?  
 
[248] asty atra <kāraṇam>. sati svabhāvabhede nīlādiṣv eva cākṣuṣatvam abhin-
naṃ, na tu rasādiṣu. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a7: asty atreti … sati svabhā-
vabheda iti; Ms B 230b2-3: yadi ca nīlādiṣu cākṣuṣatvam(1) abhinnam iṣyate. For 
the readings nīlādiṣv eva and na tu rasādiṣu, cf. Ms B 230b6, q.v. below no. 489. 
(1)°tvam em. (cf. gzuṅ bya ñid T) : °am Ms  
 
478 The opponent rejects that his own questions can be turned against himself, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 230a7: tulyaparyanuyogatām pariharati. 
 
479 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a7: saty api nīlādīnāṃ svabhāvabheda ity arthaḥ. 
 
[249] cākṣuṣatve kriyāktaḥ. Qu. Ms B 230a7-230b1. 
 
480 If the use of the word ‘colour’ were restricted by visibility, it would have an 





PSṬ Ms B 230a: cākṣuṣatve niyamahetāv iṣyamāṇe kriyānimitto rūpaśabdaḥ syāt, 
na tu jātinimitta iti.  
 
[250] cākṣuṣā <grāhyaṃ hi cākṣuṣatvam>. <evaṃ ca nīlādiṣu> kriyānimitto 
rūpaśabdaḥ syāt, na tu jātinimittaḥ(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b1: kriyānimittaṃ 
darśayati cakṣuṣetyādi; cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b1: kriyānimitto rūpaśabdaḥ syāt, na tu 
jātinimitta ity abhyupetabādhatām āha.  
(1)Cf. rigs kyi rgyu mtshan nas ni ma yin no V 138,23 : rigs tha mi dad pa'i rgyu 
mtshan gyis ni ma yin no K. 
 
481 Cf. the definition of colour as perceptible by the eye at PBh § 117: tatra 
rūpaṃ cakṣurgrāhyam. 
 
482 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b1-2: nanu caivaṃ rūpatvasamavāyaḥ kriyāktaḥ syāt. 
śabdasvajātinimitta eva tat kim ucyate kriyākta iti?  
 
[251] cākṣuṣatvābhede hi kim punā rūpatvena. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b2-3: 
cākṣuṣatvābhede hītyādi … yadi ca nīlādiṣu cākṣuṣatvam abhinnam iṣyate … kim 
punā rūpatveneti. 
 
483 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b2-3: evam manyate: bhinneṣv abhinnapravttyayogād 
rūpatvam abhinnaṃ nimittaṃ kalpyate. yadi ca nīlādiṣu cākṣuṣatvam abhinnam 
iṣyate. tata evāstv abhinnaṃ rūpam ity abhidhānaṃ, kim punā rūpatveneti: “The 
idea is as follows: since it is not justified that the application is the same with regard 
to different [colours] colourness is imagined to be the same cause. And if it is 
claimed that visibility is the same in the blue [colour], and so on, then let us concede 
that the expression ‘colour’ is the same for that reason only, but what purpose, then, 
does [the general property] colourness serve?” 
 
[252] atha rūpatvasambandhasya nimittaṃ(1) cākṣuṣatvam <uktam iti cet>. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b3-4: athetyādi … rūpatvam abhinnābhidhānasya 
pravttinimittaṃ cākṣuṣatvaṃ tu rūpatvasambandhasyeti.  
(1)rgyu mtshan V : rgyu mtshan gyis K. 
 
484 The term connnection (sambandha) denotes the category of inherence 
(samavāya).  
 
485 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b3-4: ayam abhiprāyaḥ: bhinnā hi bhāvaśaktayaḥ, tato 
rūpatvam abhinnābhidhānasya pravttinimittaṃ, cākṣuṣatvaṃ tu rūpatvasamban-
dhasyeti: “The opinion is this: Since the powers of entities are different, colourness 
is the cause of application of the same word, but visibility [is the cause] of the 
connection of colourness.” 
 
[253] evam api <cākṣuṣatve samavāyaḥ> kriyāktaḥ(1) prāpnoti, rūpatvābhivyaktir 
vā. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b4-5: evam apītyādinā … ata āha: rūpatvābhivyaktir 
veti: kriyāktā prāpnotīti sambandhanīyam. 





486 This consequence contradicts the opponent's assumption that inherence is 
invariably the same and thus by implication is not subject to action, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
230b4: evam apītyādināpy abhyupetabādhām āha, nityatvābhyupagamāt samavā-
yasya.  
 
487 This [absurd] consequence is the result of the assumption that visibility is not 
the cause of the inherence of colourness in any given colour, but rather that it causes 
its manifestation as inherent in any given colour. This, however, contradicts the 
assumption that colourness, and so on, is to be manifested by its own substrate, and 
thus it cannot be caused by an action, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b4-5: syād etad, na brūmaś 
cākṣuṣatvād rūpatvasya samavāyaḥ, 'pi tu samavetasyābhivyaktir iti. ata āha 
rūpatvābhivyaktir veti … anenāpy abhyupetabādhatām āha: svāśrayavyaṅgyatvā-
bhyupagamād rūpatvādīnām.  
 
[254] cākṣuṣatve 'pi vā <niyamaḥ kasmāt>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b6: 
cākṣuṣatve 'pi veti. 
 
488 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b6: sati svabhāvabhede kasmān nīlādiṣv eva cākṣuṣatvaṃ 
vartate, na tu rasādiṣv apīty atrāpi niyamahetur vaktavyaḥ: “When there is a 
difference of nature, why does visibility only occur in the blue [colour], and so on, 
but not in taste too. Thus also in this case the cause of restriction is to be explained.”  
 
[255] tasmād avaśyaṃ svabhāvikatvam āśrayaṇīyam. Restored, cf. Ms 230b6: 
tasmād avaśyaṃ sudūram api gatvā svabhāvikatvam āśrayaṇīyam.  
 
489 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b6-7: tādśo nīlādīnāṃ svabhāvo(1) yena tatraiva cākṣuṣa-
tvam bhavati, na rasādiṣv iti: “The [colour] blue, and so on, have such a nature that 
visibility exists in these only, but not in taste, etc.  
(1)°īnāṃ sva° em. : °īnasva° Ms 
 
[256] dravyādiṣu prasaṅgaś ca. Qu. Ms B 230b,7. 
 
490 Cf. Ms 230b7-231a1: yadi yatra cākṣuṣatvaṃ tatra rūpatvam, dravyādiṣv api 
rūpatvaṃ syāt, teṣāṃ cākṣuṣatvāt: “If there is colourness where there is visibility, 
there would also be colourness in substances, etc. because they are visible.” 
 
[257] <dravyasaṅkhyāparimāṇādīnāṃ ca cākṣuṣatvāt teṣv api rūpatvaprasaṅgaḥ 
syāt. kiṃ ca>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b7-231a1, q.v. no. 491 above. 
 
491 Jinendrabuddhi corroborates this conclusion by quoting VS IV 1:12 at PSṬ 
Ms B 231a1: dravyatvaṃ “saṅkhyā parimāṇāni pthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau 
paratvāparatve karma ca rūpisamavāyāc(1) cākṣuṣāṇī”ti vacanāt.  
(1)°samavāyāc em. : °samavāc Ms 
 
[258] bhedābhāvaḥ(1) sitādiṣu(2). Qu. Ms B 231a1.  
(1)°vaḥ em. : °vo Ms  






492 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a1-2: cākṣuṣatvasya niyamahetor aviśeṣāt, niyamahe-
tvantarābhāvāc ca rūpam ity abhidhānapratyayasāmyād nīlapītādibhedo(1) na syāt: 
“Because the cause of restriction viz. visibility is uniform and since the identity of 
the cognition due to the word ‘colour’ is the same because there is no other cause of 
restriction, there will be no difference between blue or yellow, etc.”  
(1)°pītādi° em. : °pātīdi° Ms 
 
[259] <cākṣuṣatvāviśeṣe nīlapītanīlataranīlatamādibhedo na syāt>. tasmād avaś-
yam cākṣuṣatvavyatirekeṇa <nīlapītādiṣu bhinnesv api> rūpaśabdo loke(1) rūḍher 
anugantavyo, na rasādiṣu. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a1-2, q.v. no. 489 above; Ms 
B 231a4-5: tasmād avaśyam iti … cākṣuṣatvavyatirekeṇa niyogato nīlādiṣv eva 
rūpaśabdo loke rūḍher anugantavyo, na rasādiṣu.  
(1)°do lok° em. : °dalok° Ms 
 
493 Before commenting upon Dignāga's conclusion, Jinendra relates the 
following discussion at PSṬ Ms B 231a2-4: yadi cākṣuṣatvān nīlādīnāṃ rūpatvenā-
bheda iṣyate, tatra saty api cākṣuṣatvāt tasyāviśeṣe nīlatvādibhir yogād viśeṣaḥ 
syāt. na, tasyaivāyogāt. na hi nīlādiṣu kāraṇaṃ kiṃcid asti pratiniyatam, yato nīla-
tvādisamavāyaniścayaḥ syāt. śaktibhedaḥ kāraṇam astīti ced tatrāpi ko hetuḥ, yatas 
tasya kasmiṃścid(1) eva vtti na sarvatreti. anuttaram etat: “If it is maintained that 
due to visibility there is no difference between blue, and so on, in terms of [their] 
colourness, in that case, even though this [colourness] is the same due to visibility, 
there will be a difference [between the various colours] because of the connection 
with [the general properties] blueness, etc. This is not the case because it is not 
connected. For there is no cause whatsoever in blue, and so on, that is restricted to 
each single [colour] so that one could ascertain the inherence of blueness, etc. If it is 
asserted that the cause is the difference of power (śaktibhedaḥ), also in this case [the 
question arises]: What is the reason why it only occurs in a certain thing and not in 
all. Thus this is not an answer [to our criticism].”  
(1)kasmiṃś° em. (cf. 'ga' źig kho na la T) : kacid Ms  
 
494 That is, because it is not justified that visibility is the cause with regard to the 
connection with colourness, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a4: yasmāc cākṣuṣatvasya rūpatva-
yogam prati hetutvaṃ na yujyate.  
 
495 Current usage is based upon general properties that only exist conventionally, 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a5: rūḍheś ca nimittaṃ saṃvtisad eva sāmānyam, na tu dravya-
sad ity abhiprāyaḥ: “The opinion is that the cause of current usage is a general 
property that only exists conventionally, but not as something that exists substan-
tially.”  
 
[260] yadi cārthāntaranivttyanapekṣatāyāṃ <śabdasyārthābhidhānaṃ, tarhi>. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a6: yadi cetyādi… arthāntaranivttyanapekṣatāyām.  
 
496 The purpose of this paragraph is to address once again the thesis that the word 
denotes its own referent by means of exclusion of other referents, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
231a5-6: punar arthāntaravyāvttidvāreṇa śabdaḥ svārtham pratyāyayatīty etad 
darśayitum(1) āha: yadi cetyādi.  





[261] anvayād eva siddhiḥ syād. Qu. Ms B 231a6, cf. 231a7: anvayād eva kevalād 
viśiṣṭābhidheyaniścayaḥ syāt.  
 
[262] na tu <śabdasyārthābhidhāne>(1) 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ syāt, iṣyate ca. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a6-7: na tv anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ sahitābhyāṃ syād … 
iṣyate cetyādi.  
(1)Cf. sgra'i don rjod par byed pa'i lta na ni V : sgra'i don brjod pa la K. 
 
497 It is not possible to construe this sentence unless one assumes that the 
grammatical subject is siddhiḥ that is to be supplied from 38c.  
 
498Cf. PSV V:34 at § 47 above. 
 
[263] anyatarobhayāvadhāraṇenābhidhānasāphalyād(1) vyatirekato 'py arthābhi-
dhānam, <tadyathā> “kartur īpsitatamaṃ <karma> (A I.4.49).” Restored, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 231b2: anyatarobhayāvadhāraṇenābhidhānasāphalyād vyatirekato 'pi 
viśiṣṭārthābhidhānam iṣyate ; 231a7: kartur īpsitatamam.  
(1)Cf. gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba daṅ gñi gar ṅes par bzuṅ ba brjod pa 'bras bu daṅ bcas 
pa'i phyir K : khyad par gźan gñis ka ṅes par bzuṅ bas rjod par byed pa 'bras bu 
daṅ bcas pa'i phyir ro V.  
 
499 Cf. the statement at PV IV 192a = PVin II 11a: vyavacchedaphalaṃ vākyaṃ, 
which belongs in the context of the logical properties of restriction and thus by 
implication the semantic function of the restrictive particle eva, cf. Steinkellner 1979 
(PVin II Teil II): 33 no. 66, and no.s 497-98 below. Dhammapāla's statement at 
Udānaṭṭhakathā 12,23ff (= Itivuttakaṭṭhakathā I 23,22ff): sabbāni hi vakyāni 
evakāratthasahitāni yeva avadhāraṇaphalattā, evidently belongs in the same 
context; see Pind 1997: 523ff; cf. also the related discussion of restriction as a 
concomitant property of verbal discourse at PVSV 61,16ff: śabdaṃ hi prayuñjānaḥ 
sarvo 'nvayavyatirekau nātivartate, tasya pravttinivttyarthatvāt. yadi hy ayaṃ na 
kasyacit kutaścin nivartayet pravartayed vā buddhiṃ yathābhūtānujñānāt sarva-
vyavahāreṣu na kiṃcid vyāharet, vyāhārasyāvadhāraṇanāntarīyakatvāt: yathā gha-
ṭena udakam ānayeti. yadi ghaṭena añjalinā vā udakānayanaṃ yathākathaṃcid 
abhimataṃ syāt, udakam ānayety eva vaktavyaṃ syāt, na ghaṭena iti. It is interesting 
in the present context that Mādhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya uses the avadhāraṇa eva to 
illustrate how the denotation of a particular term is taught to the exclusion of other 
referents, cf. op.cit. 97,14-15: yasmin vastuni saṅketasaṃstavānupraviṣṭayā bud-
dhyā sarveṣāṃ laukikānāṃ darśanatulyatā(1) bhavati: pthivy eveyam nāgnī, rūpam 
evedaṃ na śabda ityevamādi. 
(1) For this view, cf. VP III.3:55 and no. 312 above. 
 
500The concept of anyatarobhayāvadhāraṇa belongs in the context of subject-
predicate sentences like “x(+ avadhāraṇa) is y(+ avadhāraṇa),” the resultant 
cognition being said to depend upon whether the scope of the predicate or the 
subject, or both, is restricted by implicit avadhāraṇas. For the use of the term 
anyatarobhayāvadhāraṇa, cf. Dignāga's criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of 
pratijñā at NS I.1.33: sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā as entailing absurdities when 





514,14ff: ubhayāvadhāraṇaprāptāv anyatarāvadhāraṇe ca doṣaḥ. yadi sādhya-
nirdeśaḥ pratijñeti pratijñālakṣaṇam, tataḥ pūrvottare dve avadhāraṇe na kalpyete, 
etc; cf. PSV III:4cd (Kitagawa 1973 473,11ff): pūrvāvadhāraṇaṃ vyartham aniṣṭam 
itaratra tu (qu. PVBh 560,4; 562,28). For the role of avadhāraṇas in discourse, cf. 
Dharmakīrti’s statement at PVSV 61,19-20: vyāhārasyāvadhāraṇanāntarīyakatvāt. 
 
501 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a7-231b2: kartur eva nākartuḥ. kartśabdo 'kartāraṃ 
vyavacchindan īpsitatamaṃ svārthe na sambadhnāti. evam īpsitatamam eva nānīp-
sitatamam. īpsitatamaśabdo 'py anīpsitatamaṃ(1) vyudasya(2) na kartśabdārthaṃ 
svārthena yojayati. evam ubhayāvadhāraṇena viśiṣṭārthaniścayād abhidhānasā-
phalyam. anyatarāvadhāraṇena yathā satsu megheṣu vṣṭir bhavatīti. satsv eva 
nāsatsu, na tu bhavaty eveti: “The agent only, not the non-agent. The word agent 
does not connect “most wants to obtain” to its own referent while excluding non-
agent. In the same way “most wants to obtain” only, not “not most wants to obtain.” 
The expression ‘most wants to obtain’ too does not connect the referent of the word 
agent with its own referent by excluding “not most wants to obtain.” Thus the 
denotation fulfills its purpose because of ascertaining its specific referent by means 
of a restriction of both terms. By means of restriction of either term [means], for 
instance, “there is rain when clouds are found,” i.e., only when they are found, not 
when they are not found, but not “there is only [rain]”. Jinendrabuddhi then 
continues explaining the implications of lack of restriction at PSṬ Ms B 231b2-4: 
tad arthāntaranivttyanapekṣatāyāṃ śabdasya na prāpnotīti. tathā hi yady akartur 
anīpsitatamaṃ karma, kartśabdoccāraṇam apārthakaṃ syāt. tathā yady anīpsitata-
mam api karma, īpsitatamam ity abhidhānaṃ niṣphalaṃ syāt. tasmād arthāntara-
nivttidvāreṇa śabdo 'rthaṃ gamayatīty abhyupeyaṃ: “This does not obtain when 
the word is not dependent upon negation of other referents. That is, if karman is 
what a non-agent does not most want to obtain, the articulation of the word karman 
would be purposeless. Thus, if karman is also what [the agent] does not most want 
to obtain, the expression 'most wants to obtain' would not fulfil its purpose. 
Therefore the word indicates its referent by means of negation of other referents.” 
There is no indication in the grammatical literature that Pāṇini's definition of the 
karmakāraka was interpreted by means of avadhāraṇas in the way Dignāga's 
formulation suggests, and the quotation as well as the interpretation may well have 
been motivated by a wish to extend the use of avadhāraṇas to the Pāṇinian sūtra, 
since the Naiyāyika definition of pratijñā as sādhyanirdeśaḥ, involves the 
introduction of a ktya affix which, according to the Pāṇinian derivational system, 
denotes karma, and thus involves the Pāṇinian definition, cf. Jinendrabuddhi's 
remarks MS B 113b6 ad PSV III:3cd: karmaṇi cāyaṃ ktyapratyayaḥ. tena na 
karmābhidhāyinā sādhyaśabdenāsādhyasyākṣepaḥ: kartur īpsitatamaṃ hi karma; 
Uddyotakara quotes A I 4.49 at NV 516,13f in his rebuttal of Dignāga's objections 
and explains: karmanirdeśaś cāyaṃ sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñeti. 
(1) nānīpsitatamam. īpsitatamaśabdo em. (śin tu thob par ’dod pa min pa ni ma 
yin, śin tu thob par ’dod pa’i sgra T) : nānīpsitatamaśabdo Ms 
(2) vyudasya em. : (rnam par bsal nas T) : vudasya Ms 
 
[264] nanu cā<pohamātre śabdārthe> vyatirekād evābhidhānāṃ syāt. syād etad 
evaṃ <yady anvayo neṣyeta>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231b4-6: nanu cetyādi … 





[265] bhāvena tu mukhyena(1) < neṣyate vyāptiḥ(2)>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
232b6: bhāvena(1) tu mukhyeneti.  
(1)bhāvena conj. (cf. dṅos pos ni K : dṅos po'i phyogs nas ni V) : bhāve (cf. dṅos 
po yis [em. yi T] ni gtso bor T) Ms 
(2)Cf. khyab pa VK. It appears from Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase of the verse 
(cf. no. 496 below) that vyāpti corresponds to anvaya, as Dignāga's own 
commentary indicates. 
 
502 That is, concomitance with a real general property that is assumed to be the 
principal referent denoted by the word, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b6: vastusatsāmānyā-
khyena(1) śabdasyānvayo neṣyate: “The word's joint presence is not claimed to be 
with a so-called substantially existent general property.” 
(1) vastusat˚ em. : vastusattā˚ Ms 
 
[266] na hi bhāveṣu <jātiḥ sambhavati vyatiriktā vā syād avyatiriktā vety>(1) 
uktam. jātivyatirekeṇa tv <“adṣter anyaśabdārtha” ity etenā>rthāntarapohaviśiṣṭe 
'rthe <śabda-syānvayavyatirekau na bhinnārthau>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b7-
232a1: na hi bhāveṣv ityādinā uktam iti … jātivyatirekeṇa tv iti … arthāntarapoha-
viśiṣṭe 'rtha iti. 
(1)Cf. tha dad pa 'am tha mi dad par 'gyur ba'i V : gźan daṅ gźan ma yin pa'i K. 
 
503 According to Jinendrabuddhi Dignāga quotes this statement from another of 
his treatises (prakaraṇāntare). He continues explaining that in the context of the 
present treatise (iha) this problem has been dealt with at PS II 16, of which he 
quotes the first pāda followed by a fragment of an important passage that occur in 
the Vaiśeṣika section of PSV I:23b (v. Hattori 1968: 205-6), cf. PSṬ Ms B 231b7: 
na hi bhāveṣv ityādinā uktam iti prakaraṇāntare. iha ca “sāmānyaṃ yady api syād” 
(PS II:16a) ityādinā. “tathā viśeṣyān svair indriyair upalabhye”tyādinā ca. pādas 
abc of PS II:16 are recorded at Ms B 199a1: sāmānyaṃ yady api syāt tu tatrānyat, 
tasya darśanaṃ | āśrayādarśanān na syād; cf. PSṬ Ms B 71b7: sāmānyaṃ yady api 
syāt = Ms B 231b7. The Tibetan renderings of PSV II:16 are incompatible with the 
Sanskrit evidence presented in PSṬ and appear to render corrupt readings as they are 
impossible to construe: 
 
K (Kitagawa 1973 464b5-16 = P 113a8-113b2): spyi ni yod pa ma yin na yaṅ || 
rten ni mthoṅ ba med pa'i phyir || de las gźan te mthoṅ mi 'gyur || gcig la mthoṅ 
phyir tha dad pa 'am || (PS II:16) 
 re źig me la me ñīd kyi spyi gźan ni yod pa ma yin no || yod kyaṅ de la mthoṅ ba 
ni mi srid de rten thams cad ma mthoṅ ba'i phyir ro || gñis ñid la sogs pa du ma daṅ 
|| thun moṅ ba rnams kyi rten ma bzuṅ bar 'dzin pa ni mthoṅ ṅo || gaṅ dag 'dra ba 
phyir smra ba'i 'dra ba 'aṅ ma yin no. ci ste spyi gcig la brten par gzuṅ na yaṅ 
thams cad gzuṅ ba yin no źe na de la brten bźin du du bar 'gyur ro ||.  
 
V (Kitagawa 1973 464a4-16 = P 32a3-5): gal te spyi las yin graṅ na || de ni de 
las gźan du 'gyur || rten rnams ma mthoṅ ba yi phyir || tha dad min gcig mthoṅ mi 
'gyur || (PS II:16) 
 re źig me las gźan pa'i me ñid ces pa'i spyi ni yod pa ma yin no || yod du chug 
na yaṅ de mthoṅ ba ni mi srid do || rten mtha' dag ma mthoṅ ba'i phyir du ma rnams 





gzuṅ ba po yaṅ rten ma bzuṅ ba po daṅ mtshuṅs śiṅ 'dra bar 'gyur ro || gal te rten 
gcig bzuṅ bas kyaṅ thams cad gzuṅ ba yin na ni | de yaṅ rten bźin du du mar 'gyur 
ro ||:  
 
“Even if the general property were to exist in this(1) [viz. fire] as different [from 
its substrate] (sāmānyaṃ yady api syāt tu tatrānyat), there would be no observation 
of it because it is not observed in [all its] substrata; or [the general property] would 
be a particular (*bhedaḥ) because it is observed [completely] in a single (*ekatra) 
[substrate] (PS II:16). 
In the first place, fireness does not exist (na tāvad agnitvam asti) as a general 
property separate from fire (agner anyat sāmānyam). For even if it were to exist 
(saty api tasmin) it would be impossible to observe it (*darśanāsambhavaḥ) because 
all its substrates have not been observed (sakalāśrayādarśanāt). For perception of 
[the general property] twoness, and so on, (dvitvādīnām) that is common to many 
[substrates] (anekasādhāraṇānām) does not exist, when all its substrates have not 
been perceived (aghītasakalāśrayānām).(2) Nor [does observation] of similarity 
(nāpi sādśyasya) exist on the view of someone (*kasyacid) who claims that 
similarity is the general property (*sāmānyaṃ sādśyam iti vādinaḥ), being the same 
in substrates that have already been perceived as well as in those that have not yet 
been perceived (*ghītāghītāśrayasamam).(3) If, on the other hand, it is claimed 
that the universal is apprehended completely even though [only] a single substrate is 
apprehended (athaikāśrayanagrahaṇe 'pi samantaṃ ghyate), it would have the 
property of being manifold ([*tasya] anekatvaṃ syāt).”  
 
The following pratīkas are quoted at Ms B 71b7: na tāvad agnitvam astīti; 72a2-
4: saty api tasminn ityādi … nāpi sādśyasyeti … athaikāśrayagrahaṇe 'pi 
samantam ghyate … anekatvaṃ syāt.  
 
Jinendrabuddhi introduces his exegesis of PSV II 16 as follows: syād etat: 
sāmānyavastv ekam eva vyaktiṣu, tad vyatiriktam avyatiriktaṃ vāsti; tasya ca prati-
vyakti sarvātmanā parisamāptatvād ekasya <sarv>ātmanāgnivyaktau darśano-
papattiḥ, tasmāt sarvatrādarśanān na syāt prakāśanam ity ayuktam etad ity āha. 
 
(1)Dignāga's analysis, at PS II:16, of the view that real general properties are 
resident in things, addresses the underlying assumption that the indicator-indicated 
relation is based upon real general properties that instantiate identically in any 
particular instance of, e.g., fire and smoke. The discussion presupposes PS II:15, 
q.v. no. 13 above.  
(2)For the inserted Sanskrit terms, cf. the exegesis at PSṬ Ms B 72a2: yad 
anekāśrayasādharaṇam aghītasakalāśrayaṃ na tad daṣṭuṃ śakyam, yathāghīta-
sakalāśrayaṃ dvitvādi. tathā cāgnitvam. 
(3)This brief statement apparently alludes to Vindhyavāsin's claim about the 
inseparability of the general property similarity from the individuals that instantiate 
it, cf. the alleged quotation from Vindhyavāsin at Śṅgāraprakāśa Vol. IV 786,12-
14: āha ca vindhyavāsī: śabdasya sāmānyaṃ vācyam. tac ca sādśyarūpam iti. 
sāmānyaṃ ca pūrvavyaktyavacchinnam apūrvavyaktau pratīyamānaṃ tad uktaṃ 
sādśyam: “Vindhyavāsin says: The word's denotable object is the general property; 




distinguished in a former individual and is cognized in a new individual is called 
similarity.”  
Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s remark, at PSṬ Ms B 72a3, about the claim that similarity 
(sādśyam) has been put forward separately because it is not distinct from the 
substrate: āśrayād avyatirekitvāt sādśyam pthag upanyastam. atrāpy ayam eva 
prayogo vācyaḥ. 
Kumārila criticizes Vindhyavāsin's view at ŚV Ākti° 75-76: vyaktitaś cātireko 
'sya syān na veti vicārite, sāmānyam eva sādśyaṃ bhaved vā vyaktimātrakam. tena 
nātyantabhinno 'rthaḥ sārūpyam iti varṇitaṃ granthe vindhyanivāsena bhrānteḥ 
sādśyam ucyate. 
 
504 Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of this crucial term is indebted to the view 
that a verbal uttarance indicates the speaker's intention (vivakṣā), and that which is 
qualified by exclusion of other referents is in fact the person who is qualified by 
vivakṣā because he is the substrate (āśraya) of the referent of the word, cf. PSṬ Ms 
B 232a1: vivakṣāvati puruṣe. sa hi śabdārthasyāśraya iti tadviśiṣṭa ucyate. For the 
interpretation of śabda as indicating vivakṣā, cf. no. 9. above. For the implications 
of the expression ‘qualified by exclusion of other referents,’ cf. the remarks under 
no. 466 above. 
 
505 That is without a substantially real (vastusatī) general property (jātiḥ), cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 231b7: vinā hi jātyā vastusatyeti yāvat.  
 
[267] yas tv āha “yadi gavādi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ(1), sarvātmyapra-
saṅgāt prayuktam(2) asataḥ sadātmakatvam(3)” iti. <tatra>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
232a1: yas tv āhetyādi … 232a6: yadi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ sādhyate. evaṃ 
sati sārvātmyaprasaṅgāt prayuktam asataḥ sadātmakatvam iti; cf. 232b1: yadi 
gavādi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāra iti bruvāṇaḥ.  
(1) asato vikāraḥ : med pa las rnam par ’gyur ba/pa KV 
(2) Cf. rab tu thob pa ñid do V : thal lo K. 
(3) asataḥ sadātmakatvam : med pa las yod pa’i bdag ñid can K : yod pa ma yin 
pa’i bdag ñid V (= asadātmakatvam < a(sataḥ)sad°). 
 
506 This paragraph introduces a lenghthy discussion, covering § 56 through § 60, 
with the Sāṅkhyavaināśika Mādhava(1), who, as it appears, addresses Dignāga's 
criticism of his proof of the existence of pradhāna, in connection with his own 
rebuttal of the apoha theory. Dignāga now answers his criticism. According to 
Jinendrabuddhi, Mādhava addresses Dignāga's objection immediately after dealing 
with the direct proofs of the continuous connection of the particulars with primordial 
materiality, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232a1-2: arthāntarābhāvalakṣaṇam asatsamanvayam 
'bhyupetya gavādīnām asataḥ sadātmakatvam pratipādayituṃ ayuktam. Arthāntara-
to hy arthāntaravyudāsa iti. etāvatāyam upanyāso anvayavītoktisamanantaraṃ 
vaināśikenoktaḥ(2), so 'sataḥ sūcaka iti vākyaśeṣaḥ “Having assumed that continu-
ous connection with what is non-existent is characterized by non-existence of other 
referents, it is not possible to indicate the existent nature of cows, and so on, on 
account of what is non-existent. For exclusion is of one referent from other 
referents. In so many words the illustration, which the Vaināśika has set forth 





particulars with primordial materiality], indicates [that the primordial materiality] is 
non-existent, such is the sentence complement.”  
Mādhava's argument is related to an objection, evidently put forward by 
Dignāga in another work (Sāṅkhyaparīkṣā or Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa ?) in which he 
appears to argue that what Mādhava considers to be proof of the existence of 
pradhāna, equally well establishes its non-exsistence. The argument focuses on the 
implications of the concept of samanvaya, the main point being that everything 
manifest is continuously connected with what is non-existent in that manifest things 
are mutually non-existent, and thus is defined by continuous non-existence of all 
other things.  
Jinendrabuddhi presents Dignāga’s argument as pūrvapakṣa followed by 
Mādhava’s response at Ms B 232a2-4: yo 'yam bhavatā vyaktasya ekajātisaman-
vayaḥ pradhānasiddhyartham(3) uktaḥ, sa asatsiddhim api sūcayati. kasmāt? Asat-
samanvayāt. asatsamanvitaṃ hīdaṃ vyaktam. na pthivyādayo na gavādayaḥ paras-
parātmasu santi. yac ca yena samanvitaṃ tasyāsau vikāraḥ: tadyathā dadhi kṣīreṇa 
samanvitaṃ kṣīravikāraḥ. asatsamanvitaṃ cedaṃ vyaktam. tasmād idaṃ vyaktam 
asato vikāra iti: “The continuous connection of the manifest with a single genus 
which you have propounded in order to establish primordial materiality(4) also 
presents the proof of [its being] non-existent. Why? Because of [its] continuous 
connection with what is non-existent. For the manifest is continuously connected 
with what is non-existent. Neither the earth, and so on, nor a cow, and so on, exist in 
one another's nature. And that with which something is continuously connected is a 
modification of that. For instance yoghurt which is continuously connected with 
milk is a modification of milk. And the manifest is continuously connected with 
what is non-existent. Therefore the manifest is a modification of what is non-
existent.”  
This argument shows that Dignāga relies on the idea of things being excluded 
from each other through mutual non-existence, a view he is going to elaborate in the 
following. Cf., e.g., the classical formulation of the implications of mutual non-
existence at ŚV Abhāva° 12a-c: svarūpapararūpābhyāṃ nityaṃ sadasadātmake 
vastuni(5).  
(1)Dignāga also refers to and discusses other of Mādhava's views at PS I section 
5; 3d2-7cd, cf. Hattori 1968: 57-59, 155 no. 5.40. See Steinkellner 2005 ad loc. 
(2)So probably read : pratipādayituṃ ayuktam ity etāvātāyam upanyāsaḥ. arthān-
tarato hy arthāntaravyudāsaḥ. anvayavītoktisamanantaraṃ vaināśikenoktaṃ Ms 
and T. I assume that the clause arthāntarato … °vyudāsa originally followed after 
ayuktam as part of Mādhava's objection since he interprets exclusion of other 
referents as an instance of connection of any given thing with what is non-existent, 
in other words, as an instance of mutual non-existence.  
(3)°am em. : °a Ms  
(4)For a related argument from the Ṣaṣṭitantra, cf. Frauwallner 1982: 264,16-17: 
asti pradhānam bhedānām anvayadarśanāt. ādhyātmikānāṃ bhedānāṃ kāryakara-
ṇātmakānām ekajātisamanvayo dṣṭaḥ.  
(5)For an overview of the concept of abhāva, cf. Steinkellner 1967 II: 160ff. 
 
507 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b2: yadiśabdo hy abhyupagamaṃ paridīpayati. 
 
508 As it appears from Jinendrabuddhi's reproduction of Mādhava's objection, 




pūrvapakṣe sāṅkhyenoktaṃ “yadi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ sādhyate, evaṃ 
sati sārvātmyaprasaṅgāt prayuktam asataḥ sadātmakatvam.”  
Jinendrabuddhi explains the argument at Ms B 232a6-232b1: sarvavikāra-
svarūpatā sārvātmyaṃ, vikārasvarūpadarśanāc ca praktes tatsvarūpānumānam(1). 
tathā hi kṣīravikārā dadhyādayas tadātmakāḥ. tadātmakapraktaya eva sarvātmakā 
vikārāḥ. tataḥ prakter api sarvātmakatvam. sarvātmakatvāc ca sattvaprasaṅgaḥ(1). 
na asat sarvātmakam upapadyate. tataś ca siddhasādhanam asatpūrvakā bhedā iti.  
(1)°ānumā° em. : °āmā° Ms  
(2)°aḥ em. : °ā Ms 
 
[268] asatsamanvitaṃ sarvaṃ <yasya(1) tv> abhyupagacchataḥ(2), sattvam anekāt-
makatvād iti kiṃ kena yujyate. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b1-2: asatsamanvitaṃ 
sarvam iti … evaṃ tasya sāṅkhyasyābhyupagacchataḥ. sattvam anekātmakatvād iti 
kiṃ kena yujyate.  
(1)Cf. gaṅ źig V : gaṅ yin K. 
(2)pāda b om. Ms; recorded T, cf. paraphrase above. 
 
509 The question relates to the fact that the answer to Dignāga's objection is 
inconsistent with the opponent's own assumption, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b2: 
nābhyupagamenottaraṃ sambadhyata ity arthaḥ.  
 
[269] <yadi sarvam asatsamanvitam ity abhyupagamyeta>, tatra katame 'nye 
gavādayo <'santaḥ kena svabhāvena sattvādhyaropyāḥ syuḥ>. sarvān hi gavādīn 
<asatsamanvitān> abhyupagacchato 'sataḥ sadātmakatvaṃ prāptam ity uttaraṃ na 
yujyate(1). <tatra>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b2-4: tatra katame 'nye gavādaya iti 
… sarvān hītyādi … na hi gavādīn sadātmakān abhyupagacchataḥ tādātmyād 
asataḥ sadātmakatvam prāptam ity uttaraṃ yujyate.  
(1)Cf. lan 'di ni sbyar bar mi bya 'o V : lan 'di rigs pa yin nam K. 
 
510 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b3: itaretarābhāva eva hi vyāvahārikā gavādayaḥ, na tu 
tadvyatirekeṇānye santi. itaretarābhāvaś cāvastu kalpitatvāt. tatas tatsvabhāvatve 
katham asataḥ sattvaprasaṅgaḥ: “For cows, and so on, are denotable only on 
account of mutual non-existence, they are not different without this [mutual non-
existence]. And mutual non-existence is not an entity because it is imagined. 
Therefore, in that it has this nature, how could the [absurd] consequence be that their 
being existent is due to what is non-existent?”  
 
[270] yad apy uktam “pratyayābhedaḥ syād asatsatoḥ, praktipratyayo hi vikāre 
dṣṭaḥ, tadyathā mtpratyayaḥ śarāvādāv iti(1).” Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b4-5: 
yad apy uktam iti. … pratyayābhedaḥ syād asatsatoḥ. kasmāt? praktipratyayo hi 
vikāre dṣṭaḥ, tadyathā mtpratyayaḥ śarāva” iti. 
(1) śarāvādāv em. (cf. kham por la sogs pa la KV) : śarāva (cf. kham por la T) 
Ms 
 
511 Dignāga reproduces Mādhava's objection with some omissions as appears 
from Jinendrabuddhi's exposition at Ms B 232b4-5: tatroktaṃ “yadi gavādi 
vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ, pratyayābhedaḥ syād asatsatoḥ. kasmāt? prakti-
pratyayo hi vikāre dṣṭaḥ, tadyathā mtpratyayaḥ śarāva” iti: “In this context it is 





existent there will be no difference of cognition relative to what is existent and what 
is non-existent. Why? Because the cognition of primordial materiality is observed 
with regard to a modification, like, for instance, the cognition of clay with regard to 
a plate.” Jinendrabuddhi explains the argument at Ms B 232b5-6: etad uktam 
bhavati: asatsamanvite tadākāra eva pratyayaḥ syāt, na tu gaur aśva iti vastubhe-
dākāro bhavet, bhavati ca. tasmān na vyaktasyāsatsamanvayaḥ: “This is what is 
meant: If the cognition is continuously present with what is non-existent it will only 
have the form of this, it would not have the form of different referents called ‘cow’ 
or ‘horse’, and yet this is the case. Therefore the manifest is not continuously 
present with what is non-existent.” 
 
[271] mdabhede śaravādibhedadhīr yadi ceṣyate(1), asadabhede 'pi bhedadhīḥ 
kim iti nidhāryate. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b7: mdabhede śarāvādibhedadhīr 
yadi ceṣyata iti; 233a1-2: evaṃ saty asadabhede(2) 'pi … bhedadhīḥ … kim iti 
nidhāryate(3).  
(1)The readings gźan ñid min na 'aṅ K : gźan min yaṅ V of the Tibetan versions 
of PS V 40ab are not corroborated by the Sanskrit evidence of Ms B, and, moreover, 
do not fit metrically into the restored Sanskrit version of the two pādas. The readings 
may be due to a gloss based upon the parallel expression of the vtti ad loc., cf. gźan 
ñid ma yin yaṅ K : gźan ma yin na ni V.  
(2) asadabhede conj. (cf. med khyad med KT) : asat bhede Ms 
(3) bsal K : dgag V : bzlog T would indicate that the translators interpreted 
nidhāryate as nivāryate (“excluded” sic), which is impossible as the causative of ni 
+ √dh is not recorded in the sense “to exclude.” The mistake is incomprehensible 
as Ms leaves no doubt about the reading. 
 
512 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b7-233a1: mdbhyo hi śarāvādayo 'bhinnāḥ. tatrābhin-
nākārapratyaya<pra>saṅge yadi pratyayabheda iṣyate: mdi mtpratyayaḥ, śarāvā-
dau śarāvādipratyayaḥ, evaṃ saty asadabhede(1) 'py, asataḥ(2) kāraṇasyābhede(3) 
'pi, gavādivyakte asatsamanvite(4) 'pi bhedadhīḥ gaur aśva ityevamādipratyayabhe-
daḥ kim iti nidhāryate: “For plates, and so on, are not diffferent from clay. If it is 
claimed that there is difference of cognition: clay cognition with respect to clay, and 
plate cognition with respect to plate, in that the [absurd] consequence in this case is 
that the cognitions of these would have the same form, in those circumstances, 
although there is no difference of what is non-existent, i.e., although there is no 
difference of a cause that is non-existent, i.e., although a manifested thing like a cow 
is continuously connected with what is non-existent, then how is the cognition of 
difference, i.e., the difference of cognitions like ‘cow’ and ‘horse’ established.  
(1)asada° em. (cf. med khyad med T) : asat° Ms  
(2)asataḥ conj. (cf. med pa'i T) : tās{ā}taḥ Ms  
(3)°ṇasyābhe° em. (cf. tha dad med T) : °ṇasya bhe° Ms  
(4) asatsamanvite em. (cf. med pa daṅ ldan pa la T) : asatsamarthite Ms 
 
[272] <yathā hi mdbhyo 'bhinnatve 'pi tadmātrapratyayaprasaṅge> kenāpi vidhe-
na <śaravādipratyayabhedo 'bhyupagamyate, tathā> śabdabhedabhāvanāvaśāt 
<sadasatoḥ pratyayabhedaḥ kiṃ neṣyate>. tavāpi hi guṇānām paramaṃ rūpaṃ na 
dṣṭipatham cchati, yat tu dṣṭipathaprāptaṃ tan māyeva sutucchakam. Restored, 




Ms B 232b7-233a1, q.v. above no. 509 above. The verse stems from Ṣaṣṭitantra, cf. 
YSBh ad YS IV.13; Frauwallner, Kleine Schriften 1982: 277-78.  
 
513 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233a2: saṃsthānādibhedena vā puruṣārthavaśena vā.  
 
514 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233a2-5: anādau śabdavyavahāraparamparāyāṃ śabdaviśeṣā-
hitā(1) tadākārapratyayotpattaye yā vāsanā, sā śabdabhedabhāvanā. tadvaśād 
bhinnākārapratyayaprasūtir bhavati. etena tadātmakatve 'pi tato bhinnākārapratya-
yāvaseyatvasya śarāvādiṣu darśanād anaikāntikatvam āha. tato nāsatsamanva-
yasyāsiddhatā. yuktaṃ yad sadavyatireke 'pi vastusattvāt pratyakṣeṇa paricchinnā 
gavādayaḥ śabdā bhāvanāvaśāt tathā paricchidyante. pratyakṣīkte hi vastuni 
śabdasaṅketaḥ śakyate kartum nānyathā. asattve tu teṣām iṣyamāṇe katham 
bhinnākārapratyayāvaseyatvam iti. This is the only context in which Dignāga refers 
to the residual traces of words (bhāvanā) as causes of verbal difference. He must 
have dealt more fully with this question elsewhere because Kumārila rejects the 
view at ŚV Apoha° 100a-c (= TS 959) that the difference between the vāsanās 
explain the difference of the exclusions: na cāpi vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatāpi 
vā, apohānām prakalpyate na hy avastuni vāsanā. Kamalaśīla quotes, in TSP 
376,12ff ad loc., a passage from a work expressing views, which he attributes to 
certain Buddhists (kecid bauddhāḥ), who evidently tried to answer Kumārila's 
criticism: na khalv apohyabhedād ādhārabhedād vāpohānām bhedaḥ, api tv anādi-
kālapravttavicitravitattvārthavikalpavāsanābhedānvayais tattvato nirviṣayair api 
bhinnaviṣayālambibhir iva pratyayair bhinneṣv artheṣu bāhyeṣu bhinnā ivārthāt-
māna ivāsvabhāvā apy apohāḥ samāropyante. te ca tathā taiḥ samāropitā bhinnāḥ 
santaś ca pratibhāsante, tena vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatā cāpohānāṃ bhaviṣ-
yati: “The difference of the exclusions is certainly not due to difference of the 
excluded or difference of the substrate, but rather, the exclusions, although they are 
without self-dependent nature, are superimposed, as if they were different and of the 
nature of the referents, upon external referents that are differentiated through notions 
that seemingly (iva) rely upon different objects, although they are essentially 
without objects, being accompanied by difference of (karmic) impressions, in 
circulation in the beginningless time, which are due to various representations of 
unreal referents.” This text is strikingly reminisent of Dharmakīrti’s explanation at 
PVSV 38,17ff; cf. the similar “de-realizing” use of iva ibid. 42,12-22. 
(1)°viśeṣā° conj : °viśeṣanā° Ms 
 
515 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233a5-7: sāmyāvasthāyāṃ yo 'viparītaḥ svabhāvaḥ, so 
'tīndriyatvān na dṣṭer viṣayabhāvam anuyāti(1). yat tu rūpaṃ teṣāṃ vyaktāva-
sthāyāṃ tan “māyeva sutucchakaṃ;” svabhāvaśūnyam ity arthaḥ. tataś ca tvayāpy 
avastutattvanibandhana eva vyavahāro 'bhyupeya iti: “Their true essential nature in 
the state of homogeneous equilibrium(2) does not enter the domain of vision because 
it is beyond the [visual] sense. On the other hand, their form in their manifest state is 
'void like an illusion', that is, 'empty of essential nature'. And therefore you too 
should accept that discourse is conditioned by non-material properties.”  
(1)°āti em. : °aiti Ms  
(2) Jinendrabuddhi's use of this term shows that the concept of sāmyāvasthā did 
not originate with Vijñānabhikṣu (ca. 16th c. AD) as claimed in Larson & 






[273] sāsnādidarśanād <gopratyayo(1) yo(2) 'yam udāhtaḥ, so> viruddho 
bhavanmatyā. bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 233a7: 
sāsnādidarśanād ityādi; 233b4: viruddha iti ... bhavanmatyeti … asmanmatena tu 
bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ.  
(1)Cf. ba laṅ rtogs pa'i K : de blo V;  
(2)Cf. gaṅ K : om. V. 
 
516 According to Jinendrabuddhi this paragraph introduces Mādhava's discussion 
with an unknown Jain “distinctionist,” a Vaibhāgika, who describes the cognition of 
certain things as due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature (ātman) of 
other things, cf. PSṬ Ms B 233a7-233b1: tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktaṃ: “yasya 
darśanād yad iti(1) loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati, tadyathā sāsnādidar-
śanād(2) gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gaur. ātmāntarābhāvadarśānāc cāt-
māntare pratyayaḥ. tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇīti: “For in this context 
the Vaibhāgika has stated: “In this world whatever cognition is due to the 
observation of whatever thing: this is such and such a thing only. For instance, the 
cognition ‘cow’ is due to the observation of dewlap, etc. A cow is only dewlap, etc. 
And the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-
existence of the nature of other things. Therefore the nature of some things are 
nothing but the non-existence of the nature of other things.” After having 
summarised the Vaibhāgika's argument at Ms B 233b1-2: etena yaddarśanād 
yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati. tadyathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo 
bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gaur, ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo 
bhavatīti kāryam āha, Jinendrabuddhi continues quoting Mādhava's answer to his 
Vaibhāgika opponent at Ms B 233b2-3: atra sāṅkhyena pratividhānam uktaṃ “yadi 
sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati, evaṃ sati yad uktam: “ātmāntarābhāvadarśa-
nād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavatī”ti tad ayuktam” iti. ātmānantarābhāvanimitta-
sarvapratyayābhyupagame kathaṃ sāsnādinimittatvaṃ gopratyayasyeti. yāvad 
ātmanābhyupetahānir uktā dṣṭānte svapakṣatyāgāt: “In this context the Sāṅkhya 
has formulated the following counter-offensive: “If the cognition of a cow is due to 
observation of the dewlap, and so on, in that case the claim that the cognition of the 
nature of one thing is due to observation of the non-existence of the nature of other 
things, is not justified. If is is assumed that all cognitions are caused by the non-
existence of the nature of other things, how then could the cause of the cognition of 
a cow be the dewlap, etc.? That is, you yourself have formulated the abandonment 
of what you have admitted since you give up your own thesis for the sake of the 
example.” 
The peculiar term ātmāntara which may be specific to the Vaibhāgika argument; 
it is also used by Dignāga in the important paragraph PSV V:45, q.v. below.  
(1)Cf. źes DC : źig P.  
(2)°ād em.: °āṃ Ms 
 
517 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b4: bhavato hi sāsnādaya eva gaur iti mataṃ: “Because 
your view is that a cow is nothing but dewlap, etc.”  
 
518 According to Jinendrabuddhi, this statement sets forth Mādhava's own view, 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b4-5: asmanmatena tu “bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ.” gosāsnāda-




mutually different, that is, cow and dewlap, and so on, on the ground that with 
regard to these the excluded referent is different.” 
 
[274] yasya hi. Qu. Ms B 233b5.  
 
519 That is, the one who subscribes to the theory of exclusion, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
233b5: apohavādinaḥ. 
 
[275] abhyupagamyā(1)yaṃ dṣṭāntaḥ svamataviruddho 'pi(2). śabdabhedād dhi 
gosāsnād<iṣu> bhinnam apohyam(3). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b5: abhyupagam-
yetyādi … atas tad abhyupagamyāyaṃ dṣṭāntaḥ svamataviruddho 'py uktaḥ; Ms B 
233b6: śabdabhedād dhītyādi.  
(1)Cf. khas blaṅs nas V : khas blaṅs kyaṅ K;  
(2)Cf. yaṅ KV;  
(3)Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b5, q.v. above no. 519. 
 
520 Namely, that a cow is nothing but an aggregate of dewlap, and so on, cf. PSṬ 
Ms B 233b5: bhavato hi sāsnādisamūha eva gaur iti.  
 
521 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b5-6: etad uktam bhavati: yathā tava sāsnādisamūha-
darśanād gopratyayas tathā mamāpy ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyaya 
iti: “What is meant is the following: just as you are of the opinion that the cognition 
of a cow is due to the observation of the aggregate of dewlap, and so on, I am of the 
opinion too that the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of 
the non-existence of the nature of other things.” 
 
522 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b7-234a1: sāsnādiśabdasyāsāsnādyapohyaṃ sāsnādiṣu, 
gośabdasyāpy agaur gavi(1). yata evam bhinnam apohyam, ataḥ sāsnādiṣv asāsnā-
dyapohena sāsnādipratyayaḥ, gavy agovyavacchedena gopratyayaḥ. evaṃ cātrāpy 
ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād evātmāntare pratyayaḥ(2): “that is, the excluded [referent] 
non-dewlap, and so on, of the word ‘dewlap’, and so on, with regard to a dewlap, 
and so on, and non-cow of the word ‘cow’ with regard to a cow. Since the excluded 
referent is different in this way, the cognition ‘dewlap,’ and so on, with regard to a 
dewlap, and so on, is due to the exclusion of non-dewlaps, and so on, and the 
cognition ‘cow’ with regard to a cow is due to the exclusion of non-cows. And thus, 
in this case too the cognition of the nature of one thing is only due to the observation 
of the non-existence of the nature of other things.”  
(1)a°…°vi em. : agau javi Ms  
(2)pratyayaḥ em. : ṣityayaḥ Ms  
 
[276] “so 'napekṣa” <ity etat tu> svavikalpavi<nirmitam>(1), nirapoham (…). 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 234a1-3: so 'napekṣa ityādi … svavikalpavinirmitam(1) iti 
… nirapoham ityādi.  
(1)vinirmitam conj. (cf. sprul K : spros pa zad V) : °vi{k}?titam Ms (sprul T), cf. 
the expression avidyāvinirmitam at Dignāga’s Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthaḥ 42. 
 
523 Jinendrabuddhi quotes the passage from Mādhava's work which Dignāga 
addresses in this paragraph, cf. PSṬ Ms B 234a1-2: sāṅkhyena hy ātmāntarābhāva-





'napekṣa ātmāntarapratyayaḥ. kasmāt? na hi naḥ pratyayo bhavaty ātmāntarābhā-
vadarśanād ātmāntare, kiṃ tarhi, vidhirūpeṇaiva gaur iti”: “for the Sāṅkhya has 
asserted in order to explain that the statement “and the cognition of the nature of one 
thing (ātmāntara) is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of 
other things (ātmāntara),” is unproved, and that the cognition of the nature of one 
thing is independent, Why is that? Because in our opinion the cognition of the nature 
of one thing is not due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature other 
things, but rather, [the cognition] ‘cow’ is exclusively in the form of an 
affirmation(1).”  
(1)For the implications of the concept of vidhi, cf. no. 13 above. 
 
524Although the reading of Jinendrabuddhi's gloss svavikalpavibhājitam is not 
beyond doubt, I assume that is was intended as a pun on the term Vaibhāgika, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 234a2-3: svavikalpavibhājitam(1) etat. etad uktam bhavati: 
svavikalpavaśād evam ucyate.  
(1)°vibhājitam conj. (cf. dbye bar byas pa T) : svavikalpavi(syāddhi?)tam Ms  
 
[277] sāsnādiṣu hi <sāmānyarūpam> arthāntarābhāvanirapekṣaṃ na bhavatīti 
pūrvam evopapāditam. svarūpaṃ tv ten<āvyāvahārikaṃ> anabhilāpyatvāt. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 234a3-5: sāsnādiṣu hītyādy asyaiva vivaraṇaṃ … arthān-
tarābhāvanirapekṣaṃ na bhavatīti pūrvam evopapāditaṃ … svarūpaṃ tv ityādi … 
tena nāma tasyānabhilāpyatvāt … vyāvahārikaṃ ….  
 
525 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase at Ms B 234a3-4: sāsnādiśabdo hi sāmān-
yarūpeṇa svārthaṃ pratyāyayati. tac ca sāmānyarūpapratītāv arthāntarābhāvanir-
apekṣaṃ na bhavatīti pūrvam evopapāditam: “for the word ‘dewlap’, and so on, 
indicates its own referent in the form of its general property, and concerning this it 
has previously been argued that with regard to the cognition of the general form this 
[general form] does not exist independently of the non-existence of other referents.”  
It is not quite clear how to interpret Dignāga's remark about having 
demonstrated earlier that the general form i.e. the abstract type, presupposes the 
non-existence of other referents in the locus of the referent of any given term or 
indicator because Dignāga only introduces the idea that the denotable general form 
depends upon non-existence of other referents in the context of his discussion with 
Mādhava and the unknown Vaibhāgika.  
It is clear, however, that within the conceptual framework of the apoha theory 
non-existence of other referents in the locus of the referent is instrumental in 
establishing the generalized form of invariable connection between indicator and 
indicated as appears from Dignāga's theory of induction expounded at PSV V:34, 
q.v. above. It is thus understandable that he introduces the concept of mutual non-
existence of any given x and non-x in the context of apoha. This corresponds to the 
connection of any indicator—a word or speech unit, or a logical indicator like ‘being 
produced’—to the indicated, which is reified through non-observation of the 
indicator where the indicated is non-existent. 
 
526 Jinendrabuddhi introduces the concluding statement of this paragraph by 
presenting the opponents view that individuals are denotable in an affirmative form, 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 234a: nanu ca bhāvasvalakṣaṇādhigatir arthāntarābhāvapratītinir-




character of an entity is independent of the cognition of the non-existence of other 
referents. It is exclusively found in an affirmative form as ‘cow.’” 
 
527 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 234a5-6: svarūpaṃ svalakṣaṇam. tatpratītau yady arthān-
tarābhāvo nāpekṣeta nāma(1), tasyānabhilāpyatvāt. abhilāpyaṃ tu vyāvahārikaṃ 
rūpaṃ gavādīnāṃ nārthāntarāpohanirapekṣam pratīyate: “the own form is the 
individual character. If the non-existence of other referents does not depend on the 
cognition of this [individual character], it is because it is not denotable. However, 
the form of a cow, and so on, that is denotable, i.e., the one that is subject to 
designation, is not cognized as exempt from exclusion of other referents.” 
(1) nāpekṣeta nāma conj (cf. ltos par bya ba ma yin mod T) : sāpekṣ(?)na nāma 
Ms. For the underlying syntax of this clause, cf. the compound arthāntarābhāva-
pratītinirapekṣa, q.v. no.s 526-27. 
 
[278] yac coktam ādyapratyay<o> nāstīti, <tatra>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 234a6: 
yac coktam iti … ādyapratyayasaṃvttir eva nāsti; cf. no. [282] below.  
 
528 Dignāga addresses in this paragraph an objection made by Mādhava, which 
Jinendrabuddhi quotes in extenso and explains at Ms B 234a6-234b1: evaṃ hy 
uktam: “yady ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati, ādyapratya-
yasaṃvttir eva nāsti. kasmāt? na hi tadātmāntarābhāvadarśanam astī” ti. atrādyaḥ 
pratyayo yaḥ saṃsāre prathama utpadyate, tasyābhāvaḥ. tadānīm aparasyātmano 
'darśanād ātmāntaraṃ cāghītvā tadabhāvopalakṣitam ātmāntaraṃ grahītum 
aśakyam ity abhyupetahāniḥ(1): “for it has been objected as follows: “if the 
cognition of the nature of one thing is due to observation of the non-existence of the 
nature of another thing, there is no occurrence of a first cognition. Why? Because 
then there is no observation of the non-existence of the nature of things that are 
different from it.”  
In this context the first cognition, i.e., the one that arises as the first one in the 
round of transmigration does not exist. And then, not having apprehended the nature 
of one thing because of not observing the nature of another thing, it becomes 
impossible to apprehend the nature of the one thing that is implied by its non-
existence. Thus you give up what you have assumed.  
A related objection is put forward by Uddyotakara who maintains that negation 
presupposes an act of affirmation defining the content of a first cognition. The 
assumption underlying Uddyotakara's argument is that since apoha is nothing but 
negation without any positive content, there cannot be a first cognition on the basis 
of which negation becomes meaningful; cf. NV 331,19-332,3: vidhānaśabdārtha-
sambhave sati ādyā pratipattiḥ. yadi vidhānaśabdārtho bhavati, yasya (so read) 
vidhīyamānaśabdārthapratipattāv satyām tasyānyatra pratiṣedha ity upapannaḥ 
pratiṣedhaḥ. yasya punar vidhīyamānaḥ padārthaḥ nāsti, tasyādyām pratipattim 
antareṇa katham pratiṣedhaḥ: “the first cognition is when the referent of the word is 
present in terms of affirmation. If the referent of the word exists in terms of 
affirmation, someone who has a cognition of the referent of the word that is being 
affirmed, can negate it elsewhere. Thus negation is justified. But how could 
someone, according to whom the thing that is in the process of being affirmed does 
not exist, negate without a first cognition?” 






[279] iṣṭisiddhir anāditvāt. Qu. Ms B 234b1.  
 
529 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b1: iṣṭam evaitad ādyapratyayānabhyupagamāt. ato 
nābhyupetahānir ity arthaḥ.  
 
530 The view that the transmission (pāramparya) of vyavahāra is beginningless is 
related to similar formulations by Bharthari, cf. VPV I 58,3-4: apara āhuḥ: 
pāramparyāvicchedān nityapravtteḥ prayoktbhir utpattāv alabdhaprāthamyā 
vyavahāranityatayā nityāḥ śabdāḥ; cf. Vṣabhadeva's Paddhati ad loc. VPV I 58,22-
23: na śabdavyavahārasya vicchedo 'sti, anādau saṃsāre pāramparyeṇa vyava-
sthito 'yaṃ śabdavyavahāra iti na kūṭasthanityatā, kin tu prayogāvicchedaḥ: “there 
is no interruption of the use of words. The use of words is confined by way of 
transmission to the beginningless transmigration, thus there is no invariability in 
terms of being immutable, but rather, there is no interruption of usage.” The causal 
relationship to which Dignāga refers is the causal relationship between the word and 
its mental representation. In this regard he appears to be influenced by Bharthari, 
cf. VP III.2:32: śabdaḥ kāraṇam arthasya sa hi tenopajanyate, tathā ca 
buddhiviṣayād arthāc chabdaḥ pratīyate; cf. VPV I 42,12-3: tathā eke kārya-
kāraṇabhāvam eva śabdārthayoḥ sambandham manyante: “Some think that the 
relation between the word and its referent is a causal relationship.” VPV I 61,1-2: 
nityam avicchinnapāramparyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ: 
“The relation between the word and its referent is a causal relationship whose 
transmission is invariably uninterrupted.” VPV I 71,4-5 (ad I 25): kāryakāraṇa-
bhāvenārthākāranirbhāsamātrānugatasya pratyayasyārtheṣu pratyastarūpasyār-
thatvenādhyavasāye tasyarthātmanaḥ śabdo nimittam. tathārthāvagrahadarśanaṃ 
so 'yam iti śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaprasiddher nādābhivyaktasyāntaḥkaraṇasaṃ-
niveśinaḥ śabdasya pravttau kāraṇam.  
For the notion of śabda being the cause of the cognition of artha, cf., e.g., 
Candrānanda's vtti on VS IX.21: arthasya pratipattāv iyaṃ hastaceṣṭā kāraṇam 
pratipattavyā iti vttasaṅketaḥ tāṃ hastaceṣṭāṃ dṣṭvā tataḥ śabdāt kāraṇād artham 
pratipadyate evam asyārthasya pratipattāv ayaṃ śabdaḥ kāraṇam.  
In the present context it is significant that Helarāja in his comment on VP 
III.2:54 quotes pādas ab of a verse commonly attributed to Dignāga. Siṃhasūri 
quotes the verse at NCV 547,7-8: vikalpayonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabdayonayaḥ, 
teṣām atyantasambandho nārthāñ śabdāh spśanty api: “Words have their origin in 
representations and representations have their origin in words. They are interrelated. 
Nor are words in direct contact with their referents.” The fact that the term 
atyantasambandha is to be interpreted in terms of mutual connection appears from 
the variant of pādas cd quoted, e.g., at SVṬ Vol. II 620,2: teṣām anyonyasambandho 
nārthān śabdāḥ spśanty amī. The mutual connection of word and representation 
was correctly interpreted as a causal relation as another variant recorded, e.g., at 
Syādvādamañjarī 91,5 indicates: kāryakāraṇatā teṣāṃ nārthaṃ śabdāḥ spśanty api. 
Vacaspatimiśra allludes to this verse at NVTṬ Vol. I 241,10-12: vikalpayonayo hi 
śabdās tadgocaram abhiniviśante. yad vikalpā ghṇanti yac cādhyavasyati tad 
ubhayam apy anyavyāvttirūpam avastu, tasmān na avikalpikaṃ jñānaṃ tadgoca-
raṃ vā paramārthasad gocarayanti vikalpāḥ śabdāś cety ayam abhisandhiḥ. This 
explanation presupposes that the object of śabda or vikalpa is not a real object 




(anyavyāvttirūpam avastu), which contradicts Dignāgan doctrine as presented in 
PSV V and the Sanskrit fragment from SPVy, cf. no. 182 above. 
 
[280] <na hy ādyapratyayo ‘sty eva vyavahārakāryakaraṇapāramparyānāditvāt>. 
yasya tu <ādyapratyayam icchataḥ>. Restored cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b1: yasya tv 
ityādinā parasyaivemaṃ doṣaṃ praty āsañjayate.  
 
531 Cf. daṅ po'i rtogs pa 'dod pa K : daṅ po'i śes pa med na V. 
 
[281] <tasya> na ca śakyaṃ jātimad vyāptum, na ca śakyate jātir <eka>samasta-
vttiḥ(1), <jātimadbhyo> vyatiriktā vāvyatiriktā ve<tīmau doṣau staḥ>(2). Restored, 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b2-3: na ca śakyaṃ jātimad vyāptum iti; PSṬ Ms B 234,3-6 q.v. 
no. 536 below. 
(1)Cf. gcig mtha' dag la 'jug pa ni ma yin no V, for which read gcig mtha' dag la 
'jug pa ni yin no, cf. cig mtha' dag la 'jug par K. 
(2) Cf. źes bya ba’i skyon de dag yod do V : ‘di skyon yin no K. 
 
532 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b2-3: yadi sarvabhedeṣu śabdo niyoktuṃ śakyeta, evaṃ 
jātimad vastu śabdena vyāptuṃ śakyeta, na caitat sambhavati, jātimatām ānantyāt. 
na cāktasambandhaḥ śabdaḥ pratyāyayituṃ samarthaḥ: “If it were possible to 
apply the word to all particulars, then it would be possible for the word to 
universally pervade an object that is a general property possessor. And this is not 
possible because the general property possessors are infinite. And a word whose 
connection [to its referent] has not been established is not capable of indicating [it].”  
 
533 The translation of this clause is, with a minor emendation, based upon V 
whose readings are supported by Ms, for which, cf. no.s [281] above and 536 below.  
 
534 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b3: śakyate vyāptum iti praktena sambandhaḥ.  
 
535 According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga addresses the assumption that because 
of the unity (ekatva) of the general property it is capable of pervading its substrates, 
cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b3: syād etad ekatvāj jātiḥ śakyate vyāptum iti. The subsequent 
exposition at PSṬ Ms B 234b3-6 is indebted to Dignāga's analysis, at PSV II:16 (for 
which, cf. no. 504 above), of the problems that entail from the assumption that 
general properties are real entities: yadi tāvad āśrayāt vyatiriktā jātiḥ samastā-
śrayavttiḥ kalpyate, tadā dvitvādivad āśrayadarśanapuraḥsaraṃ tasya darśanaṃ(1) 
syāt. na cāśrayāṇām ānantyād darśanaṃ sambhavati. atha pratyāśrayaṃ sarvāt-
manā parisamāptatvād ekāśrayadarśane 'pi grahaṇam iṣyate, tadā bhedaḥ syāt. 
tataś cāśrayavad ānantyāt sambandhābhāvaḥ. athāśrayād avyatiriktaivam api 
bhedavad doṣaḥ, bhedebhyo 'vyatiriktāyās(2) tadvad evānantyād iti. jātivādina 
evādyapratyayābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ: “If, in the first place, it is imagined that the 
general property is resident in all its substrata as separate from [any given] substrate, 
then its observation would presuppose the observation of the substrata in the same 
way as the [general] property twoness, etc. And the observation is not possible 
because the substrata are infinite. If, on the other hand, it is maintained that it is 
apprehended even if a single substrate is observed because it is contained 
completely in each single substrate, then it would be a particular, and therefore there 





it is not separate from the substrate, even so the problem is similar to that of the 
particular because, when it is not separate from the particulars, it is infinite in the 
exact same way as these. Thus the [absurd] consequence that there is no first 
cognition only concerns one who opholds the doctrine of general properties.”  
(1) darśanaṃ em. :°ādarśanaṃ Ms 
(2) °āyās em. (gen. sg. f. qualifying an implicit jāteḥ in construction with 
ānantyāt) : °āyos Ms 
 
[282] yad apy uktam pratyayavttir eva nāstīti(1) tad apy ayuktam, sāmānyena nir-
ākteḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b6-7, 235a2: yad apy uktam iti … pratyayavttir 
eva(2) nāsti … tad apy ayuktaṃ; Ms B 235a2: sāmānyena nirākteḥ.  
(1) The phrase yad apy uktam pratyayavttir eva nāstīti is not reproduced in T, cf. 
T 212,25. 
(2) °vttir em. : °vddhir Ms; cf. ‘jug pa ñid yod pa ma yin no K : yaṅ dag par 
rab tu ‘jug pa ñid med do V; V presupposes the reading pratyayasampravttir eva, 
cf. no. [278] above. 
 
536 Jinendrabuddhi quotes Dignāga's source at Ms B 234b6-235a1: “pratyaya-
vttir eva nāsti. kasmāt? vyudasyātmāntarānantyāt. na hi sarvātmāntarābhāvadar-
śanam astīti.” etad uktam bhavati: yadi sarvātmāntarāṇām apohena pratyayaḥ, 
teṣām agavarthānām ānantyād adarśanaṃ gobhedavat. tataś ca na tadapohena(1) 
gopratyayas, tadvad eveti: “There is no cognition occurs at all. Why? Because of the 
infinity of the nature of the other things that are to be excluded. For there is no 
observation of the non-existence of all the things that are different.”  
What is meant is this: If the cognition is through exclusion of the nature of all 
things that are different there is no observation of these because the referents that are 
non-cows are infinite in the same way as the particular cows. And therefore the 
cognition ‘cow’ is not due to the exclusion of these infinite particulars, in the exact 
same way.”  
This objection resurfaces in the discussion at ŚV Apoha° 58, where Kumārila 
addresses the question of how to define the excluded (apohya) if it is claimed that it 
consists of everything that is defined as non-x as opposed to x. For if it consists of 
each single non-x the problem of the excluded referent‘s being infinite arises: 
sarvāpoho yadīṣyeta, sa vaktavyaḥ kathaṃ punaḥ, yadi pratyekarūpeṇa nāpohyā-
nantyato bhavet: “If exclusion of all [non-cows by the word ‘cow’] is asserted, it is 
to be explained in what way [all non-cows are excluded]. If [they are excluded] in 
the form of each single [non-cow], there can be no [exclusion of all non-cows] 
because of the infinity of the excluded.” Kumārila's discussion ŚV Apoha° 58 
through 72 is primarily concerned with the views that Dignāga propounds in PSV 
V:43d. 
(1) tadapo° em. : tadāpo° Ms 
 
537 Ms B 235a2: avkṣo(1) na bhavatīty evaṃ sāmānyarūpeṇa nirākaraṇāt: 
“Because exclusion is in a general form such as, 'it is not a non-tree';” cf. ŚV 
Apoha° 63cd: yadi sāmānyarūpeṇa te 'pohyante, na vastutā(2): “If [all non-cows] 
are excluded in a general the form [i.e. in the general form of being non-cows, this 
general form] is not a real object.”  




(2)Cf. Śarkarikā introducing ŚV loc.cit.: yadi tu pratyekasamudāyaparihāreṇa 
agorūpeṇa sarvasādhāraṇenāpohyata ity ucyate; tathā sati tasya tvanmatena 
vastutvaṃ nāstīty avasturūpeṇāpohyatvam aṅgīktaṃ syāt: “suppose, however, it is 
explained that [the excluded] is excluded through exclusion of the aggregate of each 
single [thing to be excluded] having the form of non-cow which is common to all 
[the things to be excluded]; this being the case, the property of being a thing to be 
excluded would be due to the form of an unreal object as (iti) the thing to be 
excluded does not, on your theory, have the property of being a real object.”  
 
[283] na hi so 'nyāṃ jātim pratidravyam apohate, kiṃ tarhi vyavacchedyavivak-
ṣayaikena sāmānyadharmeṇa. uktaṃ cātra vijātīye 'darśanamātreṇānumānam. 
tavaiva tv eṣa doṣaḥ: yadi svajātīyavyāptyā(1) <varteta, vyāpyasyānantyaṃ syāt(2)>. 
tasmād yathā <viṣāṇitvād anaśva ity ukte 'śve viṣāṇitvādarśanena tadvyavacche-
dānumānam>, <na tu karkādīn> pratyekam apohate, <nāpy ekaikagavādiṣv 
anuvartate.(3)tavaivāpi vyāvttibuddhir anuvttibuddhiś ceṣṭā>. tathā <cā>tra(4) 
nyāyaḥ. Restored, cf Ms B 235a2-235b5: na hi so 'nyām ityādi … jātim 
pratidravyam apohate … kiṃ tarhi vyavacchedyavivakṣayaikena sāmānyadharmeṇa 
… uktaṃ cātretyadi … vijātīye adarśanamātreṇānumānam iti … tavaiva tv eṣa doṣa 
iti … yadi svajātīyavyāptyetyādi … tasmād yathetyādi … ye 'pi te 'naśvā gavādayaḥ, 
tān api viṣāṇitvaṃ na pratyekaṃ vyāpnoti, ye 'pi tadvijātīyā aśvās tān api naiva 
pratyekam apohate … gavādisv anuvttibuddhir agavādiṣu ca vyāvttibuddhir 
bhavati … tathātra nyāyah.  
(1)KV erroneously construes this cpd. as a locative syntactically dependent on 
the verb *varteta, instead of taking it as an instrumental form, cf. raṅ gi rigs khyab 
par bya ba la 'jug pa yin na K : rigs mthun la khyab pa 'jug pa'i lta na V; cf. no. 
540 below. 
(2)Cf. khyab pa (read khyab par bya ba) la ni mtha' yod pa ma yin no V : khyab 
par bya ba mtha' med pa yin no K. 
(3)Cf. ba laṅ la sogs pa so so la yaṅ 'jug pa ma yin no V : ba laṅ la sogs pa re re 
'dzin pa ma yin no. V is preferable to K because 'jug pa (presumably corresponding 
to Sanskrit *anuvartate because V translates anuvtti as 'jug pa) anticipates the 
subsequent introduction of the technical term anuvtti. Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's 
explanation at no. 542 below, which uses vyāpnoti with a similar intention.  
(4)Cf. 'di la yaṅ V : 'dir yaṅ K. 
 
538 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 235a2-3: na(1) yasmāt so vkṣaśabdo 'nyāṃ ghaṭatvādikāṃ(2) 
jātim pratidravyam apohate ghaṭo na bhavatīty evaṃ: “Because the word ‘tree’ does 
not exclude a different general property like potness for each substance such as 'it is 
not a pot.'” Dignāga's statement presupposes an objection according to which the 
word ‘tree’, for instance, should exclude every single different general property for 
every single substance, which entails that each thing is qualified by innumerable 
exclusions corresponding to the innumerable general properties that define it. Not 
surprisingly one finds the same objection at ŚV Apoha° 59: bhinnatvāc cāpy 
apohyānāṃ bhinno 'pohaḥ prasajyate, tatraikasmin bhavet piṇḍe 'nantajātisaman-
vayaḥ: “And because the excluded things are different it follows [absurdly] that the 
exclusion is different. In that case there would be a continuous connection of 
innumerable general properties to one particular entity.”  
(1) The akward position of the negation na is motivated by the paraphrase, 





(2)ghaṭatvā° conj. : ghaṭā° (cf. bum pa la sogs pa T) Ms 
 
539 An example of vyavacchedavivakṣā is found in a Sanskrit fragment from 
Dignāga's no longer extant Hetumukham quoted at TSP 385,11-12: ajñeyaṃ 
kalpitaṃ ktvā tadvyavacchedena jñeye 'numānam: “By positing what is not 
knowable as imagined the inference of what is knowable is [performed] by means of 
exclusion of that.” 
 
540 According to Jinendrabuddhi's explanation Dignāga must have dealt more 
fully with the crucial concept of ekadharma in another treatise, cf. PSṬ Ms B 235a3-
5: ekena sāmānyadharmeṇa vyavacchedyasya yā vivakṣā, tayā hetubhūtayāpohate. 
kena kāreṇāpohate? prakaraṇāntaranirdeśāt(1) tenaiva sāmānyadharmeṇeti vijñā-
yate. etad uktam bhavati: sāmānyadharmeṇa vyavacchedyavivakṣayā prāpitābhe-
darūpeṇa(2) vkṣo na bhavatīti. evaṃ ghaṭādīn vyavacchedyān apohata iti. tato 
'siddham ānantyam avkṣādeḥ sāmānyarūpasyābhinnatvāt: “The intention of denot-
ing the excluded by a single general property–i.e. with that (intention) as cause. 
Whereby does it exclude? According to the description in another treatise one 
understands that it excludes by means of this only namely by means of the [single] 
general property. This means: by a general property whose identical form is 
obtained through the intention of denoting the excluded at the thought ‘it is not a 
tree.’ In this way a word excludes objects to be excluded (vyavacchedyān) like pots 
and so on. Therefore infinity [of the things to be excluded] is not established 
because the form of the general property of non-trees, and so on, is one and the 
same.”  
In other words, a negated term like non-tree (avkṣa) presupposes an observation 
statement like “x is not a tree (= non-tree).” The negated term non-tree denotes in a 
general way (sāmānyena) all things that are not trees. It is thus clear that the term 
avkṣa is secondary and derived from the primary term vkṣa with the sole intention 
of denoting all objects to be excluded (vyavacchedyavivakṣā) by their shared general 
property (sāmānyadharma), the so-called single property (ekadharma), namely that 
of not being trees whereby they form an aggregate (samudāya) of non-trees that is to 
be excluded. Kumārila addresses the content of PSV V:43b in ŚV Apoha° 61ff: 
samudāyātmanā nāpi bhaved eṣām apohyatā, samudāyo hi naikena vinā dharmeṇa 
jāyate. He refers twice to the concept of ekadharma “single property” in his 
criticism of the apoha thesis without connecting it to Dignāga‘s concept of 
apohyavivakṣā, which emphasizes the secondary and derivative character of the 
negated term. Cf. ŚV ibid. 72: apohyān api cāśvādīn ekadharmānvayād te, na 
nirūpayituṃ śaktis tatrāpoho na siddhyati. TS 932 and TSP 367,11-15; TS 1049-50 
and TSP 404,17-21. 
(1) °taranirdeśāt em. : °tarānirdeśās Ms 
(2) °rūpena em. : °rūpānā Ms 
 
541 Jinendrabuddhi refers in his explanation at Ms B 235a6-7 to the pivotal 
justification of exclusion at PSV V:34: adṣṭer anyaśabdārtha (PS V:34a) ity 
atroktaṃ vijātīye adarśanamātreṇānumānam iti, and continues explaining: yo hi 
yatra <na>(1) dṣṭaḥ, sa tam apohate. vkṣaśabdaś ca svārthābhāve vijātīye na dṣ-
ṭaḥ. kāraṇābhāve kāryābhāvāt. ataḥ saty apy ānantye 'numitir upapadyate: “For 
[the word] excludes that to which it is not observed to apply. And the word ‘tree’ is 




because where the cause is not found, [there] the effect is not found. Therefore the 
result of inference is justified, even though [that which is dissimilar] is infinite.”  
(1)na em., cf. ma mthoṅ ba T : om. Ms 
 
542 That is, the problem that no cognition occurs, cf. PSṬ Ms B 235a7: 
pratyayasaṃvttyabhāvadoṣaḥ; cf. the discussion above PSV 43b. 
 
543 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 235a7-235b1: yasya hi vidhinā pratyāyanaṃ tasyānvayaḥ 
pradhānam iti sakalasvajātīyavyāptyā śabdena vartitavyam, etac ca na sambhavati, 
sajātīyānām ānantyāt, tadavyatirekāc ca jāter iti: “For joint presence is the primary 
thing according to someone who is of the opinion that [the word] indicates in an 
affirmative form. Thus the word is to apply by pervading all the referents that 
pertain to the kind that is proper to it, and this is not possible because of the infinity 
of the things belonging to the same class and because the general property is not 
separated from these.” 
 
544 Cf. the exegesis of the term tadvyavacchedānumāna at PSV V:34. 
 
545 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 235b1-3: viṣāṇitvam aśvād vyāvartamānam anaśvatvaṃ 
gamayati. tac ca vastusatsāmānyavādibhir api na kiñcid anaśvatvaṃ nāma sāmān-
yaṃ vastusat pratijñātam. ye 'pi te 'naśvā gavādayaḥ, tān api viṣāṇitvaṃ na pratye-
kaṃ vyāpnoti; ye 'pi tadvijātīyā aśvās, tān api naiva pratyekam apohate: “The being 
horned, as it is excluded from a horse, indicates not being a horse. And concerning 
this not even those who accept the theory that general properties are real objects 
claim that not being a horse is a general property that is a real object. Neither does 
hornedness pervade non-horses such as cows each singly, nor does it exclude horses 
that are dissimilar from these each singly.”  
Dignāga addresses a similar problem in the only surviving Sanskrit fragment 
from his Dvādaśaśatikā: yathāha Dvādaśaśatikāyām: yady apy uktam “aprasak-
tasya kimartham pratiṣedhaḥ” iti ? naivaitat pratiṣedhamātram ucyate, kin tu tasya 
vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo 'rthāntaranivttyā loke gamyate yathā viṣāṇitvād anaśva iti 
(qu. NCV Vol 2 548,25-25): “As he claims in the Dvādaśaśatikā: Even though it is 
objected: What purpose does the negation of what is not applicable [e.g., the term 
anaśva] serve? [we answer that] it is not mere negation that is expressed, but rather 
a certain part of the referent in question is inferred in ordinary language (loke) 
through exclusion of other referents like, for instance, in the inference: it is a non-
horse because it is horned.” 
 
546 re re ’dzin pa K : so so la yaṅ ’jug pa ma yin no V. Since the passage 
describes to two types of cognitions, I have concluded that K is preferable to V. ’jug 
pa translates Sanskrit *anuvtti occurring in the immediately following sentence. 
 
547 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 235b3-4: atha ca tato yathā vipakṣavyāvttibuddhir bhavati 
sāmānyena vijātīyatiraskārād aśvo na bhavatīti, anuvttibuddhiś cāśvavyāvtteṣu 
gavādiṣu sāmānyākāreṇānaśva iti, tathātra nyāyaḥ(1). śabdo 'pi hi liṅgam. ato(2) 
gāvādiśabdād api gavādisv anuvttibuddhir agavādiṣu ca vyāvttibuddhir bhavati: 
“And therefore: Just as there is a cognition in terms of exclusion from the vipakṣa 
because of separating it in a general way from dissimilar things viz. [the cognition] 





general form viz. 'non-horse' with regard to cows, and so on, as excluded from 
horses, so is the principle in this context. For also the word is an indicator. Therefore 
the word ‘cow’, and so on, causes a cognition in terms of continuous application 
with regard to cows, and so on, and a cognition in terms of exclusion with regard to 
non-cows, etc.”  
Cf. the use of terms anuvttipratyaya and vyāvttipratyaya in Praśastapāda's PBh 
§7 and §361ff; the term vyāvttibuddhi occurs op.cit. §369. Siṃhasūri quotes a 
related passage from an unknown Vaiśeṣika treatise at NCV 29,22-23: yathoktam: 
anuvttipratyayakāraṇaṃ sāmānyam, vyāvttibuddhihetur viśeṣaḥ iti.  
(1) °ātra nyāyaḥ conj. (cf. de ltar 'dir rigs pa ste T): °ā dravyādayaḥ Ms 
(2) rtags daṅ ldan pa las T reading liṅgam ato Ms as liṅgamato sic 
 
[284] upetyātmāntarābhavam ekānekatvakalpanā | na yuktā vastuni hy eṣā. Qu. 
Ms B 236a1. 
 
548 This interesting paragraph continues addressing the question about what 
constitutes the excluded referents of a negative term like non-cow if the referents of 
the positive term cow are defined as identically the same because of non-existence 
of non-cows in cows. Dignāga responds to an argument by Mādhava, which 
Jinendrabuddhi quotes at Ms B 235b5-236a1: “yady ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād 
ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati, ekaś cātmāntarābhāvaḥ, tataḥ sarvātmāntareṣv eka-
pratyayaprasaṅgaḥ. sarvam ekarūpeṇa pratyayena pratīyeta viśeṣaṇasyaikatvāt. 
yathā śuklatvaviśeṣaṇasyābhinnatvāt kumudādayo 'bhinnākāreṇa pratyayena pratī-
yante, śuklaṃ kumudaṃ kundaṃ śaṅkham iti. atha naika ātmāntarābhāvaḥ, tataḥ 
pratyātmam pratyayanānātvaprasaṅgaḥ śabdavttinimittasya bhinnatvāt, śukla-
madhurasurabhiśītaṃ kaṇḍam iti yathā. na caitad ubhayam iṣyata iti abhyu-
petahānam” iti: “If the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation 
of the non-existence of the nature of other things and the non-existence of the nature 
of other things is one, the [absurd] consequence is that there is one cognition about 
the nature of all the other things. Everything would be cognized by a cognition that 
has the same form because of the unity of the attribute, just as the white lotus, and so 
on, is cognized through a notion that has the same form because of the unity of the 
attribute whiteness as in the statement “the lotus is white, the jasmine is (white), and 
the mother of pearl is (white).” If, on the other hand, non-existence of the nature of 
other things is not the same, then the [absurd] consequence is that there is difference 
of notion for each thing because the cause of application of the word is different as 
in the statement “sugar is white, sweet, fragrant, and cool.” And both [consequen-
ces] are unwanted. Therefore (iti) you give up what you have assumed.” 
 
[285] <vastu> hi <yat sadātma>(1), <tasya> yuktam(2) ekānekatvaṃ kalpayitum, na 
tu ātmāntarābhāvam(3) abhyupetya>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 236a1-2, q.v. below 
no. 550.  
(1)Cf. dṅos po yod pa'i bdag ñid can K : gal te bdag dṅos po la yod na ni (sic) V.  
(2)Cf. rigs pa yin gyi K : mi rigs so V.  
(3)Cf. bdag gźan med pa K : bdag gźan yod par V. 
 
549 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 236a1-2: vāstavaṃ hy ekānekatvaṃ vastuna eva sambhavati, 
na tv avastunaḥ. tad arthāntarābhāvam abhyupetya na yuktam ekānekatvaṃ 




entity. Thus it is not justified to imagine identity or difference on the assumption of 
non-existence of other referents.” 
 
[286] tavāpy avyaktavyaktiṣu tulyaḥ prasaṅgaḥ. Qu. Ms B 236a2-3. 
 
[287] <avyakte hi> vikāraśaktīnām aikye vikārabhedo na syāt. nānātve tu 
pradhānasyaikatvavirodhaḥ śaktibhyo 'nanyatvāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 236a3-4: 
mahadādivikāraśaktīnām aikye kāraṇasyābhinnatvād vikārabhedo na syāt, nānātve 
tu pradhānasyaikatvavirodhaḥ śaktibhyo 'nanyatvāt.  
 
[288] iyaṃ ca śabdavācye 'rthe cintā <nendriyagocare>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
236a6: iyaṃ ca śabdavācye 'rthe cintetyādi. 
 
550 Cf. 'phaṅs K : 'jug pa V. Both terms presumably render past participles like 
prakṣipta, cf. the related use of prakṣepa PSV V:45, q.v. below no. [289]. 
 
551 Dignāga addresses an objection by Mādhava, which Jinendrabuddhi quotes at 
Ms B 236a4-6: yad apy uktaṃ “yady ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo 
bhavati, aindriyakaś cātmāntare pratyaya ity abhāvaḥ śabdādīnām anyatamaḥ 
prāptaḥ śrotrādigrāhyatvāt. atha śabdādīnāṃ nānyatamaḥ ṣaṣṭhaṃ cāsya grāhakam 
indriyaṃ astīty etad āpannam, aniṣṭaṃ caitad ubhayam” iti. tasyaidam uttaram: 
“Moreover, it is also claimed that 'if the notion of the nature of one thing is due to 
the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things and the notion of 
the nature of one thing is effected by the [visual] sensefaculty, non-existence of any 
among words, and so on, follows [absurdly] because they [viz. words, and so on,] 
are cognizable by the ear, etc. If, on the other hand, non-existence of any among 
word, and so on, does not [follow absurdly], the [absurd] consequence is that it is 
the sixth sensefaculty [viz. the mind] that cognizes it. And both of these 
[consequenses] are unwanted.” The following is the answer to that statement.” 
 
[289] anirdeśyo hi pratyakṣārthaḥ. “ātmāntarābhāva(1) ātmāntaram” iti nirdeś-
yam praty uktam. tasmān nāsya pratyakṣe prakṣepaḥ(2). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
236a6-7: anirdeśyo hi pratyakṣārtha iti … yad etad uktam ātmāntarābhāva ātmānta-
ram iti tan nirdeśyam abhilāpyam artham praty uktam, nendriyagocaram. tasmān 
nāsya pratyakṣa indriyagocare prakṣepo yuktaḥ.  
(1)Cf. bdag gźan med pa bdag gźan yin no V : bdag ñid gźan la (sic; the 
translator appears to have read ātmāntara as a sandhi form of the locative ātmāntare 
instead of ātmāntaram) bdag ñid gźan med pa K. 
(2)Cf. 'jug pa V (= prakṣepa) : ṅes pa (sic) K, and no.s 547 and 551 above. bstan 
par bya ba ni K : bstan du med pa'i lta ba na V probably reproduce the noun phrase 
nirdeśyam prati. 
 
552 For this axiomatic statement, cf. PS I 5cd: svasaṃvedyam hy anirdeśyaṃ 
rūpaṃ indriyagocaraḥ. Hattori 1968 I. 43; cf. Ms B 236a6: svasaṃvedyo 
'nabhilāpyaḥ. nirdeśyā ca pratītiḥ. 
The object of sensation is the svalakṣaṇa, cf. PSV II.2: atha kasmād anumānam 
eva dvidhā bhidyate? yasmāt “svalakṣaṇam anirdeśyam, grāhyabhedāt” (PS II:2). 
bhinnaṃ hi pratyakṣānumayoḥ svātmavad grāhyam. yadi ca <pratyakṣārtho 





(1) Restored on the basis of PSṬ Ms B 56a1-56b4.  
 
553 This statement is strikingly similar to the Vaibhāgika's statement of his own 
view as related by Jinendrabuddhi viz. ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇīti, cf. no. 517 
above. 
 
[290] apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vikalpitaḥ,(1) vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo 
'yaṃ tenādāv upajanyate.  
Qu. TSP 363,15-16; Ms B 236a7-236b1 (pāda a); cf. 236b2: ata evāha: vikalpita 
iti; kiṃkāraṇaṃ vikalpita ityāha: vākyārtha ityādi; 236b4 (pāda c-d).  
(1)vikalpitaḥ Ms (cf. rnam par brtags VK) : vivecitaḥ TSP. 
 
554 That is, exclusion of other referents, cf. PSṬ Ms B 236b1: ayam ity 
anyāpohaḥ. 
 
555 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 236b1-2: katham punar avibhaktāvayavād ekasmād vākyāt 
padam apoddhartuṃ śakyate? utprekṣitāvayavasārūpyeṇa(2) buddhyā vibhajanāt, 
ata evāha “vikalpita” iti: “How, moreover, is it possible to abstract the syntactical 
word from a single sentence from which the [individual] parts are not separated? 
Because they are separated by the mind in conformity with invented parts precisely 
therefore he says ‘imagined'.”  
As Jinendrabuddhi's explanation indicates vikalpita is = utprekṣita, This is 
corroborated by the parallel expression utprekṣayā … vyavasthāpyate at PSV V:46. 
The reading vivecitaḥ TSP does not make sense in the context since viveka or the 
verb vi + √vic is exclusively used of the process of isolating imagined speech units 
through grammatical analysis (apoddhāra), cf., e.g., VP II:266ab: vākyasyārthāt 
padārthānām apoddhāre prakalpite. 
(1) em. : tata prekṣitāvayavasārūpeṇa Ms; T translates as if this term qualify 
buddhyā, cf. T 214,28: yan lag rab tu brtags pa daṅ tshul mthun pa’i blos.  
 
556 Ms B 236b1: apoddhāraḥ pthakkaraṇam. ktaḥ punar apoddhāro vākyāt.  
 
557 Cf. Bharthari’s statement VP II:143: vicchedagrahaṇe 'rthānām pratibhān-
yaiva jāyate, vākyārtha iti tām āhuḥ pādārthair upapāditam. 
Jinendrabuddhi explains the verse at PSṬ Ms B 236b2-3: kiṃkāraṇaṁ vikalpita 
ity āha: vākyārtha ityādi. yasmād vākyārthaḥ pratibhāsaṃjñākaḥ tena padārthena 
prathamam avyutpānnānām utpādyate. na hy aviditapadārthaḥ pūrvaṃ dhiyā 
vākyārtham(1) adhigantum utsahate, ato niravayavavākyārthapratipattyupāyatvāt 
praktipratyayavad vācakatvenāsato 'pi padasyārtha <ut>prekṣyate.(2) sā punar 
vākyārthapratibhā, śrotsantānabhāvinī ca yā vākyāc chrotur upajanyate,(3) vakt-
santānabhāvinī ca yā vākyasya samutthāpikā. tatra pūrvām adhiktya “vākyārthaḥ 
... upajanyata” [PS V 46d] ity etad uktam. vākyārthatvam punaḥ tasyāḥ prayo-
jakatvāt, tadarthaṁ hi vaktā vākyam prayuṅkte: “api nāma dhiyā(4) vākyāt parasya 
vākyārthaviṣayā pratibhā syāt.” iti yā punar vākyasya samutthāpikā, tāṃ “vākyam 
eva tadarthaś ca mukhyau śabdāv ity atra vakṣyati. vākyārthatvaṃ tu tasyāḥ 
prameyatvāt, sā hi vākyena kāryaliṅgenānumīyate dhūmenevagniḥ: “Why is it 
imagined? He explains: “The referent of the sentence,” etc. Since the referent of the 
sentence technically called intuition at first is caused to arise in those that have not 




someone who has no knowledge of the referent of the syntactical word is incapable 
of understanding in his mind right away (pūrvam) the referent of the sentence; 
therefore, since the syntactical word is a means of understanding the partless 
sentence referent in the same way as a stem and an affix, its referent is invented, 
although the syntactical word is unreal (asat) as denoting (vācaka) [its referent].” 
This intuition as sentence referent, moreover, is both the one that arises in the 
listener from the sentence, being attached to the existence continuum of the listener, 
and the one that causes the sentence to become manifest, being attached to the 
existence continuum of the speaker. Of these [two] (tatra) it is explained with regard 
to the first mentioned: “Yet, the referent of the sentence which is called intuition 
(pratibhā) is in the beginning (ādau) produced by it [namely the syntactical word].” 
Moreover, [the intuition’s] being the sentence referent is due to the fact that it 
prompts it [i.e. intuition]. For a speaker applies a sentence to that purpose, thinking: 
“Hopefully the other will get in his mind an intuition concerning the referent of the 
sentence.” Moreover, the one [i.e. intuition] that causes the sentence to become 
manifest he is going to explain in the statement “only (eva) the sentence and its 
referent are the principal speech unit and the principal referent.” However, [the 
intuition’s] being the sentence referent is due to the fact that it is an object of 
cognition, for it is inferred from the sentence as an indicator of its effect, just as fire 
[is infered] from smoke.” 
 (1) em. (cf. blos ṅag gi don T) : dhīvākṣārtham Ms 
(2) em. (cf. brtags T) : padasyārthavata prekṣyate Ms 
(3) em. : uparśayate Ms 
(4) conj. : dīpād Ms (cf. ṅag gi sgron ma las sic T). 
 
[291] padasyāsato <'pi>(1) vākyād apoddhtasya yathāgamaṃ utprekṣayārtho 
vyavasthāpyate kevalasyāprayogāt praktipratyayavat. sā cotprekṣānyeṣv āgameṣv 
ayuktārthagrahaṇī(2). tasmād idam arthāntaram utkṣiptam, <yasmād(3) ādāv ana-
bhyastaśabdārthasambandhānām padārthagrahaṇopāyā(4) vākyārthapratibhā>. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 236b6-237a7: padasyāsata(5) iti … tasya padasya vākyāt 
kāryārtham apoddhtasya yathāgamam utprekṣayārtho vyavasthāpyata iti … keva-
lasyāprayogād iti … praktipratyayavad iti … sā cotprekṣetyādi … asmād āgamād 
anyeṣv āgameṣv ayuktārthagrāhaṇī … tasmād idam arthāntaraṃ yuktimad utkṣip-
tam.  
(1) Cf. kyaṅ KV, Ms B 236b3: asato 'pi padasya, cf. no. 553 above;  
(2) ayuktārthagrahaṇī qualifies utprekṣā; K translates as if ayukta qualifies 
utprekṣā, cf. ñe bar dpyod pa de yaṅ ... don ’dzin pa mi rigs pa’i phyir; V is 
syntactically ambiguous as it does not translate artha, cf. luṅ nas bźag pa de yaṅ ... 
mi rigs par ’dzin pa’i phyir. Both versions appear to reproduce tasmāt by means of 
phyir, which is incompatible with the syntax of the pratīka quoted in PSṬ ad loc. T 
reproduces correctly the compound as mi rigs pa’i don ’dzin pa. 
(3) Cf. gaṅ gi phyir KT : de'i phyir V. 
(4) Cf. tshig gi don 'dzin pa'i thabs can T. 
(5) em. : yadasyāsata Ms 
 
558 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 236b6-237a1 quoting VP I:81: padasyāsata iti vācaka-
tvenāsataḥ. yato vākyam eva mukhyaḥ śabdaḥ tasyaivārthena sambandhād vācaka-
tvaṃ, na padānāṃ, varṇavad vyavahārāṅgena vākyārthena śūnyatvāt. yad āha: 





eva sa” (VP I:85) iti: “the syntactical word being unreal” means being unreal as 
denoting [its referent]. Since only the sentence is the principal speech unit, that 
alone has the property of denoting on account of its relation to the thnig meant, but 
not the syntactical words because like the phonemes they are empty of the meaning 
of the sentence as a part of discourse. As [Bharthari] explains: And [the listener] 
who thinks of the speech units that are unreal in the interval(1) [between a first 
element heard and the grasping of an entire sound, word or sentence] as real,(2) this 
is the listeners incapacity. It is only a means of apprehension (VP I 85).”  
(1) Cf. no. 567 below. 
(2) Cf. VPV 152,1: astitvenābhimanyante. 
 
559 The introductory clause is particularly interesting because Dignāga introduces 
the technical term utprekṣā, which plays an important role in Bharthari's VP and 
VPV. Bharthari’s commentator, Vṣabhadeva, explains tarka, which is mentioned 
together with āgama and anumāna at VPV I 10,4, as liṅgam antareṇa svayam-
utprekṣāpratibhānaṃ tarkaḥ, cf. VPV I 10,20. It is thus clear that utprekṣā is used to 
denote invention as not dependent upon an inferential indicator (liṅga) like in 
inference (anumāna). Although Bharthari rarely uses it, its importance appears 
from a central passage at VPV I 65,1-6 (ad VP I:24), which undoubtedly must have 
been known to Dignāga because his own formulation would seem to imitate it (cf. 
Pind 2003): tatrāpoddhārapadārtho nāmātyantasaṃsṣṭaḥ saṃsargād anumeyena 
parikalpitena rūpeṇa praktavivekaḥ sann apoddhriyate. praviviktasya hi tasya 
vastuno vyavahārātītaṃ rūpam. tat tu svapratyayānukāreṇa yathāgamam bhāvanā-
bhyāsavaśād utprekṣayā prāyeṇa vyavasthāpyate(1). tathaiva cāpravibhāge śabdāt-
mani kāryārtham anvayavyatirekābhyām rūpasamanugamakalpanayā samudāyād 
apoddhtānāṃ śabdānām abhidheyatvenāśriyate: “Now, what is called the referent 
of the syntactical word obtained by means of abstraction, is abstracted from its 
connection [with the other syntactical words] although it is closely connected [with 
them], its separation [from them] being accomplished in an inferred conceptually 
constructed form. For the form of this object in its isolated state is beyond common 
usage. In general, however, it is defined by way of invention in accordance with 
one's own ideas, under the influence of residual memory traces due to repeated 
practice according to this or that āgama. And thus in the segmentless speech unit it 
is taken as the denotable object of the speech units as isolated from their aggregate 
through grammatical analysis by way of constructing conceptually the recurrence of 
their form through joint presence and joint absence for the sake of the grammatical 
operations.”  
It is thus clear that for Bharthari invention in this particular context is similar to 
systematic deliberation, which involves the inductive process of generalisation 
through joint presence and joint absence. Notice Bharthari's use of the term 
svapratyaya, which Dignāga introduces in the following kārikā PS V:47. 
Another parallel occurs at NCV 549,2-3: vākyārthapratipattyupāyaḥ padārtho 
'san vākyād apoddhtya utprekṣayā vyākhyāyate: “The meaning of the syntactical 
word that is a means of cognizing the meaning of the sentence is explained by way 
of deliberation, having abtracted it from the sentence.”  
The term utprekṣā occurs once at VP III 241c, where it appears to denote the 
action of imagining (something unreal), cf. Helarāja Vol. I 180,9-10 ad VP III.2:86: 




In his criticism of Bharthari's philosophy of language at NC 581,1f, Mallavādi 
states immediately after quoting VP II:129-31 that according to Bharthari the 
referent of a speech unit is grasped by means of darśana, a particular doctrine or 
utprekṣā, deliberation. Siṃhasūri explains that it is grasped as the denotable object 
by means of the doctrine about primordial materiality (pradhāna), and so on, or by 
the deliberation of a person, cf. NCV 581,21ff: darśanotprekṣābhyām ityādi: 
pradhānādidarśanena puruṣasya utprekṣāyā vārtham abhidheyatvena upagrahya.  
Bharthari is also using the verb utprekṣate at VP II:236 in the sense of 'to think 
up' i.e., 'to deliberate.' Since PS V 46 describes exclusion of other [referents] as 
imagined vikalpitaḥ, the parallel statement of the vtti that the “referent of the 
syntactical word is determined by way of deliberation” would indicate that utprekṣā 
in this particular context is used of a similar type of conceptualisation of the 
reference of individual speech units. It would seem from Dignāga's subsequent 
rejection of the use of deliberation in other traditions as not founded on justified 
procedures that he is using it with the background of Bharthari's view of induction 
through joint presence and absence. Exclusion of other [referents] as a means of 
positing the referent of any given speech unit is ultimately based upon the inductive 
procedure of joint presence and joint absence (v. PS V:34 above), which could be 
described as an instance of tarka as suggested by Vṣabhadeva’s gloss. But in 
contrast to the grammatical tradition represented by Bharthari, the Dignāgan 
version of this procedure emphasises the predominance of joint absence over joint 
presence. In the passage from VPV quoted above Bhathari refers expressly to 
anvyayavyatireka as the means of positing thought up speech units as referents for 
the sake of explaining the relevant grammatical operations. It seems therefore clear 
that he uses utprekṣā along with kalpanā to describe the nature of this procedure, 
one he himself endorses elsewhere in VP as a natural extension of its use in 
Mahābhāṣya, e.g., at VP II:166: ye śabdā nityasambandhā jñātaśaktayaḥ, anvaya-
vyatirekābhyāṃ teṣām artho vibhajyate. This procedure, however, introduces speech 
units that although valuable in śāstraic discourse are ultimately thought up, cf. 
svavtti 249,6-8 ad VP II:233: iha sarveṣv eva śāstreṣu trayyāntavādino manyante: 
sarvaśaktim artham utprekṣayā pravibhajyāvidyām anuvartayanto prāyeṇa pthak 
tīrthapravādāḥ pratāyante. In these circumstances it is understandable why Dignāga 
introduces the concept of utprekṣā and at the same time describes the referent 
defined by means of apoddhāra as imagined.  
(1)Cf. Paddhati 65,20-21: etad āha: taṃ tam āgamam āśtya tadabhyāsāt svayam 
pratyayam anugacchanta utprekṣayā vyavasthāpayantīti.  
 
560 Cf. ñe bar dpyad nas K : om. V. 
 
561 As opposed to other traditions according to which the particulars, the general 
property, the relation, and the general property possessor are the referents of the 
syntactical word, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a1-2: yasya (scil. padasya) ya āgamaḥ: keṣāṃ 
cid bhedā vācyāḥ, padasyārtha ity āgamaḥ, (1) pareṣāṃ jātir, anyeṣāṃ sambandhaḥ, 
keṣāṃ cit tadvad iti.  
(1) This phrase appears to be misplaced. T reads gaṅ gi luṅ gaṅ yin pa ’ga’ źig 
rnams kyis (sic) brjod par bya ba tha dad pa’i tshig gi don can no źes pa luṅ ste, 
which does not reproduce the syntax of the Sanskrit version. It should probably 





yasya (scil. padasya) ya āgamaḥ: keṣāṃ cid bhedā vācyāḥ, pareṣāṃ jātir, anyeṣāṃ 
sambandhaḥ, keṣāṃ cit tadvad iti padasyārtha ity āgamaḥ. 
 
562 As an example of the impossibility of using a syntactical word in isolation 
Jinendrabuddhi quotes a version of an often quoted vārttika stating that when no 
other syntactical verb is heard, 3. sg. pr. of the root √as ‘to be, to exist' is 
understood. The quotation is followed by the citation of VP II:271. It is interesting 
in this particular context that the explanation is related to similar statements in VPV 
I 65,7ff (ad VP I:24), cf. Ms 237a2-3: laukikāt viprayogāc chabdānām artho 
nirdhāryate. na ca loke kevalasya padasya prayogo 'sti. “yatrāpi hy anyat kriyāpa-
daṃ na śrūyate vkṣaḥ plakṣa iti, tatrāpy astir bhavantīparaḥ prathamapuruṣo(1) 
'prayujyamāno 'stīti gamyate(2).” tathā coktaṃ “yac ca ko 'yam iti praśne gaur 
aśva iti cocyate, praśna eva kriyā tatra prakrāntā darśanād<ike”>(3) (VP II:271) ti: 
“The referent of speech units is ascertained by departing from common usage; for 
among people a syntactical word is not used in isolation. For even when a different 
syntactical word denoting an action is not heard like in the statement “plakṣa is a 
tree,”(4) even in that case, without the the verb AS being applied in present, first 
person singular, one understands “is;” and similarly it is said: and when someone 
answers the question “what is that” by saying “a cow” or “a horse,” an action like 
observing is resorted to in the question (VP II:271).” 
(1) em. : ˚puruṣe Ms 
(2) Cf. the discussion at Mahābhāṣya Vol. I 443,5-8 on vārtt 11 ad A II 3:1 as 
well as Kaiyaṭa's statement at Mahābhāṣyapradīpa Vol. V 402,6-7: anye tu 
varṇayanti: yatra kriyāpadaṃ na śrūyate tatrāstir bhavantīparaḥ prathamapuruṣo 
'prayujyamāno 'py astī ti gamyata iti. 
(3) em. : ˚ād iti Ms (cf. mthoṅ ba’i phyir T). 
(4) The discussion evidently centres on the syntactical peculiarity of nominal 
sentences like “plakṣa (is) a tree,” in which no verb is expressly stated, and 
addresses the rationale of supplementing copula. Bharthari reinterprets the discus-
sion in the light of his metaphysics of being, cf. VPV I 66,2-3: yāvac cāpavāda-
bhūtāḥ kriyāviśeṣāḥ śabdapravttikāraṇam astitvam na nivartayanti tāvad astir 
bhavantīparaḥ prathamapuruṣo 'prayujyamāno 'pi vkṣādibhiḥ padair ākṣiptaḥ 
pratīyate. 
 
563 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 236b4-6: padavādino hi padam avidyamānapraktyādivibhā-
gam arthe prayujyate. praktipratyayau tu kevalam padārtham āśrīyete, na tu 
kevalau prayujyete. na cāprayujyamānayoḥ sattvam avadhārayituṃ śakyam. ato na 
sta eva tau. tathāpi yathā tayor artha utprekṣayocyate tathā padasya: “For accord-
ing to some who adheres to the idea of the syntactical word, the syntactical word in 
which there is no division into stem and affix is applied to the referent. Stem and 
affix, however, rely merely on the meaning of the syntactical word, they are not 
applied alone; and it is impossible to decide upon the existence of the two, when 
they are not applied [alone]. Therefore they do not exist. Nevertheless, their referent 
is told by means of invention,(1) in the same way as [the referent] of the syntactical 
word;” cf. the discussion of kevalasyāprayogaḥ at Mahā-bh I 219,10-18 (vārt 7-8); 
VP II:194ab: pratyayo vācakatve 'pi kevalo na prayujyate (cf. vyapekṣāpadasya 
kevalasyāprayogāt, ct. ad. loc.).  
(1)The fact that Jinendrabuddhi is using the term utprekṣā in this context supports 




anvaya and vyatireka. In fact, Patañjali introduces the description of how to 
determine the denotation of any given affix by means of joint presence and joint 
absence immediately after having addressed the question at Mahā-bh loc. cit. of 
whether or not it is meaningful to talk about referents of affixes that do not exist 
apart from the syntactical word. 
 
564 KV translates this compound differently, v. no. [291] above. 
 
565 That is, in other traditions than the present one, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a6: asmād 
āgamād anyeṣv āgameṣu. Jinendrabuddhi quotes PS V 2a as an illustration of the 
unjustified views about the referent current in other schools, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a7: 
yathā tathoktaṃ “na jātiśabdo bhedānām” ityādinā. 
 
566 That is, exclusion of other referents, which is based upon systematic and 
logical thinking (yukti), cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a7: yuktimad … anyāpohākhyam. As an 
example of the logical thinking involved in exclusion of other referents Jinendra-
buddhi continues quoting PS V:34: yuktimattvaṃ cāsya pratipāditam “adṣṭer 
anyaśabdārthe” (lacuna in Ms B corresponding to text translated in T 216,6-33, 
ending with brjod ´dod kyaṅ ’phen te = vivakṣāpy ākṣipyate Ms B 237a7-237b1). 
 
567 This clause explains according to T 216,7 the purpose of the imagined 
referent of the syntactical word ([vi]kalpitapadārthaprayojanam). 
 
568 Cf. T 216,16-20: Those who have not repeatedly experienced the connection 
between the word and its referent (*anabhyastaśabdārthasambandhāḥ) they cognize 
the referent of the sentence as having as its means the apprehension of the referent 
of the syntactical word. But those who happen to be knowledgeable about the 
meaning of the sentence due to repeated experience of the connection between the 
word and its referent (*śabdārthasambandhābhyāsāt), their intuition, which is 
concerned with a sentence referent without parts, is due to a partless sentence only.” 
 
[292] vākyam eva tadarthaś ca mukhyau śabdārthau, tayor abhinnatvāt. <yas tv 
anyas tadantarāle(1) śabdārthagrahaṇābhimānaḥ, sa utprekṣayā, niraṅkuśatvāt>(2). 
Restored, cf. Ms B 236b6: vākyam eva tadarthaś ca mukhyau śabdārthāv(3) ity atra 
vakṣyati; YD 96,21: vākyam eva(4) tadarthaś ca mukhyau śabdārthau, tayor abhin-
natvāt(4).  
(1)Cf. de'i naṅ nas K : phyis (sic) V.  
(2)As it appears from Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase at T 216,26-29, he quotes this 
clause interspersed with glosses. For Sanskrit parallels to niraṅkuśatvāt, cf. no.s 
574-75 below. 
(3)°ārthāv em. (cf. sgra'i don T) : śabdau ity Ms 
(4)So read; KPD evaṃ ca, A eca, ed. ekaṃ ca;  
(5)So read with Dkha, ed. abhinnārthatvāt (cf. tha mi dad pa'i phyir K : tha dad 
med pa'i phyir V). 
 
569 Cf. Kaiyata's similar explanation of Patañjali's definition of the meaning of a 
sentence (cf. Mbh I 218,10: eṣām padānāṃ sāmānye vartamānānāṃ yadviśeṣe 
'vasthānaṃ sa vākyārthaḥ) at Mahā-bh-P Vol. II 60,13f: yadviśeṣe pādārthasaṃsar-





mukhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ. Dignāga refers briefly at PSV II:4c to those who assert that 
only the sentence is a speech unit, evidently with Bharthari's standpoint in mind, cf. 
no. 2 above. 
 
570 Cf. T 216,24-26: “The syntactical words, and so on, are not like segments 
(*bhāgabhūtāḥ) in the sentence, nor are the referents of the syntactical words [like 
segments] in the referent of the sentence because they are invented (*utprekṣitatvāt). 
Their referent is like the referent of a stem and an affix.” 
 
571 That is, “the interval between a first element heard and the grasping of an 
entire sound, word or sentence,” cf. Cardona 1999: 314 no. 165. Dignāga evidently 
has VP I:85 in mind, q.v. above no. 559. 
 
572 Cf. T 216,26-28: “The other belief in apprehending a speech unit (*śabdagra-
haṇābhimānaḥ) in the syntactical nominal (*pade) and a referent of the speech unit 
in the syntactical nominal is mistaken” (*viparītaḥ). 
 
573 That is, utprekṣā is an independent unstoppable mental force capable of 
conjuring up entities like “a hundred herds of elephants sitting on the tip of a 
finger,” cf. VP III.2:86 (with Helarāja's VPP Vol. I p. 180,9 ad loc.): avastuṣv api 
notprekṣā kasya cit pratibadhyate, which Dignāga obviously has in mind. It is 
remarkable in this context that the Tibetan version of Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīkṣā, 
which largely consists of verses lifted from VP III.2, omits this verse. Jinendra-
buddhi comments at T 216,29f: “The meaning is ‘because it is self-dependent' 
(*svātantryāt); and its selfdependence is due to its not being dependent upon a 
referent; and for this very reason it is impossible to stop it when it is found to 
venture beyond real things (*vastu).”  
It has not been possible to trace similar statements about the nature of utprekṣā 
to Bharthari's VPV I or the fragmentary VPV II, but Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 
on Brahmasūtra II.1.3:11, offers a striking parallel to Dignāga's description of 
utprekṣā as unfettered: yasmān nirāgamāḥ puruṣotprekṣāmātranibandhanās tarkā 
apratiṣṭhitā bhavanti, utprekṣāyā niraṅkuśatvāt. The vocabulary and the sceptical 
attitude towards the validity of tarka is reminiscent of Bharthari; interestingly 
Vacaspati’s Bhāmatī ad loc. quotes Bharthari’s VP I:34, which places Śaṅkara's 
vocabulary in the context of the Vedānta tradition to which Bharthari sometimes 
refers, e.g., in the crucial passage at VPV II 249,6ff in which the concept of utprekṣā 
occupies a prominent place. 
 
574 Cf. lcags kyu med pa yin pa'i phyir ro V : lcags kyu med pa'i phyir ro K : 
lcags kyu med pa ñid kyi phyir T, which translates Sanskrit niraṅkuśatvāt, cf. 
Mhvyut 4981 and Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra II.3:11 q.v. no. 
573 above.  
 
[293] <ye 'py artheṣu> pratibhām hitvā anyam bāhyam artham <tatsam-
bandhaṃ>(1) vā vākyārthaṃ kalpayanti, teṣām api tat kalpanāmātram. Restored, cf. 
PSṬ Ms B 237b1.: pratibhāṃ vivakṣāṃ ca hitvety arthaḥ. tato 'nyam bāhyam 
arthaṃ gavādikaṃ, bāhyārthānāṃ sambandhaṃ <vā>(2), parasparopakāralak-




(1)Cf. de daṅ 'brel pa V (Ms B 237b3: tato na bāhyo 'rthaḥ tatsambandho vā 
vākyārtha upapadyate) : 'brel pa K.  
(2)vā em., cf. 'am T 216,35: om. Ms; cf., however, Ms B 237b3 above.  
(3)vākyā° conj. (cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b3 above): śabdā° Ms 
 
575 Ms B 237b1.: gavādikam; cf. VP II:132: yo vārtho buddhiviṣayo 
bāhyavastunibandhanaḥ, sa bāhyavastv iti jñātaḥ śabdārtha iti gamyate.(1) 
(1)The ct. attributed to Puṇyarāja comments upon this verse in the light of 
Dharmakīrti's philosophy, cf. PVSV pp. 38-39. 
 
576 That is, the connection that is characterized by the mutual assistance of the 
external referents, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b 1.: bāhyārthānāṃ sambandhaṃ <vā>(1) 
parasparopakāralakṣaṇam. The emphasis is probably on the co-operation of the 
external referents as means of realisation (sādhana) of a particular action; cf. 
Jinendrabuddhi's remarks at Ms B 62a5-6 on the statement vākyam eva śabdaḥ, q.v. 
above no. 2. Cf. NMañj 300,11: anye vāstavaḥ padārthānām parasparasaṃsargo 
bāhya eva vākyārtha ity āhuḥ.  
(1)Cf. no. [293] above. 
 
577 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a1: niryuktikam arthaśūnyam ity arthaḥ.  
 
[294] yathābhyāsaṃ hi vākyebhyo vināpy arthena jāyate, svapratyayānukāreṇa 
pratipattir anekadhā. Qu. YD 75,5-6, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b2: yathābhyāsaṃ hītyādi … 
svapratyayānukāreṇeti. 
 
578 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b2: yo yo 'bhyāso yathābhyāsam. 
 
579 Pāda d pratipattir anekadhā is lifted from VP II:134: yathendriyasannipatad 
vaicitryeṇopadarśakam, tathaiva śabdād arthasya pratipattir anekadhā; cf. ŚV 
Vākyādhikaraṇa 325cd-326ab: pratibhānekadhā puṃsāṃ yady apy artheṣu jāyate, 
tathāpi bāhya evārthas tasya vākyasya ceṣyate. 
 
580 PS V 47c svapratyayānukāreṇa is identical with VP II:135c. Dignāga 
undoubtedly uses the term in the same sense as Bharthari who applies it in the sense 
of ‘own idea,' cf. VP II:135: vaktrānyathaiva prakrānto bhinneṣu pratipattṣu, 
svapratyayānukāreṇa śabdārthaḥ pravibhajyate: “The denotation to which a 
speaker has resorted in another way is differentiated among different listeners in 
accordance with their own ideas.” Puṇyarāja explains ad loc.: tathā vaiśeṣikeṇāva-
yavinam pratipādayituṃ ghaṭaśabdaḥ prayuktaḥ sāṅkhyair guṇasamāharamātram 
abhimanyate, jainasaugataiḥ paramāṇusañcayamātram iti: “For instance, the word 
'pot' that is applied by a Vaiśeṣika to make people understand that it is a whole 
consisting of parts, is considered by the Sāṅkhyas to be a mere aggregate of the 
guṇas, by the Jains and Buddhists a mere collection of atoms.” This explanation is 
corroborated by Vṣabhadeva's Paddhati 199,17-8 (on VPV I 199,4: pratipattir 
upapadyate): yathā vaiśeṣikasya ghaṭaśrutāv avayavini pratipattir apareṣāṃ 
saṅghamātre. Vṣabhadeva mentions svapratyaya as a factor in the listener's 
decoding of a sentence at Paddhati 75,7-8: sa hi pratipattā krameṇārtham 
pratipadyamānaḥ svapratyayānusāreṇa śabdagatām abhidhāṃ kramavatīṃ vyava-





accordance with his own ideas establishes that the denotation inherent in the speech 
unit involves progression.” 
The term svapratyaya in the sense of ‘own idea’ is also found at 
Mahāyanasūtrālaṅkāra I 20: yathārute 'rthe parikalpyamāne, svapratyayo hānim 
upaiti buddheḥ: “When the referent is imagined according to the word that 
expresses it, one's own ideas ruins one's understanding.” Vasubhandhu's gloss 
svapratyaya iti svayandṣṭiparāmarśakaḥ: “svapratyaya means reflection upon 
one's own views,” leaves no doubt about the meaning. 
Jinendrabuddhi, on the other hand, interprets svapratyaya in the sense of ‘own 
cause’ which he understands as a vāsanā, i.e., a ‘latent impression’ whose substrate 
is vijñāna, explaining that in conformity with this cause a cognition of different 
aspects arises in conformity with repeated practice [in a former existence] even 
without an outer referent. Consequently it is not justified to assume that the meaning 
of a sentence is the outer referent or its relation [with another referent], cf. PSṬ Ms 
B 237b2-3: svapratyayo vijñānādhārā vāsanā tadānurūpyeṇa vināpi bāhyenārthena 
yato yathābhyāsam pratipattir anekākārotpadyate, tato na bāhyo 'rthaḥ tatsam-
bandho vā vākyārtha upapadyate.  
 
[295] <asaty api bāhye 'rthe> vākyāt svapratyayānurūpyeṇārthābhyāsavasanā-
pekṣā- rthakriyāpratipattir nānārūpotpadyate(1) vikalpaś ca,(2) vyāghrādiśrutivat. 
tadaviśeṣe vā(3) śrṅgārakāvyasya śravaṇād rāgiṇāṃ rāgānurūpā pratītir bhavati, 
vītarāgāṇāṃ tu vegānurūpā. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b4-238a1: arthābhyāsa-
vāsanā tadapekṣā tannimittārthakriyāpratipattiḥ nānārūpotpadyate, … vākyasya 
vāsanāprabodhanimittatāṃ darśayituṃ vākyād ity uktam. svapratyayānurūpyeṇeti 
… vyāghrādiśrutivad iti … tadaviśeṣe vā vākyārthasyāviśeṣeṣv arthakriyāprati-
pattir(4) vikalpaś cotpadyata iti praktena sambandhaḥ. śṅgārakāvyasya śravaṇād 
iti. … abhinne 'pi vastuni rāgiṇāṃ rāgānurūpā pratītir bhavati manojñākāratvāt, 
vītarāgāṇāṃ tu saṃvegānurūpā.  
(1) For a similar phrase, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b4-5: arthakriyām pratipattā yayā 
pratibhayotpannayā pratipadyate sārthakriyāpratipattir nānārūpotpadyate. 
(2) Cf. the above syntactical remark: vikalpaś cotpadyata iti praktena samban-
dhaḥ, which shows that the phrase vikalpaś ca must have been an integral part of the 
original formulation of the preceding sentence that applies similarly to the subject 
matter of the following one. The proposed restoration is corroborated by K and V, 
although the latter confuses the argument completely by taking tadaviśeṣe as part of 
the phrase, presumably because of a wrong punctuation, cf. rnam par rtog pa sna 
tshogs pa skyed par byed do V : don bya ba (so read : don K, cf. don byed pa ltar 
rtogs pa V) rtogs pa'i rtog pa K.  
(3)K reproduces vā by yaṅ. 
(4) arthakriyā° em. (don bya ba T) : kriyā° Ms 
 
581 Cf. the analogous expression at ŚV Apoha° 40ab: asaty api ca bāhye 'rthe 
vākyārthapratibhā tathā, padārthe 'pi tathaiva syāt kim apohaḥ prakalpyate. 
 
582 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b4-5: arthakriyām pratipattā yayā pratibhayotpannayā 
pratipadyate sārthakriyāpratipattir nānārūpotpadyate. (1) 
The intimate connection between pratibhā and arthakriyā is also stressed by 
Bharthari, cf. VPV I 75,4: arthakriyāviṣayā pratibhā (ad VP I:24-26): “pratibhā 




(1)Cf. no. [295] above. 
 
583 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b5-6: yasya yādśī vāsanā tasya tadanurūpaiva pratibho-
pajāyata ity arthaḥ. 
 
584 Repeated practice (abhyāsa) is mentioned by Bharthari as one of the six 
causes of pratibhā, cf. VP II:152; cf. Iyer 1969: 88ff. 
 
585 Cf. Bharthari's description, at VPV I (ad VP I:113) 186,5 foll., of how the 
impulses and dispositions that the use of language leaves in babies in their former 
lives determine their cognitions relative to this or that purposeful action: samāviṣṭa-
vācāṃ ca svajātiṣu bālānām api pūrvaśabdāveśabhāvānāsaṃskārādhānāt tāsu tāsv 
arthakriyāsv anākhyeyaśabdanibandhanā pratipattir utpadyate. 
 YD 75,8-9: yena hi yo 'rtho 'bhyastaḥ sukhāditvena tasya vināpi tenārthena 
śabdamātrāt pratipattir utpadyate: “The cognition of someone about a referent he 
has learnt from repeated practice to be pleasant, and so on, arises from the mere 
word even without the referent.” 
 
586 Dignāga's formulation is similar to Bharthari's statement at VPV I 199,3-4: 
pratipuruṣaṃ tu bhāvanānuvidhāyinī saty asati vārthe svapratyayānukāreṇa bhin-
narūpā śabdebhyaḥ pratipattir upapadyate: “It is rather the case that for each 
person words give rise to different cognitions of the referent irrespective of whether 
it exists or not, [cognitions] that reflect his bhāvanā [i.e., the residual traces left by 
usage in former lives of the said person](1) in accordance with his own ideas.”  
See Pind 2003. 
(1)For the concept of bhāvānā, cf. Iyer 1969: 90ff. Biardeau 1964: 317-18; 333-
34. 
 
587 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b6-7: asaty api vyāghre vyāghras tiṣṭhatīty ukte 
vyāghrasādhanasthānakriyāpratibhāsā pratītir upajāyate. ādiśabdena nadyastīre 
guḍaśakaṭam paryastam ityādi grahaṇam: “Although there is no tiger, when it is 
said 'a tiger is near by' a cognition arises that is reflected as the means [of effecting 
an action] viz. a tiger and the action of standing near by. By the word ‘etc.' is meant 
[statements] like ‘a wagon load of molasses lies overturned at the river bank.'” 
Cf. NCV 548,2–549,1: śabdābhyāsavāsanājanitārtheṣu pratibhā vākyebhyo 
jāyate tiraścām manuṣyāṇāṃ(1) ca yathābhyāsaṃ svajātiniyatā svapratyayānukāre-
ṇa(2) śūrakātarādīnām iva vyāghrādiśabdaśravaṇāt kopaharśabhayādinimittetyādi 
yathāvad(3) anugantavyam: “In animals and human beings an intuition that is 
restricted to their own class in accordance with practice and according to their own 
ideas arises from sentences about referents that are generated by latent impressions 
due to verbal practice. As for instance, that of heroes or cowards, which because of 
hearing the expression 'the tiger [is here]', and so on, are motivated by anger, 
excitement, or fear, etc.”  
(1)Cf. VP II:117.  
(2)Cf. VPṬ II 57,18-19: tena pratiniyatajātyanusāreṇaiva niyataiva kācit 
pratibhā prabodhyate.  
(3)YD 75,9-11: tadyathā vyāghro 'tra prativasatīty ukte vināpi bāhyenārthenā-
bhyāsavaśād eva svedavepathuprabhtayo bhavanti: “For instance, when someone 





of practice [with regard to the referent of the sentence], even without the outer 
referent;” cf. ibid. 76,9-10 which apears to paraphrase Dignāga's statement: arthā-
bhyāsavāsanāpekṣāsatsv api vyāghrādiṣu pratipattir utpadyata iti: “A cognition 
about tigers and so on arises, although they are non-existent, dependent upon the 
latent impressions [that result] from repeated practice [in a former existence].” 
The example of the tiger is also mentioned by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his criticism of 
the concept of pratibhā at NMañj 335,28-30: yo 'pi vyāghra āyāta ity ukte śūra-
kātaranarādhikaraṇanānāprakārakāryotpādaḥ sa bāhye 'rthe vyāghrāgamanādau 
pratipanne vāsanānusārena bhavan, na pratibhāmātrahetuko bhavati; cf. op.cit. 
336,2-3: tathā śabdārthe 'pi vyāghrāgamane 'vagate śurāṇām utsahāḥ katarāṇām 
bhayam ityādi kāryam bhavati.  
Kumārila alludes to it at ŚV Vākyā° 329cd-330ab: anekākāratā yāpi śūra-
bhīrudhiyam prati vāsanānugrahāt soktā kuṇapādimater iva; cf., although in a 
different context, VP II:321: vyāghrādivyapadeśena yathā nivartyate asatyo 'pi 
tathā kaścit pratyavāyo vidhīyate. 
 
588 That is, the referent of the sentence, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b7: 
vākyārthasyāviśeṣeṣu. The author of YD explains the determining force of the 
vāsanās on the way in which individuals interpret the same utterance by alluding to 
the well-known example of a woman that gives rise to different ideas depending 
upon whether it is a lover, an ascetic, or a dog that is “thinking” of her, cf. op.cit. 
75,1-3: āha yo 'nādau saṃsāre devamanuṣyatiraścām(1) abhinne 'rthe bāhye 
stryādau pratyaye pūrvābhyāsavāsanāpekṣaḥ kuṇapakāminībhakṣyādyākārabhinna-
pratyaya itikartavyatāṅgam utpadyate sā hi pratibhā.  
Kumārila alludes to the same example in the pūrvapakṣa of ŚV Śūnya° 58-61cd: 
nakṣatraṃ tārakā tiṣyo dārā ityevamādiṣu | naikatrārthe viruddhatvāl liṅgānekatva-
sambhavaḥ, parivrāṭkāmukaśunāṃ kuṇapādimatis tathā; cf. the rebuttal introducing 
the term svapratyayānukāra at 215ab-216ab: kuṇapādimatau caivaṃ sārvarūpye 
vyavasthite vāsanāḥ sahakāriṇyo vyavasthākāradarśane. svapratyayānukāro hi 
bahvākāreṣu vastuṣu.  
It is also mentioned by Dharmakīrti at PVSV 32,6-7: yathā rūpadarśanāviśeṣe 
'pi kuṇapakāminībhakṣyavikalpāḥ, and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa at NMañj 335,32–336,3: 
yathāvasthite vanitātmani bāhye 'rthe vāsanānusāreṇa kuṇapa iti kāminīti bhak-
ṣyam iti pratibhā bhavanti. 
The fixed order of the examles presupposes that they were quoted from a verse 
text, as the three terms kuṇapaḥ kāminī bhakṣya constitute a śloka pāda like 
parivrāṭkāmukaśunām quoted by Kumārila. This being the case, Bodhicittavivaraṇa 
20 seems to be a likely source, as parivrāṭkāmukaśunām ekasyām pramādatanau 
kuṇapaḥ kāminī bhakṣya iti tisro vikalpanāḥ is meant to illustrate the statement of 
verse 19 that there are different views about an object in the outer world (*bāh-
yārtha) that has one and the same appearence (*ekākāra), which is the subject 
matter of this paragraph. 
 
589 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b7-238a1: adharapayodharādisaṃvarṇanāvākyaśravaṇāt: 
“From hearing sentences in which lips and breasts, or the like, are eulogized.” 
 
[296] sāpi vākyāntarārthebhyo <vyavacchinne> 'rtha iṣyate sambandhābhijñasya. 




pratibhāyāḥ pratyakṣānumānayor antarbhāvaṃ darśayitum āha: sāpītyādi; B 
238a5-6 q.v. no. 592 below; 238a7: sambandhābhijñasyeti.  
(1)Pāda d of the Tibetan versions of PS V 48 contain the compound ṅag gi don V 
: ṅag don K = Sanskrit *vākyārthaḥ. However, this term is metrically inconsistent 
with pāda d of the verse. It is most likely a gloss on pratibhā that was interpolated 
into the verse to identify the referent of the pronoun sā at pāda a. For *sā, cf. 'di yaṅ 
V : om. K; the reading of PS V 48d gźan min KV is a semantic substitute m.c. for 
tha dad min = na bhidyate, which occurs in the subsequent vtti of PSV V 48 (tha 
dad pa ma yin no K : gźan ma yin no V). 
 
590 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 238a7: yaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaṃ jānāti,  
 
591 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 238a5-6: Devadatta gām abhyāja śuklām ityāder vākyād yā 
śrotuḥ pratibhopajāyate sā Yajñadatta Pāṭaliputraṃ gacchetyādīnāṃ vākyāntarā-
ṇāṃ ye 'rthās tebhyo vyāvtte 'rthe pratibhāsāmānyaviśeṣa(1) iṣyate: “The intuition 
that arises in the listener because of a sentence like 'Devadatta, bring a white cow'(2) 
is claimed to be of a referent, that is of a particular general type of intuition, as 
excluded from the referents of other sentences like ‘Yajñadatta, go to Pāṭaliputra'.”  
(1)Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms 238a6-7 of the reason for using the 
term pratibhāsāmānyaviśeṣa: tad evaṃ yāvanti vākyāni tāvanty eva pratibhās tadar-
thaviṣayā ity uktam bhavati. etena pratibhānekatvaṃ darśayān pratibhāsāmānyaṃ 
vākyasamutthāyāḥ pratīter viṣayo 'stīti sūcayati. anekaviṣayādhāraṃ hi sāmānyam 
pratītam: “What is meant is as follows: there are just as many intuitions, whose 
objects are the referents of the [sentences], as there are sentences. Showing thereby 
that there are many intuitions he indicates that the general property intuition is the 
object of a cognition that originates from a sentence. For it is understood that the 
general property is the container of many objects.”  
The introduction of the term pratibhāsāmānyaviśeṣa reflects the discussion about 
whether or not verbal communication complies with the canon of the trairūpya, cf. 
no. 9 above and Appendix 1. 
(2)Cf. Mahā-bh I 217,25. 
 
592 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 238a7-238b1: etena vākyaṃ liṅgam(1) iti manyamāno yā 
sāmānyarūpe 'rthe sambandhābhijñasya liṅgāt pratītir bhavati, sānumānaṃ dhū-
māgnipratītivat. tathā ca śrotur vaktpratibhāyām pratibheti: “Therefore, in that he 
takes the sentence as an indicator (liṅgam), the cognition that someone who knows 
the connection (between the word and its referent) gets from the indicator about the 
referent in a general form, is inference like the inference of fire from smoke; and in 
the same way the listener has an intuition of the intuition of the speaker.”  
(1)liṅgam conj. (cf. rtags T) : om. Ms 
 
593The Tibetan translations of PSV V 48 recorded in K and V differ considerably, 
and PSṬ contains nothing that would make it possible to infer the readings of the 
underlying Sanskrit text. The translation is based upon K, which unlike V is not 
syntactically confused. For ṅag so so la tha dad (*pratyekaṃ vākye bhidyate) K, V 
reads ṅag gźan las tha dad (*vākyāntarād bhidyate); for tsig gi don bźin du 
(*padārthavat) K, V reads rdzas bźin (dravyavat [sic]). 
 






594 Cf. gaṅ źig ṅag las rtogs pa ni | sna tshogs rtog pa (so read with PN) skye 
'gyur ba K : gaṅ źig ṅag las skyes pa yi | rnam rtog sna tshogs śes pa ni V. The 
expression sna tshogs rtog pa K : rnam rtog sna tshogs = *nānākalpikā. (?) is 
related to the statement at PSV V:47 (q.v. above) about arthakriyāpratipattiḥ (rtogs 
pa K : śes pa V) and vikalpaḥ (rnam rtog V : rtog K) of various forms (nānārūpā, 
sna tshogs KV) that arise due to a sentence. 
 
595 Cf. 'das ma yin K : gźan ma yin V. 
 
596 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b1-2: yat svasaṃvedyaṃ tat saṃvedane pratyakṣe 
'ntarbhavati, rāgādivat. pratibhā belongs to the category of mental perception 
(mānasam pratyakṣam) as defined by Dignāga at PS I 6ab: mānasaṃ cārtharā-
gādisvasaṃvittir akalpikā; cf. PS I 7ab: kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāv iṣṭā nārthe 
vikalpanāt. Hattori 1968: 92 (I.45), 94 (I.47), 95 (I.51).  
 
597 Cf. spobs pa K : rtogs pa V. 
 
598 Cf. ni (= Sanskrit tu, cf. PS V 49a, q.v. above) V : yaṅ K. 
 
599 Cf. rig pa yin pas K : raṅ rig yin pa'i phyir V. 
 
[298] yuktaṃ tāvad <naimittikeṣu śabdeṣv> anyāpohenārthābhidhānam, 
yādcchikeṣu tu katham. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b2-3: yuktaṃ tāvad ityādi. 
naimittikā jātiguṇakriyādravyaśabdāḥ. teṣu … anyāpohena sāmānyarūpeṇābhidhā-
naṃ sambhavati. yādcchikeṣu tv ekavastūpanipātiṣu katham.  
 
600 That is, words denoting a general property, a quality, an action, or a 
substance, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b2: naimittikā jātiguṇakriyādravyaśabdāḥ. This 
classification corresponds to the semantic conditions mentioned at PSV I:3d: jāti-
śabdeṣu jātyā gaur iti. guṇaśabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti. kriyāśabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka 
iti. dravyaśabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍī viśāṇīti; cf. Hattori 1968: 83 no. 1.27. Prominent 
Sanskrit grammarians like Bharthari did not accept this classification. Bharthari, 
for instance, explains terms like pācaka and daṇḍin as kt and taddhita derivatives, 
respectively, whose cause of application (pravttinimitta) is a syntactical relation 
(sambandha) that is expressible by means of the abstract affixes tvatalau; this view 
is mentioned by Dignāga who writes: atra kecid āhuḥ - sambandhaviśiṣṭa iti.(1) For 
the idea of sambandha as pravttinimitta, cf. PSV V 9ab §15 above with no. 133 ad 
loc.  
(1) Cf. Kāśikāvtti vol. IV p. 105,30: kecit tu kriyākārakasambandhaṃ kriyā-
śabdānāṃ pravttinimittam icchanti. Like Dignāga, Jinendrabuddhi probably has 
Bharthari’s view in mind. 
 
601 According to the theory to which Dignāga's opponent alludes, arbitrary terms 
are characterized by being applied to a single (eka) not common (asādharaṇa) enti-
ties (vastu) (Cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b3’: yādcchikeṣu tv ekavastūpanipātiṣu katham?). 
Consequently the semantic conditions of such terms differ from those of words 
whose causes of application (pravttinimitta) are general properties, qualities, or 




theory presupposes the existence of general properties, although not as real entities, 
but as defined by exclusion of other referents—equivalent to the absence from the 
locus of the referent of its complement)—the question arises whether proper nouns 
are subsumed under the general apoha theory, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b4: na hi teṣāṃ 
sāmānyam abhidheyaṃ samasty anekādhāratvāt sāmānyasya. etena yādcchikeṣu 
sāmānyārthānabhidhānād abhyupetahānam: “For their denotable object is not the 
general property because the general property has a multitude of substrata. 
Therefore, since the general property as referent is not denoted in the case of 
arbitrary terms you abandon your thesis.” 
Dignāga describes very briefly at PSV I:3d the characteristic of proper nouns as 
that of qualifying a referent by means of a name: yadcchāśabdeṣu hi nāmnā viśiṣṭo 
'rtha ucyate ḍittheti; Jinendrabuddhi explains at PSṬ I 38,4 that proper nouns are 
not dependent upon such causes of application as general properties, cf. Ms loc. cit.: 
anapekṣitajātyādipravttinimittā yādcchāśabdāḥ; NCV 60,5-6: nimittanirapekṣaṃ 
nāma yādcchikaṃ ‘ḍittho', ’ḍavittha' ityādi. 
Yuktidīpikā is the only non-Buddhist source that alludes to Dignāga's view of 
the cause of application of arbitrary terms, cf. YD 100,17-20, q.v. below no. 604 
below.  
(1)Cf., e.g., Patañjali's statement at Mahā-bh I: 19,20: catūṣṭayī śabdānām 
pravttiḥ: jātiśabdā guṇaśabdāḥ kriyāśabdā yadcchaśabdāś caturthāḥ. The view 
that arbitrary terms are without cause of application can be traced to the debate at 
Mahā-bh II 367,18ff (ad A V.1:119), where Patañjali discusses the problem of what 
accounts for the introduction of the bhāvapratyaya tā or tva after arbitrary terms like 
'ḍittha,' when there is no subsisting property (vartin) ḍitthaness in persons like 
ḍittha: ḍitthādiṣu tarhi vartyabhāvāt vttir na prāpnoti: ḍitthatvam, ḍitthatā; Kaiya-
ṭa explains that proper names are not dependent upon a cause of application inherent 
in the object because they apply according to a persons wish, cf. Mahā-bh-P Vol. V: 
348,17-18: ḍitthādayo yadcchaśabdā arthagataṃ na kiṃcit pravttinimittam 
apekṣyante, puruṣecchāvaśena pravartanāt; cf. PVVṬ 419,18-19 (ad PVSV 115,19-
20): bāhyaṃ nimittam antareṇa śabdaprayogecchā yadcchā. tasyām bhāvād yādc-
chikāḥ. teṣu devadattādiṣu vyaktiṣu. 
 
[299] yādcchike 'py <arthābhedāt>(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b4: yādcchike 
'pītyādinā. 
(1) don tha dad phyir K : don bye bas V which translate *arthabhedāt. Dignāga’s 
argument, however, presupposes the suggested emendation 'py arthābhedāt, which 
is consistent with the metre, cf. e.g. PSV V:7c above. For a related error, cf. the 
prose commentary at [300] below. 
 
602 Arbitrary terms like ḍittha denote referents that consist of an aggregate of 
separate properties. Consequently such referents are plural like the referents of 
general terms and thus comparable to those of general terms, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b4: 
ḍitthādīnām anekatvaṃ darśayan, tatrāpi sāmānyam astīti pratipādayati.  
 
[300] yādcchiko hi samudāyavācī ḍitthādiśabdaḥ <samudāyino> 'bhedenāha. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b4-6: yādcchiko hītyādi … kāṇakuṇṭādiguṇasamudāya-






(1) tha dad par K : bye bas V = bhedena sic. The translations of KV are probably 
due to a misinterpretation of the sandhi of the underlying noun phrase <samudā-
yino> 'bhedena. Jinendrabuddhi's gloss sāmānyena ’in a general way’ explains 
abhedena, which occurs in a similar context at Ms B 239b4: vijātīyān sajātīyāṃś 
cābhedenāha. 
 
603 A word like 'ḍittha' denotes an aggregate of qualities like being blind on one 
eye or being dwarfish, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b4-6: kāṇakuṇṭādiguṇasamudāyavācī 
yādcchiko ḍitthādiśabdaḥ. The same examples are mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi 
and Siṃhasūri in their explanations of PSV V:34, v. above no.s 421-22 where the 
relevant texts are quoted and translated. YD relates Dignāga's view at 100,17-20: 
candrādiṣv idānīm asādharaṇaviṣayeṣu kā pratipattiḥ syād iti. āha: āha: avayavā-
pekṣatvāt. Candraśabdo hy anekeṣv avayaveṣu vartate jātidravyaguṇakriyāsu ca. 
tathā ḍitthādiśabdaḥ. tasmād evaṃjātīyakānām api cānumānād abhedaḥ: “Now, 
what sort of cognition would there be with regard to the [word] 'moon', and so on, 
whose referent is not common”? He explains: because it depends upon parts. For the 
word 'moon' refers to many parts as well as to general property, substance, quality, 
and action. The same does the word 'ḍittha'. Therefore, for [words] belonging to 
this class there is no difference from inference either.” Jinendrabuddhi mentions the 
question concerning the semantic conditions of application of terms like 'sun' at Ms 
B 239b4-5: ye tarhy ete sūryādayaḥ śabdāḥ ekavyaktyupanipātinaḥ, te kathaṃ 
sāmānyavacanāḥ. tatrāpi sūryādīnām avasthābhedena bhedād anekatvam astīty 
adoṣaḥ: “How then do words like ‘sun’, which apply to a single particular, denote a 
general property. Also in this case the sun, and so on, is plural because of internal 
distinction due to difference of state. Consequently (iti) there is no problem;” cf. 
PVSVṬ 419,21f (ad PVSV 115,19f): atha devadattaśabdo 'py avasthābhedena 
jātivācaka iṣyate; a similar discussion is related at TSP 453,14-18 (ad TS 1225): ye 
'py ete ḍitthādayaḥ śabdā yadcchaśabdatvena pratītāḥ, te 'pi janmanaḥ prabh-
tyāmaraṇakṣaṇād anuvartamānāḥ pratikṣaṇabhedabhinnam asādhāraṇabhedena 
vastu gamayitum aśaktāḥ kālaprakarṣamaryādāvacchinnavastusamavetāṃ jātim 
abhidheyatvenopādadate: “Also words like ‘ḍittha’ that are known as proper nouns 
depend upon a general property inherent in the referent delimited by the bounds of 
timespan as their denotable object, being incapable of making a referent that is 
differentiated by differences every moment known by means of a non-common 
difference, as they apply to it continually from birth to the moment of death.” 
 
604 That is, in a general form without distinguishing between the many parts that 
constitute the aggregate, which is also the property of the so-called aggregate terms 
(samudāyaśabda), cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b5-6: tasya samudāyasya ye 'vayavāḥ kāṇa-
kuṇṭādayaḥ, tān abhedena (so read, Ms bhed°) sāmānyenāha. tato yathā vkṣaśab-
daḥ śiṃśapādīn viśeṣān abhedenābhidadhat sāmānyavācī tathā samudāyaśabdo 'pi 
ḍitthādiśabdaḥ: “The parts of the aggregate are the [properties of] being blind on 
one eye and being dwarfish, and so on, It denotes these without distinction, i.e., in a 
general form. Therefore, just as the word ‘tree,’ while denoting without distinction 
particulars like śiṃśapā, denotes the general property, in the same way also an 
aggregate term like ‘ḍittha'.” 
 
[301] kas tarhi jātisamudāyaśabdayor viśeṣa iti. na kaścit. prasiddhivaśāj jātiśab-




kara iti. kvacid mukhyaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b6-7: kas tarhītyādi … kas 
tarhi jātisamudāyaśabdayor viśeṣaḥ … na kaścid iti; 239a1-3: yathoktaṃ Sāmānya-
parīkṣāvyāse … prasiddhivaśāj(1) jātiśabdaḥ pratyekam api samudāyiṣu vartate … 
ata āha prasiddhivaśād ityādi … tadyathā hy abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara ity ukte … 
kvacid mukhyo 'vayaveṣu vartate. 
(1)em. : prasiddha° Ms 
 
605 That is, if both terms denote a general property, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b6: yady 
ubhāv api sāmānyavācinau.  
 
606 Jinendrabuddhi qualifies this statement at PSṬ Ms B 238b7 with the 
subsequent exposition in mind: etāvatā leśena nāsty eva viśeṣa ity abhiprāyaḥ, na tu 
sarvathā nāsty eveti. anyathāyaṃ jātiśabdo 'yaṃ samudāyaśabda iti bhedo na syāt: 
“Thus the opinion is that because it is such a minor point, there really is no 
difference, but it is not the case that there is no [difference] at all. Otherwise there 
would be no distinction, like when one says 'this is a general term', 'this is an 
aggregate term.'”  
 
607 Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignāga's statement with reference to a similar 
exposition in Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b7-239a2: nanu cāvayaveṣu 
mukhyopacaritavttitvena viśeṣo bhavati. jātiśabdasya hi pratyekam avayaveṣu 
mukhyā vttiḥ samudāyaśabdasya tūpacaritā. yathoktaṃ Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāse: 
ayaṃ tu jātisamudāyaśabdayor viśeṣaḥ prasiddhivaśāj(1) jātiśabdaḥ pratyekam api 
samudāyiṣu vartate, samudāyaśabdas tu pratyekaṃ samudāyiṣūpacaryata iti: 
“Certainly the difference is due to direct and transferred application to the parts. For 
the application of a general term to each of the parts is direct, whereas that of an 
aggregate term is transferred. As it is explained in Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa: “This, 
however, is the difference between general and aggregate terms: According to 
acknowledged usage a general term, on the one hand, applies to each member of the 
aggregate, whereas an aggregate term is transferred to each member of the 
aggregate.” 
(1)em. : prasiddha° Ms 
 
608 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 239a2-3: sūkaravyaktyavayaveṣv api sūkakaraśabda upacārāt 
pravartate. tadyathā hy “abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara”(1) ity ukte, avayavā api na 
bhakṣyante: “The word ‘swine’ is also applied in a transferred sense to the parts of 
the individual swine. For when, for instance, it is said that one should not eat the 
village swine, parts of it are not to be eaten either.”  
Bharthari mentions the same example at VPV II 224,16-17 with reference to the 
parts of a swine: abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara iti. atra bhakṣayatikriyā tathābhūtam eva 
sādhana(bhūtaṃ dravyāvayavam apekṣate) … avayave ca samudāye ca samudāya-
śabdapravttir iti.  
(1)Cf. Mahā-bh Vol. I: 5,16-17: abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara ity ukte gamyata etad 
āraṇyo bhakṣya iti. 
 
[302] yathāha: sāṅkhyāpramāṇasaṃsthānanirapekṣaḥ pravartate, bindau ca 







609 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 239a3-4: ādiśabdena pthivyādiparigrahaḥ. 
 
610 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 239a4-6: saṅkhyādyanapekṣatvenāvayaveṣu mukhyavttitvaṃ 
darśayati. saṅkhyādisāpekṣyatve kārṣāpaṇayojanacaturaśrādiśabdavad ekadeśa-
vttitvaṃ na syāt. tatra saṅkhyānapekṣo bindumuṣṭikādisaṅkhyānapekṣatvād(1) ekas-
minn api hi bindau(2) vartate. anekasminn api salilaśabdaḥ. pramāṇanirapekṣo 
nābhyūrujānumātratvādyanapekṣaṇāt.  
(1)muṣṭikā conj. (cf. T 219,9: khyor pa gaṅ ) : mukā° Ms 
(2)°au em. : °or Ms 
 
611yan lag la K : yan lag 'ba' źig la V (“a part alone”). 
 
[303] saṃsthānavarṇāvayavair viśiṣṭe yaḥ prayujyate, śabdo na tasyāvayave 
pravttir upalabhyate. VP II:155. 
 
612 Cf. VPV II 223,5-6: saṃsthānaviśiṣṭopakramaḥ parimaṇḍalo dīrghaś 
caturaśra iti tadavayavo nābhidhīyate. tathā muṣṭigranthi(ktala? read mālā?)-
kuṇḍalakādayaḥ śabdās tadavayaveṣu na prayujyante.  
 
[304] varṇaviśiṣṭe citraḥ kalmāṣaḥ.(1) Qu. Ms B 239a7. 
(1) Cf. yan lag can gyi khyad par V : yan lag khyad par can la 'jug pa ni K; V 
corroborates PSṬ; 'jug pa K (= *vtti) is probably an interpolation; it is reasonable 
to conclude that all similar occurrences in this paragraph of 'jug pa K that are not 
found in V are interpolations too. 
 
613 Cf. VPV II 223,7-8: varṇaśabdānāṃ citraḥ kalmāṣaḥ sāraṅga iti tadava-
yaveṣv apravttiḥ: “Words denoting colour such as ‘speckled’, ‘variegated’, ‘dapled’ 
do not apply to their parts;” Cf. PSṬ Ms B 239a: nīle rakte vā citrāvayave na 
vartante: “They do not refer to a part of the speckled whether it is blue or red.” 
 
[305] avayavaviśiṣṭe. Qu. Ms B 239a6. 
 
614 The Tibetan translations bre V 148,7 : bre phyed (= ardhaprastha/droṇa) K 
149,7 are ambiguous since bre is used to render both Sanskrit prastha and droṇa, cf. 
the dictionary by Che riṅ dbaṅ rgyal s.v. In view of the fact that Dignāga quotes the 
examples in the order of the VPV II 223,7-8 (q.v. no. 614 above), it is reasonable to 
assume that he is doing the same in this case too.  
 
615 Cf. bre gaṅ K 149,7 : khal (= kharī) V 148,7. 
 
616 Cf. VPV II 223,7-8: avayavaśabdena śataṃ sahasram prastho droṇo māsaḥ 
saṃvatsaraḥ (ityādayo ghyante?). Ms B 239a6-7: niyatāvayavaviśiṣṭaṃ samudā-
yam abhidadhataḥ śatādiśabdā avayave na vartante: “Words like ‘a hundred’ that 
denote an aggregate qualified by fixed parts do not apply to a part.” 
 
[306] <samudāyaśabdaś ca kvacit> pratyekam parisamāpyate. Restored, cf. PSṬ 





617 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 239a7-239b1: pratyekam avayave mukhyaḥ prayujyata ity 
arthaḥ. mukhya ity etat kutaḥ? uttaratropacarita iti vacanāt: “The meaning is that it 
applies directly to each part. What is the reason for [using] the expression 'directly'. 
Because of the expression 'transferred' in what follows.” 
 
618 Cf. groṅ 'oṅs V : 'gro K; PSṬ Ms B 239b1-2: grāmaśabdo ghakṣetra-
vāṭapuruṣādisamudāyavācakas(1) tadekadeśeṣu puruṣeṣu vartate: “The word 
‘village’ that denotes the collection of houses, fields, enclosure, people, and so on, 
refers to parts of these viz. the people;” Mahā-bh I 59,20-22: grāmaśabdo 'yam 
bahvarthaḥ. asty eva sālāsamudāye vartate, tadyathā: grāmo dagdha iti. asti vāṭa-
parikṣepe vartate, tadyathā: grāmām praviṣṭa iti. asti manuṣyeṣu vartate, tadyathā: 
grāmo gato, grāma āgata iti: “The word ‘village’ has many referents. It happens 
that it refers to the collection of houses, for instance: “the village burned down.” It 
happens that it refers to the enclosure and surroundings (i.e. the arable land), for 
instance: “He entered the village.” It happens that it refers to the people, for 
instance: “the village went away, the village came back.”” 
(1)There is no word in this definition that matches lam T. 
 
[307] <kvacid> upacaritaḥ(1), <tadyathā> “kāyakarmaṇā 'tmakarma vyākhyātam” 
(VS V.2.18). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b1: kāyakarmaṇā <'tmakarma>(2) 
vyākhyātam iti.  
(1)Cf. Ms B 239b1: uttaratropacarita iti vacanāt.  
(2)'tmakarma em. (cf. bdag gi las T) : om. Ms 
 
619 Dignāga quotes as an example of this usage VS V.2:18. Jinendrabuddhi 
explains it at PSṬ Ms B 239b2 as follows: atra kāyaśabdaḥ karacaraṇādisamudaye 
vartamānas tadavayava eva upacaryate: “In the present case the word body while 
applying to the aggregate of hands and feet, and so on, is transferred to a part of it.” 
Cf. Candrānanda's exegesis at VSV 43,3-4 in which kāya stands for hasta: iha 
ātmaśabdena vāyuḥ, yathātmasaṃyogaprayatnābhyāṃ haste karma tathātmavāyu-
saṃyogāt prayatnāc ca prāṇāyāmakarma. 
 
620 Cf. khyu źes bya ba daṅ nags źes bya ba V : kho bo cag źes bya ba K; Mahā-
bh I 239,24-25: ekārthā samudāyā bhavanti tadyathā yūthaṃ śatam vanam iti; ibid. 
426,21. 
 
621 Jinendrabuddhi attempts to clarify the actual difference between words 
belonging to the class of general terms and those belonging to the class of aggregate 
terms in the following pasage at Ms B 239b2-4, quoting a brief definition from 
Dignāga's Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa: Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāse tu avayaveṣūpacarita-
vttitvam bhūyastvena dṣṭam iti jātiśabdāt samudāyaśabdasya viśeṣaṇatvenoktam. 
diṅmātradarśanaṃ caitat. ayam punar atra sphuṭo viśeṣo jātisamudāyaśabdayoḥ: 
samudāyaśabda ekasamudāyāntovartino(1) vijātīyān sajātīyāṃś cābhedenāha. Jāti-
śabdas tu tatsamānajātīyān eva samudāyān asamudāyāṃś ceti: “In Sāmānya-
parīkṣāvyāsa, however, the difference of an aggregate term from a general term is 
said to be that “its application as transferred to the components is observed to be 
preponderant.” This view is just a hint. This, however, is the obvious difference 
between a general term and an aggregate term, namely: the aggregate term denotes 





that reside in a single aggregate, whereas a general term [denotes] aggregates and 
non-aggregates that are of the same kind.”  
(1) ˚āntovartino conj. : ˚āntaḥ (j?)ātino Ms 
 
[308] <ath>āktasambandhaśabdād(1) yā<rtha>pratītis,(2) <tadyathā yad uktam 
‘ayaṃ panasa’ iti tatra> katham anumānam iti. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b5-6: 
aktasambandha iti … katham anumānam iti. 
(1)Cf. 'brel par ma byas pa'i sgra las K (translating aktasambandhe śabde at 
PSV V 2ab1) : ’brel pas ma byas pa sgra’i don V. The paraphrase with ˚ja 
’originating from’ at PSṬ Ms B 239b6: aktasambandhaśabdajā yā pratītiḥ (see 
below no.624) would indicate that the case morpheme las translates a Sanskrit 
ablative as suggested in the restoration above. 
(2)Cf. don rtogs pa K : don ston par byed pa V; paraphrase at PSṬ Ms B 239b6 
below no. 624. 
 
622 Jinendrabuddhi interprets the term aktasambandha as referring to a person 
who does not know the connection of a word to its referent, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b5: 
aktasambandha iti sambandhānabhijñaḥ pratipattā. This interpretation is possible, 
but it makes no sense in the context and may be due to carelesness. Jinendrabuddhi 
may not always have compared his explanations to the original he commented upon. 
 
623 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at PSṬ Ms B 239b6: aktasambandha-
śabdajā yā pratītir na sānumānaṃ, tadyathā yasya mlecchaśabdajaḥ saṃśayaḥ. 
tathāvidhā sambandhakāle 'yaṃ panasa ity atrāpi pratī<tir i>ti: “The cognition that 
originates from a word whose connection to [its referent] has not been told is not 
inference, like the doubt that originates from the words of a non-Sanskrit speaker. At 
the time of [teaching] the connection through the statement “this is a Jack-fruit tree,” 
the cognition is also in that case of the same kind.”  
 
[309] na tatra <panasaśabdād arthapratītiḥ. kasmāt>? Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 
239b7: na tatretyādinārthasiddhatām āha. 
 
[310] pratīten(1)<ārthadarśanāt?>(2). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b7: pratīteneti.  
(1)Cf. rtogs pa'i V : so sos (sic) K. 
(2)Cf. don ni bstan phyir ro V : don mthoṅ ba yi phyir K. The reading 
*arthadarśanāt suggested by V and K is peculiar and non-standard in this context. 
The purpose of the 50b is to explain, as the context indicates, that the relation 
(sambandha) between any given word and its referent is shown to somebody by 
someone to whom it is known (pratīta). This is the rationale for Dignāga's use of 
the expression sambandhapradarśanārtham which occurs in the vtti. I believe that 
Tib. don corresponding to Sanskrit artha is an interpolation based upon the 
expression arthasiddhatvāt that occurs in the vtti. Consequently I would suggest 
restoring 50b as pratītena *pradarśanāt. On this assumption we must translate 50b 
as: “Because [the relation] is shown by someone to whom [it] is known.”  
 
624 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b7: pratītasambandhenety arthaḥ. For a different 
translation of 50b, cf. note [310] note 2. above. 
 





626 It is not possible to decide with absolute certainty what the original Sankrit 
version of the first sentence of PSV V:50 might have been: KV are syntactically 
confused and both versions omit crucial words. The term grags pa rñiṅ pa V : om. 
K, corresponds probably to Sanskrit vddha. This term is commonly used in descrip-
tions of how children learn the connection between a word and the referent from the 
discourse of grown ups (vddhavyavahāra, cf. ŚBh 46,7); cf., for instance, the 
explanation at ŚBh 46,2-4: vddhānaṃ svārthena vyavaharamānām upaśṇvanto 
bālāḥ pratyakṣam arthaṃ pratipadyamānā dśyante. See also Kumārila's related 
discussion at ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 138ff. Raja 1963: 26ff. I assume that 
'brel pa bstan pas K :'brel pas rab tu rtogs pa V correspond to Sanskrit pratīta-
sambandhena, cf. the use of pratītena at PS V 50b. 
 
[311] ayaṃśabdena. Qu. Ms B 239b7. 
 
627 At this point Jinendrabuddhi addresses the question of the denotation of the 
demonstrative pronoun, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b7-240a2: nanu cāyaṃśabdo 'py 
āsannapratyakṣavastusāmānyavacanaḥ, kutas(1) tena panasārthasiddhiḥ? naiṣa 
doṣaḥ. yathā pratītasambandho vkṣaśabdaḥ sāmānyavacano 'pi yadā purovartini 
palāśādau prayujyate 'yaṃ vkṣaś chidyatām iti, tadā vkṣaviśeṣa eva vartate. 
tathāyaṃśabdo 'pi: “Certainly, also the demonstrative pronoun ‘this’ denotes the 
general property of a proximate perceptible object, so how can it establish the 
referent ‘Jack-fruit tree’? This is not a problem! In the same way as the word ‘tree’ 
whose relation is known: When it is applied, although it denotes the general 
property, to the present palāśa, and so on, as in [the statement] ‘this tree is to be cut 
down,’ it is used to denote a particular tree only, so also the demonstrative pronoun 
‘this’.  
(1)kutas conj. : tatas Ms 
 
628 Cf. lag pa'i brda' V : lag brda'i. For Dignāga’s use of hastasaṃjñā, cf. ŚV 
Śabda° 20: hastasaṃjñādayao ye 'ye pi yadarthapratipādane bhaveyuḥ ktasaṅketās 
te na liṅgam iti sthitaḥ. Sambandhākṣepa: 139; PVSV 134,9. 
 
629 I assume that the introduction of the particle 'am after yan lag brda' V (om. 
K) reproduces Sanskrit ca.  
 
[312] kiṃ tarhi saṃjñāvyutpattiḥ(1). Qu. Ms B 240a2.  
(1)Cf. 'on kyaṅ miṅ (so read; ed. mi) rtogs pa K 149,18 : śiṅ tog pa na sa'i sgra 
don rtogs pa V 148,19. For rtogs pa = vyutpatti, cf. Mhvyut 7495-96. 
 
630 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a2: panasaśabdena tatra saṃjñāvyutpattimātraṃ kriyata 
ity arthaḥ. In the case of saṃjñāvyutpatti the relation between any given word and 
the thing it denotes is taught by pointing at a prototypical instance of the referent 
and thus presupposes a visible referent. Consequently there is no inference in the 
case of saṃjñāvyutpatti. Dignāga addresses briefly the implications of saṃjñāvyut-
patti at PSV II:5: śābdam api tu <asādhāraṇena viṣayena> sambandhābhāve 
<dvidhānumānaṃ parīkṣyeta> dṣṭārtham adṣṭārthaṃ <ca>. <tatra> dṣṭārthe 
saṃjñāvyutpattiḥ. adṣṭārthe 'rthavikalpamātram, na viśiṣṭārthāpratītiḥ. Restored, 





… adṣṭārtham. 62b7: dṣtārthe saṃjñāvyutpattiḥ. adṣtārthe 'rthavikalpamātram 
(qu. PVSV 37,26); 63b5: na viśiṣtārthāpratītiḥ.  
 
The two Tibetan versions translate this crucial passage as follows: 
 
K (Kitagawa 1973 454b8f = P 111a1-3): sgra las byuṅ ba yaṅ 'brel pa med par 
thun moṅ ma yin pa'i yul mthoṅ ba daṅ ma mthoṅ ba las rjes su dpag pa rnam pa 
gñis su brtag par bya 'o || de la mthoṅ ba'i don la miṅ bstan pa 'o || ma mthoṅ ba'i 
don la rnam pa rtog pa tsam yin gyi, don gyi khyad par rtogs pa ma yin no ||.  
 
V (Kitagawa 1973 454a5f = P 29b4-6): sgra yaṅ yul thun moṅ ma yin pa daṅ 
'brel ba yod pa ma yin pas rnam pa gñis ka rjes su dpag pa brtag par bya ste | 
mthoṅ ba'i don daṅ ma mthoṅ ba'i don no || de la mthoṅ ba'i don la ni mi gsal bar 
byed pa 'o || ma mthoṅ ba'i don la ni rnam par rtog pa tsam 'ba' źig ste | don gyi bye 
brag rtogs par byed pa ni ma yin no ||:  
 
“However, when there is no connection [of any given word] with an individual 
referent, it should also be investigated whether verbal cognition is inference in two 
ways, namely (1) as having a visible referent and (2) as having an invisible referent. 
Now, with regard to the one having a visible referent, it is teaching a name [and thus 
it is not inference]. With regard to the one having an invisible referent, it is nothing 
but representation of the referent. There is no cognition of a distinct referent [and 
thus it is not inference either].”(1)  
(1)Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at PSṬ Ms B 62b5-7 is deeply indebted to 
Dharmakīrti’s PVSV 37,24ff; text lifted from PVSV is printed in roman: 
“sambandhābhave” saṃketakāle. śabdārthasambandhābhijño hi saṃketakālānu-
bhūtārthasāmānyam eva pratipādyate śabdāt, na svalakṣaṇam, tasya pūrvam 
adṣṭatvāt. prayogakāle viśeṣaviśayatvāśaṃkā na bhavaty eva. saṃketakāle tu 
pratyakṣaṃ svalakṣaṇam iti, saṃbhavati tadviṣayatvāśaṃkā. ataḥ “sambandhā-
bhava” ity āha. “dṣṭārthaṃ” yatrārthaḥ pratyakṣeṇa dśyate. “adṣṭārthaṃ” 
viparyayāt. “drṣṭārthe saṃjñāvyutpattir” iti. yathāyaṃ panasa iti. atra sambandha-
vyutpattir eva bhavati, nānumānam, arthasya pratyakṣatvāt. adṣṭārthe svargādāv 
arthavikalpamātram iti. na hi svargādiśabdāḥ svargādīnāṃ saṃketakāle 'nyadā vā 
svalakṣaṇam buddhāv arpanti, anatīndriyatvaprasaṃgāt (cf. PVSV 37,24-25). Keva-
laṃ tatpratipādanābhiprāyaiḥ prayuktāḥ. śrotary apratibhāsamānatatsvabhāvam 
arthabimbam arpayanti (cf. PVSV 37-25-27): asti kaścit surādhivāsaviśeṣa(1) ity 
evamādikam. naivaṃ svalakṣaṇam pratipannam bhavati pratipāditaṃ vā: svargādi-
śravaṇe tadanubhāvinām iva pratibhāsābhedaprasaṃgāt(2). apratipadyamāno 'pi ca 
tatsvabhāvaṃ tathābhūta eva vikalpapratibimbe tadadhyavasāyī saṃtuṣyati, tathā-
bhūtatvād eva śabdārthapratipatteḥ (cf. PVSV 37,27-38,5). atra ca sambandhābhāva 
iti etad nāpekṣyate, kiṃ tu dṣṭārtheṣv eva. tatra hi dṣṭatvād viśeṣ<as>ya, tasyaiva 
vācyatāśaṃket<a>. tatas tannivrttyartham uktam saṃjñāvyutpattir iti: “When there 
is no connection” that is, at the time when the language convention is taught 
(saṃketakāle). For the one who knows the connection of a word to its referent 
understands from a word merely the general property of the referent he experienced 
at the time when the language convention was taught, but not the individual because 
it has not been observed previously. At the time when the language convention is 
put into practice doubt about whether a particular is the object does not exist at all. 




convention, doubt about whether it is its [i.e. the words] object is possible. Therefore 
he says “when there is no connection. “Having a visible referent” means “when the 
referent is observed by sensation.” “Having an invisible referent” means in the 
diametrically opposite case. “With regard to the one having a visible referent, it is 
teaching a name,” like, for instance: “this is a Panasa.” In that case it is nothing but 
teaching the relation, but it is not inference because the referent is visible. “With 
regard to the one having an invisible referent” like heaven “it is a mere 
representation of the referent.” For words like heaven do not at the time when the 
language convention is taught or on other occasions convey the particular to the 
mind because the [absurd] consequence is that it would not transcend the senses. 
They are merely used with intentions of teaching about them. They convey to the 
listener a mental picture of the referent whose essential nature is not clear [to him] in 
words like “it is a particular kind of dwelling place for gods and so on.” A particular 
is not understood or explained in this way because the [absurd] consequence is that 
there would be no difference of mental picture from hearing [words] like “heaven” 
in those who in a way would experience it directly. Although [the listener] does not 
understand its essential nature he takes pleasure in a representation picture of 
exactly this nature, identifying it as that [namely a particular] because the cognition 
of the referent of a word is precicely of this nature. And in this context the 
expression “when there is no connection” has no relation to that, but rather to visible 
referents only. Since a particular among these is observed, one would expect it to be 
the denotable object. Therefore it is said: “teaching a name” in order to exclude 
this.” 
 
[313] sambandhapradarśanārthaṃ tu <tasya saṃjñārthasy(1)āyaṃśabdena sāmā-
nādhikaraṇyam>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a2: sambandhapradarśanārthaṃ(1) tv 
ityādi.  
(1) For this term, cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a2f, q.v. no. 632 below. 
(1)em. (cf. 'brel pa rab tu bstan pa'i don T; Ms B 240a3: sambandhapradar-
śanārtham) : sambandha om. Ms 
 
631 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a2f.: saṃjñārtho yasya sa tathocyate. 
 
632 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a2: tuśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ. 
 
633 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a3: yad etad ayaṃśabdena panasārthena panasaśabdasya 
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ tat sambandhapradarśanārthaṃ: “The co-reference of the 
word ‘panasa”'with the demonstrative pronoun ‘this’ whose referent is the panasa 
has the purpose of showing the connection.”  
Uṃveka eloborates on the issue at ŚVṬ (Umveka) 371,12-14 (on Śabda° 102): 
ayaṃ panasa iti vā prayujyamāne vācyavācakalakṣaṇasambandhāvagatiḥ. na ca sa 
eva panasaśabdavācyaḥ, ayamitiprasiddhārthapadasāmānādhikaraṇyāvaseyatvāt: 
“Or, when one makes use of the statement ‘this is a Jack-fruit tree’ one understands 
the connection that is characterized as one of the denotable object with the denoting 
term. And it [viz. the connection] is not only denotable by the word ‘Jack-fruit tree’ 
because it is to be ascertained by the co-reference of the syntactical word whose 
referent is well known with [the demonstrative pronoun] ‘this’.”(1)  
Jinendrabuddhi continues the discussion of the role of co-reference in 





vttiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam. tadā cānirjñātasambandhatvād eva nāsti panasaśab-
dasyārthas(2), tat kutaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ? saṅketayitrā saṃjñātvena panasār-
thavtteḥ(3), tadā ayaṃśabdasyārthe sa niyuktaḥ, tatas tatra tasya vttir ity adoṣaḥ. 
ayam atrārthaḥ: saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhavyutpattimātrārtha eva tadā panasaśab-
dasyāyaṃśabdaviṣaye panase saṃjñārthena niyoga iti: “Co-reference is certainly 
the application of two words to a single denotable object. And at this point (tadā) 
the word ‘panasa’ has no referent because its relation [to the referent it denotes] is 
not known, so how could there be co-reference? Because the person who teaches the 
conventional denotation applies it [viz. the word 'panasa'] to the referent panasa as 
its name, it is at this point applied to the referent of the demonstrative pronoun 
‘this’, therefore its application to this is not a problem. The meaning in the present 
case is this: At this point the application of the word 'panasa' that has the purpose 
of being a name of the panasa that is the referent of the demonstrative pronoun 
'this' has merely the purpose of teaching the relation between the name and the 
thing named.”  
For Dharmakīrti’s view of pradarśana in relation to vyutpatti, cf. the discussion 
at PV I 117ff with PVSV ad loc. 
(1) Dignāga's view on the role of the demontrative pronoun for establishing the 
relation between the vocal sign and its referent is closely related to Bharthari's 
view, cf. the quotation from the Saṅgraha at VPV I 101,3: so 'yam iti vyapadeśena 
sambandhopayogasya śakyatvāt; VPV 105,3-4; VPV I 126,4-5: so 'yam iti saṃjñinā 
śaktyavacchedalakṣaṇaḥ sambandho niyamyate; VP II:128. 
(2) °śabdasyārthaḥ em. (cf. T sgra'i don) : °asya Ms 
(3) panasārtha° em. (cf. pa na sa’i don T) : palāsārtha° Ms 
 
[314] ubhayor abhidheya iti ktvā(1). Qu. Ms B 240a6.  
(1)Cf. gñis ka brjod par bya ba yin no źes byas nas V : gñi ga'i brjod par bya ba 
yin pa'i phyir K. 
 
634 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a5-6: kathaṃ punas tena sambandhaḥ śakyate pradarśa-
yituṃ, yāvatā nāsya tatra kiñcit pravttinimittaṃ vastusat bhavadbhir iṣyata ity āha: 
“ubhayor abhidheya iti ktvā” iti. panasāyaṃśabdayor dvayor apy abhidhānār-
haḥ,(1) tābhyāṃ vā śakyo 'bhidhātum ity arthaḥ. etad uktam bhavati: śabdānām 
icchāmātravttitvāt sarva evārthā yogyāḥ. tasmād vināpy anyena pravttinimittena 
śakyate sambandho darśayitum iti: “But how, moreover, is it possible to show the 
relation with it [viz. the Jack-fruit tree], insofar as you claim that it [viz. the word 
‘Jack-fruit tree’] has no real cause of application whatsoever in it [viz. Jack-fruit 
tree]? He answers: “On the assumption that [the connection] is the denotable object 
of both.” The meaning is that both the word ‘Jack-fruit tree’ and the demonstrative 
pronoun ‘this’ are capable of denoting it [viz. the connection], or, that it can be 
denoted by both of them. What is meant is this: Since words apply by the mere wish, 
all referents are fit [as referents]. Therefore it is possible to show the connection 
even without something else as cause of application.” 
(1)°as em. : °aṃ Ms 
 
[315] atādarthyāc(1) ca saṃjñārthaḥ panasaśabdaḥ(2). Qu. Ms B 240a7.  
(1)atādarthyāc em. (cf. de'i don ñid ma yin pa’i phyir T) : atārth° Ms  
(2)Cf. de'i don las ni miṅ gi don pa na sa'i sgra yin no K : de'i don du brda'i don 





635 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a7-240b1: tena panasenānarthavattvāt(1) panasaśabdaḥ 
samjñāvyutpattiprayojana ity arthaḥ: “The meaning is this: Since it is does not have 
a referent because of the Jack-fruit tree, the word ‘Jack-fruit tree’ has the purpose of 
teaching the name.”  
Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is concise to the point of being obscure. The 
underlying intention is that until the connection between the name (saṃjñā) 
‘panasa' and its referent is established, the term per se has no referent and only 
denotes its own form (svarūpa). Its sole purpose is that of being a name whose 
relation to its referent has to be taught by pointing to a prototypical instance of it, 
and the use of the demonstrative pronoun “this” as mentioned by Dignāga.  
Cf. Bharthari's explanation at VPV ad VP I 66a-b: prāk saṃjñinābhisam-
bandhāt saṃjñā rūpapādārthikā, ṣaṣṭhyāś ca prathamāyāś ca nimittatvāya kalpate. 
… yāvat saṃjñinā tu saṃjñā na sambaddhā tāvan na saṃjñipadārthiketi: “Before 
[its] connection with the thing named, the name has [its own] form as referent and is 
fit for being the cause [of application] of the sixth triplet or the first triplet.”  
Cf. VPṬ (Paddhati) 125,22 ad loc.: saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhavyutpattikāle ‘ayaṃ 
panasaḥ’ iti. na hi saṃjñāyās tadā so 'rthaḥ: “Like at the time of teaching the 
connection between a name and the thing named in the words “this is a Jack-fruit 
tree.” For this is not the referent of the name at that time.” 
 
[316] <(yo 'yaṃ?) sambandhaḥ> sa eva tarhi śabdasya <prameyam>(1) bhaviṣyati. 
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b1: sa eva tarhītyādi. yo 'yaṃ śabdārthayoḥ samban-
dhaḥ sa eva śabdasya … abhidheyo bhaviṣyati.  
(1)Cf. 'o na 'brel pa de ñid sgra'i gźal byar 'gyur ro K : śiṅ tog pa na sa'i sgra 
de ñid daṅ (sic) 'brel pa ltar sgra'i gźal byar 'gyur ba yin no V. 
 
636 The introduction of the term *prameya (Tib. gźal bya) is motivated by the 
opponent's view that śābda is a separate mans of cognition (pramāṇa) having as 
object of cognition (prameya) a connection like that of the word ‘panasa' with the 
object it denotes. It is uncertain why Jinendrabuddhi substitutes abhidheya for 
prameya, cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b1: yo 'yaṃ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ sa eva śabdasya 
vidhirūpeṇābhidheyo bhaviṣyati, tataś cānenaiva viśeṣeṇa śābdam anumānāt 
pramāṇāntaram bhaviṣyatīti manyate: “The idea is that only the relation between 
the word and its referent will be the denotable object of the word in an affirmative 
form, and therefore, i.e., because of this difference, verbal cognition will be a 
separate means of cognition from inference.” 
 
637 The kārikā may be restored as: na sambandhaḥ, kalpitatvāt(1). Cf. 
Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase at Ms B 240b3-5 no. 640 below. 
(1) brtags pa'i phyir V presupposes the reading *kalpitatvāt : rnam rtog yin phyir 
K *vikalpitatvāt (?), which is ummetrical.  
 
[317] sambandho hi <panasaśabdārthau> pramāṇāntareṇopalabhy<āsyāyam' 
(1)iti> manasā kalpyate(2), anumānānumeyasambandhavat, tato <na> śābdaṃ 
pramāṇāntaraṃ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b1-5: pramāṇāntareṇopalabhyeti … 
manasā kalpyata iti… anumānānumeyasambandhavat; cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s para-





(1)Cf. 'di 'di'i yin no V : 'di ni 'di 'o K; for the semantics of the use of the sixth 
triplet, cf. VP III.3:3: asyāyaṃ vācako vācya iti ṣaṣṭhyā pratīyate. VPV I 125-126 ad 
VP I 66-67; PV III:129: asyedam iti sambandhe.  
(2)Cf. yid kyi<s> 'brel pa rtogs par byed pa K : śiṅ tog pa na sa daṅ (sic) 'brel 
par rtogs pa V.  
 
638 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b2: pratyākṣādinā. Jinendrabuddhi continues addressing 
the question of how the relation between the two relata, i.e., the word and the 
referent, is established by means of sensation, when the forms of the word and its 
referent are defined by their general properties viz. exclusion of other words and 
other referents, respectively, and sensation does not have general properties as its 
field of operation. The answer is that the term ‘other means of cognition’ denotes the 
knowledge that arises as the immediate result of the other means of cognition 
because the cause has been transferred to the effect, cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b2-3: kathaṃ 
punaḥ pratyakṣeṇa sambandhinor upalambho yavatā sāmānyarūpau śabdārthāv iti 
pratipāditam? na ca pratyakṣaṃ sāmānyaviṣayam. paramatenaivam uktam. Pramā-
ṇāntarapṣṭhabhāvi vā jñānaṃ kārye kāraṇopacārāt pramāṇāntaraśabdeno(1)ktam 
ity adoṣaḥ.  
(1)°deno° em. : °do no° Ms 
 
639 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b3-5: sambandho hi sambandhivyatirekeṇa nāsty eva, 
kevalaṃ sambandhinoḥ(1) parasparāpekṣāvaśād vikalpyate, yac ca kalpitaṃ na tat 
kvacid(2) arthakriyāyām upayujyate. arthakriyārthaś ca sarvaḥ prekṣāvatām āram-
bha iti na sambandho 'numānārhaḥ. yat kalpitaṃ na tad anumānārham. anumā-
nānumeyasambandhavat. tathā ca śabdārthasambandhaḥ: “For the connection does 
not exist independently of the relatum. It is merely imagined because of the mutual 
dependence of the two relata. And that which is imagined is under no circumstances 
fit for purposeful action; and every undertaking of intelligent persons has as its 
objective purposeful action. Thus the relation is not capable of being inferred. For 
that which is imagined is not capable of being inferred in the same way as the 
inference-inferendum relation. And so is the relation between the word and its 
referent.”  
This explanation is evidently influenced by Dharmakīrtian thought. For the 
concept of parasparāpekṣā cf., e.g., Dharmakīrti’s Sambandhaparīkṣā verse 3. For 
the term arthakriyārtha, cf. e.g. arthakriyārthin at PVSV 89,19. 
(1°noḥ em. (cf. 'brel pa can dag T) : °inaḥ Ms 
(2) kvacid em. (cf. ’ga’ źig tu T) : kecid Ms 
 
[318] atha śeṣam upamānādi kathaṃ <na pramāṇāntaram>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms 
B 240b5: atha śeṣam upamānādi katham iti. 
 
640 That is, sambhava and the rest, cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b6: ādiśabdena … 
sambhavādayo ghyante. For sambhava and the other means of knowledge, cf. 
Randle 1930: 326ff. 
 
[319] śeṣam uktaṃ diśānayā. Qu. Ms B 240b6. 
 
641 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b6: yathoktayaiva diśopamānādīnāṃ yathāsambhavam 





[320] upamānaṃ tāvad gogavayādiṣu sārūpyapratipattyartham. tatra parata 
upaśrutya yā pratītiḥ sā śābdam. svayaṃ tu dvayārthaṃ pramāṇantareṇādhigamya 
manasā sārūpyaṃ yadā kalpayati, tadā(1) tad api na pramāṇāntaram. nāpy evam 
adhigamyamānaṃ sārūpyaṃ prameyam. evam anyāny apy anumānavikalpāvyati-
riktatvāt parikṣiptavyāni.(2) Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b7-241a5: upamānaṃ tāvad 
ityādi. gogavayādiṣv iti viṣayaṃ darśayati. sārūpyapratipattyartham iti ... tatra 
parata upaśrutyeti … yā pratītiḥ sā śābdam. … svayaṃ tu dvayārtham iti. svayam 
eva gāṃ gavayaṃ cādhigamya pratyakṣeṇa manasā sārūpyaṃ yadānayoḥ kalpayati 
tadānubhūtārthaviṣayatvāt … pramāṇam eva na bhavati … anyathā gāṃ mahiṣaṃ 
ca pratyakṣeṇa dṣṭvā yadā tayor visadśatvaṃ kalpyati: asmād ayaṃ visadśam iti, 
tadā tad api <na>(3) pramāṇāntaraṃ syād ity abhiprāyaḥ. nāpy evam adhigam-
yamānam iti … sārūpyaṃ prameyam; 242b4-5: evam ityādi. anyāny api yāni pra-
māṇāni pramāṇāntaratvena kalpitāni, tāny apy anumānavikalpāvyatiriktatvāt 
pramāṇāntaratvena parikṣeptavyāni; for the reading pramāṇantareṇa, cf. YD 72,18 
q.v. below no. 646. 
(1)Cf. bsal bar bya ba ñid yin no V 148,36-37 : gźan sel ba'i tshul yin no K 
149,35.  
(2)Although neither V nor K reproduce yadā and the apodosis tadā, their 
presence may be inferred from their occurrence in Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase; the 
use of the case marker la in the phrase yid kyis rtogs par byed pa yin la K 149,33 
may be an attempt to translate yadā; cf. the use of yadā and tadā in Uddyotakara's 
reproduction of Dignāga's view of upamāna, for which see no. 647 below. 
(3) na conj. (cf. de ni tshad ma gźan ma yin no V : tshad ma gźan ma yin te K) : 
Ms and T om. 
 
642 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b7: sārūpyapratipattyartham iti sādśyaniścayanimittam ity 
arthaḥ. Jinendrabuddhi then continues quoting the definition of upamāna at NS I.1:6 
prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam upamānam followed by a short explanatory 
gloss, cf. B 241a1: etat tasya lakṣaṇaṃ: prasiddhapramāṇaniścito gavādiḥ; tena 
sādharmyaṃ samānadharmatvaṃ prasiddhasādharmyam. tasmād gavādyapekṣayā 
gavayādisārūpyasya yat sādhanaṃ siddhiḥ, tad upamānam: “The following is its 
definition: A cow, and so on, is ascertained by means of an acknowledged means of 
cognition. Acknowledged common property means having properties in common 
with this, i.e., having the same property [as this]. Therefore the establishing, i.e., 
siddhi of the similarity of the gayal, and so on, with reference to a cow, and so on, is 
upamāna.” 
 
643 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b1-3: gaur iva gavaya ityādy āptavacanaśravaṇapūrvikā 
gavayādisārūpyasya vivakṣārūḍhasya yā pratītiḥ, sā śābdam eva śabdaprabhava-
tvāt. śābdasya cānumāne 'ntarbhāvitatvād na pramāṇāntaram. bāhye tv arthe 
visaṃvāditvāt tasyāḥ prāmāṇyam eva nāstīty abhiprāyaḥ: “The cognition of the 
similarity of a gayal [to a cow], and so on,—(the similarity) being imposed by 
(someone's) intention to speak—which presupposes hearing the words of an 
authority such as “the gayal is like a cow,” is nothing but verbal cognition in that it 
stems from words; and since verbal cognition is included in (the category of) 
inference, it is not a separate means of cognition. However, since there is 
disagreement about an external referent, this [cognition] has no cognitive validity. 





644 Cf. Ms B 241a4: tatkalpanaṃ smtyādivat. pramāṇam eva na bhavati. kutaḥ 
punaḥ pramāṇāntaraṃ bhaviṣyati. 
 
645 Yuktidīpikā reproduces almost verbatim Dignāga's view at YD 72,17-18: na 
tāvat parata <upaśrutya?> upamānaṃ pramāṇāntaram. yadā svayam eva gāṃ 
gavayaṃ copalabhya vikalpayati “yathāyam tathāyam” iti tadā tasyārthasya 
pramāṇāntareṇādhigamāt pramāṇam eva tan na bhavatīti. 
 
646 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 241a5: apramāṇenādhigamyamānam. smtyādi 
adhigamyamānam iva na sārūpyaṃ prameyam ity arthaḥ. In the immediately 
following excursus at Ms B 241a5-242b4 Jinendrabuddhi discusses Vātsyāyana’s 
interpretation of upamāna in his commentary on NS I.1:6, and that of Śabara on MS 
I.1:5. For this section, cf. Appendix 3. 
The view that similarity is an object of cognition would imply that is is a 
perceptible general property (vastu). Kumārila addresses Dignāga’s rejection of this 
view at ŚV Upamāna˚ 17ff: pratyakṣābhāsam etat tu nirvikalpavādinām, prame-
yavastvabhāvāc ca nābhipretā pramāṇatā. 
Apart from Dignāga's remark at Nyāyamukha 3b.10-11 about the inclusion of 
upamāna in anumāna his view of upamāna is only known from PS V § 67 and the 
more explicit passage at NV 60,16-61,1 in which Uddyotakara appears to reproduce 
Dignāga's view as pūrvapakṣa. It is evidently not based upon PS V § 67. 
Uddyotakara is therefore addressing the discussion found in another Dignāgan work, 
presumably the lost Nyāyaparīkṣā: pratyakṣāgamābhyāṃ nopamānam bhidyate. 
katham iti. yadā tāv ubhau gogavayau pratyakṣena paśyati tadā hy ayam anena 
sarūpa iti pratyakṣataḥ pratipadyate. yadāpi śṇoti “yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya” iti 
tadāsya śṇvata eva buddhir upajāyate kecid gor dharmā gavaye 'nvayina 
upalabhyante kecid vyatirekiṇa iti, anyathā hi yathā tathety eva na syāt. bhūyas tu 
sārūpyaṃ gavā gavayasya ity evaṃ pratipadyate. tasmād nopamānaṃ pratyakṣā-
gamābhyām bhidyate iti: “Comparison is not distinct from sensation and testimony. 
In what way? Because when a person sees both the cow and the gayal, in that case it 
is by immediate sensation that he apprehends that one is like the other; and when he 
is told that the gayal is like the cow, in that case it is just on hearing of this that the 
knowledge arises in his mind that some of the qualities of the cow are found in the 
gayal and others are not: as otherwise the word 'like' would not have been used by 
the speaker; and he apprehends a preponderant sameness of the qualities of the gayal 
with those of the cow. For this reason comparison is not distinct from immediate 
sensation and testimony;” cf. Randle 1926: 49. As mentioned by Randle op. cit. 50-
51, Dignāga's criticism does not address Vātsyāyana's interpretation of NS I.1:6, 
and he may in fact have had another interpretation of the sūtra in mind. Kumārila 
does not expressly mention Dignāga's view, but his criticism of the attempt to 
include upamāna in anumāna at ŚV Upamāna° 43ff is no doubt directed at Dignāga.  
 
647 Dignāga's inclusion of arthāpatti, implication, and abhāva, non-existence, in 
anumāna is known from PSV II:51, for which, cf. Frauwallner 1968: 90-91. See 
also YD 73,1-18; 74,9-16. Jinendrabuddhi mentions, in addition, aitihya (tradition) 
and sambhava (inclusion), and closes his commentary on chapter five by quoting 
PSV I:2ab like in the beginning of the chapter, cf. Ms B 242b5-7: tatraitihyam(1) iti 
hocur ity(2) anirdiṣṭapravaktkaṃ(3) paramparāgataṃ vacanam. yatheha vane(4) yak-




prāmāṇyam eva nāsti. sambhavo nāma yatra yasya sambhavaḥ tadgrahaṇāt(5) sam-
bhavisattāgrahaṇaṃ: yathā droṇagrahaṇād āḍhakasya sattā ghyate. etad api sam-
udāyavyavasthāpāḥ samudāyinaḥ kāraṇam iti droṇāt kāryaliṅgād eva grahaṇam. 
tato ‘numāna antargataḥ arthāpattyādīni pūrvam eva ktābhividhānānīti sthitam 
etat “pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇe dve eve”ti.  
Cf. the somewhat different presentation at YD 73,19-74,3 of Dignāga’s (?) inter-
pretation of sambhava as an instance of presumption and therefore by definition 
included in the category of inference.  
The compound anumānavikalpa—grammatically a karmadhāraya “the repre-
sentation which is inference”—is not recorded elsewhere in PSV and Jinendrabuddhi 
does not comment upon it.  
(1) em. : tatreti hyam iti Ms 
(2) em. : dobu ritya Ms (źes drag ciṅ brjod nas sic T) 
(3) em. : nirdiṣṭapravarttakam Ms, cf. T ṅes par bstan pa 'jug par byed pa 
indicating that T presupposes the same wrong reading; Jinendrabuddhi alludes to 
Vātsyāyana's formulation, cf. Nyāyabhāṣya on NS II.2:1: iti hocur ity anirdiṣṭapra-
vaktkaṃ pravādapāramparyam aitihyam; cf. Kiraṇāvalī on PBh § 263. 
(4) conj. (dper na nags 'di na gnod sbyin T) : yahivathehavaṭe Ms 
(5) em. : tatagrahaṇāt Ms 
 
648 Cf. le'u lṅa pa 'o K : tsad ma kun las btus pa las gźan sel ba brtag pa'i le'u 




Restored Sanskrit Text of 
Pramāṇasamuccayavtti V §§1-66 
 
 
§1. uktam pramāṇadvayam. kecic chābdam api <pramāṇāntaram man-
yante>.  
 
na pramāṇāntaraṃ śābdam anumānāt. tathā hi saḥ |  
ktakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate || [1] 
 
śabdo hi yatra viṣaye prayujyate tasya yenāṃśenāvinābhāvitvasam-
bandhaḥ, taṃ ktakatvādivad arthāntaravyavacchedena dyotayati, 
<tasmād anumānān> na bhidyate. 
 
§2. ye tv āhuḥ: jātiśabdaḥ svabhedān sarvān evāha, ukteṣu tu niya-
mārtham viśaṣaśrutir <iti>. <tatrocyate> 
 
na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ [2a] 
 





ānantye hi bhedānām aśakyaḥ sambandhaḥ kartum. na cāktasamban-
dhe śabde 'rthābhidhānaṃ yuktaṃ svarūpamātrapratīteḥ.  
 
§3. kiṃ ca, 
vyabhicārataḥ. [2b2] 
 
yathā hi sacchabdo dravye vartate tathā guṇādiṣv apīti vyabhicārāt 
saṃśayaḥ syāt, nābhidhānam. 
 
§4. yo 'pi manyate: <jātiśabdo jātimātre tadyogamātre vā> samban-
dhasaukaryād avyabhicārāc ceti. tad ayuktam, <na hi tayor api> 
 
vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthair apthakśruteḥ. [2cd] 
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tathā hi <sad dravyam, san guṇaḥ, sat karmeti bhedārthair dravyādi-
śabdaiḥ> sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na syāt. tac ca dṣṭam. na hi sattā <tad-
yogo vā> dravyaṃ guṇo vā bhavati, kiṃ tarhi, dravyasya guṇasya vā. 
āha ca: 
 
vibhaktibhedo niyamād guṇaguṇyabhidhāyinoḥ 
sāmānādhikaraṇyasya prasiddhir dravyaśabdayoḥ. 
    [VP III.14:8] 
 
sambandhaś cātra sambandhidharmeṇa vācya ucyate:  
tathā hi bhāvaḥ ktvoktaḥ, bhāvaś cānyena yujyate. [3] 
 
sambandhanaṃ hi sambandhaḥ. <so 'nyena yujyate rāgādivat>. tasmāt 
sambandhidharmeṇa sambandho vācya iti ktvāśaṅkitaṃ svadharmeṇa 
tu nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ śabda ity idaṃ tat prati nāsti. ato nai-
vasya jātiśabdena vācyatvam upapadyate. 
 
§5. <ye tv āhuḥ>: viśeṣasabdaiḥ <sāmānādhikaraṇyāt sambandha-
saukāryād avyabhicārāc ca jātimanmātraṃ vivakṣitam iti. tatra> 
 
 tadvato nāsvatantratvāt. [4a] 
 
evam api hi sacchabdo jātisvarūpamātropasarjanaṃ dravyam āha, na 
sākṣād iti tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepād atadbhedatve sāmānādhika-
raṇyābhāvaḥ. na hy asatyāṃ vyāptau <sāmāṇādhikaraṇyabhāvaḥ>. 
tadyathā śuklaśabdaḥ svābhidheyaguṇamātraviśiṣṭadravyābhidhānāt, 
saty api dravye madhurādīn nākṣipati. tataś cātadbhedatvam. evam 
atrāpi prasaṅgaḥ. 
 
§6. <kiṃ ca>, 
 
 upacārāt. [4b1]  
 
sacchabdo hi bhūtārthena svarūpaṃ vā jātiṃ vāha. tatra pravttas tad-
vaty upacaryate. na tu yo yatropacaryate, sa tam artham bhūtārthe-
nāha. 
 
§7. <sārūpyasya ca> 
 
  asambhavāt. [4b2]  
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tadvati ca <guṇasārūpyaṃ> na pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ <sambhavati>, 
nāpi guṇopakārāt. 
 
§8. kathaṃ na pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ? upacāre sati 
 
buddhirūpasya bhinnatvād rājño bhtyopacāravat. [4cd] 
 
tadyathā […]. upacaryate ca <jātiśabdas tadvati>.  
 
§9. krameṇānabhidhānāc ca kundaśaṅkhādiśuklavat. [5ab] 
 
<yatra hi samānapratītis tatra krameṇābhidhānam, tadyathā> śuklaṃ 
kundam, kumudam, śaṅkham iti; sakc ca jātitadvatoḥ śabda<prayoga 
iti> nāsti pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ sārūpyam. 
 
§10. guṇopakārāt tādrūpye prakarṣaḥ syād vinā dhiyā. [5cd] 
 
yadi sphaṭikavad guṇoparāgāt tadvān guṇasvarūpo bhavet, evaṃ sati 
dravye guṇaprakarṣabuddhyanapekṣā<pi> prakarṣabuddhiḥ syāt. na hi 
sphaṭika upadhānabuddhyapekṣā pravartate raktabuddhiḥ, avyutpan-
nasya bhedabuddhy<abhāvāt>. 
 
§11. <kiṃ ca>, 
 
saṃsargirūpāt sarvatra mithyājñānam prasajyate. [6ab]  
 
sarvo hi śābdaḥ pratyayo 'rthe saṃsargirūpavyavahitaḥ, tataḥ <sphaṭi-
kavad> ayathārthaḥ syāt.  
 
§12. <kiṃ ca> 
 
sāmānyādibahutve ca yugapad grāhakeṣu ca 
upakāro virudhyeta. [6cd-7a] 
 
yadā ca bahavo grahītāro bhavanti guṇavataḥ śuklādes tadyathā gha-
ṭaḥ, pārthivaḥ, dravyam, san, śuklaḥ, madhuraḥ, surabhir ityevamādi-
viśeṣaiḥ, tadā guṇopakāro virudhyate. na hi śakyaṃ tadā dravyena 
ekaguṇarūpeṇa sthātum, aviśeṣāt, nāpy ekadeśena guṇarūpam anubhā-
vituṃ śakyam, ktsnasya ghaṭādirūpapratīteḥ. 
 
sarvair vā mecakekṣaṇam. [7b] 
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atha punaḥ sarvair ghaṭatvādibhir upakāro yugapat ktsnasya kriyate, 
tataḥ pratyekaṃ ghaṭādirūpagrahaṇābhāvād mecakadarśanaṃ yugapat 
sarvarūpāpatteḥ syāt. 
 
§13.bhedeṣu jātau tadyoge tulyo doṣaś ca teṣv api. [7cd]  
[…] 
[…] <jātau> mukhyo bhedeṣūpacāritaḥ. […] avaśyam […] sambha-
vataḥ […]. 
 
§14. tadvāṃs ca bheda eveṣṭaḥ sa ca pūrvaṃ nirāktaḥ. [8cd] 
[…] 
 
§15. nanu coktam […]. yady evaṃ 
 
 tadvanmātraṃ tu sambandhaḥ sattā veti vicāritam. [9ab] 
 
[…] <yathāha:> samāsakttaddhiteṣu sambandhābhidhānam anyatra 
rūḍhyabhinnarūpāvyabhicāritasambandhebhya <iti. tatra ca na> 
 




§16. tadvān artho ghaṭādiś cen na paṭādiṣu vartate. 
 sāmānyam arthaḥ sa katham. [9cd-10a] 
 
anekavtti hi sāmānyam […] tac ca […] katham […].  
 
§17. nanu ca […]. sattādiṣu ca … tasmāt […]. sā ca <nāsty arthasya>, 
yasmāt […]. […], na tu kenacit tadvatā; sattāyogau ca <pūrvaṃ 
nirāktau>. 
 
§18.  nānimittaḥ sa <ca> mataḥ. [10c] 
 
[…] tataś ca […].  
 
§19. atha punar ananyasmiṃ dravye vartate sadguṇaṃ,, sacchabdād 
ghaṭādyākāṅkṣāyāṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ syāt, nīlatarādivat. 
 
 yady ekatrāsitādivat. [10d] 
 
<sambandhe guṇe vā syāt>, 
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 <naitad apy asti>. [11a1] 
 
nīlaśabdo hi […].  
 
§20. <kiṃ ca,> 
 
 upetyāpi naitaj jāter ajātitaḥ. [11a2-b] 
 
[…] naivaṃ sajjātir ghaṭādijātimatī yatas tān viśeṣān upādāya dravye 
varteta. […] 
 
§21. evaṃ tarhy <ucyate> yady apy aśabdavācyā, tathāpi ghaṭādiṣv 
arthākṣipteṣu bhedākāṅkṣā bhaviṣyati. tadvān hy artho 'vaśyaṃ ghaṭa-
tvādīnāṃ kenacit sāmānyenānubaddha <iti>. 
 
 arthākṣepe 'pi anekāntaḥ. [11c]  
 
arthākṣepo hi <yasminn arthe niścayotpattiḥ>, tadyathā divā na 
bhuṅkta iti rātribhojane <niścayaḥ>. iha punaḥ sad ity ukte na 
ghaṭādiṣu niścayaḥ. <iti saṃśaye sati> nāsty <arthā>kṣepaḥ. 
 
§22. <yasmāj jātiśabdo na katham api bhedasāmānyasambandha-
jātimadvācakaḥ,> 
 
 tenānyāpohakc chrutiḥ. [11d] 
 
tasmād <yad uktam prāk>:  
 
 ktakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate [1cd] 
 
<iti tad eva sthitam>.  
 
§23. āha ca:  
  
 bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na śabdāt sarvathā gatiḥ 
 svasambandhānurūpyāt tu vyavacchedārthakāry asau. [12] 
 
 anekadharmā śabdo 'pi yenārthaṃ nātivartate  
 pratyāyayati tenaiva na śabdaguṇatādibhiḥ. [13] 
 
§24. yady anyāpohamātraṃ <śabdārthaḥ>, kathaṃ <nīlotpalādiśabdā-
nāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ syād, viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaś ca>. kathaṃ ca 
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na syāt? yasmād bhinnam <apohyaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdānām. eṣa 
doṣo nāsti>, te 'pi hi 
 
 apohyabhedād bhinnārthāḥ svārthabhedagatau jaḍāḥ 
 ekatrābhinnakāryatvād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyakāḥ. [14] 
 
<nīlotpālādiśabdā hi> saty apy apohyabhede svārthaviśeṣavyañjanār-
tham ūrdhvatākākanilayavat svam apohārtham ekatropasaṃharantaḥ 
<samānādhikaraṇā bhavanti>. tathā hi te pratyekaṃ svārthaviśeṣe 
saṃśayahetavaḥ, śabdāntarasahitavyaṅgyārthāsambhavāc ca <viśe-
ṣaṇaviśeṣya>bhūtāḥ. 
 
§25. yat tarhi tad ekādhikaraṇam […]. 
  
 na ca tat kevalaṃ nīlaṃ na ca kevalam utpalam 
 samudāyābhidheyatvāt. [15a-c] 
 
nīlotpalaśabdābhyāṃ <hi> sahitābhyāṃ sa <pratīyate>, na kevalābh-
yām. <kevalau hi> 
  
 varṇa<vat tau> nirarthakau. [15d] 
 
yathaiva hi […]  
 
§26. viṣama upanyāsaḥ. na hi […] 
  
 varṇe na kaścid arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye 
 tadvācya iti tatrāpi kevalaṃ sa pratīyate. [16] 
 
yathaiva hi […]. yat tūktam […] tatrāpi […] arthaśūnyaiḥ samudayaiḥ 
[…]. bhinnaśabdavācyenārthena bhinnārthā ity ucyante. […]. 
 
§27. […] <etayor hy> avayavārthayor adhikaraṇaṃ tato bhinnaṃ syād 
abhinnaṃ vā. […] 
  
 samudāyaikatā nāsti mitho 'bhedaprasaṅgataḥ. [17ab] 
 
yadi hi […]. 
  
 samūhānekatāsakteḥ. [17c] 
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samūhasyānekasmād abhedād anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ. […] nīlotpalārtha-
yoḥ […], ekatrāpi vartamānau 
  
 <śabdau svārthaṃ na tyajataḥ>. [17d] 
 
[…] samuditayor api […] kutaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ? <eṣa doṣo nāsti> 
dvāv api <viśeṣārthau>, sāmānye viśeṣāntarbhāvāt. tulyarūpau <sā-
mānyārthena>. viśeṣārthavattvajñāpanārthaṃ dvitīyaśabdaprayogaḥ. 
[…]. 
 
atra tāvad nīlaśabden<ābhedenā>bhidhīyate, 
  
 na jātiḥ. [18a1] 
 
<na hi nīlaśabdo dravyajātiṃ> sāmānyenāha, <kuto viśeṣo dravya-
jātāv antarbhūtaḥ kalpyeta?>  
 
nanu ca <nīlavad dravyaṃ sāmānyenāha>, […]. ayuktam evaṃ bhavi-
tum. <kasmāt>? 
  
  pūrvam uktatvāt. [18a2] 
 
<tadvadabhidhānaṃ hi “tadvato nāsvatantratvād” [4a] ityevamādinā> 
pūrvam eva niṣiddham. 
 
[…] tad ayuktam. <kasmāt>? 
  
 saṃśayāt. [18b1] 
 
saṃśayo hi <sāmānyaśabdād viśeṣeṣu dṣtaḥ>. na ca yataḥ saṃśayaḥ 
<tenābhidhānaṃ yuktam>. syāt tv arthato <viśeṣaśabdāt sāmānya-
pratītir avyabhicārāt>. 
 
yat tarhīdam <uktam “antarbhūtaviśeṣaṃ sāmānyam” iti>, naitad <uk-
tam abhidheyatvāt, kiṃ tarhi,  
  
  anapohanāt>. [18b2] 
[…] 
 paryāye gatir ekasmāt. [18c]. 
 
paryāyaśabde hy anirjñātānekārthe paryāyāntarasya prayogas tat<pūr-
vā>rthapratītaye. etad eva hi <paryāyaśabdānām> paryāyavam: paryā-
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yeṇārtham abhidadhati, <na yugapat>. tathā cotpalārthasya nīlaśab-
denaivāvagater viśesaṇaviśesyatvābhāvaḥ. […] 
 
§28. <yathābhede> tathā bhede 'pi: <samudāyibhyaḥ> samudāyasyā-
nyatvaṃ sādhyam. na hi tasya teṣu teṣāṃ vā tatra kārtsnyenaikadeśena 
vā vttiḥ sambhavati. […] 
 
[…]. tad dhy arthayor vā bhavec <chabdayor vā>. […]. 
  
 yady apy ekārthavttitā <jātiguṇayoś cārthayoḥ>  
 na sāmānyaviśeṣatvam. [19a-c] 
 
yady api hi <nīlaguṇotpalajātyor ekatra dravye vtteḥ sāmānādhika-
raṇyaṃ syāt, na viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ>. na hi […] 
  
  tadvatoḥ […] [19d] 
 
[…] dravyayor anyatrāvtteḥ. […] dvayor ekasya vā sāmānya-
viśeṣavattvāyogāt. […]. 
  
 […]  [20ab] 
 
atyantabhinnau hi <śabdau jātiguṇābhidhāyakau, tasmāt tayoḥ sāmā-
nādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ> […]. 
  
 […]  
 
 tulyātulyam prasajyate. [20cd] 
[…]. 
 
§29. atulyatvāvivakṣā cet. [21a] 
 
<yadi manyate: sambandhiktabhedāvivakṣāyāṃ> tulyatvaṃ tāvad 
upādāya sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhaviṣyati. yatrāpi hi […] tulyākāra-
buddhi <hetutvāt>. ubhayavyudāsānughīte […] tatra śabdavyāparaḥ. 
tanmātrasya vivakṣā prayujyate. sambandhikte tv  <viśeṣe 'vivakṣite 




   gavāśvasamānatā. [21b] 
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[…] <tasya vastuno> 'nabhidheyatvena <samānateti> nīlotpalādivat 
sāmānādhikaraṇyaprasaṅgaḥ.  
 
§30.  tatrāktiviśeṣaś ca. [21c] 
 
[…] svasāmānyābhivyaktihetor <bhedasya> tatkte hi tayos tathā-
bhidhāne katham avivakṣā, na tu nīlotpalatvavato 'rthasya.  
  
 anekāktisaṅkaraḥ. [21d] 
 
ekasmin vastuni <anekasāmānyā>bhivyakter anekasaṃsthānasamā-
veśaḥ <syāt>, na ca dṣṭam.  
 
§31. api ca, 
  
 <tulyam>. [22a1] 
 
<gavaśvādīnāṃ hi> tulyātulyam adhikaraṇam anabhidheyatvāt sattādi-
vyañjakatvāc ca gotvādivyañjakatvāt. tatrāpy atulyatvāvivakṣāyāṃ 
sāmānādhikaraṇyaprasaṅgaḥ.  
 
§32.  iṣṭe 'pi cābhāvaḥ. [22a2] 
 




 na vyaktir guṇakarmaṇoḥ. [22b] 
 
<guṇakarmaṇor hy> asaṃsthānavattvāt <tadgatasāmānyā>nabhivyak-
tiprasaṅgaḥ. śaktibhedena svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvād dravyādiṣu 
bheda iti […].  
 
§34. […]. śābdānāṃ tāvad abhidhāyakaśabdaktaḥ. teṣāṃ hi yadcchā-
śabdeṣu tadabhidheyatvaṃ viśeṣaḥ. 
  
 bhedo vācakabhedāc ca […]. [22c] 
 
[…]. aviśiṣṭe hi vastuny abhidhāyakena śabdenābhedopacārān na vak-
tavyaṃ viśiṣṭasāmānyābhivyaktihetutvād gavādayo viśiṣṭāḥ. abhidhā-
nabhedād api dṣṭo bhedaś caitrādivad <iti cet>. na, tasyaiva parīkṣ-
yatvāc <cai>kasyāpi anekaparyāyaśabdābhidheyatvāc <ca>. […] tatrā-
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rtha iva vicāraḥ. […] sa tu nābhidhāyakaḥ […] śākaṭikā<der> <bāla>-
prayuktasya ca <ekārthābhidhyakatvāt>. 
 
§35. […] <tadyathā> śiraḥ pṣtham udaraṃ pāṇir iti tadviśeṣebhya 
[VS X.11] <ity uktam>. 
  
 vyañjakavyaktito bhede <prāptam anyonyasaṃśrayaṃ> [23ab] 
 
[…]. dravyasvabhāvaḥ kaḥ? svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvam. sāmānya-
svabhāvaḥ kaḥ? svadravyābhivyaṅgyatvam. […]. 
 
§36. <kiṃ ca> 
  
 svabhāvānaikataikasya bahuvyakteḥ parasparam. [23cd] 
 
[…]. dravyād dhi <bahusāmānyasya> sattāder <vyaktiḥ>. […]. sarva-
thā ca guṇasambandhabhedāc ca śaktibhedāc cābhidhānabhedāc ca 
bhedābhyupagame <ekasyāpy> anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ. 
  
[…]     [24] 
[…]. 
 






 anyatve 'pi na sāmānyabhedaparyāyavācyanut. [25cd] 
 
tulye 'pi hi anyatve <śabdo na sāmānyabhedaparyāyaśabdānām ar-
tham apohate. kuta iti cet?> avirodhāt. paryāyaśabdasya <tāvat> tul-
yam apohyaṃ yugapad aprayogāt, na ca svārthapratikṣepo yuktaḥ. 
sāmānyaśabdenāpi svabhedeṣu arthāntaraṃ vyudastaṃ bhedaśabdo 
'numodate, arthitvāt. yathā hi śiṃśapā na palāś<ādi>, evaṃ na <ghaṭā-
dy> api. etena <sāmānyasāmānyaśabdārthāpratikṣepo 'py uktaḥ>. ta-
thā sāmānyaśabdaḥ svārthaṃ abhiprete viṣaye vyavasthāpyamānam 
viśeṣaśabdena viśeṣaviśeṣaśabdena vā kathaṃ nopekṣate? <evam avi-
rodhād na sāmānyādiśabdārthāpoho yuktaḥ>. samūhaś ca tathār-
thāntaravācakaḥ. evaṃ ca sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor svārthasāmānye 
vartamānāyor dvayor bahūnāṃ vā tadviśiṣṭārthāntaravācakatvam upa-
padyate yathoktam prāk. 
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§39. <āha ca> 
  
 tanmātrākaṅkṣaṇād bhedaḥ svasāmānyena nojjhitaḥ 
  nopāttaḥ saṃśayotpatteḥ, sāmye caikārthatā tayoḥ [26] 
  
 anekam api sāmānyam bhedenāvyabhicāriṇā 
  upāttaṃ na tayor tulyā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā [27] 
 
§40. kim punar atra <kāraṇaṃ yena bhedaśabdo bhedāntaraśabdār-
tham apohate?> 
  
 bhedo bhedāntarārthaṃ tu virodhitvād apohate [28ab] 
 
bhedārthā hi śabdāḥ sāmānyārthāpaharitvād rājaputravat paraspara-
virodhinaḥ. tataś ca na parasparārthaṃ kṣamante. tadyathā <'ayaṃ 
vkṣaḥ śiṃśape'ti śiṃśapāśabdo vkṣaśabdena saha prayujyamānaḥ 
khadirādibhyo vkṣatvaṃ vyavacchidya svaviṣaye vyavasthāpayati. 
tathetaratrāpi. evaṃ tāvad bhedaśabdasyai>kadravyāpahāritvād <bhe-
dāntaraśabdārthāpoho yuktaḥ>.  
 
§41. atha sāmānyāntarabhed<ārthaṃ> ghaṭādim asambandhaṃ> 
kasmād apohata <iti. yasmād> 
  
 sāmānyāntarabhedārthāḥ svasāmānyavirodhinaḥ [28cd] 
 
vkṣaśabdena hi <ghaṭādayaḥ pārthivādyapahāritvād virodhinaḥ>. tena 
hi nirākriyamāṇaṃ abhyanumodate mitraśatruvat. arthāc ca tena sa 
nirasta iti pratīyate. etena <sāmānyāntarabhedānāṃ guṇādīnāṃ tad-
bhedānāṃ ca rūpādīnāṃ> nirākaraṇam upekṣaṇaṃ ca sambandhasam-
bandhataḥ ktaṃ veditavyaṃ <mitramitraśatruvat, mitraśatrumitra-
vat>. 
 
§42. tatra tu 
  
 na sākṣāt tasya te 'pohyāḥ. [29a] 
[…] 
 mā bhūt sāmānyatulyatā. [29b] 
 
yadi hi sākṣād apoheta, vkṣaśabdena tulyārthaḥ syāt.  
  
 tathā bhedāntarāṇāṃ <tu teneva> na syād apohaḥ. [29cd] 
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yathaiva hi vkṣaśabdaḥ palāśādīn nāpoheta, tathā śiṃśapāśabdo 'pi 
nāpoheta <tena tulyatvāt>. <yadi nāsti sa doṣo>'lpabahvarthāpoha-
tvena bhinnatvād <ity evam> ayuktam. yathaiva hi vkṣaśiṃśapāśa-
bdau <vkṣatvaśiṃśapātvaviśiṣṭaṃ vastu bruvāṇāv atyantabhinnār-
thaṃ> brūtaḥ, tathehāpy <asaṅkīrṇenārthena> bhavitavyam. arthāt tu 
syād alpabahutarāpohaḥ.  
 
§43. yadi bhedo bhedāntarārtham <apoheta, madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ 
śīto guruś ceti yad etad guṇasya guṇāntaraiḥ sāmānādhikaranyaṃ,> tat 
katham? […] 
 
 sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ tu <guṇasya yad guṇāntaraih 
 tasyaikadravyavttatvād āśrayeṇāvirodhatvāt> [30] 
[…]. 
 
§44. adṣṭatvād vyudāso vā. [31a] 
 
<atha vā> yasmād bhedaśabdo bhedāntarārthe na dṣṭaḥ, tasmād apo-
hate. kasmāt tu na dṣṭaḥ? svābhāvike 'py arthe […] āhopuruṣikā prati-
pannā […].  
 
§45. evaṃ tarhi  
 
 sāmānyaṃ syāt svabhedanut. [31b] 
 
yady adarśanenāpohate, <sāmānyaśabdasyāpi svabhedeṣv adarśanād 
apohaprasaṅgaḥ syāt>. 
  
 nānyayuktasya dṣṭatvāt. [31c] 
 
dṣṭo hy arthaprakaraṇādibhiḥ sāmānyaśabdo viśeṣaṃ pratipādayati. 
  
 ta<dābhaḥ> saṃśayas tathā. [31d] 
 
<evaṃ tarhi> sāmānyaśabdād bhedābhāsaḥ saṃśayo yuktaḥ,> teṣv api 
dṣṭapūrvaḥ, ūrdhvatāvat. 
 
 saṃśayo 'yukta iti cet. [32a] 
 
<idaṃ> manyate: yady arthaprakaraṇādisahita evopalabdhaḥ syāt, 
tataḥ <kathaṃ saṃśaya> iti.  
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 niścite kevalāt tu saḥ. [32b] 
 
naiva <arthādi>sahitāt saṃśaya ity ucyate>, kiṃ tarhi arthādisahitād 
niścita uttarakālaṃ kevalāt saṃśayaḥ. 
  
 bhede cen nāsti kevalaḥ. [32c] 
[…] 
 dṣtaḥ śrotvyapekṣayā. [32d] 
 
yadā hi śrotānyasāmānyavyudāsenārthībhavati, <tadyathā> kiṃ vkṣaḥ 
pārthiva uta pañcamahābhautika ity <ukte>, tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya 
prayoga sambhavati. niścite tarhi <tasya> vkṣe kutaḥ pārthivaśabda-
prayogāt saṃśaya iti <cet>, tasya niścite 'nyasya <kevalāt saṃśayaḥ>. 
[…]. 
 
§46. yathā cārthāntarāpohenārthe sāmānyam, tathā> 
  
 <śabdāntaravyudāsena śabde sāmānyam ucyate>. [33ab] 
 
yathaivāktakavyudāsena yat ktakatvaṃ tat sāmānyam anityatvādi-
gamakam, tathā śabdāntaravyavacchedena śabde sāmānyam ucyate. 
tenaiva cārthapratyāyakaḥ. tatrāpi 
 
 <aikyaṃ yatrārthasaṃśayaḥ>. [33c] 
 
yatrākṣādiśabdād arthe śakaṭāṅgādau saṃśaya <utpadyate>, tatra śab-
dasyaikyam. 
  
 tatsandehe tv anekatā. [33d] 
 
<yatra> bhavatiśabdādau śatrantādau saṃśayaḥ, <tatra> śrutisāmye 'pi 
śabdabhedo draṣṭavyaḥ, tadyathā ka iheti. 
 
§47. katham punaḥ śabdasyārthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne pūrva-
doṣāprasaṅgaḥ? <yasmād> 
  
 adṣṭer anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāṃśe 'pi darśanāt 
 śruteḥ sambandhasaukaryaṃ na cāsti vyabhicāritā. [34] 
 
anvayavyatirekau hi śabdasyārthābhidhāne dvāram, tau ca tulyātulya-
yor vttyavttī. tatra tu tulye nāvaśyaṃ sarvatra vttir ākhyeyā kva cid, 
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ānantye 'rthasyākhyānāsambhavāt. atulye tu saty apy ānantye śakyam 
adarśanamātreṇāvtter ākhyānam. ata eva ca svasambandhibhyo 'nya-
trādarśanāt tadvyavacchedānumānaṃ svārthābhidhānam ity ucyate. 
anvayadvāreṇa cānumāne vkṣaśabdād ekasmin vastuni śiṃśapādyā-
bhāsaḥ saṃśayo na syāt. tatsaṃśayavat pārthivatvadravyatvādyābhāso 
'pi saṃśayaḥ syāt. yatas tu <vkṣaśabdo 'pārthivādiṣu na dṣṭaḥ>, ato 
vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam. <āha ca> 
 
 vkṣatvapārthivadravyasajjñeyāḥ prātilomyataḥ 




§48. na ca sambandhadvāraṃ muktvā śabdasya liṅgasya vā svārtha-
khyāpanaśaktir asti, tasyānekadharmatve sarvathā pratyāyanāsambha-
vāt, <svārthāvyabhicāraś ca> bhedānabhidhānāt. evaṃ tāvat pūrvok-
tadoṣasyābhāvaḥ. 
 
§49. anantarasyāpy abhāvaḥ. <katham? yasmād> 
 
 vyāpter anyaniṣedhasya tadbhedārthair abhinnatā. [36ab] 
 
sāmānyaśabdasya hi yat ktyam arthāntaravyudāsaḥ sa svabhedāprati-
kṣepeṇeti bhedaśrutyā saha sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapannam. <tasmāt 
svabhedārthair pthakśrutidoṣo nāsti>. […] tathā hi svārthāvyabhi-
cāraḥ <kevalasyānyatrāvtteḥ>. 
 
§50. paścimasyāpi doṣasyā<bhāvaḥ>, 
 
 sākṣād vtter abhedāc ca. [36c] 
 
na hy arthāntaram upādāya <śabdaḥ svabhedeṣu vartate>. tasmāt pāra-
tantryeṇa <svabhedānākṣepadoṣo nāsti>. bhāktadoṣo 'pi nāsti, nāpi 
bhedānavasthānād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ. avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 
'pi nāsti, arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvād adravyatvāc ca. ata eva 
<sāmānyaviśeṣāntarayogānusaraṇaṃ na kartavyam>, sākṣād arthānta-
rapratiṣedhāt. <evam pūrvadoṣābhāvād> arthāntarāpoha eva śabdār-
thaḥ sādhuḥ. 
 
§51. <atra ca> 
  
 jātidharmavyavasthiteḥ. [36d] 
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jātidharmāś caiketvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā atraiva vya-
vatiṣṭhante, abhedāt, āśrayāvicchedāt, ktsnārthapratīteḥ. <evam pūr-
voktadoṣābhāvād> guṇotkarṣāc ca śabdo 'rthāntaranivttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān 
āha. 
 
§52. <evaṃ sati>, 
  
 apohaniyamaḥ kasmāt? [37a] 
 
rūpaśabdena rasādayo apohyante, na punar anyatamavarṇābhidhāne 
śeṣā varṇā <atyantabhinnā api. sa kiṅktaḥ>? yasya tu rūpatvam abhin-
naṃ nīlādiṣv evāsti, na rasādiṣv <ity evam eṣa doṣo nāstīti cet>. […] 
  
 lokarūḍho na mśyate. [37b] 
 
uktaṃ hi <Bhagavatā>: “janapadaniruktiṃ nābhiniviśeta saṃjñāṃ ca 
lokasya nābhidhāvet.” tasmād asmābhir api <lokavyavahārā naimittikā 
vā> pāribhāṣikā <vā> bhūtārthatvena na mśyante, lokavad evānu-
gamyante. siddhaś ca rūpaśabdo loke nīlādiṣv eva, na rasādiṣu. 
 
§53. rūpatve tulyam etac ca. [37c] 
 
<yasya ca atyantabhinneṣu nīlādiṣu rūpatvavttiḥ, tasya kena rasā-
dyavttiḥ?> rasādyavttivad vā pītādyavttiḥ?  
asty atra <kāraṇam>. sati svabhāvabhede <nīlādiṣv eva cākṣuṣatvam 
abhinnaṃ, na rasādiṣu>. 
  
 cākṣuṣatve kriyāktaḥ. [37d] 
 
cākṣuṣā <hi grāhyaṃ cākṣuṣatvam; <evaṃ ca> kriyānimitto <nīlā-
diṣu> rūpaśabdaḥ syāt, na tu jātinimittaḥ. cākṣuṣatvābhede hi kim 
punā rūpatvena? atha rūpatvasambandhasya nimittaṃ cākṣuṣatvam 
<uktam iti cet>, evam api <cākṣuṣatve samavāyaḥ> kriyāktaḥ prāp-
noti, rūpatvābhivyaktir vā. cākṣuṣatve 'pi vā <niyamaḥ kasmāt>? 
tasmād avaśyaṃ svabhāvikatvam āśrayaṇīyam. 
  
 dravyādiṣu prasaṅgaś ca. [38a] 
 
<dravyasaṅkhyāparimāṇādīnāṃ cākṣuṣatvāt teṣv api rūpatvaprasaṅgaḥ 
syāt>. <kiṃ ca> 
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 bhedābhāvaḥ sitādiṣu. [38b] 
 
<cākṣuṣatvāviśeṣe nīlapītanīlataranīlatamāder bhedo na syāt>. tasmād 
avaśyaṃ cākṣuṣatvavyatirekeṇa <nīlapītādiṣu bhinneṣv api> rūpaśab-
do loke rūḍher anugantavyaḥ, na rasādiṣu. 
 
§54. yadi cārthāntaranivttyanapekṣatāyāṃ <śabdasyārthābhidhānaṃ 
syāt, tarhy> 
  
 anvayād eva siddhiḥ syāt, [38c] 
 
na tu <śabdasyārthābhidhāne> 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ syāt; iṣyate ca. 
anyatarobhayāvadhāraṇenābhidhānasāphalyād vyatirekato 'py arthā-
bhidhānam, <tadyathā> “kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma.” 
 
§55. nanu cā<pohamātre śabdārthe> vyatirekād evābhidhānāṃ syāt. 
syād etad evaṃ <yady anvayo neṣyeta>, bhāvena tu 
  
 mukhyena <vyāptir neṣyate>. [38d] 
 
na hi bhāveṣu <jātiḥ sambhavati vyatiriktā vā syād avyatiriktā vety> 
uktam. jātivyatirekeṇa tv <“adṣṭer anyaśabdārtha” ity etenā>rthān-
tarapohaviśiṣṭe 'rthe <śabdasyānvayavyatirekau na bhinnārthau>. 
 
§56. yas tv āha “yadi gavādi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ, sarvāt-
myaprasaṅgāt prayuktam asataḥ sadātmakatvam” iti.  
  
 asatsamanvitaṃ sarvaṃ <yasya tv abhyupagacchataḥ>  
 sattvam anekātmakatvād iti kiṃ kena yujyate? [39] 
 
<yadi sarvam asatsamanvitam ity abhyupagamyeta>, tatra katame 
'nye gavādayo <'santaḥ kena svabhāvena sattvādhyaropyāḥ syuḥ?>. 
sarvān hi gavādīn <asatsamanvitān> abhyupagacchato 'sataḥ sadātma-
katvaṃ prāptam ity uttaraṃ na yujyate. yad apy uktam “pratyayā-
bhedaḥ syād asatsatoḥ, praktipratyayo hi vikāre dṣṭaḥ, tadyathā 
mtpratyayaḥ śarāvādau,” <tatra>, 
  
 mdabhede śaravādibhedadhī yadi ceṣyate  
 asadabhede bhedadhīḥ kim iti <sā> nidhāryate? [40] 
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<yathā hi mdbhyo 'bhinnatve 'pi tadmātrapratyayaprasaṅge> kenāpi 
vidhena <śaravādipratyayabhedo 'bhyupagamyate, tathā> śabdabhe-
dabhāvanāvaśāt <sadasatoḥ pratyayabhedaḥ kiṃ neṣyate>. tavāpi hi  
  
 guṇānām paramaṃ rūpaṃ na dṣṭipatham cchati 
 yat tu dṣṭipathaprāptaṃ tan māyeva sutucchakam 
 
§57.  sāsnādidarśanād <gopratyayo yo 'yam udāhtaḥ  
 so> viruddho bhavanmatyā. bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ [41] 
 
yasya hi […] abhyupagamyāyaṃ dṣṭāntaḥ svamataviruddhaḥ. śabda-
bhedād dhi <gosāsnādiṣu bhinnam apohyam>. 
 
 “so 'napekṣa” <ity etat tu> svavikalpavi<nirmitam>  
 nirapoham […]. [42] 
 
sāsnādiṣu hi <sāmānyarūpam> arthāntarābhāvanirapekṣaṃ na bhavatī-
ti pūrvam evopapāditam. svarūpaṃ tv ten<āvyāvahārikam> anabhilāp-
yatvāt. 
 
§58. yac coktam <ādyapratyayo> nāstīti, <tatra>  
  
 iṣṭisiddhir anāditvāt. [43a] 
 
[…]. yasya tu […] na ca śakyaṃ jātimad vyāptum, na ca […]. 
 
§59. yad apy uktaṃ pratyayavttir eva nāsti, tad apy ayuktam. 
  
   sāmānyena nirākteḥ. [43b] 
 
na hi so 'nyāṃ jātiṃ pratidravyam apohate, kiṃ tarhi vyavacchedyavi-
vakṣayaikena sāmānyadharmeṇa. uktaṃ cātra vijātīye 'darśanamātre-
ṇānumānam. tavaiva tv eṣa doṣaḥ. yadi svajātīyavyāptyā <varteta, 
vyāpyasyānantyaṃ syāt>. tasmād yathā <viṣāṇitvād anaśva ity vacane 
'śve viṣāṇitvādarśanena tadvyavacchedānumānam>, na tu <karkādīn> 
pratyekam apohate, <nāpy ekaikeṣu gavādiṣu vartate. tavāpi vyāvt-
tyanuvttibuddhimatam>. tathā <cā>tra nyāyaḥ. 
 
§60. upetyātmāntarābhavam ekānekatvakalpanā 
 
 na yuktā vastuni hy eṣā. [44a-c] 
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<vastu hi yat sadātma, tasya> yuktam ekānekatvaṃ kalpayitum, na tv 
ātmāntarābhāvam abhyupetya. 
  
 tavāpy avyaktavyaktiṣu. [44d] 
 
tulyaḥ prasaṅgaḥ. <avyakte hi> vikāraśaktīnām aikye vikārabhedo na 
syāt. nānātve tu pradhānasyaikatvavirodhaḥ śaktibhyo 'nanyatvāt. 
 
 iyaṃ ca śabdavācye 'rthe cintā <nedriyagocare>. [45ab] 
 […] 
 
anirdeśyo hi pratyakṣārthaḥ. “ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram” iti nirdeś-
yam praty uktam. tasmān nāsya pratyakṣe prakṣepaḥ. 
 
§61. atra ca 
  
 apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vikalpitaḥ 
 vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo 'yaṃ tenādāv upajanyate. [46] 
 
padasyāsato <'pi> vākyād apoddhtasya yathāgamaṃ utprekṣayārtho 
vyavasthāpyate kevalasyāprayogāt praktipratyayavat. sā cotprekṣā-
nyeṣv āgameṣv ayuktārthagrahaṇī. tasmād idam arthāntaram utkṣip-
tam, <yasmād ādāv anabhyastaśabdārthasambandhānām padārthagra-
haṇopāyā vākyārthapratibhā>. vākyam eva tadarthaś ca mukhyau śab-
dārthau, tayor abhinnatvāt. <yo hy anyaḥ tadantarāle śabdārthagraha-
ṇābhimānaḥ, sa utprekṣayā, niraṅkuśatvāt>. 
 
§62.  <ye 'py artheṣu> pratibhāṃ hitvā anyam bāhyam arthaṃ <tat-
sambandhaṃ> vā vākyārthaṃ kalpayanti, teṣām api tat kalpanāmā-
tram. <kasmāt?> 
  
 yathābhyāsaṃ hi vākyebhyo vināpy arthena jāyate  
 svapratyayānukāreṇa pratipattir anekadhā. [47] 
 
<asaty api bāhye 'rthe> svapratyayānurūpyeṇārthābhyāsavāsanāpekṣā 
vākyād arthakriyāpratipattir nānārūpotpadyate vikalpaś ca, vyāghrā-
diśrutivat. tadaviśeṣe vā śṅgārakāvyasya śravaṇavād rāgiṇāṃ rāgānu-
rūpā pratītir bhavati, vītarāgāṇāṃ tu saṃvegānurūpā. 
 
§63. sāpi vākyāntarārthebhyo <vyavacchinne> 'rtha iṣyate




 pratipattis tu yā vākyād […] [49] 
[…]. 
 
§64. yuktaṃ tāvan <naimittikeṣu śabdeṣv> anyāpohenārthābhidhā-
nām, yādcchikeṣu tu katham? 
  
 yādcchike 'py <arthābhedāt>. [50a] 
 
yādcchiko hi samudāyavācī ḍitthādiśabdaḥ <samudāyino> 'bhedenā-
ha. kas tarhi jātisamudāyaśabdayor viśeṣa iti. na kaścit. prasiddhivaśāj 
jātiśabdaḥ <kvacit> pratyekam apy avayaveṣūpacaryate. tadyathā 
abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara iti. kvacin mukhyaḥ. yathā 
  
 sāṃkhyāpramāṇasaṃsthānanirapekṣaḥ pravartate 
 bindau ca samudāye ca vācakaḥ salilādiṣu  




 saṃsthānavarṇāvayavair viśiṣṭe yaḥ prayujyate  
 śabdo na tasyāvayave pravttir upalabhyate 
    [VP II 155] 
 
[…] varṇaviśiṣṭe citraḥ kalmāṣaḥ. avayavaviśiṣṭe […] pratyekam pari-
samāpyate […] upacaritaḥ. […] <tadyathā> “kāyakarmaṇā 'tmakārma 
vyākhyātam” (VS V.2:18). […] 
 
§65. <ath>āktasambandhaśabd<ād> yā pratītiḥ, <tadyathā yad uktaṃ 
‘ayam panasa’ iti, tatra> katham anumānam? iti. na tatra <panasa-
śabdād arthapratītiḥ. kasmāt>? 
 
 pratīten<ārthadarśanāt>. [50b] 
 
[…] ayaṃśabdena […] kiṃ tarhi saṃjñāvyutpattiḥ. sambandhapradar-
śanārthaṃ tu <tasya saṃjñārthasyāyaṃśabdena sāmānādhikaraṇyam> 
ubhayor abhidheya iti ktvā. atādarthyāc ca saṃjñārthaḥ panasa-
śabdaḥ. 
 




 <na, sambandho vikalpitāt>. [50c] 
 
sambandho hi <panasaśabdārthau> pramāṇāntareṇopalabhya '<asyā-
yam' iti> manasā kalpyate, anumānānumeyasambandhavat, <tato na 
śābdam pramāṇāntaraṃ>. 
 
§67. atha śeṣam upamānādi kathaṃ <na pramāṇāntaram>? 
 
 śeṣam uktam diśānayā [50d] 
 
upamānaṃ tāvad gogavayādiṣu sārūpyapratipattyartham. tatra parata 
upaśrutya yā pratītiḥ sā śābdam. svayaṃ tu dvayārtham <pramāṇan-
tareṇā>dhigamya manasā sārūpyaṃ <yadā> kalpayati, <tadā> tad api 
na pramāṇāntaram. nāpy evam adhigamyamānam sārūpyam prame-




Ms B 192a2-193a1 contains Jinendrabuddhi’s discussion of whether 
or not the logical canon of the trairūpya applies to the verbal sign 
(śabda), and if so, in what way. The discussion is closely related to a 
similar debate that follows the quotation of PS V 1 at TSP 539,22-23 
on TS 1514. It is obvious that Jinendrabuddhi’s discussion presup-
poses the same arguments as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, even 
though his formulation of the pūrvapakṣa in spite of conspicuous 
similarities differs somewhat in detail from the one presented in TS 
and TSP. The historically interesting question is whether it is possible 
to identify the author of the arguments that Jinendrabuddhi attempts to 
answer. Kumārila criticized Dignāga´s view that the verbal sign–the 
syntactical word (pada) or other speech units–is subject to the con-
straints of the triple format of the trairūpya in ŚV Śabdapariccheda, 
which contains an essential part of his criticism of the apoha thesis. 
His main arguments are presented by Śāntarakṣita at TS 1490ff 
quoting the relevant passages from ŚV Śabdapariccheda verses 56, 83 
through 88, and 98. As mentioned in the English translation note 9 
above, Dharmakīrti introduced the idea that the inferential nature of 
the verbal sign consists in its indicating the speaker´s intention 
(vivakṣā)–a view that can be traced to the grammarian-philosopher 
Bharthari–and Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla address 
the criticism levelled at Dharmakīrti’s view. Who was this scholar? It 
is possible to suggest a plausible identification on the basis of two 
ślokas, which Kamalaśīla quotes in the course of his presentation of 
the opponent’s view. The first reads: saṅketāpekṣayā tasya hdi ktvā 
prakāśanam, anumānatvam uddiṣṭaṃ na tu tattvavyapekṣayā. This 
verse would seem to address a statement at PV I 327: vivakṣā niyame 
hetuḥ saṅketas tatprakāśanaḥ, cf. PVSV ad loc. If we take into con-
sideration that Kamalaśīla in the same context quotes ŚV Codanā-
sūtram 1381 which has a close parallel in verses from Kumārila’s 
Bhaṭṭīkā quoted at Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali 24,27ff it is highly likely 
that Jinendrabuddhi and his younger contemporaries, Śāntarakṣita and 
Kamalaśīla, address Kumārila’s criticism of Dharmakīrti’s view. The 
pūrvapakṣa includes as indicated below quotations from Dharma-
kīrti´s PVin and PVSV. They must have been embedded in the source 
Jinendrabuddhi used as basis for his rebuttal. If the identification of 
the work as Kumārila’s Bhaṭṭīkā is correct we must conclude that this 
work like his other ṭīkās on the Jaiminīyasūtras formally consisted of 
                                                 
1 I am indebted to Helmut Krasser for this reference. 
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verses embedded in a prose commentary, and, moreover, that the ano-
nymous author, who as suggested may be Kumārila, knew Dharma-
kīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya. There is no doubt that Kumārila addressed 
Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of Dignāga’s apoha theory because the 
views mentioned at TS 901-4 are quoted by Karṇakagomin (PVSVT 
131,16ff) as refuted by Dharmakīrti. Karṇakagomin’s claim is, of 
course, an anachronism because Dharmakīrti never managed to 
address Kumārila’s criticism of his philosophy. I assume, for instance, 
that Śāntarakṣita lifted, from the Bhaṭṭīkā, the criticism aimed at the 
apoha theory, which he quotes at TS 901-4, since the critique quoted 
at TS 904cd incorporates a citation of PV I 72c as part of his criticism: 
itaretarabhedo ‘sya bījaṃ cet pakṣa eṣa naḥ, which is in line with the 
quotations from Dharmakīrti’s works found in the passage from PSṬ 
edited below. Quotations from Dharmakīrti’s works are printed in 
roman as well as those passages that PSṬ and TSP have in common.  
 
kathaṃ punaḥ śabdasya trairūpyam? kathaṃ ca na syāt. dharmiṇo 
‘yogāt. tathā hi śabdārthasya na dharmitvam upapadyate, pratyāyya-
tvād anityatvavat. na cārthe śabdasya pakṣadarśanam, vaktari sthita-
tvāt, tatraivopalabdheḥ. tasmāt pramāṇāntaram evedam, yathāsama-
yam arthapratipattihettvāt. tad etac chābdasya prāmāṇyaviṣayāpari-
jñānād evam ucyate. na hi tasya bāhye ‘rthe prāmāṇyam. tathā hi na 
tad tasya bhāva eva bhavati.  
kva tarhi?  
vivakṣāyām. tatra cāsty eva śabdasya trairūpyam. tathā hi vivakṣāvān 
puruṣo dharmī, vivakṣā sādhyadharmaḥ, vivakṣāvaty evopalambha-
nāt, śabdasya pakṣadharmatvam, vivakṣāvān pūrvānubhūtaḥ sapak-
ṣaḥ, tadvyatireko vipakṣa iti. kathaṃ trairūpyaṃ na sambhavati? 
nanu ca vivakṣāyām api naivetasya prāmāṇyaṃ yujyate. tathā hi (cf. 
TSP 540,13ff) vivakṣāsāmānye vā prāmāṇyaṃ syāt, vivakṣāviśeṣe vā. 
na tāvat sāmānye. tena vyavahārāyogāt. yadi hi vivakṣāsāmānyaṃ 
śabdasyārthaḥ syāt, gaur ity ukte nav<āva>dhāritavarṇavibhāgaḥ 
kim ayam āha? iti, na paryanuyuñjīte, śabdoccāraṇamātrād eva 
vivakṣāsāmānyasya vijñātatvāt. vivakṣāsāmānyārthavattv<ān> <na> 
śabdāḥ pravttihetavo bhaveyuḥ. na hi vivakśāsāmānyena kaścid 
arthī; pravttyaṅga<ñ ca> pramāṇam, “na hy ābhyām artham paric-
chidya pravartamāno ‘rthakriyāyāṃ visaṃvādyata” (PVin I.1) ity 
abhidhānāt. tad evaṃ na vivakṣāsāmānye prāmāṇyaṃ, nāpi viśeṣe, 
vyabhicārāt. sa punar... vivakṣāviśeṣavataḥ śabdāntaropalabdheḥ.2 
tathā hy uktaṃ yathā rakto bravīti, tathā virakto ‘pīti (cf. PVSV 9,7-
                                                 
2 This clause is evidently incomplete and impossible to construe. 
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8).3 śabdavyavahārā hi buddhipūrvam anyathāpi śakyante kartum (cf. 
PVSV 110,13). tato na śabdebhyo viśeṣaniścayaḥ, viśeṣa eva ca 
vyavahārāṅgam, tasya cāvadhārayitum aśakyatvāt kutaḥ śābdasya 
prāmāṇyam. 
tatra yad uktaṃ na vivakṣāsāmānyam avyabhicāre ‘pi śabdārthaḥ, 
tena vyavahārāyogād iti, tad ayuktam. yo hi santānāntaramātrasādh-
yārthakriyārthī, tasya kathaṃ na vivakṣāsāmānyaṃ vyavahārāṅgam, 
na hy asau śabdād vivakṣāsāmānyam paricchidya pravartamānaḥ 
santānāntaramātrasādhyāyām arthakriyāyāṃ visaṃvādyate. yad apy 
uktaṃ nāpi viśeṣe prāmāṇyam, vyabhicārād iti, tad apy asat, viśe-
ṣasyaiva hetutvāt. viśeṣasya duranvayatvād ayuktaṃ hetutvam iti cet. 
dhūmasyāpi tarhi hetutvaṃ na syāt. na hy asāv api māyākāranirmitād 
dhūmābhāsād <bh>ūtasaṅghātād anyavyāvttena rūpeṇa sarveṇa 
pratipattrāvadhārayituṃ śaktaḥ. taṃ prati tasyānumānāṃgatvam. tad 
etad itaratrāpi samānaṃ; atha vā, pratipattāvisaṃvādivacanaḥ khalv 
ayam īdśo yatrābhiniveśa<ḥ>. tadvacanasyāvisaṃvādatulyatām 
adhyāropyānumānaṃ karoti. ataḥ pratipattur abhidhānaprāyo viśeṣa-
vaśād viśeṣeśabdasyānumānatvam uktam, na punaḥ paramārthataḥ. 
                                                 
3 Cf. Karṅakagomi’s PVSVṬ 397, 19: tathā hi sarāgā api vītarāgavad ātmānan 




After having addressed the problem that Dignāga has not substantiated 
the apoha theory when making the bold claim at PSV V:11d that his 
theory stands unchallenged, Jinendrabuddhi continues expounding in 
an excursus some of the theoretical issues which Dharmakīti 
addressed in his own exposition of the apoha theory in PVSV. 
Jinendrabuddhi's excursus consists to a large extent of quotations or 
slightly edited quotations from Dharmakīrti's PVSV interspersed with 
his own explanations inserted in order to contextualise the topics that 
he addresses. This section was translated into English by Th. 
Stcherbatsky from the Tibetan version of PSṬ as “Jinendrabuddhi on 
the Theory of the Negative Meaning of Names” (cf. Buddhist logic I: 
461-471) without recognizing that Jinendrabuddhi's exposition is 
indebted to Dharmakīrtian philosophy. On account of the historical 
interest of this excursus it is here reproduced from Ms B 205a2-208a1. 
The quotations from PVSV are printed in roman and traced to their 
context. It is historically interesting that Jinendrabuddhi connects 
Dharmakīrti’s rejection of the view that the apoha theory entails that 
any given word has two functions (dvau vyāparau) namely affirmat-
ion and negation to Bhāmaha’s criticism of Dignāga’s apoha theory at 
Kāvyālaṅkāra VI.17-18, as do Śāntarakṣita at TS 911-12 (cf. TSP 
359,15-17 ad loc.) and TS 1019d. The identification is corroborated 
by Karṇakagomi at PVSVṬ 250,19-22 on PV I 127ab: na cāpi śabdo 
dvayakd anyonyābhābhāva ity asau.4 It is significant that Karṇaka-
gomin in his comment on this line quotes Kāvyālaṅkāra VI.17-18 with 
the remark that this objection is hereby rejected (iti nirastam). 
Śāntarakṣita’s critique of Bhāmaha’s objection at TS 1019d: nānvayo 
‘vyatirekavān repeats Dharmakīrti’s own argument at PVSV 63,14-15: 
na hy anvayo ‘vyatireko ‘nanvayo vā vyatirekaḥ, which explains the 
statement anyonyābhābhāva ity asau of PV I 127b. This shows that 
these important writers agreed on the philosophical context of 
Dharmakīrti’s argument. Their identification of Bhāmaha as the target 
of Dharmakīrti’s rebuttal solves the much discussed problem of 
                                                 
4 Śākyamati appears to believe that Dharmakīrti answers objections made by 
Kumārila and others. As all commentators agree in identifying the addressee of 
Dharmakīrti’s remarks with Bhāmaha, Śākyamati’s identification is peculiar, in 
particular as the objection Dharmakīrti addresses is not found in Kumārila’s 
Ślokavārttika. Cf. Śākyamati’s remarks on the relevant passage of PVSV: gźan 
bzlog pa ni śugs kyis yin pas sgra la bya ba gñis ni med do, de bas na gŹon nu ma 
len pa la sogs pas (Kumārila etc.) sgra gcig gis bya ba gñis mi nus pa'i phyir thams 
cad du sgra gñis brjod par thal bar 'gyur ro źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de spaṅs pa yin 
no.  
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Bhāmaha’s date as there is no reason to believe that the view that PV I 
127b addresses Bhāmaha’s objection only originated with Śānta-
rakṣita, Jinendrabuddhi, and Karṇakagomin who are fairly close in 
time to Dharmakīrti and therefore must have been in contact with the 
tradition of the Dharmakīrti circle of students. Bhāmaha’s views are 
not mentioned or presumed by Kumārila and Uddyotakara, whose 
criticism of the apoha theory was addressed by Dharmakīrti. 
Bhāmaha’s Kāvyālaṅkāra may therefore have been i circulation after 
the composition of Ślokavārttika and Nyāyavārttika. Thus the 
evidence makes it possible to conclude that Bhāmaha may have been 
an older contemporary of Dharmakīrti. This conclusion is not 
contradicted by Bhāmaha’s mention of some Nyāsakāra at Kāvyālaṅ-
kāra VI 36. For even though Jinendrabuddhi is known as the Nyāsa-
kāra par excellence, the examples attributed by Bhāmaha to the 
Nyāsakāra are not mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi in the Nyāsa under 
the Pāṇinian rules to which Bhāmaha refers. On the other hand, 
Sanskrit grammatical literature mention other Nyāsakāras than Jinen-
drabuddhi. We must therefore conlude that Bhāmaha is referring to 
one of the unknown Nyāsakāras.5  
Quotations from PVSV are printed in Roman and traced to their 
context in Dharmakīrti’s work. 
 
kim punar atrāpohamātram abhidheytvenābhihitam atha tadviśiṣṭam. 
kiṃ cātaḥ? yady anyāpohamātraṃ “svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣata” 
(PS V:1cd) iti granthavirodhaḥ, svārthād bhedenānyāpohasyāśrita-
tvāt. tathā “tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo 'rthāntaranivttyā gamyate 
(Dvādaśaśatikā),” “śabdo arthāntarnivttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān 
āhe”tyādayo (PSV V:36d) nirdeśās tadvatpakṣasya sūcakā virudh-
yante. atha tadviśiṣṭan “tenānyāpohakc chrutir” iti (PS V:11d) 
vyāhanyate. yasmād anyāpohaṃ karotīti, abhyāpayatīty arthaḥ. yathā 
nañpratiṣedhaṃ karotīty atra. na hi śabdasyānyakaraṇaṃ sambha-
vati. tadvatpakṣaś ca syād, na pakṣāntaram. tataś ca tadvatpakṣoditā 
doṣā ihāpi prasajyeran. naiṣa doṣaḥ. anyāpoha eva hi śabdārtho, na 
ca virodhaḥ. yato yo 'sau svārthaḥ sa evānyāpohakd ity atrānyā-
pohaśabdenoktaḥ. “anyāpohena bhāṣata” (PS V:1d) ity asya tu pra-
yojanam uktam. api caikabhedacodane 'py <anya>vyāvttigater6 
anvayavyatirekacodan<ay>ā vyavahārāṅgatāṃ7 śabdānāṃ darśayan 
“anyāpohena bhāṣate,” “tasya vastunaḥ kaścit bhāgo 'rthāntarani-
vttyā gamyate” (Dvādaśaśatikā), “śabdo 'rthāntaranivttiviśiṣṭān eva 
                                                 
5Cf. Introduction 5.6-8.  
6em. (cf. gźan las ldog pa rtogs pa T) : avyāvttigater Ms. 
7em. : °āṃ matāṃ Ms. 
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bhāvān āhe” tyādy8(3) (PSV V:36d) āha, na tu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvam 
(cf. PVSV 62,26-63,1, 63,9). nanu cānvayamātracodanayaiva 
vyatirekamātracodanayaiva vā śabdasya vyavahārāṅgatā bhaviṣyati. 
naitad asti. ekānvayasya parihāryābhāve niṣphalacodanatvāt tathaiva 
parihāryasya kvacit sthityabhāve, na cānvayo 'vyatireko nāpi vyatire-
ko 'nanvayaḥ (cf. PVSV 63,10-15). svārthasyaiva hi pratyāyanam 
anvayaḥ. na cāsau vyatirekam antareṇa sambhavati. svārthād arthān-
tarasyaiva vyavacchedo vyatirekaḥ. so 'pi na vinānvayenāvakalpate. 
ata eva ca śabdasya na dvau vyāpārau tadanyavyāvartanaṃ ca svārthā-
bhidhānaṃ ca svārthasya bhedarūpatvāt, tadabhidhānād eva tadanya-
vyāvttigateḥ (cf. PVSV 63,13-14). yath“āyam asya bhrāte”ty ukte 
bhrāttvasyobhayagatatvād ekasyāpi bhrāttvābhidhāne nāntarīyaka-
tvād itarasyāpi bhrāttvaṃ gamyate. tathā dvayor bhidyamānayor 
bhedasyobhayagatatvāt, ekabhedacodane 'pi nāntarīyakatvāt tadanya-
vyāvttiḥ (cf. PVSV 63,7-8). tataś ca yad ucyate: “yady arthānta-
rāpohaṃ śrutiḥ karoti tasyāḥ pratiṣedha eva caritārthatvāt svārtha-
pratyāyanāya śabdāntaram mgyatām”9 iti, tad asaṅgatam. yataḥ 
śabdaḥ svārtham eva pratyāyayati, tasmin tu pratīyamāne nāntarīya-
katvād arthāntaravyāvttir gamyata iti. tad evam apoha eva śab-
dārthaḥ, na ca kaścit virodha iti. kaḥ punar asau śabdasyārthaḥ? yo 
'sau vivakṣāyāḥ sāmānyākāraḥ. sa ca vivakṣāyām ananya10 iti vivak-
ṣāyāṃ śabdasya prāmāṇyam uktam. nanu ca sāmānyaṃ śabdārthaḥ; 
tataḥ katham buddhipratibhāsaḥ śabdasya viṣaya ucyate. sa eva khalu 
sāmānyaṃ vyavasthāpyate. kathaṃ? ihendriyālokamanaskārā ātmen-
driyamanorthasannikarṣā vā yathā asaty api sāmānye bhinnā api rūpa-
jñānam ekaṃ jananti, tathā śiṃśapādayo 'pi bhedāḥ parasparānvaye 
'pi svānubhavadvāreṇa vikalpavāsanām prabodhayantaḥ praktyaiva 
vikalpakam ekam abhinnapratibhāsaṃ jñānaṃ janayanti (cf. PVSV 
41,1-4). sā caikasādhyasādhanatayā anyavivekināṃ vikalpavāsanāyā 
api praktir11 yat tadvaśena tadutpadyamānaṃ (cf. PVSV 38,20-22) 
bhinnam eṣāṃ rūpaṃ tirodhāya pratibhāsaṃ vābhinnam ātmīyam eṣv 
adhyāropya (cf. PVV 38,18-19) bhinnān api tān abhinnān iva kenacid 
ākāreṇa darśayati. tasya yo bhinnaḥ pratibhāso bāhya ivārthakri-
yākārīva vyaktibhedānuyāyī ca bhrāntaiḥ pratipattbhir bāhyatvenā-
dhyavasitaḥ. sa bhāvanām buddhiparvartinām eva bahir iva parisphu-
ratām pratipattur abhiprāyānurodhena sāmānyaṃ vyavasthāpyate (cf. 
                                                 
8em. : āheyody Ms. 
9Cf. Kāvyālaṅkāra VI.17d: yadi gaur ity ayaṃ śabdaḥ ktārtho 'nyanirāktau, 
janako gavi gobuddher mgyatām aparo dhvaniḥ, and the parallel at TS 911, 
PVSVṬ 250,19-22.  
10ananya Ms (cf. mi 'khrul T). 
11em. : apy apraktir Ms 
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PVSV 38,25-39,1). katham idānīm anyāpohaḥ sāmānya<ṃ> śabdārtha 
ity ucyate. sa eva khalv anyāpohaḥ (cf. PVSV 39,1-2). kathaṃ? sa eva 
yāvatā bāhyānām arthāntaravyāvttir anyāpohaḥ. vyāvttir anyāpoho 
'rthāntaravyavaccheda ityādayo hi paryāyāḥ. na ca vyāvttir vyāvtti-
mato 'nyābhimatā. tataḥ katham bāhyasvalakṣaṇātmako 'nyāpoho jñā-
nākārasvabhāvaḥ syāt (cf. PVSV 39,4-5). naiṣa doṣaḥ. tattvam vicāra-
yanto vyākhyātāraḥ khalv evaṃvivekaṃ kurvanto, netare. te tu tam 
eva bauddham ākāram arthakriyāyogyam manyamānāḥ saṅketavya-
vahārakālayor dśyavikalpāv arthāv ekatvenādhyavasyanti. atas tad-
abhiprāyavaśād bāhyārthaviṣayo 'nyāpoha ity ucyate (cf. PVSV 39,5-
8). pratibhāsabhedādibhyas tu tatvacintāyāṃ vipaścito nābhedam 
anumanyante (cf. PVSV 39,9-10). kiṃ cāyam abhinnākārā buddhir 
utpadyate tasyā anyāpoha evāśraya iti (cf. PVSV 39,14-15) darśayi-
tuṃ śabdasya viṣayo 'nyāpoha ity uktam. tasya vastuṣu bhāvāt aviro-
dhāc ca, (PVSV 39,15-16) samānabuddhir hy āśrayabhāvo 'nyāpo-
hasyāviruddhaḥ. tathā hi bhedā ekakāryatayātatkāryebhyo vyāvarta-
mānāḥ svānubhavadvāreṇa vibhramaphalavāsānāṃ12 yā hetavo bha-
vantaḥ sāmānyākārānuraktām buddhiṃ janayantīti darśitam etat. atra 
sāmānyavādinaś codayanti: yady avkṣebhyo bhedo vkṣaḥ saṅketa-
kāle tasyā vkṣagrahaṇa<m a>ntareṇa tathā grahītum aśakyatvāt; 
avijñātavkṣeṇāvkṣasyāpi tadvyavacchedarūpasyāparijñānād (cf. 
PVSV 58,22-24) itaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ. ko ‘vkṣa? iti praśne prāha13 yo 
na vkṣa iti. vkṣaḥ kaḥ? yo nāvkṣa iti. tataś ca buddhāv anārūḍhe 
'rthe 'nyavyavacchedena na saṅketaḥ kartuṃ śakyata iti (cf. PVSV 
58,24-25). teṣāṃ sāmānye 'pi saṅketakaraṇe avkṣāvyavacchinnā na 
vā “yadi vyavacchinnāḥ katham prāg vkṣagrahaṇād te jñātā” (PV I 
115b2-d) na hi tadā pratipattā vkṣaṃ vetti vkṣāvkṣaparijñānāyaiva 
tadarthitayopagamāt. so 'jānānaḥ katham avkṣavyavacchedam 
pratipadyeta saṅkete. apratipattau ca (cf. PVV 59,3-9) parāvyavac-
chedena niveśitāc chabdāt tatparihāreṇa vyavahāre pravttir ayuktā, 
śiṃśapādibhedavat (cf. PVSV 59,13-14). yadavyavacchedena yatra 
saṅketitaḥ śabdaḥ, na tatra tatparihāreṇa pravartayati. tadyathā 
vkṣatve śiṃśapādibhedāvyavacchedena saṅketito vkṣaśabdo na 
tatparihāreṇa pravartayati. avkṣāvyavacchedena ca saṅketito vkṣatve 
vkṣaśabdaḥ. viruddhavyāptaḥ. syād etan, na vastusāmānyavādinā 
kasyacid vyavacchedena kiṃcid vidhīyate, kiṃ tarhy, ekam agrato 
'vasthitaṃ vastu sandarśya vkṣo 'yam iti saṅketaḥ kriyate. tathā saṅ-
ketakāle dṣṭam eva sāmānyaṃ tatsambandhinaṃ vā vyavahāre 'pi 
pratipadyata iti. asamānaḥ prasaṅga iti. nāsamāno yasmād (cf. PVSV 
                                                 
12em. : °phalāvāvāsanaṃ Ms 
13em. : prāya Ms 
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59,18-60,1) ekam pradarśyāyaṃ vkṣa iti bruvāṇo (PVSV 60,4) 'va-
dhārya vā saṅketaṃ kuryād anavadhārya vā. yady avadhāryāyam eva 
vkṣo nānya iti prāg vkṣagrahaṇam antareṇāparijñānann avkṣān 
kathaṃ tadvyavacchedam pratipadyeta saṅkete. athānavadhāryāyam 
api vkṣo 'nyo pīti. kathaṃ vyavahārakāle14 'nyaparihāreṇa15 pravar-
teta pratipatteti. sa eva doṣaḥ. na doṣaḥ, dṣṭaviparyāyasya sujñāna-
tvāt. evaṃ hi kiṃcid dṣṭavato 'nyatra tadvilakṣaṇākārām buddhim 
anubhavataḥ, tataḥ saṅketakālaghītād vastunaḥ tadviparītākāram idam 
anyad iti vaidharmyaniścayo bhavati. sa hy ayam eva vkṣa iti pra-
darśya vyutpādito yatraiva tan na paśyati tad evāvkṣaṃ svayam eva16 
pratipadyate. nedaṃ vyavacchedavādinaḥ sambhavati. ekatra dṣṭasya 
rūpasya kvacid ananvayāt pratyakṣeṇa saṅketakālaghītasyordhvam17 
apratipattiḥ satyām api pratipattau saṅketakālaghītā yā vyaktir vyak-
tyantare 'pi sa evāyam iti pratītir na syāt (cf. PVSV 60,5-13). tathā hi 
tato yathā ghaṭo vilakṣaṇas tathā palāśādibhedo 'py anvayino rūpasyā-
nabhyupagamāt. evaṃ tarhy apohavādino 'pi tulyam etat. yasmād (cf. 
PVSV 60,13) ete bhāvā bhedino 'pi pratyavamarśañānādikam ekaṃ 
kāryam praktyā kecit kurvanti nānye18 (cf. PVSV 60,16-17). tān 
dṣṭvā pratipattā ete taddhetavo nānya iti buddhyā vibhajya rāśidva-
yaṃ vyavasthāpayati. tatrāsya parasparayā eka kāryapadārthaprasūteḥ. 
abhinnārthagrāhiṇī ca tadanubhavaprabhavaprakter avyavasitabāh-
yārthasvarūpe sāmānyākāravati pratyavamarśajñāne ya ekakāryahetu-
tvena vibhaktā bāhyā ivārthakriyākāriṇa ivānvayinā kenacid rūpe-
ṇānugatā iva pratyavabhāsyante. tān avyavasitabāhyasvabhāvān prati-
pādya pratipādavikalpeṣv abhinnapratibhāsāṃs taimirikadvayadvican-
dradarśanavat. svasvapratibhāsānubhave 'py ekatvenāvyavasitān dar-
śya ete vkṣā iti kte saṅkete sa bhrāntaḥ. tatraikam ivānuyāyirūpaṃ 
dṣṭvā ataddhetutvena vibhaktān atadviparītākārān avkṣatvena sukh-
yam evādhyavasyati. na punar ekaṃ vastu tatrābhinnaṃ dśyam asti 
yasya darśanādarśanābhyām bhinnadarśane 'py eva vkṣavibhāgaṃ 
kurvīta. tasya vibhāgena daṇḍavat daṇḍinyagrahaṇāt. aghītasya cānu-
palakṣaṇāt. ākter apy ekatra dṣṭāyā anyatra tu draṣṭum aśakyatvāt. 
tadatadvator vkṣāvkṣatve vyaktir ekaiva vkṣaḥ syāt (cf. PVSV 61,3-
8). iha cāpohasvarūpavidvadbhir abhāvamātram anyāpoha ity adhyā-
ropya dūṣaṇābhidhitsayā yat paraiḥ pralapitaṃ tad anyāpohasvarū-
pasaṃvartanenaivāpaktam parākrāntaṃ ca tannirākaraṇāya mahāt-
mabhir ity alam atiprasaṅgena. 
                                                 
14em. (cf. tha sñad kyi tshe T) : vyavahāra Ms 
15em. (cf. yoṅs su spaṅs pas T) : °vyavahāreṇa Ms 
16 (10) em. (cf. raṅ ñid kyis) : ena Ms 
17 (11) em. : °uttare Ms 




Immediately after his comment on Dignāga’s criticism of the view 
that upamāna is an independent means of cognition, Jinendrabuddhi 
inserts an excursus at Ms B 241a5-242b4 on the latest developments 
in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā philosophy concerning upamāna. Jinendra-
buddhi’s sources are no longer available and the names of the 
philosophers whose views are mentioned and criticized are not known. 
As is obvious from a comparison of PSṬ, TS, and TSP, the sources 
and presumably also their authors were known to Jinendrabuddhi, 
Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla. I have traced parallels to Sanmati-
tarkaprakaraṇa. The quotations are printed in roman.  
 
Pakṣ ilas  tv āha: āgamāhitasaṃskārasmtyapekṣāt sādharmyajñānāt 
[= NV 356,5] samākhyāsambandhapratipattir upamānārtha [= NBh 
355,18-19] iti [= TSP 551,25-552,10] gaur iva gavaya ity anenā-
gamenāhito yaḥ saṃskāraḥ smtijñānahetuḥ. tasmād yā smtis tad-
apekṣāt sādharmyajñānāt, yā sāmākhyāsambandhapratipattiḥ saṃ-
jñāsaṃjñisambandhaparicchedaḥ, sa upamānasya viṣayaḥ. etad uk-
tam bhavati: prathamaṃ tāvad “gaur iva gavaya” iti śabdena paric-
chinatti, tato gavayaṃ dṣṭvā smtyapekṣāt sādharmyajñānād evaṃ 
vyavasyaty “ayaṃ sa gavaya” iti.  
etad api yadi yathāgamāt paricchinnas tathāpaśyann api paricchi-
natti. tataḥ smtir eva, na pramāṇam. ath’āyam (‘di’i sic T) <asāv>” 
iti viśeṣapratyavamarśād viśeṣeṇa pratipadyate. tato ‘numānam eva, 
<na> pramāṇāntaram. tathā hi yo gosadśaḥ, sa gavaya iti vyavasthā-
yāṃ sādśyāl liṅgād viśiṣṭā pratītiḥ. etad uktam bhavati: dśyamānaḥ 
piṇḍo dharmī; “ayaṃ gavaya” iti saṃjñā sādhyadharmaḥ; śabdānu-
bhūtapurovasthitayor yat sāmānyaṃ gogavayasādśyam, tat pakṣa-
dharmaḥ; āgamānubhūtabuddhivyavasthito gavayo dṣṭānta iti. anan-
topāyā ca samākhyāsambandhapratipattir iti. ka upamāna evānu-
rodhaḥ (ṅor dga’ ba sic T), tadyathā yas tuṅganāsaḥ, sa Caitro; yo 
‘śve, sa Maitra iti; na c’ evaṃ pramāṇam.  
 
Śabaras tv āha: upamānam api sādśyam asannikṣṭe ‘rthe buddhim 
utpādayati: yathā gavayadarśanaṃ gosmaraṇasyeti (MS I.1:5).  
tasyāpi ghītaviṣayatvāt smtyādivat pramāṇatvaṃ anupapannam19. 
syād etat, nānughītamātrasyaiva grahaṇe ‘sty upamānasya pramāṇ-
yam, kiṃ tarhi sādśyaviśiṣṭasya; na ca tat tathā pūrvaṃ ghītam; ato 
ghītaviṣayatvam asiddham iti.  
                                                 
19pramāṇatvaṃ anupapannam conj. : pramāṇyaṃ anupa Ms 
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ayuktam etat, pratyakṣata etadadhigamāt. sādśyaviśiṣṭam eva hi tat 
pūrvam api paricchinnaṃ; avaśyaṃ caitad abhyupagantavyam, anya-
thā hi pūrvaṃ gāṃ dṣṭvā paścād mahiṣam api paśyate, gavi sadśa-
buddhiḥ syāt, na ca bhavati. tasmāt sādśyaviśiṣṭam api vastu ghya-
mānaṃ nālaṃ pramāṇāntarakalpanāyeti.  
athaivam api tasyāpi kayācit mātrayā viśiṣṭasya grahaṇam iti pra-
māṇāntaratvaṃ kalpyate, pratyakṣataḥ paricchinne nīlotpaladravye 
yad uttarakālabhāvinīlotpalam iti grahaṇam, tad api nāma pramā-
ṇāntaraṃ kalpanīyam. atrāpi hi naiva tat pūrvaṃ nīlam utpalam ity 
anenākāreṇa pratyakṣataḥ paricchinnam avikalpakatvāt. syād etad, 
indriyajatvāt tasya pratyakṣa evāntarbhāvaḥ. indriyajñānam api 
vyavahārakuśalasya savikalpakas bhavati. ato ‘yam prasaṅga iti. 
ayuktam etat, samayāpekṣatvāt anyathā samayānabhijño ‘pi tathā 
paricchindyāt; na cendriyaṃ samayam apekṣate. mā bhūd vastunaḥ 
svabhāvānavasthitiḥ. tathā hi nīlotpalātmanā yad vastu vyavasthitaṃ 
tatraivecchātaḥ pītaśabdasaṃkete kaścin nīlam ity adhyavasyati, kaś-
cit pītam iti. tato na jñāyeta: “kathaṃ tadvastu vyavasthitam”? iti. na 
hi yathāvastusamayas tasyecchānn <apy?> avidhānāt, icchāyāś 
cāvastuniyatatvāt.  
kiñ ca, yadi dśyamānād anyatra parokṣe anena tat sadśam iti sā-
dśyabuddhiḥ pramāṇāntaraṃ kalpyate. dśyamānād anyatra parokṣe 
anena tat visadśam iti visadśatvadhīr api pramāṇāntaraṃ sapta-
maṃ kim iti na kalpyate.20 abhāvapramāṇābahirbhāvād iti cet. na, 
bhāvaviṣayatvād asyāḥ. syād etad, itaretarābhāvarūpatayā visadśa-
buddher yo viṣayaḥ, so bhāvaviṣaya eva. tataś cātrāvaviṣayatvam 
upapannam iti. yady evaṃ sadśabuddhiviṣaye ‘py eṣa nyāyo ‘stīti 
sadśabuddher apy abhāvapramāṇābahirbhāvaprasaṅgaḥ. atha sā-
dśyaviśeṣaṇāpekṣam aviśeṣeṇaiva dśyamānāpekṣa<ṃ> pūrvadṣṭe 
jñānam upamānam iti kalpyate. evam api Caitram paricchidya tad-
uttarakālaṃ ca tatputram avagamya evam adhyavasyati: “asya sa 
pite”ti. tatrāpi sambhavaty eva: pūrvaghīte Caitre paścād dśya-
mānaputrāpekṣaḥ pittvāvasāyaḥ. tathā sopānamālām ākrāmataḥ21 
prathamaphalakātikrame22 dvitīyaphalakaprāptāv abhikrānte phalake 
bhavati jñānaṃ “tasyās tat pūrvam” iti dśyamānaphalakāpekṣa<m>, 
                                                 
20Cf. the verse qu. STP Vol II 583,15-16: dśyāt parokṣe sādśyadhīḥ 
pramāṇāntaraṃ yadi, vaidharmyamatir apy eva pramāṇaṃ kiṃ na saptamam. 
21 Cf. STP Vol II 583, 17-18: tathā sopānamālām ākrāmataḥ prathamākrāntaṃ 
paścād ākrāntād dīrghaṃ mahad hrasvaṃ cetyādy anekaṃ pramāṇaṃ prasaktam 
iti; TSP 550,18-19: ”asmāt pūrvaṃ idaṃ paścād dīrghaṃ hrasvaṃ idaṃ mahat, ity 
evamādivijñāne pramā ’niṣṭā prasajyate,” iti vaktavyam. 
22phalakātikrame conj. : phalaka ti krame Ms 
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Die vorliegende Dissertation präsentiert eine annotierte englische 
Übersetzung des fünften Kapitels der Pramāṇasamuccayavtti (PSV 
V) des buddhistischen Philosophen Dignāga (6. Jh. n.u.Z.), in dem 
Dignāga seine Sprachphilosophie (apoha-Theorie) darlegt, die den 
philosophischen Diskurs in Indien nach Dignāga für Jahrhunderte 
beeinflußt hat. Die originale Sanskritfassung des Textes ist nicht mehr 
erhalten. Abgesehen von einigen Fragmenten in Sanskrit aus der nach-
Dignāgeischen philosophischen Literatur stehen als einzige 
vollständige Quellen für die Untersuchung von Dignāgas apoha-Lehre 
zwei schlechte, im tibetischen Kanon überlieferte Übersetzungen des 
Textes zur Verfügung. Die englische Übersetzung der PSV V beruht 
daher auf diesen beiden tibetischen Übersetzungen und den in Hattori 
1982 publizierten Sanskrit Fragmenten, sowie weiteren Fragmenten, 
die ich in anderen Quellen gefunden habe.  
 
Die Übersetzung wird durch eine kritische Edition großer Teile des 
entsprechenden fünften Kapitels des einzigen erhaltenen Sanskrit 
Manuskripts der Viśālāmalavatīṭīkā (PSṬ V) ergänzt und gestützt. 
Dieser Jinendrabuddhi, einem indischen Grammatiker und 
Philosophen der Mitte des achten Jh., zugeschriebene Kommentar ist 
der einzige erhaltene Kommentar zur PSV und daher eine wichtige 
Quelle für Informationen zum philosophischen Kontext, in dem 
Dignāga sein Werk verfaßt hat. 
 
Da die Schwierigkeiten für das sprachliche und inhaltliche 
Verständnis der tibetischen Übersetzungen fast unüberwindbar sind, 
habe ich das Zeugnis des in die PSṬ V eingebetteten Sanskrit-
Wortlauts dazu genutzt, viele der Abschnitte der PSV V in das 
Sanskrit zu rekonstruieren, soweit diese Zeugnisse sich mit den 
tibetischen Übersetzungen decken. Diese Rekonstruktionen beruhen 
auf den Zitaten der PSV V in der PSṬ und den Paraphrasen von 
Dignāgas originalem Sanskrit-Text durch Jinendrabuddhi.  
Da Dignāgas apoha-Theorie eine andauernde Debatte unter den 
Zeitgenossen und folgenden Generationen buddhistischer und nicht-
buddhistischer indischer Philosophen initiiert hat und weiterhin unter 
seinen modernen westlichen Interpreten Fragen und Probleme in 
bezug auf Bedeutung und Zweck seiner zentralen Theorie auslöst, 
bietet die vorgelegte Arbeit auch eine neuerliche Untersuchung der 
grundlegenden Voraussetzungen dieser Theorie, wie sie in PSV V 
dargelegt worden ist. 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation is centred on presenting an annotated English 
translation of chapter five of the seventh century A.D. Buddhist 
philosopher Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavtti (hence PSV V), in 
which Dignāga expounds his philosophy of language known as the 
apoha theory, which affected post-Dignāga philosophical debate in 
India for centuries. The original Sanskrit version of Pramāṇa-
samuccayavtti (hence PSV) is no longer extant. Except for a few 
Sanskrit fragments traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature, the 
only comprehensive sources available for the study of Dignāga’s 
apoha doctrine are two mediocre Tibetan translations of PSV included 
in the Tibetan bsTan ’gyur and a small number of Sanskrit fragments 
traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature. Thus, the English 
translation of PSV V is based upon its two Tibetan versions and 
Sanskrit fragments published in Hattori 1982, including Sanskrit 
fragments I have traced to other sources. The translation is 
accompanied and supported by a critical edition of the bulk of the 
corresponding fifth chapter of the single Sanskrit manuscript of 
Viśālāmalavatī ṭīkā (hence PSṬ V). This unique tīkā attributed to 
Jinendrabuddhi, a central eighth century A.D. Indian grammarian and 
philosopher, is the only extant commentary on PSV and thus an 
important source of information on the philosophical context in which 
Dignāga propagated his work. As the difficulties of construing the 
Tibetan translations are almost insuperable, I have taken advantage of 
the Sanskrit evidence embodied in PSṬ V and restored into Sanskrit 
many paragraphs PSV V, if the Sanskrit evidence is matched by the 
Tibetan translations. The restorations are established on the basis of 
quotations from PSV V presented in PSṬ and Jinendrabuddhi’s 
paraphrases of Dignāga’s original Sanskrit presentation. Since 
Dignāga’s “apoha theory” generated an incessant debate among 
contemporary and subsequent generations of Buddhist and non-
Buddhist Indian philosophers, and continues to elicit questions among 
Dignāga’s modern Western interpreters about the meaning and 
purpose of anyāpoha, this work includes a fresh study of its basic 
presuppositions as presented in PSV V. 
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